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Abstract 
This dissertation is a transnational history of twentieth-century anti-colonial 
nationalism. It focuses specifically on the connections between the dissenting British left 
and Iraqi nationalists during the First World War and its aftermath. Based on extensive 
archival research in English and Arabic of official and unofficial sources in London and 
Syria, I show how British and Iraqi anti-colonial activists simultaneously sought to 
democratize British imperial policy-making in the metropole and periphery of the 
Empire. From its early hours, Liberal and Labour leaders opposed to the First World 
War campaigned tirelessly for an internationalist settlement without annexations as the 
only guarantee of lasting peace for the postwar world. Colonial 'national awakenings' in 
Egypt, India, and Iraq, they argued, both challenged the legitimacy of British 'imperial 
democracy' and heralded a new era of international democracy deserving British 
support. Iraq was, for them, a test case for a nobler approach to maintaining international 
security through nurturing, rather than subjugating, national sovereignty. The British 
government's unwillingness to relinquish Iraq after the war was taken as evidence of its 
unfitness to govern free peoples either at home or abroad. Through my research, I am 
able to show how the so-called 'extreme nationalist' editors of Iraq's daily press followed 
the development of these arguments globally and adapted them in their attempt to 
reorient the development of their state around Iraqi national interests. Playing upon the 
sensitivity of British administrators to domestic and international public opinion, Iraqi 
nationalists were able to keep the development of their political institutions on a far more 
democratic course than either the British or Arab elite desired. Thus I show how British 
and Iraqi figures created a network of dissent that sought to undermine the foundations of 
iii 
British imperial rule in Iraq and realize the idea of national sovereignty as the capstone of 
international law, to the detriment of imperial legitimacy globally. This study, I believe, 
demonstrates how transnational approaches can provide us with a richer understanding of 
the role of popular nationalism in the birth of the international world in the early 
twentieth century. 
This dissertation is dedicated to my loving wife, 
Stephanie DiCapua Getman. 
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Introduction 
In August of 1914, British subjects from every corner of the Empire 'rushed to the 
colours' in support of Liberal Prime Minister H. H. Asquith's defensive war for the 
'rights of small nations' against the forces of global domination.! Despite Asquith's 
repeated assurances that the British government had no territorial ambitions of its own in 
entering the fray, however, by 1920, with four ofthe world's great imperial powers left 
shattered by the war, British territorial influence would expand to include nearly a quarter 
of the globe. Moreover, within a few years of the armistice, British troops would be 
asked to turn their arms on nationalist risings, largely inspired by the very principles 
Asquith had asked them to go to war to uphold, in Ireland, Egypt, India and the newly 
conquered territory of Iraq. The discrepancy between the promise of self-determination 
the war seemed to herald and the persistence or even the introduction of British rule in its 
wake was not lost on subject peoples who, in many cases, had fought shoulder to 
shoulder with British forces in what they believed was a war for their own national 
liberation.2 Girded by a common sense of hope and betrayal, nationalist movements 
under British administrations throughout the Empire and beyond struggled into the 
interwar period to force the British government into conformity with the internationalist 
principles the war had been fought to defend and the League of Nations had been erected 
to codify and protect? The sense of betrayed loyalties and nationalist aspirations was not 
limited, however, to the imperial periphery alone. 
1 The First World War was by far the most popular war in British national and imperial history. For a 
discussion of the domestic support for the war, see David Silbey, The British Working Class and 
Enthusiasm/or War. 1914-1916 (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2005). For a discussion of the 
Commonwealth's involvement, see W. David McIntyre, The Commonwealth 0/ Nations: Origins and 
Impact. 1869-1971, vol. 9, Europe and the World in the Age of Expansion (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 181-183. For a discussion of the extensive involvement of Indian troops, see 
Hugh Tinker, "India in the First World War and After," Journal o/Contemporary History 3, no. 4 (1968): 
89-107. 
2 Erez Manela has offered perhaps the most complete discussion of the hopes for self-determination in 
occupied territories and their disappointment in Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination 
and the International Origins 0/ Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
3 For an influential discussion of nationalist movements in the British Empire after the First World War as a 
general problem for British imperial policy makers, see John Gallagher, "Nationalisms and the Crisis of 
Empire, 1919-1922," Modern Asian Studies 15, no. 3 (1981): 355-368. 
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From the hour of its outbreak, a handful of opponents to entering the Great War 
from the Labour and Liberal camps decried Asquith's explanations for the war as a gross 
deception designed to veil the fact that British imperial interests had, in fact, been the 
mainspring of the conflict. Moreover, if permitted to do so, the British government 
would surely use the settlement of the war to ensure its own global dominance in its 
wake.4 Even as the Asquith administration was preparing the diplomatic and 
administrative framework for Britain's postwar 'Empire in the East' in the fall of 1914, 
the politicians and propagandists writing for the Union of Democratic Control and the 
Independent Labour Party, the' sister centers of dissent' during the war, were laying the 
groundwork for a popular movement in Britain to fully democratize, root and branch, not 
only the British political system, but the entire inter-imperial system of European 
oligarchy from metropoles to periphery beginning with the British Empire. 
As the persistence of British imperial rule through to the 1960's attests, neither of 
the related zeitgeists of anti-colonial nationalism in the 'east' or anti-imperial 
internationalism in the 'west' would fully achieve the ends the grassroots activists 
responsible for generating them had envisioned. Nevertheless, over the course of the war 
and into the interwar period, organized opposition to the return to imperial 'business as 
usual' emanating primarily out of the Labour movement in Britain, the "classical centres 
of disaffection" in Ireland, India, and Egypt,5 and the ambiguously defined region of 
British-occupied Iraq posed a collective problem for British policy makers, if not a 
conspiratorial network of dissent, that threatened to undermine not only the security of 
British administrations abroad, but the principle of 'imperial democracy' itself as a 
legitimate form of government in the postwar world.6 Although this dissertation does not 
4 The most complete overview of organized British opposition to the First World War is Keith Robbins' 
The Abolition of War: The "Peace Movement" in Britain, 1914-1919 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 
1976). A more detailed examination of the foremost political opponents to the Asquith and Lloyd George 
administrations during the war emanating out of the Labour and Liberal Parties can be found in Marvin 
Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics During the First World War (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971); Sally Harris, Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of Democratic 
Control, 1914-1918 (Hull]: University of Hull Press, 1996); Helena Maria Swanwick, Builders of Peace: 
Being Ten Years' History of the Union of Democratic Control (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 
1973); and Robert Edward Dowse, Left in the Centre; the Independent Labour Party, 1893-1940 (London: 
Longmans, 1966). 
5 The words are John Gallagher's, Gallagher, "Nationalisms," p. 355. 
6 For a rare discussion of official conspiracy thinking about domestic and imperial anti-colonial nationalist 
movements in the British government, see John Fisher, "Major Norman Bray and Eastern Unrest in the 
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argue for the existence of an international or even an intra-imperial conspiracy to take 
down the British Empire, it does attempt to illustrate how anti-colonial nationalism in the 
metropole and periphery of the British Empire acted collectively on British imperial 
policy making and to argue the benefits of a transnational approach to the study of both 
as a unified category of inquiry. 
For the 'dissenting left' in Britain, the postwar persistence of imperial domination 
in the possessions of Ireland, India, and Egypt and the introduction of it in Iraq were the 
greatest evidence that Britain herself was the true imperial hegemon behind the Great 
War for global domination. Every act of anti-colonial resistance in those regions, I argue, 
gave dissenting writers grist for the mill of critique seeking to cast Tories and Whigs 
alike as the parties of imperial conquest and war and fuel for the propaganda machine 
reinventing British Labour as the party of a dawning age of internationalism and global 
democracy. In their turn, Ireland, India, Egypt, and Iraq all took full advantage of the 
language of internationalism that dissenting writers had appropriated from Asquith's calls 
to arms and transformed into a movement for a League of Nations in building cases for 
their own independence over the interwar period? The geographical point over which the 
forces of anti-colonial nationalism at the metropole and periphery of the British Empire 
would have the most powerful collective and cumulative influence, however, was in 
British occupied Iraq. 
Although direct collaboration or even communication between the dissenting left 
in Britain and the nationalist movements in the periphery was limited at best and almost 
non-existent in Iraq, the impact of the collective efforts of anti-colonial nationalist 
movements throughout the Empire on British policy and political development in Iraq 
would be far more profound and immediate than in any other region in the Empire. As 
the flagship nation-making project of the League of Nations from 1920, every step the 
Anglo-Iraqi condominium took along the road to full self-determination would, in its turn, 
British Empire in the Aftermath of World War I," Archives 27, no. 106 (2002): 39-56 and Priya Satia, Spies 
in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Chapter 6. 
7 See John Horne, "James Connolly and the Great Divide: Ireland, Europe, and the First World War," 
Saothar 31 (2006): 75-83; Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914-1921 (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1971); Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India and the 
Arabs, 1914-1921 (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1971). 
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serve as an irrevocable benchmark for the devolution of British imperial power into the 
hands of subject peoples globally. At every stage of Iraqi national development under 
British auspices, from her occupation in 1914 to her emancipation from British rule in 
1932, representatives of the dissenting left and, later, two Labour governments under 
their leadership, supported Iraqi demands for self-determination in principled opposition 
to the stifling of national progress in the name of imperial interests everywhere. It is the 
overarching thesis of this dissertation that the collective effort of the dissenting left and 
Iraqi anti-colonial nationalists to influence the direction of the Anglo-Iraqi nation-making 
project over the course of the First World War and interwar period served as a catalyst for 
the birth or, at the very least, the conception of the post-colonial nation-state of Iraq as 
well as the post-imperial nation-state of Britain in approximately the same historical 
moment. 
At its heart, this dissertation is a transnational history of anti-colonial nationalism 
and the origins of British decolonization in the twentieth-century. Its central argument, 
however, is not that anti-colonial nationalism in either the metropole or periphery of the 
British Empire was the foremost cause of the Empire's decline and disintegration, though 
both clearly contributed to that end. Rather, I argue that, in the context of the world's 
first global inter-imperial war, an efflorescence of anti-colonial nationalism at the 
metropole of the British Empire exponentially amplified the pressure anti-colonial 
nationalism in the periphery immediately after the war could bring to bear on the British 
government in a mutually reciprocating way. As a result, the progress of colonial and 
metropolitan nationalist movements in the British Empire became inextricably linked for 
the first time in its history. Although the path toward decolonization would proceed in fits 
and starts for the duration of the century, it was no coincidence that a Labour government 
would playas crucial a role in the dismantling of the Empire in the 1940' s and then again 
in the 1960's as it had at the beginning of that process in midwifing the first 
internationally sanctioned imperial nation-making project in Iraq during the war and the 
final emancipation of Iraq from British rule in 1932. 
This dissertation is organized into three sections framed around the path of the 
Anglo-Iraqi nation-making project from its genesis in British public debate over the 
'ultimate destination' of territories occupied during the First World War, to its 
codification as a mandate under the League of Nations, and finally to its implementation 
over the interwar period and culmination in Iraqi independence in 1932. The first three-
chapter section takes a closer look at the role imperial issues played in the Labour 
movement's eclipse of Liberalism as the main party of opposition over the course of the 
war and its implications for British foreign and imperial policies during the war and its 
immediate wake especially as they pertained to the occupation of Iraq. 
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There is little question for historians about whether the First World War saw a sea 
change for British politics in Labour's favor 8 or that intra-imperial relations had been 
transformed so dramatically in the immediate wake of the war as to constitute a 'Third 
British Empire' characterized 'informal,' if not entirely consensual, imperial rule.9 
Although Labour's traditional opposition to the rise of 'new imperialism' in Britain in the 
late nineteenth-century and the critique of 'imperial democracy' produced by its leaders 
has been well documented,JO it is the general consensus of historians interested in the 
Labour movement, British anti-colonialism, and decolonization that Labour attitudes 
about the Empire before the Second World War were largely irrelevant to the course of 
imperial policy, largely because imperial policy was somewhat irrelevant to the Labour 
8 For an excellent survey of the many arguments about the decline of Liberalism and rise of Labour, see 
Keith Laybourn, "The Rise of Labour and the Decline of Liberalism: The State of the Debate," History 80, 
no. 259 (1995): pp. 207-226. 
9 The phrase appeared earliest in Alfred Eckhard Zimmern, The Third British Empire, Being a Course of 
Lectures Delivered at Columbia University, New York, by Alfred Zimmern (London: H. Milford, 1926), pp. 
1-45. For a discussion of the impact of the war on Commonwealth relations, see A. G. Hopkins, 
"Rethinking Decolonization," Past & Present 200, no. 1 (2008): 211-247 and Mcintyre, Commonwealth of 
Nations. For a discussion on the impact on colonial relations, see John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 
"The Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic History Review Vol. 6, no. 1 (1953); and Gallagher, 
"Nationalisms ." 
10 For a classic overview of British attitudes toward the Empire focusing on the publications of individuals, 
see A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power (London: Macmillan and 
Co. LTD, 1959). Bernard Porter offers an account more inclusive of social and political contexts in 
Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895-1914 (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1968) and Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and 
Culture in Britain (Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Although Partha 
Gupta's study of Labour's interest in India broke ground in excavating Labour's interest in colonial 
independence struggles, she concludes, with Howe, that Labour invariably compromised its stand on 
colonial independence over issues of domestic and economic import during this period. Partha Sarathi 
Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964 (New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, 1975), p. 132. 
movement.J1 At most, it has been argued, Labour contributed only indirectly to the 
curtailment of imperial maneuver during the war by spearheading the movement for a 
League of Nations in Britain, though driven by internationalist ideals, rather than anti-
imperial designs.12 
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This first three chapters of this study challenge these assumptions with evidence 
drawn from the official records and documents, annual reports, periodicals, propaganda, 
and other related materials emanating out of various Labour organizations affiliated with 
the Independent Labour Party (lLP) , the traditional left wing of the British Labour 
movement, and the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), a Liberal-led pressure group 
established at the outbreak of the war. I supplement these materials with publications and 
propaganda representing alternative and mainstream views of the war and imperial policy 
as well as with debates over these issues in the British Parliament. Finally, I excavate 
both the progress of imperial policy itself and the official mind of the government about 
its opposition from a variety of official documents of the British Cabinet and the Foreign 
and Colonial Offices. 
11 Although Stephen Howe dedicates a chapter in his book to pre-Second World War anti-colonialism in 
Britain, he identifies the 1930's as a turning point in Labour thinking, noting that, before then, Labour was 
"primarily if not exclusively concerned with domestic problems." Stephen Howe, Anti-Colonialism in 
British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire, 1939-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 45. Also 
see John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 1-23; 
Bernard Porter has argued that what attention Labour leaders did give to imperial issues was mostly an 
extension of existing anti-capitalist attitudes, limited to a critique of the function of subject peoples as 
exploitable workers and culminating in a socialist notion of a 'moral imperialism.' Bernard Porter, Critics 
of Empire, pp. 124-133 and 185-6; Also see Brock Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World 
War Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 21-25,7-9, and 40-44. 
12 For Labour's contribution to the League of Nations movement in Great Britain, see Henry R. Winkler, 
The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain: 1914-1919 (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 
1952); Kenneth J Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 1914-1918 (Cambridge [Eng.]: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976); For a discussion favoring Labour's role in pressuring the Lloyd George 
administration into joining the league, see George W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the 
League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914-1919, Supplementary Volumes 
to the Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978) and Leslie A. 
Hammond, The British Progressive Contribution to the League of Nations Ideas, Dissertation (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh, 2001). For Labour's disappointment with the League, see Lucian M Ashworth, 
International Relations and the Labour Party: Intellectuals and Policy Making from 1918-1945 (London; 
New York, 2007), Chapters 1 and 2; For a recent work challenging the influence of the British left on 
Lloyd George's attitude toward the League, see Peter J Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace: The League of 
Nations in British Policy, 1914-1925 (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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Others historians have shown that the ILP and UDC13 provided the main conduits 
for drawing disaffected Liberal and Labour minded Britons into the Labour movement 
during the war as well as the leadership nucleus and political program for the post-war 
Labour Party.14 In the first chapter, I illustrate that the UDC and ILP's campaign to 
reinvent British Labour as a viable leadership alternative clearly reflected the legacy of 
imperial critique produced by its leaders over decades prior. It was the rise of the 'new 
imperialism' in the late nineteenth century, they argued, that had led to the corruption, 
perhaps deliberately, of an essential political identification with the principles of 
democracy and nationality in Britain and, thus, the collapse of Britain's democratic civic 
and political identity. As a result, an 'Egyptian temple' of ruling class policy makers had 
been permitted to doom the British to endless war in the name of imperial power without 
a whisper of popular dissent, or even awareness, from a people increasingly accustomed 
to an anti-democratic political life. I argue that Asquith's presentation of an inter-
imperial war of conquest as a war of liberation presented an opportunity for dissenting 
leaders to use the transfer of territory that would inevitably accompany an Allied victory 
as a means of discrediting the government as having lied to the British people about its 
aims and, thus, revealing its disregard for democracy in principle, be it at home or abroad. 
The second chapter describes a parallel development over the first half of the war 
of two competing ideas about the role of the British Empire in the postwar world. An 
examination of official government documents pertaining to the occupation of Iraq in the 
early hours of the war reveal a British government reluctant to expand its direct 
responsibilities in the region, but also keenly aware of the opportunity, if not the 
necessity, of staking its claim to dominance in the Persian Gulf at that precise historical 
13 The most recent work on the UDC is Sally Harris' Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union 
of Democratic Control, 1914-1918 (Hull]: University of Hull Press, 1996. The most comprehensive history 
of the movement remains, however, Marvin Swartz's The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics 
During the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). There are surprisingly few studies dedicated 
to the ILP during this period, the two most comprehensive being Helena Maria Swanwick, Builders of 
Peace: Being Ten Years' History of the Union of Democratic Control (New York and London: Garland 
Publishing, 1973); and Robert Edward Dowse, Left in the Centre; the Independent Labour Party. 1893-
1940 (London: Longmans, 1966). 
14 For a study of the influx of disaffected Liberals into the Labour movement through the UDC and the ILP 
during this period, see Catherine Ann Cline, Recruits to Labour: The British Labour Party. 1914-1931 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963). Also see footnote 11 above. 
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moment.15 Even as British administrators set about the construction of 'New India' in 
Iraq and British diplomats secretly settled their claims to it, reports of the occupation of 
Iraq were characterized by the language of liberation. One of the key advantages of 
presenting the British Empire as a force for liberation, rather than occupation or, worse, 
exploitation, I argue, was that it answered directly to the alternative vision of the Empire 
being presented by dissenting propagandists.16 UDC and ILP writers, I show, also 
attempted a reimagining of the British Empire as a postwar force for liberation, but on the 
basis that the prevailing legacy of British 'imperial democracy' to date had been a global 
stifling of national progress and an endless series of inter-imperial wars. Contrary to 
Asquith's conception of the British Empire as the most promising force for making the 
world safe for democracy, dissenting writers argued that 'imperial democracy' was 
national democracy's clearest antithesis. In addition to proliferating the subjugation of 
national aspirations, imperial expansion also necessitated the militarization of British 
society to keep down the natives and fend off their rivals. The choice before the British 
people was to permit their government to restart the cycle of war by annexing its most 
recent spoils or transform Great Britain into a force for dismantling the whole system of 
subject peoples at the heart of inter-imperial war by beginning the emancipation of its 
own possessions and erecting a League of Nations to guide that process globally. 
The third chapter of this dissertation examines the efforts of UDC and ILP leaders 
to translate a series of events that seemed to vindicate their arguments about the war and 
imperial democracy into political capital for the Labour movement. In so doing, I make 
an argument for a far more aggressive and influential role of the dissenting left in 
15 The most complete discussion of the occupation of Mesopotamia as a matter of British policy can be 
found in Paul K. Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission 
(Cranbury: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press: Associated University Presses, 1994). For a discussion of 
the occupation as it was viewed by Mesopotamian Arabs, see Ghassan R Atiyyah, Iraq 1908-1921 A 
Political Study (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1973). Among the studies of the 
mandate period in Iraq as a whole, the most comprehensive works remain the 1937 classic Philip Willard 
Ireland, 'Iraq: A Study in Political Development (London: Kegan Paul, Origional Publication in 1937) and 
the 1976 update Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq 1914-1932 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976). For a more recent 
consideration of the mandate in relation to later Iraqi socio-political development, see Toby Dodge, 
Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Colombia University 
Press, 2003). 
16 Priya Satia has argued that representing the liberation of Iraq worked as a kind of imperial redemption on 
a deeper psychological level for Britons and their leaders, see Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War 
and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), Chapter 5. 
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bringing about the demise of British Liberalism and Lloyd George's acquiescence to an 
internationalist peace as well as the place of imperial issues in their political agenda.17 
With the advent of conscription and Lloyd George's declaration that he intended to fight 
the war to the 'knock-out blow' in 1916, UDC and ILP writers warned their readers that 
the public transition from a defensive war to a war for global domination was underway 
and would mean the collapse of the democracy movement in Britain for generations even 
in the best case of a British victory .18 With the fall of Asquith to Lloyd George that 
December, they argued, that transformation had been completed. 
The demand for a negotiated peace that dissenting propagandists and politicians 
had been making from the beginning of the war was given a tremendous fillip, however, 
with the outspoken support of Woodrow Wilson over 1916 and into 1917, casting Lloyd 
George's intransigence in an increasingly suspicious light.19 Lloyd George's argument 
that only a military victory would bring a definitive end to German ambitions for global 
domination was significantly undermined in the wake of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution 
in Russia and the revelation of secret Allied agreements dating back to 1915 to divide and 
annex the occupied territories of the Ottoman Empire at wars end.20 The fact that the 
British had already effectively occupied the majority of the territories involved and begun 
the process of administrating it was particularly damning evidence in the hands of the 
dissenting left. As my examination of UDC and ILP shows, dissenting writers seized 
17 In both Swartz and Harris, the fall of the Asquith administration and the rise of Lloyd George are 
represented as something that happens to the UDC and the ILP, for better or worse, and not as something 
that they themselves believed they had contributed to. See Swartz, Chapter 7 and 8 and Harris, Chapter 4. 
For a discussion of the gravitation of the Lloyd George administration toward the League idea and an 
internationalist peace that privileges the role of internationalist 'idealists' on the British left, see Henry R. 
Winkler, League of Nations Movement and Egerton, Creation of the League of Nations. For more recent 
work arguing, against Winkler and Egerton, that Lloyd George was in support of a League idea based on 
international security from the beginning of his administration, see Peter J Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace: 
The League of Nations in British Policy, 1914-1925 (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
18 Perhaps the most complete discussion of conscription and British reactions to it along the lines 
mentioned above is in R. J. Q. Adams and Philip P. Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 
1900-18 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987). 
19 For a rare discussion of the role dissenting thinkers had in inspiring Wilson's thought on an 
internationalist settlement, see Laurence W. Martin, Peace without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the 
British Liberals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958). 
20 For the impact of the Russian Revolution on British politics, see Stephen Richards Graubard, British 
Labour and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1924, Harvard historical monographs 30 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1956) and Gerhard Schulz, Revolutions and peace treaties, 1917-1920; (London: 
Methuen, 1972). 
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upon the revelation as the clearest evidence that Asquith and Lloyd George after him had 
intended to use the war as an opportunity to shore up British global domination from the 
very beginning, in spite of the cost to the British nation and the principles of nationality 
and democracy. When Lloyd George persisted in refusing to either commit to an 
internationalist peace or openly declare his imperial ambitions, the Parliamentary Labour 
Party independently announced its support for a peace without annexations or 
indemnities in the fall of 1917, shifting the mass of the Labour movement definitively 
into line with the UDC and ILP's peace agenda. Accordingly, dissenting leaders 
celebrated Lloyd George's announcement of his acceptance in principle of an 
internationalist peace and his recognition of British occupied Iraq's right to her own 
'separate national condition' in January 1918 as a victory for the Labour movement as a 
whole, but also as an acknowledgement of its legitimacy as viable party of opposition and 
a vindication of its ideals for the postwar British Empire. 
The second section of this dissertation considers the role that British public 
opinion and Arab nationalism played in the planning and codification of the Lloyd 
George administration's 'mandate solution' to the problem of keeping control of British 
occupied Iraq after the war.21 Generally viewed as a concession of appearances to 
Woodrow Wilson's vision for the League of Nations, the British government's 
designation of Iraq as deserving of independence, but dependent upon a prolonged period 
of British 'tutelage' to attain it was an almost archetypical representation of the postwar 
transition to 'indirect imperialism. ,22 Through an examination of the official records of 
the British Cabinet, the reports of various imperial administrations in Foreign and 
Colonial Office records, Parliamentary debates, League of Nations documents, dissenting 
21 The mandate system as a system has not been a popular subject of study for some time. For an early 
history of the mandate idea and its implantation at the League, see Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the 
League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). For a discussion of the official mind of 
the government on the mandates, see Wm. Roger Louis, "The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the 
Mandates System, 1919-1922," International Organization Vol. 23, No.1 (Winter 1969): 73-96. 
22 Toby Dodge makes this argument specifically in Toby Dodge, "Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous 
State-Building in Historical Perspective," in From Nation-Building to State-Building, ed. Mark T. Berger 
(London: Routledge, 2008). Also, see Egerton, Creation of the League of Nations, Chapter 6; G. H. 
Bennet, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-1924 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1995), Chapter 6; and Peter J Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy, 
1914-1925 (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter 1. 
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propaganda and the personal accounts of Arab representatives at the League, I argue, that 
the advent of the mandate in Iraq was as much a testament to the British government's 
new susceptibility to public opinion as it was to the persistence of British imperial 
influence and power in the postwar world. 
Although the mandate system was' invented' by a British imperial administrato~ 
as a means of preserving imperial influence through the fa~ade of indigenous self-
government, it mirrored the very role envisioned for the League of Nations by dissenting 
writers as a means of midwifing the end of the inter-imperial system.24 Immediately 
following Lloyd George's recognition of Iraq's provisional independence in 1918, policy 
planners scrambled to assemble a 'British case' for postwar control in Iraq with the 
understanding that, although public opinion had made annexation impossible, 
relinquishing control of Iraq could very well spell the end of Britain's eastern empire. 
The solution Britain's most seasoned imperial administrators arrived at in the spring of 
1918 wa~ to find sufficiently legitimate Arab leader and convince him to declare before 
the League of Nations and the world that a temporary period of indirect British rule was 
precisely what he and Arab peoples everywhere most desired. To obtain such a 
spokesman, British officials made unprecedented concessions of sovereignty on paper, 
raising the hopes of Arabs and dissenting propagandists alike that the transition from an 
inter-imperial to an international world was, in fact, beginning. 
Although such efforts succeeded in ferrying the Empire through the troubled 
waters of the internationalist peace, British and Arab public opinion was not so easily 
satisfied. In response to Lloyd George's appointment of Great Britain as the mandatory 
power in Iraq without reference to either Iraqi or British opinion, dissenting leaders, now 
at the helm of the Labour Party itself, decried the mandates as a victor's peace and the 
realization of the Secret Treaties of 1915. Moreover, at the Second Socialist International 
in 1920, Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald declared his Party's commitment to applying 
23 See Jan Christiaan Smuts, The League of Nations; a Practical Suggestion (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1918). 
24 For Labour's conception of a mandate idea, see Henry R. Winkler, League of Nations Movement, Chapter 
8.; H. R. G. Greaves, The League Committees and World Order; a Study of the Permanent Expert 
Committees of the League of Nations as an Instrument of International Government (London, Oxford 
University Press: H. Milford, 1931); Lucian M. Ashworth, International Relations and the Labour Party: 
Intellectuals and Policy Making from 1918-1945 (London; New York, 2007), Chapter 2. 
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the principle underlying the mandate system to all British possessions. As for the Iraqi 
Arabs, the announcement of the mandate in 1920 sparked a region-wide revolt, spumed 
largely by the nationalist propaganda of Britain's own Arab spokesman, Faysal bin 
Husayn, that would take months and millions in sterling to violently put down.25 Labour 
propagandists took full advantage of the 1920 rising in portraying the Lloyd George 
administration as hopelessly archaic in its anti-democratic imperialist ambitions and the 
Labour Party as the only legitimate alternative government in the dawning age of 
internationalism. 
The third section of this dissertation considers the progress of the Anglo-Iraqi 
nation-making project from the establishment of the Iraqi Council of State in 1920 to 
Iraqi emancipation from British rule and admission to the League of Nations in 1932.26 
With very few exceptions, the story of the mandate period in Iraq has been represented as 
a contest of wills between the dynastic or nationalistic aspirations of Iraq's first King, 
Faysal bin Husayn, and the efforts of a series of British High Commissioners to build into 
the very infrastructure of the Iraqi state the mechanisms of indirect British control?7 This 
study approaches the Iraqi mandate, rather, as a political space opened up by grassroots 
anti-colonial nationalist movements in Britain and Iraq and in which those movements 
exhibited a significant degree of influence on what sort of state British administrators and 
their Arab clients were able to impose on the Iraqi people. In addition to all of the 
sources mentioned for previous sections, the final three chapters draw from the official 
records of Britain's Baghdad Residency, intelligence summaries from British Political 
Officers stationed throughout Iraq, and selections from the Iraqi daily press collected in 
supplementary reports by the Baghdad Residency. 
The fifth chapter focuses primarily on Iraqi and British reactions to the 1920 
rising and the early stages of implementing the' Arab Far;ade' of self-government in Iraq. 
25 For the most complete consideration of Iraqi reactions to the occupation and the mandate, see Ghassan R 
Atiyyah, Iraq 1908-1921 A Political Study (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1973). 
26 Among the studies of the mandate period in Iraq as a whole, the most comprehensive works remain the 
classic works by Ireland and Sluglett. For a more recent consideration of the mandate in relation to later 
Iraqi socio-political development, see Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a 
History Denied (New York: Colombia University Press, 2003). 
27 The most important exception is the recent work by Orit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture 
in Hashemite Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-87. 
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Although the Iraqi press has occupied a remarkably small place in the historiography, 
through an examination of press supplements included in the weekly intelligence reports 
produced by British administrators out of the Baghdad Residency, I demonstrate that the 
Iraqi newspaper editors and journalists played a crucial role in mobilizing Iraqi public 
opinion about the mandate and guiding it into a formidable popular political movement 
that would have a significant influence on the progress of the Iraqi state?S 
From the earliest publications after the 1920 rising, I illustrate a pervasive 
conviction among Iraqi newspaper editors and journalists that the decision of the British 
Government to rule Iraq through the guise of a mandate was a clear indication of the 
weakness of imperial power in what they identified as a dawning age of national 
awakening among imperial citizens and subject peoples the world over. Moreover, Iraqi 
editors argued, as the 1920 rising demonstrated and the immediate replacement of an 
openly colonial administration with an Iraqi Council of State in its wake confirmed, the 
Iraqi people had forcibly established themselves at the forefront of that global struggle 
for emancipation. Casting themselves as the catalyst for Iraq's still nascent literary and 
political culture, as well as its watchdog, the so-called 'extreme nationalist' Iraqi press 
immediately undertook the task of educating Iraqis about the principles of democracy, 
constitutionalism, and internationalism that defined modern global political society and 
encouraging them to nurture Iraqi political life with their voices and, when the time came, 
with their votes?9 
Although policy planners had indeed already been committed to erecting an Arab 
Fa~ade in Iraq before the 1920 rising,30 I argue that the fervor raised in its wake by 
Labour propagandists amplified its effect on the Lloyd George administration. 
Accordingly, plans to install a provisional government, arrange for the 'election' of 
Faysal as head of state, and augment the mandate with an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty were 
28 The Iraqi press appears in most studies of the mandate period, though usually in a very peripheral role as 
a reflection of popular dissatisfaction with British rule. Perhaps the most extensive discussion of the press 
in the classic works mentioned above is Ireland's 'Iraq. Grit Bashkin has recently offered the definitive 
ethnographic discussion of Iraqi editors, though she does not discuss the extent of their influence on the 
progress of Iraqi government. See Grit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-87. 
29 Bashkin also acknowledges this self-perception, see Bashkin, pp. 28. 
30 Ireland's view, for example, is that the 1920 rising not only set the program for self-government back, 
but opened the door for a retrogression in the form the government would ultimately take. See Ireland, pp. 
220-296. 
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dramatically accelerated?! Using British and American political practices as their guide 
and Britain's colonialist history as their goad, I demonstrate, Iraqi editors challenged the 
blatantly unconstitutional manner in which their administrators attempted to foist a 
fac;ade of self-government upon them with publications designed to educate the Iraqi 
people in the practices of constitutional democracy as well as those of imperial 
administration posing as such in British possessions. In its challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Residency's attempts to impose an appointed Council of State, a 
constitution, and even a King on the Iraqi people, the Iraqi press set a clear pattern for 
Iraqi political development. Although the Residency would repeatedly succeed in forcing 
its agenda through a series of Iraqi assemblies, some concessions to nationalist demands 
or constitutionalist principles were usually involved. By pushing British tolerance for 
such opposition to its absolute limit, I argue, the Iraqi nationalist press forced the 
Residency to reveal the colonial nature of British rule in Iraq to the Iraqi people, but also 
its dependence upon a modicum of Iraqi consent by conceding, even if only in the 
smallest degree, to its demands. High Commissioner Percy Cox's decision to seize the 
opportunity of Faysal' s sudden illness in the summer of 1922 to suppress the Iraqi press 
and force the passage of the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty through the an intransigent Iraqi 
Council, but only with the concession that later adjustments on the contentions points 
railed against in the Iraqi press could be made, I argue, was an early and ideal example of 
this pattern as well as the power of the Iraqi press. For its part, in the Parliament and the 
press, Labour or Labour affiliated propagandists took full advantage of such frustrations 
to illustrate the Lloyd George administration's persistent lack of conformity with the 
principles of the mandate. As news of British interests in developing Iraq's oil reserves 
came to light over the early years of the mandate, Labour propagandists seized upon it as 
yet more evidence of the government's exploitative agenda for its costly imperialist 
adventure?2 
31 For a discussion of the domestic and international forces driving this acceleration, see Christopher 
Catherwood, Churchill's Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New York: Carroll & Graf 
Pub., 2004). 
32 Attention to the growing opposition to continuing the mandate in Iraq appears in most studies of the 
mandate, but only very peripherally and usually cast as a general disgruntlement of British taxpayers for the 
cost of the mandate. The role of Labour in generating such opposition is never mentioned. See, for 
example, Ireland, pp. 311-313 and Sluglett, pp. 69,76, and 79. 
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The sixth chapter of this dissertation chronicles the odyssey of forcing the Iraqi 
government to ratify an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty most Iraqis believed would codify their status 
as a British protectorate, the opposition of the Iraqi and British press, and the impact that 
Turkey's unexpected claim to possession of Mosul in 1924 had on that process. 
Immediately following Cox's administrative coup, those Iraqi editors permitted to resume 
publication undertook to mobilize the Iraqi public into political parties in preparation for 
the coming series of elections?3 Unable to forestall the advance of Iraqi popular political 
life without delegitimizing the Arab Fa~ade both in Iraq and in Britain, the Residency 
sought to directly engage it with their own vernacular papers and the collaborative 
construction of a system of political patronage through Faysal' s Sherifian court around 
their more 'moderate' Iraqi clients?4 As negotiations over the drafting and passage of 
crucial instruments of government progressed, the Iraqi political landscape polarized over 
the question of whether an alliance with the British or their ejection would prove the 
quickest path to 'complete independence.' The nationalist press in Iraq was emboldened 
in its opposition to the, ostensibly, pro-British stance of the Palace by the advances being 
made against British domination in Ireland, Egypt, and India, but especially by the 
seeming polarization of British society as well over the government's commitment to 
staying the course in Iraq and the popular movement to end the mandate emanating out of 
Labour propaganda. 
Even as the Iraqi people were learning the power of political organization, 
however, they were also learning the limitations of democracy in what largely remained 
an inter-imperial world. For although the pressure Iraqi nationalists could bring to bear 
on the Residency, the Palace, and the 'moderate' Iraqi majority was growing, the contest 
between the British and Turkish governments and, later, the League of Nations, over the 
fate of the petroliferous region of Mosul from 1924-1926 brought Iraqi dependence upon 
33 Where the Iraqi press is considered by historians, it is usually in relation to the emergence of political 
parties in Iraq which are viewed as controlling the press. See, for example, Amy Ayalon, The Press in the 
Arab Middle East: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 93-95. 
34 In Ireland, Sluglett, and Dodge, Iraqi political life is viewed almost exclusively as an extension of the 
Sherifian patronage system and occasional but not very formidable opposition to it. 
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British imperial influence into sharp relief.35 British Labour, I argue, was learning a 
similar lesson as the Party came into government for the first time in 1924. For although 
Labour had campaigned on the emancipation of Iraq, a combination of domestic, inter-
imperial, and internationalist obligations limited their intervention to merely preventing 
the Residency from disbanding an intransigent Iraqi assembly and ratifying the Anglo-
Iraqi Treaty by Royal decree.36 Faced with what Iraqi editors believed would be the 
immediate evacuation of the British, the loss of Mosul, and presumably Turkish 
occupation, Iraqi moderates and nationalists alike accepted the concession of their 
national rights in ratifying a constitution, oil concessions, and the Treaty as the requisite 
British 'ransom' for the mere integrity of their state in 1926. Nevertheless, when denied 
the right to debate the final passage of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, Labour, then in the 
opposition, and the main party of nationalist opposition in Iraq both walked out of their 
respective Houses in protest in late 1925 and early 1926. 
The seventh and concluding chapter of this dissertation illustrates how a 
multiplicity of political forces generated by the British and Iraqi governments and 
organized opposition to those governments came into play in defining Anglo-Iraqi 
relations as the state gradually passed from British to Iraqi control from 1926 to 1932. 
With the ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1926, Iraqi independence became 
merely a matter of time. Accordingly, as other historians have shown, the Baldwin 
administration and the Sherifian court became locked in a contest over the precise 
measure of sovereignty Iraq would formally concede to the British in exchange for 
Baldwin's support for League membership.37 Although negotiating the formal 
transaction, codified in a second Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, was clearly a Palace affair, I argue 
3S The struggle between Britain and Turkey over possession of Mosul is almost exclusively viewed by 
historians as a matter of international politics in which Iraqi opinion factors not at all. See, for example, 
Peter J. Beck, '" A Tedious and Perilous Controversy': Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 
1918-1926.," Middle Eastern Studies VoU7, No.2 (1981): 256-276. 
36 Although Labour's policy on Iraq does not factor into the story, a good account of Labour's experiences 
with the 'taming responsibilities of office' in the 1920's can be found in David Howell, MacDonald's 
Party: Labour Identities and Crisis, 1922-1931 (Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
37 Sluglett, Chapter 4; Ireland, Chapter 22; and Toby Dodge, "International Obligation, Domestic Pressure, 
and Colonial Nationalism; The Birth of the Iraqi State Under the Mandate System," in The British and 
French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives/ Les Mandats Fran9ais et Anglais Dans Une Perspective 
Comparative, ed. Nadine Meouchy and Peter Sluglett (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004),143-164. 
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that the force Faysal could bring to bear on British negotiators stemmed directly from a 
dramatically expanding 'extreme nationalist' political movement of a decidedly anti-
British and even anti-League of Nations tone in this period?8 Using the moderate pro-
British majority he himself had engineered to keep the Treaty negotiations from totally 
collapsing, Faysal utterly undermined any semblance of democracy or constitutionalism 
by rigging elections and swapping ministers and Prime Ministers to encourage the 
impression among Iraqi moderates and British negotiators alike that radical nationalism, 
now able to draw thousands into the street in protests, was practically on the verge of a 
coup d'etat. By 1929, however, Faysal was only able to achieve a stalemate of 
negotiations with the intransigent Baldwin administration. 
Matters changed dramatically with the advent of a second, stronger Labour 
government in 1929. Within months of taking office, the MacDonald administration 
announced its intentions to offer its unconditional support for Iraqi membership in the 
League of Nations and to replace the stagnated Anglo-Iraqi Treaty with one more in line 
with international, rather than intra-imperial, norms?9 Although not the wholesale 
democratization of the British Empire called for during the war, I argue, Labour's 
emancipation of Iraq points up the persistence of Labour's anti-colonial nationalist roots. 
It was because of Labour's legacy of opposition to the mandate that, even in the face of 
other inter-imperial responsibilities that had 'tamed' Labour in office, the liberation of 
Iraq remained within the realm of the possible. This fact was not lost on Faysal or Iraqi 
nationalists, who had been awaiting just such an opportunity. 
When Labour took office, Faysal reshuffled the government yet again to set the 
stage for new treaty negotiations and then again to lay the groundwork for shoring up the 
monarchy as the absolute power center of the Iraqi state. The popular demand for the 
immediate ousting of British advisors and opposition to even the adjusted treaty 
38 Sluglett has made a similar argument, but focuses exclusively on Iraqi politicians he views as primarily 
self-serving with little attention to the political parties as such. See Sluglett, Chapter 4. 
39 Sluglett, like Ireland, merely identifies the advent of a Labour government as a transition point for British 
policy without an analysis of Labour's view of the mandate. See Sluglett, pp. 141-170; Toby Dodge's more 
recent study of the mandate period does point out that Faysal deliberately "paralyzed" Iraqi politics as a 
means of pressuring the British into acquiescing to his demands, but offers no consideration of Iraqi politics 
per se or attempts to make an argument for the actual influence of Faysal's efforts on the negotiations. 
Dodge goes a bit beyond Ireland and Sluglett in recognizing that the "Labour minority government. .. was 
not constrained by the imperial ideology of its predecessor," but that comment is the extent of his analysis. 
See Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq, pp. 34-37. 
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relationship continued to be encouraged by Faysal for the advantage of making whatever 
treaty arrangement he finally settled seem less like a compromise and more like the latest 
British/ait accompli in spite of his negotiators best efforts. With negotiations complete 
by 1930 and Iraqi independence imminent, Nuri al Said, the member of the Sherifian 
court who would dominate Iraqi politics for the next quarter century, began gradually 
drawing Iraqi nationalist leaders he and Faysal had supported in the preceding years into 
the government and shutting out and suppressing more independent figures and parties. 
In so doing, I argue, Faysal and Nuri imbued an increasingly authoritarian Iraqi 
monarchy with a degree of nationalist legitimacy that would carry it into the 1950's, but 
also galvanized the underground nationalist movements shut out of the government that 
would lead to the birth of the Iraqi Republic and the death, literally and figuratively, of 
the Sherifian court.40 
40 Perhaps the most comprehensive study of underground Iraqi nationalist movements and their socio-
political origins remains Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: 
A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'Thists, and Free 
Officers, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). 
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Chapter 1: A 'Contest of Mobilization' 
The news that an Austro-Serbian conflict over the murder of Austrian Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo had, in little more than a month, escalated into a pan-
European conflagration involving their own Government's declaration of war on 
Germany undoubtedly came as great shock to most Britons in the summer of 1914.1 Had 
not the Times conveyed the sentiment of the King himself that his personal negotiations 
over the shared commercial interests of Britain with Germany and the Ottoman Empire 
were "rapidly approaching a satisfactory issue" earlier that year?2 Those statesmen privy 
to or participant in recent British foreign relations were, of course, well aware of the 
increasing likelihood that growing inter-imperial tensions on the continent could draw 
British forces into the fray. Such relations were conducted far from the eye of the public 
or even the Parliament, however, and through "methods so secret and precarious" that, 
according to John Callaghan, au courant officials were increasingly concerned that "the 
outbreak of a major war might be accompanied by profound problems of obtaining 
popular legitimacy" from a largely unsuspecting or even suspicious nation? 
Compounding this problem even further, Radicals, Pacifists, and Socialists, had been 
organized for well over a decade in opposition to what was known of the Government's 
secret balance of power diplomacy, which they had condemned as emblematic of the 
undemocratic and inegalitarian nature of the British political system at best, and at worst, 
for Keith Robbins, "a powerful reaction against the principles of peace" among 
1 Laurence W. Martin, Peace without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1958), p. 22. 
2 Times o/London, February 10, 1914. 
3 John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History (London: Routledge, 2(07), p. 17-19. 
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imperialist elites that would ultimately make a major war, and, subsequently, the further 
subjugation of the wage-earning classes at home, inevitable.4 
This chapter is primarily concerned with examining the tactics and methodologies 
employed by both pro-war and dissenting propagandists to harness the all-important force 
of public opinion, particularly of the working classes, upon the outbreak of the war. As 
Anne Summers has pointed out, it would be "fundamentally insulting to the working 
classes [to] suggest that they were as putty in the hands of socialist leaders and/or the 
propagandists of the governing class" then competing for their allegiance.s Rather, I 
would suggest that the style and content of the print product of war time propagandists on 
either side of the "contest of mobilization,,6 during the early months of the war reflected a 
new appreciation of the power of public opinion as a formidable force for change made 
clear to pro-war and pro-peace activists alike by the State's desperate need of volunteer 
service at the beginning of the war and the overwhelming number of 'free-born Britons' 
who chose to provide it, at the request of their government, at least until January 1916? 
The political crises generated over the course of the war between what Arno 
Mayer has termed "the 'parties of order' (predominantly the Right) and the 'parties of 
movement' (predominantly the left),' in Britain is, of course, ground well-trodden by 
historians.s The following discussion seeks to offer a more nuanced consideration of the 
manner in which British organizations of dissent, in particular the Union of Democratic 
4 Keith Robbins, The Abolition o/War: The 'Peace Movement' in Britain, 1914-1919 (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1976), p. 10. And Callaghan, pp. 12-23. 
5 Anne Summers, "Edwardian Militarism," in Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking 0/ British National 
Identity, vol. 1,3 vols. (Routledge, 1988),236-258, p. 236. 
6 Brock Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 
34. 
7 The Military Service Act, inaugurating Britain's first full conscription policy, was issued in January 1916. 
8 Amo J Mayer, Political Origins o/the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1959), p. vii. 
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Control (UDC) and the Independent Labour Party (ILP) , attempted to force a popular and 
official reckoning with the shortcomings of prewar inter-imperial political economy in 
Europe as a system through a discussion of its failure not only to prevent a pan-European 
conflagration, but to uphold the essential principles of democracy and nationality at the 
heart of British national identity. It is my contention that, in illuminating the fundamental 
contradictions between the principles of democracy, nationality, and self-determination 
the war was supposedly being fought to preserve and the practice of inter-imperial 
balance of power politics that had brought the war to Britain's doorstep, dissenting 
leaders, perhaps inadvertently, set in motion a popular movement in Britain for the 
organization of a postwar world in which prewar imperial ideals could not survive. 
By the end of the war, the UDC had published some thirty pamphlets and nearly 
fifty leaflets in addition to the publication of UD.C. weekly magazine with the ILP 
keeping pace in its own Labour Leader, surpassing the UDC with over 70 pamphlets, and 
leaflets in print between 1914 and 1918.9 Certainly, the publications of the UDC and the 
ILP did not present a monolithic perspective on the causes of the war or vision of post-
war Europe. Both organizations deliberately kept their pages and presses open to a broad 
range of dissenting opinion that they might attract both literary talent and politically 
undecided supporters into their range of influence. lO However, the themes introduced by 
such early critics of the war as Ramsay MacDonald and the ILP's National Council 
would provide a framework of critique common to nearly all of the war-time publications 
with the ILP and UDC drawing heavily from both the Labour and Liberal traditions of 
9 For a list of UDC publications, see Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics 
During the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), Appendix E, pp. 231-234. For the ILP, see 
Gillian B. Woolven, Publications of the Independent Labour Party, 1893-1932 (The Society for the Study 
of Labour History, 1977). 
10 Swartz, p. 63. 
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domestic or imperial critique while infusing a sense of global connectivity that would 
come to define the foreign policy of the Labour movement as it developed into an 
increasingly legitimate party of opposition over the course of the war. 
On August 3,1914, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey addressed the House of 
Commons to "clear the ground" between the Foreign Office and the Members of 
Parliament that they might approach the crisis created by Germany's threat to occupy 
'little Belgium' as a throughway to France "from the point of view of British interests, 
British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not 
been preserved."ll The details of exactly how the peace was lost, of which Grey made 
only scant mention, would have to wait for Asquith's speech in the House three days 
later, the morning after war had been declared "in the traditional way," for John 
Callaghan, "with no reference to Parliament.,,12 What Grey, somewhat ironically, took 
pains to convey to that morning, was that "the House of Commons remains perfectly 
free ... to decide ... what our line should be," by which he meant that the Cabinet and 
Foreign Office had "no secret engagement [to] spring upon the House ... [entailing] an 
obligation of honour upon the country ," nor "construe [ d] anything which has previously 
taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the 
freedom of ... the House of Commons to decide ... whether we should intervene."J3 The 
outstanding fact of the crisis, he argued, was that, because of her predominant place in the 
11 Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons, August 3, 
1914 in War Speeches by British Ministers (London: T.Fisher Unwin, LTD, 1917), p. 142 and 146. 
12 Callaghan, p. 25. 
13 Grey, War Speeches, p. 143-146. 
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European balance of power, Britain was obliged to intervene despite the absence of any 
formal agreements or alliances.14 
In elucidating the principles at issue, Grey recalled an earlier crisis involving the 
preservation of Belgian neutrality against the belligerent wills of France and Germany in 
the War of 1870. Although, in both cases, the invasion of Belgium would have been a 
violation of existing inter-imperial accords guaranteeing her sovereignty, Grey clarified 
with a quote from Gladstone that Britain's historic as well as current "interest in the 
independence of Belgium ... is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation 
of the guarantee.,,15 What made the invasion of Belgium, for Grey as it had been for 
Gladstone thirty-four years prior, "the direst crime that ever stained the pages of 
history,,16 was not merely the violation of sovereignty or treaty, but the implications of 
such "unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power whatever ," as Gladstone had phrased it, 
for the balance of power itself and, subsequently, the future of European security and 
prosperity.17 For it was upon the assumption that the balance of power would be 
maintained, Grey insisted, that the preceding century of European cooperation and 
prosperity had been built. 
In illustrating his point, Grey pointed up the example of France and Britain, "two 
nations who had had perpetual differences in the past" that had "cleared these differences 
away" in the name of mutual prosperity through balance of power diplomacy. Secure in 
14 Times of London, in an article discussing the 'New Balance of Power' on August 22nd , 1913, described it 
as an "ancient principle ... still held in honour by the Great Powers of Europe" comprising systems of 
agreements between "partner[s] in an alliance or entente" in which "assistance can be counted upon for the 
coalition in case of a conflagration ... that each member should do the utmost which lies in him to ensure 
his own independence and freedom of action with his own strength" by defending the integrity of his allies 
if encroached upon by other Powers. 
15 Grey, War Speeches, p. 155. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 155. 
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the mutual "feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two 
countries," Grey argued, Britain and France had largely released their fleets from the 
costly task of constantly monitoring their shared coastline to undertake the more 
prosperous duties of expanding their imperial markets and opening new trade routes 
abroad.18 "How far that entails an obligation," Grey stated, "let each man look into his 
own heart," but added that 
My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet engaged in a war which France had not 
sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English 
Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could 
not stand aside and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our 
arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing! I believe that would be 
the feeling of this country ... [and] that it would be a feeling which would spread 
with irresistible force throughout the land.19 
Even beside this 'sentimental' principle of honor, Grey forewarned, the strategic 
implications of such an act of acquiescence would be dire for Britain's position in Europe 
as well, for if 
France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her 
position as a great Power, [and] becomes subordinate to the will and power of one 
greater than herself ... and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, 
and then Holland, and then Denmark ... I do not believe for a moment that ... we 
should be in a position to ... prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to 
us ... falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our 
moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect.20 
The threat being posed, for Grey, was not to Belgium or France alone, but to the Anglo-
centric balance of power in Europe. In fostering and reaping the benefits of a secure 
inter-imperial system of global commerce, Britain had also accrued an obligation of 
18 Ibid., p. 148. 
19 Ibid., p. 148. 
20 Ibid., p. 157. 
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honour and, indeed, a duty to defend the mutual trust undergirding that balance against its 
marauding antithesis for the sake of her own national inheritance.21 
Although Herbert Henry Asquith expressed complete agreement with Grey about 
Great Britain's responsibilities as a 'Great Power' regarding the inter-imperial balance of 
power in Europe, the Liberal Prime Minster grounded his own justifications for going to 
war in far more internationalist and even populist language. In his address to the House 
the day after war was declared, Asquith coupled Great Britain's obligation to guarantee 
the sanctity of "solemn international obligations" with that of guaranteeing that "small 
nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith by the arbitrary 
will of a strong and overmastering Power" as two foundational "principles, the 
maintenance of which is vital to the civilization of the world." It was with these 
principles foremost in mind, he reminded the House, that the British government 
undertook to guarantee the national integrity of Belgium and international security of 
Europe alike seventy-five years prior with the Treaty of London (1839). The time had 
come once again, he declared, for the British Empire to not only defend, but even more 
permanently enshrine these essential principles of human progress as the basis of all 
future international relations.z2 
In a series of well-attended and widely publicized 'call-to-arms' speeches in 
London, Edinburgh, Dublin, and Cardiff given over the first months of the war, Asquith 
presented the British people with a vision of the war as an apocalyptic struggle between 
an Anglo-centric ''family of nations," bound together by their commitment to "what is 
21 Ibid .• p.148-151. 
22 Rt. Han. H. H. Asquith, Prime Minister, in the House of Commons, August 6,1914 in War Speeches. 
p.7. 
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properly called the public law of Europe ,,,23 and the desire of Germany and her allies to 
subjugate that family to their own barbaric "Religion of Force" and, thereby, reverse the 
very progress of democratic civilization. 24 Indeed, Belgium was the embodiment of 
public law, as it would then have been understood, being a long-contested territorial 
space unable to defend itself against encroachment, but imbued with 'legal' sovereignty 
through inter-imperial treaties as a means of stabilizing the balance of power in Europe.25 
Asquith presented this inter-imperial compromise, however, as the enshrinement of a 
spirit of "free and full self-development which" in Belgium which, he opined, to "small 
States, to ourselves, to our great and growing Dominions over seas, to our kinsmen across 
the Atlantic, is the well-spring and life-breath of national existence." Germany's invasion 
of Belgium was not merely criminal, for Asquith, but "the greatest crime against 
civilization and culture since the Thirty Years War ," because the act explicitly defiled 
that principle, the Germans having made 'free development' "the one capital offense" in 
their vision of a postwar world under German domination?6 Already, as Asquith spoke 
in London that September, the German forces were demonstrating their willingness "to 
sacrifice both the garnered fruits and the potential germs of the unfettered human spirit,,27 
in the "shameless holocaust of irreparable treasures," such as the libraries and museums 
"lit up by blind barbarian vengeance" during the siege of Belgium's cultural capitals?S 
23 Rt. Hon. H.H. Asquith, Prime Minster, at the Guildhall in London, September 4, 1914, in War Speeches, 
p.26. 
24 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
25 For a discussion of this topic, see Hannis Taylor, A Treatise on International Public Law (Chicago: 
Callaghan and Company, 1901), pp. %-97 
26 Asquith, London speech in War Speeches, p. 17. Asquith was referring with this statement to the sacking 
of Louvain specifically. Emphasis added. 
27 Ibid., p. 17-18. 
28 Ibid., p. 17-18. For a discussion of the use of German atrocities against the Belgians as propaganda, see 
Nicoletta Gullace, The Blood of Our Sons: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship 
during the Great War, 1st ed. (New York: Pal grave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 17-33. 
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Such was only a taste of what was to come, he warned, "a lurid and illuminating ... first 
step ... in a deliberate policy of which ... the ultimate and not far distant aim was to crush 
the independence and the autonomy of the Free States of Europe" along the road to 
global supremacy?9 
Against these atrocities, Asquith grounded British war aims in the Gladstonian 
notion of the "enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European 
politics," referring to such a goal as being "as good a definition as we can have of our 
European policy" for the war and postwar world?O By way of defining 'public right,' 
Asquith stated that, 
It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation 
of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States and the future 
moulding of the European world. It means, next, that room must be found and 
kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller 
nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of its own. Belgium, Holland, 
Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, Greece, and the Balkan States-that they 
must be recognized as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful 
neighbours-more powerful in strength and in wealth-to a place in the sun. And 
it means finally, or it ought to mean ... the substitution for force, for the clash of 
competing ambitions of a real European partnership based on the recognition of 
equal rights, and established and enforced by a common Will?l 
Asquith recognized that these aims signified a transition in the course of British and inter-
imperial politics. In the near fifty years since Gladstone first called for the 'enthronement 
of public right,' he admitted, "little progress, it seems, has as yet been made towards that 
great and beneficent change" either abroad or in the metropolitan heart of the Empire?2 
Speaking to his Irish constituents in Dublin, Asquith cautiously acknowledged that there 
had certainly been "wars in the past in regard to which there has been ... uneasiness as to 
29 Ibid., p. 17-18. 
30 Rt. Hon. H. H. Asquith, Prime Minister, at Dublin, September 25,1914 in War Speeches, p. 40. 
31 Ibid., p. 40. 
32 Ibid., p. 40. 
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the wisdom of our diplomacy ... [and] doubts as to the righteousness of our cause.'>33 
Even "a year ago," he admitted, such aims "would have sounded like a Utopian idea."34 
Asquith nevertheless repeatedly gave his assurances of his government's 
'benevolent disinterest' in territorial conquest and commitment to the principles of 
nationality, insisting that, in the decision to take the nation to war, the government was 
"not impelled, any of us, by some of the motives which have occasioned the bloody 
struggles of the past ... so far as we are concerned ambition and aggression play no part ... 
we do not covet any people's territory. We have no desire to impose our rule upon alien 
populati ons ."35 
Asquith stressed that, even in spite of Britain's past deviations from his principles 
for the war, the Empire itself stood as "a great, world-wide, peace-loving partnership," 
which, 
by the wisdom and the courage of our forefathers, by great deeds of heroism and 
adventure on land and sea, by the insight and corporate sagacity, the tried and 
tested experience of many generations, [had] built up a dominion which is 
buttressed by the two pillars of Liberty and Law?6 
It was the Empire itself, in fact, that had provided the "greatest evidence" of British 
commitment to the principles of nationality and democracy for which they now fought. 37 
From every comer of the Empire, Asquith informed his audiences, Dominion and 
Protectorate alike had "respon[ded] to our common appeal" with a magnitude and 
swiftness that had "moved all our feelings to their profoundest depths.,,38 Moreover, the 
33 Asquith, Dublin speech in War Speeches., p. 36. 
34 Ibid., p. 41 and 44. 
35 Asquith, Cardiff speech in War Speeches, p. 47. 
36 Ibid., p. 47. 
37 Asquith, Dublin speech, War Speeches, p. 46. 
38 Ibid. 
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rush to arms of these "children of the Empire" were undertaken "not as an obligation, but 
as a privilege, [to exercise] their right ... to contribute money, material, and, what is better 
than all, the strength and sinews, the fortunes, and lives of their best manhood.,,39 Even 
from India, he noted, "every class and creed, British and native, princes and people, 
Hindoos and Mohammedans, vie with one another in a noble and emulous rivalry" in 
their rush to the colors.40 
Across the United Kingdom, Asquith repeatedly offered up the imagery of "our 
magnificent Indian Army ... [fighting] side by side and shoulder to shoulder with our 
home and Dominion troops" under the same flag and for the same principles in lands 
equally foreign to both as "a symbol to all of a unity that the world in arms cannot 
dissever or dissolve," asking "with these inspiring appeals and examples from our fellow-
subjects all over the world, what are we doing, and what ought we to do at home?,,41 The 
imagery of the Indian soldier seeming to best the British citizen in the zeal of his imperial 
patriotism was obviously meant to arouse a spirit of competition along with a sense of 
national honor to represent British courage and patriotism on the field.42 It also served to 
vindicate the 'civilizing mission' itself, however, proving that, even to the mind of the 
colonized British subject, "whatever [the Empire had] won by the sword we hold and we 
retain by the more splendid title of just and disinterested rule, by the authority, not of a 
despot, but of a trustee.,,43 
39 Asquith, Guildhall speech, War Aims, p. 22. 
40 Ibid., p. 22. 
41 Ibid. Also in War Speeches, see Asquith's speech in Edinburgh on September 18, p. 30, his speech in 
Dublin, p. 42, and in Cardiff, p. 46. 
42 For a discussion of British reactions to the Government's appeals to their sense of patriotism, see David 
Silbey, The British Working Class and Enthusiasm/or War. 1914-1916 (London; New York: Frank Cass, 
2005), pp. 104-124. 
43 Asquith, Dublin speech in War Speeches, p. 46. 
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At the heart of declarations was the idea that, despite its shortcomings, the British 
Empire was a powerful, perhaps the most powerful, force for the progress of democratic 
civilization in the world and that, if an Allied victory were to be achieved, the ideals of 
the Empire's domestic and imperial 'civilizing mission' would be ultimately realized, and 
vindicated, in the crucible of the war through the shedding of British blood. Never before 
in its history had British Empire, he declared, been more akin to a family of nations, 
"without distinction of creed or party, of race or climate, of class or section ... united in 
defending principles and in maintaining interests which are vital, not only to the British 
Empire, but to all that is worth having in our common civilization, and all that is worth 
hoping for in the future progress of mankind.,,44 For the justness and righteousness of the 
British cause in the war were anchored in the same principles as the 'civilizing mission,' 
the war aims he offered being, at bottom, merely a broadening of that mission to include 
protecting and providing for the advancement of weaker peoples even beyond the borders 
of the Empire itself.45 However contradictory such a mission might seem to the enemy, 
Asquith asserted, it had become "proposition which British citizens in every part of the 
world to-day regard as beyond the reach of controversy.,,46 Moreover, he promised, "if 
and when this War is decided in favour of the Allies it will at once come within the 
range, and before long within the grasp, of European statesmen.,,47 
44 Ibid., p. 36. 
45 For a discussion of perspectives on the civilizing mission, see Prasenjit Duara, "The Discourse of 
Civilization and Decolonization," Journal o/World History Vol. 15, No.1 (2004), pp. 1-4. 
46 Asquith, War Speeches, p. 46. M.L. Sanders and P.M. Taylor have argued for the importance of this 
theme in British propaganda, noting the Wellington House publication of a series of pamphlets dedicated to 
the subject beginning just after the beginning of the war. Michael L Sanders and Philip M Taylor, British 
Propaganda During the First World War, 1914-18 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), p. 152-3. 
47 Asquith, Dublin speech in War Speeches, p. 41 and 44. 
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The earliest and, certainly, the most provocative voice of dissent over British 
intervention came from Chair of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) Ramsay 
MacDonald. Immediately following Grey's speech to the House, MacDonald condemned 
Grey's duplicitous appeals to British national honour for what, to his mind, was clearly a 
war for the balance of inter-imperial power as the true crime being committed. 
MacDonald assured the House that every member of his party would eagerly pledge their 
support to any statesmen, regardless of party or class, who could prove a legitimate threat 
to Britain's national integrity or honor. Indeed, even coming to the rescue of "a small 
European nationality like Belgium" endangered by the aggression of a greater power 
would be a noble cause to the mind of Labour. For MacDonald, however, such claims 
were nothing more than a smoke screen meant to obscure the fact that British subjects 
were being called forth to support Russia, the most 'earth-hungry' power in the world, "in 
a European war which is not going to leave the map of Europe where it is now" 
regardless of the victor. Citing the last British intervention in a Russian conflict over the 
balance of power and the recent struggles to suppress the 'rights of small nations' in 
Africa, MacDonald declared that 
there has been no crime committed by statesmen of [Grey's] character without 
those statesmen appealing to the nation's honour. We fought the Crimean War 
because of our honour. We rushed to South Africa because of our honour. The 
right hon. gentleman is appealing to us to-day in the cause of our honour. 
MacDonald similarly found the notion that, if Britain remained neutral in the conflict, 
"we are going to have the power of civilization and the genius of France removed from 
European history ... another absolutely impossible conception" that could "never justify 
the action which the right hon. gentleman has foreshadowed." For those familiar with 
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such tactics, MacDonald argued, Grey's pretensions amounted to little more than 
diplomatic alibis for reckless diplomacy and the all too familiar cant of jingoistic 
patriotism, neither of which held any appeal for him or his Party. "When his speech gets 
into cold print tomorrow," MacDonald assured the House, "he will not persuade a large 
section of the country" either. 48 
The appeal of the Asquith administration's war rhetoric would far exceed 
anything MacDonald could have imagined, however. Within a week of his speech, 8,193 
volunteers enlisted, followed by an additional 43,764 by the end of its first week, and yet 
another 49, 982 by the end of its third, a great many of which were working class 
members of the Trade Unions and constituents of the Labour Party.49 When even a 
majority of MacDonald's own Party were converted not only to the vigorous prosecution 
of the war, but a political truce in which disputes over domestic issues were to be put 
aside for the duration of the war, MacDonald chose to resign his chair, rather than his 
principles.5O Passing the mantle of parliamentary leadership of the labour movement to 
Party Secretary Arthur Henderson the next day, MacDonald entered a new phase of his 
political career as a figurehead of the dissenting left and a traitorous political pariah for 
the pro-war right.51 
It was no coincidence that MacDonald's first statements in print about the 
decision to intervene in the conflict appeared in the pages of the Labour Leader, the 
official weekly of the Independent Labour Party (lLP). Originally organized as a 
political arm of the Trade Union Councils in the 1870's, the ILP had retained its radical 
48 Manchester Guardian and Times of London, August 4,1914 
49 Silbey, pp. 22,47, and 64. 
50 Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party: 1910-1924 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 90-
91. 
51 Ibid., pp. vii-viii and 1-8. 
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platform for social and political reform even as the more conformist Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP) that evolved from it became the official voice of the Labour 
movement in Parliament. The ILP's vehement opposition to British intervention in the 
conflict would cost them more than a third (some ten thousand) of their working-class 
members52 and the ousting of their leaders from the Trade Unions.53 Nevertheless, the 
ILP's long history of opposition to the kind of reckless imperialistic and anti-democratic 
foreign policy practices that, they argued, had made the war inevitable would make the 
ILP a "ready-made organizational home," according to Arno Mayer, for such dissenting 
voices as MacDonald's.54 MacDonald's resignation from the PLP would also be a 
watershed for Labour's radical left, according to Robert Dowse, signifying the ILP's 
transition from the shadow of the PLP to "the most important party in opposition to the 
Government's war policy" as such luminaries as MacDonald, already a longstanding and 
influential member of the ILP, fell back on it as an organizational platform.55 The Labour 
Leader provided the early voices of dissent with a public forum as well as a crucible in 
which their initial arguments against going to war would be refined into a critique of the 
belligerent nature of the European system of inter-imperial political economy as a whole. 
On August 13, 1914, the Labour Leader led with the "Manifesto of the National 
Council of the Independent Labour Party" on the war on the front page followed 
immediately by MacDonald's "Why We are at War: A Reply to Sir Edward Grey." In 
refuting Grey's logic of intervention, both pieces stressed the anti-democratic nature of 
52 see Catherine Ann Cline, Recruits to Labour: The British Labour Party, 1914-1931 (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1963), p. 9. 
53 McKibbin, pp. 90-91. 
54 Mayer, pp. 40, 46-47. 
55 Robert Edward Dowse, Left in the Centre; the Independent Labour Party, 1893-1940, (London: 
Longmans, 1966), p. 20. 
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British foreign policy for its imperialistic aims as well as the authoritarian manner in 
which it was made. In this sense, from its earliest expression, opposition to the war was 
cast as a critique of the incompatibility of imperialism and democracy that would 
characterize the dissenting press campaign to come for the duration of the war and 
beyond. 
True to its raison d'etre of giving a political voice to the domestic grievances of 
the working classes, the ILP opened its manifesto with the critique that British 
"Diplomacy has been underground, secret, deceitful" and practiced "behind the back of 
Parliament and people." Free from the hindering influence of democracy, "Diplomatists" 
suffered no accountability in forging the sort of "secret understandings" that had 
generated the war and simply "den[ied] their existence when challenged" by the people. 
In the total absence of accountability, it was no wonder that the nations had been 
"stampeded by fear and panic" into uniform "through the influence of its Jingo Press," 
each erroneously believing it was fighting a defensive war for its own national survival.56 
The ILP characterized and critiqued the conflict itself in explicitly imperial terms. 
At bottom, the war was a contest over imperial aggrandizement between Germany and 
Russia in which "Britain has placed herself behind Russia, the most reactionary, corrupt, 
and oppressive Power in Europe." In so doing, Britain was not only permitting, but 
enabling Russia "to gratify her territorial ambitions and extend her Cossack rule ... 
gravely imperil[ing] ... civilization and democracy." Anti-democratic in their aims as 
well as the manner in which they were forged, such alliances of imperial interest were 
also brutally indifferent to the suffering they brought to their peoples and particularly 
56 The Independent Labour Party, "The I.L.P. and the War: The Manifesto of the National Council of the 
Independent Labour Party," Labour Leader, August 13th , 1914. ILP151l914174, LSE 
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their working classes "who go to kill and be killed at the command of rulers to whom the 
people are pawns" in what amounted to their "organized murder.,,57 
Nevertheless, the conflagration presented the democracies of Europe with an 
opportunity to learn from the errors of their statesmen and correct the imbalances of their 
systems of government at war's end. "In forcing this appalling crime upon the nations," 
the ILP insisted, 
it is the rulers, the diplomats, the militarists who have sealed their doom. In tears 
and blood and bitterness, the greater Democracy will be born ... our cause is holy 
and imperishable ... the nation must now watch for the first opportunity for 
effective intervention ... [and] must begin to prepare our minds for the difficult 
and dangerous complications that will arise at the conclusion of the war. The 
People must everywhere resist such territorial aggression and national abasement 
as will pave the way for fresh wars ... press for frank and honest diplomatic 
policies, controlled by themselves, for the suppression of militarism and the 
establishment of the United States of Europe, thereby advancing toward the 
world's peace.58 
In his formal "Reply to Sir Edward Grey" in the pages following the ILP's manifesto, 
MacDonald expanded on its themes with a knowledge of foreign policy making to which 
his chairmanship in the PLP had made him privy. 
For MacDonald, the "policy of the balance of power" depicted by Grey as 
grounded in 'mutual feelings of confidence and friendship' had, in fact, long been 
characterized by mutual suspicion, hostile rivalries, secret alliances, and the accumulation 
of armaments in anticipation of the inevitable "smashing up of the very balance which it 
is designed to maintain." Since 1905, MacDonald illustrated, Grey had made a deliberate 
choice in forging political ententes around the principle of "tipping the balance of power 
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against [Germany]" in spite of the dangers of inter-imperial war it obviously portended.59 
Grey's preference for managing Britain's foreign relations through ententes, or 
'understandings' ("the worst form of alliance," for MacDonald), was a tactical one: "An 
alliance is definite. Everyone knows his responsibilities under it. The entente deceives 
the people." Through the entente tactic, Grey was able to avoid any domestic 
accountability or formal obligation in executing his diplomatic plot to harness the 
political and military power of France and Russia to check the growth of an emergent 
Germany. Grey's claim in the House that the British had contracted no formal 
obligations was therefore, for MacDonald, "literally true but substantially untrue." 
Although comprising no formal obligations, the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian 
Ententes of 1904 and 1907 respectively, MacDonald illustrated, had literally "force[d] 
Germany to fight" by 1914 and left Britain "so helplessly committed to fight for France 
and Russia that Grey had to refuse point blank every overture made by Germany to keep 
us out of the conflict." No doubt, MacDonald admitted, "taking a narrow view ... 
Germany's share is a heavy one ... she, with Russia, is mainly responsible for the war; 
taking a longer view, we are equally responsible.,,60 
Unsurprisingly, MacDonald's loyalties were debated in newspapers all over 
Britain as his article was reproduced in leaflet form and circulated throughout the 
country.61 When the German Chancellor stated to the Danish Press that Grey had 
deliberately used Belgium as an excuse to make war on Germany a few weeks later, for 
59 Ramsay MacDonald, "Why we are at War: A Reply to Sir Edward Grey," Labour Leader August 13'\ 
1914. For a discussion of Grey's "pro-French and ultimately anti-German policy" as welJ as organized 
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1915-1918, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 46-47. 
60 Ibid. 
61 David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London: J. Cape, 1977), p. 186. 
example, the Times claimed that he had merely "followed the lead given to him by Mr. 
Ramsay MacDonald ... in an article published by him in the Labour Leader.,,62 
According to his biographers, MacDonald's position on the war sparked a newspaper 
campaign against him of such "extraordinary savagery,,63 as to cast MacDonald "in the 
role of national traitor for the duration" of the war64 and, at least initially, frighten off 
many who might have agreed with or even supported him from Liberal and Labour 
camps alike.65 
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MacDonald's was merely a "temporary political eclipse," however, and certainly 
one in which he, the ILP, and the dissenting voices soon to emerge throughout the British 
Isles would experience alone. As Arno Mayer has shown, the outbreak of war signified a 
domestic victory for "the old ruling classes" at the head of the political right across 
Europe, who "achieved a position of power to which they had aspired only in their most 
daring dreams before the war" as the vast majority of Conservatives, Liberals, and even 
Labourites got behind their Governments' efforts to stabilize the balance of power in 
Europe in their favor and that of their allies.66 For the remaining voices of dissent, 
however, the outbreak of war offered a clearer view of the global impact of the 'real 
enemy inside the gates,' inspiring a far more extensive and public critique of British 
foreign policy and its domestic implications than ever before undertaken by Liberal, 
Radical, or Labour minded Britons. As the vying military forces of Europe settled into 
62 Times of London, September 17, 1914. 
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their prolonged melee, so too did their political representatives into new alliances largely 
defined by their perspectives on the causes, consequences, and potential opportunities of 
the war. In Britain, as elsewhere, the dictum that 'war is politics continued by other 
means' also held true of these war-forged alliances, with dissident and pro-war 
propaganda alike drawing from their political legacies to defend positions taken during 
the war and visions for the postwar world. 
Those who stood in opposition to Grey's proposed intervention in the crisis did so 
for a variety of reasons, from a principled socialist or pacifist objection to war to a 
personal hatred for Grey and his approach to foreign policy making. Nevertheless, 
dissenters tended to share much in common in terms of political principles and aims, with 
most coming from the Liberal and Labourite left with a background in activism for social 
and political reform. The extreme political marginalization of the dissenting left also 
tended to encourage solidarity across lines of party and principle, a trend reflected in the 
popular perception of dissenters and their political ideas as a unified and homogenous 
movement. Although' dissenting opinion' began and would largely remain a mosaic of 
voices and ideas about the war and the British political system as a whole, as Sally Harris 
has shown, collective action did foster an "interpenetration of the foreign-policy doctrines 
and ideologies of Britain's Radicals, and Independent Socialists" palpable in their 
wartime and postwar propaganda.67 Catherine Ann Cline has similarly shown that the 
organizational centers of dissent would also serve as important conductors of political 
power, traveling during this period from a Liberal Party in decline into a Labour 
67 Harris, p. 125. 
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movement only just coming into its own as a legitimate party of opposition.68 Perhaps 
the most significant conductors of that power during the war were the ILP and its 'sister 
center' of British dissent, the Union of Democratic Control (UDC). 
The brainchild of Liberal MP for Ellen Charles Philips Trevelyan, the UDC was 
originally conceived as a pressure group to limit the degree of British intervention in the 
early hours of the war. Founder of the National Peace Council (NPC) and Congo Reform 
Association (CRA) in 1904 and the British Neutrality Committee (BNC) on the eve of the 
war, Trevelyan had been an outspoken opponent of Grey's approach to foreign policy 
making for sometime. Upon the declaration of war, Trevelyan immediately sounded the 
views of journalist and co-founder of the CRA, Edmund Dene Morel and Liberal MP for 
Stirling Burghs Arthur Ponsonby, both of whom had been among the most vehement 
critics of Grey and the Foreign Office generally in the years leading up to the war. By 
the war's second week, these men had formed the UDC as a means not to stop the war, an 
aim its leaders quickly recognized as futile, but rather to force a popular reckoning with 
the failures of the prewar political system that had generated it and to use the peace as a 
platform for political reform at the national, imperial, and inter-imperiallevels.69 
As the organization's name and the political tendencies of its founders suggested, 
the primary shortcoming of the prewar system of government, as well as the mainspring 
of the war, was the absence of democratic control, or even oversight, in the making of 
foreign policy in Europe?O It followed, then, that the first step toward brokering real 
change at the inter-imperial level was to mobilize the British public in the name of 
68 Cline, pp. 4 and 129; For a discussion considering the benefits and drawbacks of UDC and ILP 
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democratizing the Foreign Office at home, the last preserve of total ruling class autonomy 
in the British govemment.71 Although UDC leaders maintained their faith in the 
pacifistic tendencies of the people as a democratic body, there were nevertheless alive to 
the fact that, in seeking to mobilize the British public, they were "swimming against one 
of the strongest and fiercest tides of opinion in recent British history ," as one 
commentator described the unprecedented popular support for the war effort in Britain.72 
E.D. Morel in particular was acutely aware of the necessity of capturing the "sheer 
weight in numbers needed to win battles in the field of mass politics," not to mention the 
political and propaganda infrastructure, that only the support of the Labour movement 
could provide?3 It was for these reasons in the main, according to Marvin Swartz, that 
UDC leaders welcomed Ramsay MacDonald into their inner circle and, through him, 
took the UDC into a close partnership with the ILP for the duration of the war.74 
The alignment of the Liberal-heavy UDC and the staunchly socialist ILP was by 
no means seamless, however. As Keith Robbins has pointed out, influential ILP leaders 
like Bruce Glazier and outspoken socialist writers like Alfred Slater objected that the 
force of the ILP's voice for revolutionary change in the global system of capitalist 
imperialism would be diluted by its identification with the UDC's focus on foreign policy 
reforms and the immediate causes of the war?5 Similarly, Labour's 'clean hands' in the 
war and its relative political independence, the movement's "chief appeal" for 
disenchanted Liberals, according to Cline, would in tum be diffused with each Liberal 
71 This view of the Foreign Office in relation to the government as a whole was a central theme for the 
UDC. see Arthur Ponsonby. Parliament and Foreign Policy (London: Union of Democratic Control. 1915). 
72 Marquand. p. 184. 
73 Swartz. pp. 58-62 and Mayer. pp. 44-46. 
74 Swartz. Ch. 2. especially pp. 58-62. 
75 Robbins. p. 65. 
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recruit.'6 Robbins and Cline also agree on the reluctance of UDC Liberals to actually join 
the ILP, let alone identify themselves as socialists. Even those disenchanted Liberals that 
did directly identify themselves with the ILP, for Cline, "seem for the most part to have 
accepted rather than embraced [the] central doctrine of their new party."TI 
Nevertheless, there is an historical consensus that the relationship between the 
UDC and the ILP during the war provided a crucial pathway from Liberalism to Labour 
and, thus, to the eventual empowerment of Labour as the main party of opposition after 
the war.78 Largely as a result of the tireless campaigning of E.D. Morel, the number of 
Labour organizations affiliated with the ILP and, through it, the UDC, would double by 
the end of1915.'9 In its tum, all eleven members of the UDC's Executive Committee 
would eventually join the Labour Party, in addition to the many Liberal recruits they 
brought with them.so Although they began the war from the political margins, the 
collaborative efforts of the UDC and the ILP to re-imagine Labour as a legitimate party 
of opposition to the government played no small role in nearly doubling the overall 
affiliated membership of the Labour movement by the end of the war.81 It follows, in the 
view of this writer, that the hybrid political platform of domestic and foreign policy 
reform evident in the shared propaganda campaign undertaken by the UDC and ILP 82 
would have a lasting impact on the constituency it was designed to mobilize throughout 
76 Cline, p. 4. 
77 Cline, p. 129 and Robbins, p. 64. 
78 Harris, pp. 125, Douse, pp. 24-34, Mayer, pp. 44-58, Robbins, p. 62 and 64-65, Henry R. Winkler, Paths 
Not Taken: British Labour and International Policy in the 1920's, (Chapel Hill and London: The 
University of North Carolina, 1994), pp. 1-6; Matthew Worley, Labour Inside the Gate: A History o/the 
British Labour Party Between the Wars (London; New York: LB. Tauris, 2005), pp. 1-4. 
79 Robbins, p. 62 and 64-65. 
80 Mayer, p. 49. 
81 Worley, pp. 1-4. 
82 For some discussion of this dualistic platform, see Mayer, 44-58. 
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the British Isles as well as the dissenting leaders who would lead Labour twice into 
government within a decade of the war's end. 
Although dissenting writers would remain firm in their conviction that the 
government's role in generating the war and its aims for prosecuting it had been 
misrepresented to the British public, the founders of the UDC nevertheless emphasized in 
their first public statement that, "there is no question of this association embodying a 
'stop-the-war' movement of any kind." Rather, they declared in a letter to the editor of 
the Manchester Guardian on September 18, 1914, 
the whole emphasis of our effort is laid upon indicating clearly the fundamental 
principles which must mark the final terms of peace if the general policies for 
which the present Government presumably stands, and which nearly all writers, 
certainly all progressive writers, have from the beginning urged, is finally to be 
vindicated .83 
As if to demonstrate the uniformity of principles between the dissenting left, the 
government, and the British people suggested by this statement, the founders identified 
First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill as "the first member of the Government to 
furnish the broad lines of the settlement" in warning days earlier against the dangers of 
"disregarding the principle of nationality and in rearranging frontiers without regard to 
the wishes of the populations concerned" at the peace.84 They then translated Churchill's 
sentiment into the UDC's first Cardinal Point for the peace that "No province shall be 
83 Manchester Guardian. September 18, 1914. 
84 The letter was referring to a recent speech given by Churchill on the government's aims for the war 
published in the Times of London on September 12, 1914. 
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transferred from one Government to another without the consent by plebiscite of the 
population of such province."ss 
Far from the claim of solidarity the UOC's identification of Churchill's aim for 
the war with their own seemed to make, however, the reference to his recent speech was, 
in fact, an indictment of its duplicity. The founders implied as much by suggesting in 
their letter that "it is unlikely that this aim will be realized unless behind the statesmen 
there is the push of a well-defined public opinion.,,86 As the remainder of this chapter 
will demonstrate, the early decision to place the interdiction of coercive territorial 
transfer at the center of the UOC's 'peace aims' and to specifically identify that aim as 
equally central to the war aims for which the Asquith administration had called the 
British people to arms was a crucial tactic for dissenting propagandists designed to 
undermine as far as possible the popular faith in British 'imperial democracy' as a 
legitimate institution of government. 87 
In The Morrow a/War (1914), the UOC established the fifteen to twenty page 
pamphlet as its primary publication form and offered in full its statement of purpose 
beginning with the Four Cardinal Points. The Points, which would thereafter appear on 
the inside cover of every UOC publication, read as follows: 
(1) No province shall be transferred from one Government to another without the 
consent, by plebiscite or otherwise, of the population of such province. 
85 Manchester Guardian, September 18, 1914. 
86 The letter was referring to a recent speech given by Churchill on the government's aims for the war 
published in the Times of London on September 12, 1914. 
fI7 I am borrowing the term 'imperial democracy' from Andrew Gordon to describe a government or a 
perspective on government in which the potentially contradictory goals of national democracy and imperial 
sovereignty coexist in a state of constant play in which one or the other predominates depending on the 
context or demands made upon the institution or statesmen in the moment. See Andrew Gordon, Labor 
and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (University of California Press, 1992), p. 7-10. 
44 
(2) No treaty, arrangement, or undertaking shall be entered in the name of Great 
Britain without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring 
democratic control of foreign policy shall be created. 
(3) The foreign policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating alliances for 
the purpose of maintaining the "balance of power ," but shall be directed to the 
establishment of a Concert of Europe, whose deliberations and decisions shall be 
public. 
(4) Great Britain shall propose as part of the peace settlement a plan for the 
drastic reduction of the armaments by the consent of all the belligerent Powers, 
and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general nationalization of 
the manufacture of armaments, and the control of the export of armaments by one 
country to another. 
Phrased like an abbreviated Decalogue of political practices to be forbidden in the 
postwar world, the Cardinal Points clearly reflected, as Harris has shown, the personal 
views of UDC founders on specific shortcomings of prewar inter-imperial and domestic 
politics.88 The Points also shared two other common characteristics, however, that have 
been largely overlooked by historians. First, everyone of the Points practically mirrored 
the lofty aims and justifications for the war offered by Asquith and Grey in their widely 
publicized speeches and reiterated by statesmen like Churchill thereafter as the 
government's 'national policy' for the war. Second, the negatively framed Points all 
targeted crucial pillars of the centuries-old British policy of containing inter-imperial 
rivalry through 'balance of power diplomacy' that, for dissenting writers, had made the 
outbreak of war inevitable. 
That these two characteristics seem utterly contradictory, I argue, was precisely 
the point. As MacDonald illustrated in the UDC pamphlet War and the Workers (1914), 
although dissenting writers would largely appropriate the language of 'Asquithain' aims 
88 For a discussion of the points in relation to the specific interests of the UDC founders, see Harris, pp. 47-
68. 
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for the war in their 'peace aims,' they uniformly believed that, if left to the whims of 
statesmen alone, 
all the blessings to Europe which were talked about on public platforms at the 
commencement of the war ... of course, will not be realized, some of them 
because they cannot be realized by any war, and others because they are as 
objectionable to Russia as ever they have been to Germany and Austria and are 
therefore not likely to come from the defeat of these two Powers alone.89 
More importantly, however, dissenting writers viewed Asquith's aims for the war as 
incompatible with fundamental precepts of British domestic, imperial, and foreign policy 
traditions. By mobilizing the British public in support of Asquith's principles recast as 
UOC aims for the peace, I argue, dissenting leaders aimed not only to deflect some of the 
opprobrium of the overwhelmingly pro-war British public, but to channel it back toward 
the government itself as the Asquith administration failed to meet the lofty expectations 
Asquith himself had set over the course of the conflict. That this was the intention of 
UOC founders from the beginning was made clear in their first two institutional 
publications, The Morrow of War and The National Policy (1914).90 
At the heart of the first Point dealing with territorial transfer, The National Policy 
argued, was the "principle of nationality" given so much emphasis by Asquith in his calls 
to arms, but more succinctly defined in the recent speech of Churchill as "the setting free 
of those races which have been subjected and conquered" and the settling of the "ultimate 
destination" of "disputed areas of country ... with a fair regard to the wishes and feelings 
of the people who live in them." With Churchill, the UOC agreed that the principle of 
nationality should be "the first of these ... great and sound principles for the European 
89 Ramsey J. MacDonald, War and the Workers (Union of Democratic Control, 1914), p. 4. Morel FJ3/6/J. 
LSE 
90 Although four pamphlets were published between The Morrow o/War and The National Policy, those 
two were the first to be published as the views of the UDC and not attributed to a specific author by name. 
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system ... which we should keep before US."91 The authors then expanded on the point, 
using the lofty statements of British statesmen to prove that "the absolute need for 
recognizing the principle of nationality and the consent of the governed and of 
abandoning the attempt to hold provinces acquired by conquest against their consent ... is 
recognized among the members of the Cabinet." Moreover, they argued, the centrality of 
the principle of nationality for both the pro-war and the pro-peace movements 
demonstrated a "remarkable unanimity as to the general policy" which "Ministers, ex-
Ministers, leaders of all parties, men eminent in thought and literature, the great 
newspapers ... consider England to be pursuing in the present war ... [that was] also 
remarkably [coincident] with the general policy of the Union of Democratic Control.,,92 
Similarly, the spirit of the third Cardinal Point of abandoning balance of power 
alliances and diplomacy in favor of a democratic and transparent International Council 
was also presented as common cause for the government and its putative opposition. The 
National Policy quoted with praise Grey's early commitment to "promote some 
arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no 
aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, 
and ourselves, jointly or separately," as indicating both openly and "very plainly not only 
the circumstances under which the war arose, but what must be the future of British 
policy if a recurrence of the present catastrophe is to be prevented.,,93 Similarly, Asquith 
had also defined his conception of the 'public right' as including "the substitution for ... 
the clash of competing ambitions ... of a real European partnership based on the 
91 Ibid., p. 3. For a full reproduction of the speech, see Times of London, September 12, 1914. 
92 Union of Democratic Control, The National Policy, (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1914), p. 1-
2. MoreliF 13/6/ 1, LSE. 
93 Ibid., p. 7. 
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recognition of equal right and established and enforced by the common will."94 Such a 
view was even more forcefully expressed, it was suggested, by former Prime Minister 
A.J. Balfour in stating that "the international future of our race lay in as far as possible 
spreading wide the grip and power of International Law" and that the "controversies 
which arose between Governments ... should be decided not by the sword but by 
arbitration.,,95 
The necessity of a policy of enforced disarmament expressed in the fourth Point 
was also dear, according to The National Policy, to former Prime Minister Archibald 
Primrose, then Lord Rosbery, who seemed to echo the ILP's manifesto on the war in 
recently warning, if retrospectively, that "When ... you go on building up armaments 
against each other, there comes a time when either the guns go off of themselves or else 
the people say, 'we can no longer bear this burden of suspense. We had better make an 
end of it and come to blows at once' ."96 Asquith himself, noted The National Policy, had 
specifically designated the first task of a European political system founded on the notion 
of the 'public right' as being "the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of 
militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States and of the future moulding of 
the European world."97 
The UDC's second Point of demanding the democratization of foreign policy 
making in Great Britain was, tellingly, given far less emphasis than the other Points in 
The National Policy. The authors demonstrated the official recognition of a need for 
94 Ibid., p. 7. 
95 Ibid., p. 11. 
96 Ibid., p. 6. 
97 Ibid, p. 11. 
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democratic reform with a quote from former Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen 
Chamberlain, who had recently commented that 
I don't know why this is, but in the most democratic of countries, our people have 
been told less of foreign politics ... than has been the custom in all great 
Continental nations ... it has been a tradition handed down, I think, from older 
days, when less dependent upon the voice of the people, and, as I think, not suited 
to the circumstances of to-day .98 
It was for this reason, the authors argued, that the UDC so strongly "urge[d] the 
formation of a deliberate and conscious public opinion ... to enforce those ideals" at the 
peace,for 
We do not know what the circumstances of the peace may be. We cannot 
estimate the diplomatic or class pressure which may be brought, even by our own 
Allies to influence the decision in some selfish or unwise direction ... Otherwise it 
may be that there will be only a partial and one-sided application of those 
principles ... [in which some] may find their nationality considered ... [while 
others] may have no security given them that their national existence will be 
respected .99 
The passive tone of these sections of The National Policy did indeed reflect, as Harris and 
Swartz have suggested, the sensitivity of UDC founders to the surge in patriotic feelings 
that accompanied the war and their fear of alienating potential liberal and working class 
supporters with overly critical language of the Asquith administration or the war effort.lOo 
That being said, the 'Asquithian' language of The National Policy also performed the 
more subtle work of establishing a touchstone for the government's war aims against 
which its policy could be measured in the future. Viewed along side the more directly 
critical language of The Morrow o/War, the tactic of setting the stage for the 
98 Ibid., p. 13. 
99 Ibid., p. 6. 
100 Within a few weeks of the war's outbreak, for example, Ramsay MacDonald offered to resign from the 
UDC to avoid rendering it ineffective merely by his association with it. For a discussion of the threat of 
dissent to traditional leftist movements in Europe, see Mayer, pp. 8-1-14. For a consideration of this by the 
UDC, see Harris, pp. 56-59 and Swartz, p. 32. 
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government's failure to live up to its own aims in The National Policy becomes far 
clearer. 
As The Morrow of War declared in its closing paragraphs, the UDC stood on the 
assumption that the aims for the war espoused by the government, accepted by its 
opposition, and championed by the British people 
cannot be attained until the constitutionally governed democracies of the West are 
brought to realize how impossible it is that their moral and spiritual development 
and their happiness and well-being can be secured under a system of government 
which leaves them at the mercy of the intrigues and imbecilities of professional 
diplomatists and of the ambitions of military casts ... [and] private interest 
dependent for its profits upon the maintenance of that 'armed peace' which is the 
inevitable prelude to the carnage and futility of war. 101 
There was no question, the authors argued, that, if clearly understood, the anti-democratic 
manner in which British statesmen had generated the war would persuade "any man of 
ordinary intelligence," not only that Asquith's aims for the war were nothing more than a 
bald deception, but that the very "system of Government under which we live is not a 
democratic system, but its antithesis."I02 
Beginning with the first Point, The Morrow of War stressed the centrality of 
coercive territorial transfer as the life-blood of the prewar inter-imperial system. Arguing 
the simple logic that, "if no province were retained under a Government's power against 
the will of its inhabitants, the policy of conquest and the imposition of political power 
would lose its raison d'etre," the authors explained that the Point had been "placed first 
because if adhered to practically and in spirit, and if recognized by the European Powers 
as a principle that must guide all frontier arrangements, it would help to put an end to 
101 Ibid., p. 14. 
102 Union of Democratic Control, The Morrow a/War (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1914), 
p. 6. MorellFl316IJ. LSE. 
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European war."I03 The great difficulty of enforcing the first Point lay in the logic 
undergirding the second. As territorial transfer became increasingly central to inter-
imperial diplomacy over the final decades of the nineteenth-century, the Foreign Office, 
already the closed preserve of aristocratic power in the British government, 104 had 
become impenetrably autocratic. Not only had the British public been "treated as though 
foreign affairs were outside-and properly outside-its ken," they argued, but the 
Foreign Office itself had gradually eliminated any form of public access or oversight to 
the point that even Parliamentary inquiry had become "so restricted as to be 
perfunctory .,,105 The result of this trend had been the enthronement of 'balance of power 
diplomacy' addressed by the third Point. For although the principle of the balance was 
meant to prevent anyone power from acquiring a predominant position in Europe, its 
practice had rendered "the public ... the sport of private ambitions and interests, of 
personal prejudices and obscure passions, which it can neither detect nor control, and, for 
the most part, does not even suspect."I06 As a consequence, Europe had become nothing 
less than a field of armed camps with each power "withdraw [ing] from the constructive 
work of the world, to prepare for the world's destruction.,,107 The time had come, the 
authors argued, for the British people to realize that "the domestic concerns of the nation, 
its constitutional liberties, its social reforms, all its internal activities in short, depend 
upon the preservation of peaceful relations with its neighbours ... [and] to insist upon ... 
some mechanical means whereby a greater national control of foreign policy can be 
103 Ibid., p. 1. 
104 The so called 'income test' required all candidates for the Foreign Office to have an income of at least 
£400 a year. 
105 Ibid., p. 4 and 5. 
106 Ibid., p. 6 and 7. 
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secured."I08 It was "to awaken these sentiments among the democracies of this and other 
countries," they declared, that the UDC had been formed. I09 
In the ILP's leaflet The Truth about the War (1914), ILP secretary Francis 
Johnson encouraged all members to purchase their own copies of the Labour Leader and 
to encourage as many other people as they could to do the same. In addition to 
supporting their party, Johnson explained, the proliferation of its publications was meant 
to counteract the efforts of statesmen and the pro-war press to 'bewilder' the man in the 
street with their audacious claim that the war was "a 'Just,' a 'Righteous,' and a 'Holy' 
one" while keeping from him any "real facts about the war and the causes which led to 
our being involved in it." It was crucial that members of the ILP "be well supplied with 
facts and arguments ... given week by week with fullness and accuracy in the Labour 
Leader ," if the pro-war campaign of misinformation and official secrecy was to be 
broken.l1O 
In keeping with the Labour Leader's promise, UDC and ILP writers spent the 
next eighteen months systematically deconstructing more than half a century of inter-
imperial diplomacy for their readers in complimenting and overlapping pamphlets, 
leaflets, and articles in an attempt to expose Asquith's 'war for the rights of small 
nations' as an inter-imperial war for the balance of power. The value of this campaign 
for understanding the position of dissenting writers on British 'war-guilt' and the state of 
British democracy has already been illustrated by other historians. I will take a different 
108 Ibid., p. 4 and 6. 
109 Ibid., p. 14. 
110 Independent Labour Party, The Truth About the War (Manchester: National Labour Press, 1914). 
ILPI51l914172, LSE 
approach in foregrounding the theme of the incompatibility of imperial interest and the 
principle of democracy embedded in much of the print product of the dissenting left 
dealing with the origins of the war. 
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The road to war, for most dissenting writers, began not with the assassination of 
the Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914, but rather with the signature of the Anglo-French 
Entente-cordiale nearly a decade prior. lll In addition to settling standing disputes 
between the French and British governments over spheres of influence in Newfoundland, 
Central and West Africa, and Siam, the Entente of 1904 gave formal British recognition 
of French predominance in Morocco in exchange for that of France for British 
predominance in Egypt. When tensions between France and Germany in Morocco 
resulting from the Entente brought Britain to the brink of war in 1911, E.D. Morel 
published a detailed history of the 'Agadir Crisis' called Morocco in Diplomacy (1912), 
in which he emphasized the intimate connection between government policies that 
flouted the principles of democracy, nationality, and free development abroad and the 
anti-democratic manner in which those policies were made and sustained at home, even 
in the face of war.112 When the Great War then averted finally came, Morel brought his 
study up to date with the UDC pamphlet Morocco and Armageddon (1915). 
Like Belgium, Morel pointed out, the independence of Morocco had long been 
recognized by "Public Law" among the empires rivaling for influence in the region, 
III Tracing the origins of the war to Anglo-French agreements over Morocco and Egypt were a 
commonplace in the literature, see E. D. Morel, Morocco and Armageddon, vol. 11, Labour and War 
Pamphlets (Manchester and London: Independent Labour Party, 1915), LSE IILP15IJ915156; C. H. 
Norman, Britain and the War: A Study in Diplomacy (Manchester: The National Labour Press, LTD., 
1914), pp. 2,8-9, ILP15IJ914153, LSE; Union of Democratic Control, The Balance of Power (London: The 
Union of Democratic Control, 1915), p. 15; Independent Labour Party, How the War Came, vol. 1, Labour 
and War Pamphlets (Manchester: The National Labour Press, LTD., 1915), p. 5, ILP15IJ91514, LSE; 1. 
Fenner A. Brockway, Is Britain Blameless? (Manchester and London: The National Labour Press, LTD., 
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specifically dating back to the Madrid Convention of 1881. Ostensibly prompted by 
unrest in Morocco, France determined in 1904 to seek recognition of her special interest 
in maintaining order there due to her position in nearby Algeria. The Anglo-French 
Entente provided this recognition in language that respected the public law's dictum of 
maintaining an 'open door' in Morocco and, initially, proved inoffensive to the interests 
of other powers. In clauses hidden from even the British and French Cabinets, however, 
Foreign Secretary Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, then Lord Lansdowne, and his French 
counterpart Theophile Delcasse flouted public law, Moroccan independence, and British 
democracy by secretly arranging for the political and economic partition of Morocco 
between Spain and France. Moreover, according to Morel, the French had secretly 
orchestrated the unrest in Morocco to bring about such an arrangement in a larger plot to 
exlcude Germany, her main rival in the region, in the first place. ll3 It was the German 
Kaiser, for Morel, who upheld the principles of the public law and Moroccan 
independence, once he got wind that Germany's then sizable economic interests in the 
region were being "humbugged and flouted" by officially recognizing Moroccan 
sovereignty in 1905 and demanding that the powers party to the Madrid Convention 
follow suit. 114 
For his part, Delcasse left no doubt that the Entente meant more than cordial 
feelings in his reaction to the German overtures, declaring in the French newspaper 
Gaulois (published soon after in the Times and various newspapers in Germany), "Of 
what importance would the young navy of Germany be in the event of war, in which 
England, I tell you, would assuredly be with us against Germany? What would become 
1\3 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
114 Ibid., p. 8-9. 
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of Germany's ports, of her trade, of her mercantile marine? They would be 
annihilated.,,115 Similarly, the Times, that "ever-faithful thermometer of Downing Street 
temperature ... believed all over the Continent to be the mouthpiece of the British Foreign 
Office," according to Morel, along with "virtually all the British Tory Press," responded 
with "inconceivable" violence, heaping "threats and insults [and] abuse" upon Germany 
and the Kaiser and "scornfully and violently" denying the right of Germany to any voice 
in the settlement of Moroccan affairs.116 Nevertheless, at German insistence, the 
Algeciras Conference of 1906 "laid down in explicit terms the Public Law of Europe with 
regard to Morocco's future" declaring its provisions to be based upon the "Sovereignty 
and independence of his Majesty the Sultan [of Morocco], the integrity of his dominion, 
and economic liberty without any inequality.,,117 Even before the Act of Algeciras had 
been signed, however, Lansdowne and Delcasse's replacements, Grey and French 
Ambassador Paul Cambon, had already begun new rounds of secret "conversations" even 
more explicitly coordinating their military planning in anticipation of such tensions 
eventually leading to open conflict with Germany. 118 
ILP writers produced similar accounts of the Entente, all of which pinpointed 
1905 as the moment when British foreign policy became specifically directed at isolating 
Germany in Europe and, consequently, the beginning of the road to the Great War.119 
The next step down that road, according to the UDC pamphlet The Balance of Power 
115 Ibid., p. 9. DeIcasse's statements were reprinted in Times of London on July 13, 1905. 
116 Ibid., p. 8-9. 
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(1914), was taken in 1907 with the Anglo-Russian Entente. Like the Anglo-French 
agreement, the Russian Entente involved a quid pro quo of recognition of 'spheres of 
influence,' the latter being concerned with the division of Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. 
It also shared the ulterior intent of checking the expansion of German interests and 
influence along the inter-imperial frontier by empowering her main regional rival and 
exchanged declarations of intent to support one another in the case of outside 
aggression.120 A third component of these agreements drawing the opprobrium of 
dissenting writers was the tacit complicity of the British Government in the exploitative 
and expansionist policies of the French and the Russians in the regions concerned. 
In Morocco, according to Morel, French "officialdom," backed "to the uttermost" 
by the British and in utter violation of her "solemn Treaty obligations, ... bullied, tricked, 
[and] exploited" the rulers of Morocco into complete economic and political submission, 
driving the state itself into a "bloody chaos" of civil unrest and economic depression. l2l 
In Persia, Russian agents similarly derailed the emerging constitutional movement, 
restored the despotic Shah from his exile, occupied by force the richest and most 
populous provinces, and aided in the disruption of the administrative missions attempting 
to restore Persia's ailing political and economic infrastructure then being conducted by 
the United States. 122 In both cases, dissenting writers argued, the Foreign Office had 
been permitted to sacrifice the sanctity of public law and to subject the national integrity 
120 Union of Democratic Control, The Balance of Power (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1915), pp. 
16 and 17, More/IF 1316, LSE. 
121 Morel, Morocco, p. 3. 
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56 
of weaker powers to the exploitative and expansionist whims of France and Russia 
specifically "because our policy was rapidly becoming anti-German in Europe."l23 
The first major challenge to the legitimacy of this use of public law to adjust the 
balance of power in Europe at the expense of small powers and rival empires came not 
from Berlin, but from Constantinople through the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. As 
C.H. Norman, a socialist agitator for the ILP and journalist known for his critical attitude 
toward imperial policy,124 explained in the ILP pamphlet Britain and the War (1914), 
with the rise of the Young Turk regime, "the Powers, who had divided among themselves 
certain portions of the Turkish Empire feared that Turkey might be induced to challenge 
the proceedings under which partial dismemberment of her Empire had taken place," 
namely the settlement of the Crimean War (1853-56) in which the belligerent empires 
recognized the independence of the Balkan States from the Ottoman Empire, along with 
their division into spheres of Austrian and Russian influence, as public law.125 For the 
UDC's Henry Noel Brailsford, perhaps one of the most prolific British journalists of the 
early twentieth-century and staunch critic of balance of power diplomacy, 1908 marked a 
pinnacle turn on the road toward what he considered to be a European "war for the 
Empire of the East.,,126 
Fearful of both Turkish and Russian designs in the regions, Austria responded to 
the Young Turk Revolution by formally annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. Perceiving 
this act as a violation of the "Austro-Russian condominium," argued Brailsford, the 
123 Ibid. 
124 See, for example, C. H. Norman, "Empire and Murder," Social Democrat Vol. 10, no. 5 (May 19(6): pp. 
264-273. 
125 Norman, Britain and the War, p. 1. 
126 Henry Noel Brailsford, The Origins o/the Great War (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 
1914), p. 14, LSEIMoreIIFl3161l, 
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Russian Government accelerated its policy of encouraging Serbian dreams of Pan-Slavic 
unity at the expense of Austrian legitimacy in the province of Bosnia and Ottoman 
legitimacy in the provinces of Thrace and Macedonia.127 Meanwhile, the "strangulation 
of all non-French enterprise" in Morocco, for Morel, was driving Austria's ally Germany 
to take a stand, however symbolic, by anchoring a single gunboat, the infamous Panther, 
off Agadir in 1911, that would bring the two powers to the brink of war .128 The Balkans 
were soon to follow in 1912 with Serbia marching toward pan-Slavic independence from 
Austria "in Russian greatcoats" and "financed by the French banks," according to 
Brailsford, and ultimately wringing international recognition of her gains in territory and 
prestige in the Balkans through peace settlements that were "directed as much against 
Austria as against Turkey" in 1913.129 
Although German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg was able to 
successfully arrange a quid pro quo with France recognizing French claims to Morocco 
in exchange for her recognition of German claims in West Africa and willing to accept 
the conclusion of the Balkan Wars in favor of the Serbians, he nevertheless came to view 
the two as aspects of the greater aim of "the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy [and] the scattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance with a complete 
isolation of the Germany Empire in consequence," a policy he believed, according to 
Norman, had been initiated by King Edward and gradually extended through secret 
partnerships with Russia, France, and even Japan.l30 The "British Tory Press" played no 
small role in encouraging this conclusion, for Morel, responding to the Agadir Crisis with 
127 Brailsford, Origins, p. 6. 
128 Morel, Morocco, p. 4. 
129 Brailsford, Origins, p. 7. 
130 Norman, Britain and the War, p. 2 and Brailsford, Origins, p. 7-9. 
58 
a "desperate eagerness ... to convince the British public that Germany's 'affront' was an 
affront to us; that Germany was threatening us ,,,131 a sentiment also conveyed by Grey 
and Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George in their 1913 statements to 
German Government and British people respectively that British imperial interests were 
to be protected against German aggression even at the cost of war.132 
The "naked simplicity" of the German "case" for taking up the cudgels of Austria 
over the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand even into a pan-European war was 
illustrated by Brailsford in a quote from the German White Paper in which her precarious 
position within the balance of power was made clear; 
Had the Servians been allowed, with the help of Russia and France, to endanger 
the integrity of the neighbouring [Austro-Hungarian] Monarchy much longer, the 
consequence must have been the gradual disruption of Austria, and the subjection 
of the whole Slav world to the Russian scepter, with the result that the position of 
the German race in central Europe would have become untenable.133 
Even more directly, Reginald Clifford Allen, manager of the PLP's organ the Daily 
Citizen and close friend of Ramsay MacDonald, linked Germany's belligerence to British 
foreign policy in the ILP pamphlet Is Germany Right and Britain Wrong? (1916). 
"Germany," Allen argued at length, 
is a nation of vigour and strength, she is a new nation, she is a growing nation ... 
what did this young nation find? Herself surrounded on all sides. Her expansion 
forbidden ... it is we who have forced all this German vigour into the wrong 
channels ... we have branded her whole national life with a military spirit; her 
only defense was one of aggressive preparation-and where better could she learn 
that spirit than from the Empire upon which the sun never sets?134 
13lMorel, Morocco, p. 14. 
132 Ibid., p. 17.Morel quotes from Grey's correspondence with the German Ambassador on July 23 and 
Lloyd George's Mansion House speech of July 22. 
133 Brailsford, Origins, p. 9. 
134 Clifford Allen, Is Germany Right and Britain Wrong? (Lawrence Mansions, 1914), p. 16. IILP1191613, 
LSE. For a more complete discussion of dissenting positions on German war guilt in relation to British 
foreign policy, see Swartz, pp. 73-78 and Harris, pp. 85-88. 
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As the ILP's National Council would suggest in its manifesto on the war, "when all this 
has been done, any spark will start a conflagration like the present.,,135 The mere fact that 
the concert of European power could have become so gyroscopically balanced along the 
inter-imperial frontier as to careen into a global conflagration at the assassination of one 
man or the invasion of "little Belgium" was clear evidence, for the dissenting writers of 
the ILP and UDC at least, that the prewar system of international relations was flawed at 
a foundational level. It was to the elucidation of these systemic prewar problems and the 
implications they held for the postwar world that writers of this mind then turned. 
Exactly how the progress of inter-imperial civilization had sown the seeds of its 
own undoing was explained by the UDC through an examination of a "set of political 
ideas conveniently summed up in the phrase of the Balance of Power" in a UDC 
pamphlet dedicated to the subject.136 The importance of understanding the concept, as the 
UDC pamphlet The Balance of Power indicated in its opening sentence, was that 
"Friends, enemies, and Englishmen irrespective of political opinion have all connected 
our part in the Great European War with the doctrine of the Balance of Power."J37 That 
the balance was "an accepted dogma of British foreign policy" had been clearly evident 
in the speeches of Asquith and Grey in justifying going to war. 138 There was far more to 
the doctrine, however, than "the principle followed for centuries by British policy of 
making head against the Continental Power which was strongest for the time being.,,139 
135 Labour Leader, August 13th , 1914. 
136 UDC,Balance of Power, p.l-2. 
137 Ibid., p. 1. 
138 See above, pp. 3-9. 
139 Ibid. 
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Quoting the words of the doctrine's 'admirers,' a long list of well-known 
academics, politicians, and intellectuals, the authors offered a popular positive conception 
of the make up and legacy of the balance of power. Citing the works of Emerich de 
Vattel, the doctrine was described as emerging in response to the increasing 
interdependence of European nations on one another as they developed into an organic 
unity, "one political system ... in which every part is connected ... in such a disposition of 
affairs that no Power can ever find itself in a position to enjoy undisputed predominance 
and to impose the law on others."l40 Subsequently, the existence of nations, according to 
H.P. Brougham, came to be defined less "in proportion to their internal resources [and 
more] in proportion to the place which they occupy in a vast and regular system," a 
system in which the "most powerful States, are for their own sakes, constantly watching 
over the safety of the most insignificant.,,141 The "balance of power" such relationships 
demanded, according to L.F.L. Oppenheim, provided both the necessity of and the 
necessary equilibrium for the emergence of international law , for "a law of nations can 
exist only if there is an equilibrium ... if the Powers cannot keep one another in check, no 
rules of law will have any force ... a balance of power must prevent any member ... from 
becoming omnipotent.,,142 In the views of these admirers, the author summarized, the 
doctrine, though resting "on the instinct of self-preservation ... has been developed into a 
political system, under the shelter of which the conceptions of international equity and 
the rule of law have grown in strength. It has protected the smaller nations, encouraged 
diversity of national type, and introduced greater stability in human affairs.,,143 
140 Ibid., p. 3. Quoting from Vattell's Le Droit des Gens, Book 3, Ch. 3, Sect. 47. 
141 Ibid., p. 4. Quoting from Brougham's Essays Vol. 2. 
142 Ibid. Quoting from Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, pp. 73 and 185. 
143 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Such a 'conception of political philosophy,' however, failed to consider the 
"inevitable inequality of power" pervasive in all human interrelations, for, as the authors 
argued, "Nations, like men, are equal in respect of rights, but in every other respect, like 
men, are inevitably unequal."l44 The "fundamental vice of the Doctrine" was its 
tendency to suppress, rather than nurture the development of national consciousness in its 
protectorates, 
regarding nations, not as living organisms, but as inert pieces of mechanism, 
without taking account of the movement which is perpetually modifying them and 
of the revolution that a man or an idea may suddenly introduce into the relations 
of one people with another. It seeks vainly to suspend the growth of vital force, to 
prevent this people from growing greater and another from declining, and it 
argues against the rise of the sap in a nation's springtime by quotations from the 
dusty archives of Foreign Offices.145 
Rather than progressing toward a more egalitarian international future, "the Balance of 
Power in practice ... has usually contemplated that eminently unideal thing known in 
diplomatic circles as the status quo ante," with the victors of "wars for the Balance" 
taking the day of their victories "without consideration of whether the state of things 
existing at that date was in accordance with reason or justice, and say that that was the 
ideal distribution of power, and that every disturbance of that relation was an offence 
which had to be corrected, by war if necessary ," the Peace of Westphalia (1648), Treaty 
of Utrecht (1713), or Peace of Vienna (1815), being but a few examples.l46 Inherent in 
these agreements was the "celebrated principle of the quit pro quo" concerning territory, 
144 Ibid., p. 5 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
"the principle by which if one robber steals a man's purse another thereby acquires the 
right to his overcoat and a third to his watch and chain.,,147 
The thematic comparison of the treatment, as well as the fate, of less powerful 
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nations to that of less politically empowered men was not merely a rhetorical tool, but a 
statement of the interrelation of domestic and foreign policy in Britain, the practice of 
balance of power diplomacy internationally being 
the equivalent, in international politics of the worst kind of Toryism in home 
politics. It asked nations to accept the position as settled by the last war as divine 
law, just as the domestic equivalent of the Doctrine asked the individual to accept 
the position into which he was born as the station to which God had called him, 
whereas, in fact, no one had called him to it but his father and mother. l48 
It was, in fact, the "early Whigs," with their Francophobic tendencies, that linked "a 
sound domestic policy with the maintenance of the Balance abroad" of checking French 
influence, "foreshadow[ing] a constantly-recurring tragedy in the development of 
progressive political thought in England.,,149 The ideals of both the American and French 
Revolutions were, the authors argued, derived from the England's legacy of progressive 
thought dating back to the Glorious Revolution. And yet, driven by balance of power 
politics, British Governments persisted in policies hostile to both leading to a series of 
wars in which the British abetted the subjugation of the revolutionary spirit of 1789 in 
France to the authoritarian rule of Napoleon, alienated and ultimately lost their own 
American colonies, and "victoriously defeated in our own country the ideas of 1688."150 
Not only was balance of power politics opposed to the spirit of 1688, having never "in its 
long history ... showed the least regard for the rights of the peoples ... [being] equally 
147 Ibid., p. 6. 
148 Ibid., p. 5. 
149 Ibid., p. 8. 
ISO Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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ready to suppress the just desires of a people rightly struggling to be free ... [as it was] 
sometimes opposed to the wrongful ambitions of tyrants," it was responsible for 
midwifing its antithesis in the rebirth of European militarism.151 
With the rise of the specter of Germany as, to the mind of Viscount Grey, 
Britain's most dangerous competitor for European supremacy, the doctrine of the balance 
was evolved from a policy of maintaining a status quo to one of forcefully isolating 
German power in Europe through entangling agreements with Russia and France that 
directly precipitated the Franco-Russian conflict with Germany and drew Britain into the 
fray immediately after them. The pursuit of such a policy, argued the UDC, was folly in 
that it ignored a basic political principle that national and imperial "growth and decline 
are the laws of Nature and cannot permanently be arrested by external force." What 
made such folly a tragedy, it was argued, was its self-perpetuating nature, for "as every 
war for the Balance has ended in failure, so every peace governed by it will be a 
preparation for another war ."152 
In recasting the First World War as the inevitable result of British foreign, 
imperial, and, indeed, domestic policy making, UDC and ILP writers called into question 
the very legitimacy of the principles undergirding Britain's 'imperial democracy' at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. As the self-appointed, and sole, Party of Peace in the 
United Kingdom, dissenting leaders also recast themselves as the foremost alternative 
leadership nucleus for a postwar British democracy committed to reversing the policy 
trends that had brought the nation into war in the first place. At the center of their policy 
151 Ibid., p. 7. 
152 Ibid., p. 23. 
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of critique and reform, as the above discussion has attempted to show, was the argument 
that prewar Victorian imperial ideals and the progress of democracy had become 
opposed, if not antithetical, to one another even under the leadership of the Liberal Party. 
Over the next two years, dissenting leaders would tum their attention to making 
political capital out of the popular support they were generating for a peace settlement 
along the very lines established by Asquith in his calls to arms. The Party of Peace, as 
the following chapter will illustrate, would transition during the course of the war into the 
main party of opposition to both the government itself and the prewar principles that had 
guided it into nothing short of Armageddon. A key component of dissenting propaganda 
driving this transition was the absolute inability of the political institutions of British 
government to privilege the needs of the nation over those of the Empire and the ruling 
class elites at its helm. In proving this supposition, dissenting leaders would draw from 
their own political legacy of challenging the corruption of national democracy in Britain 
into the inter-imperial despotism that had come to characterize it in recent decades. In so 
doing, I argue, these writers would not only undermine the legitimacy of British imperial 
rule at the popular level, but set the British nation on the road toward an era of 
decolonization in which the Labour movement would playa decisive role. 
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Chapter 2: Resisting the 'Philosophy of Expropriation' 
Whether the outbreak of the Great War had been avoidable or inevitable, the 
leadership of the Union of Democratic Control and the Independent Labour Party soon 
conceded the "imperative," as the UDC put it, "that, once begun, the war should be 
prosecuted to a victory for our country ."1 Nevertheless, dissenting writers invariably 
agreed with the sentiment, expressed by H.N. Brailsford, that the British people "are 
taking a parochial view of Armageddon if we allow ourselves to imagine that it is 
primarily a struggle for the independence of Belgium and the future of France," as the 
Government had claimed? For the 'spirit of Prussianism,3 was not some anomalistic and 
alien political philosophy that could be out-brutalized on the battlefield, but the 
governing dynamic of inter-imperial culture itself, with deep roots in the national 
political culture of their own Empire no less than that of every other belligerent power. 
The first step toward a true victory for the British people, in the sense dissenting writers 
envisioned it, over inter-imperial war itself was a popular recognition that their own 
system of Government had long been blackened with the same brush as their ostensible 
enemies and was no less likely than they to tum a military victory into a bid for global 
supremacy and the peace into merely the prelude to future wars. Such recognition was 
made especially urgent, it was argued, by the already perceptible drift of the Government 
away from its early liberal and idealistic aims for the war and into a more ambitious 
1 Union of Democratic Control, The Morrow a/War, (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1914), 
p.l, Morel/FJ3/6/1 , LSE. 
2 Henry Noel Brailsford, The Origins a/the Great War (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1914), 
p. 13. ILP/511914/53, LSE. 
3 'Prussianism' would have been understood by most Britons as a national adoration for militarism as a 
principle of social organization characterized by early modem Prussia. 'Militarism' would have meant the 
predominance of military discipline in both society and in governmental administration coupled with the 
belief in the legitimacy of military force as a means for national growth as well as defense. 
agenda that, if permitted to do so, would render the reconstruction of a postwar world 
capable of supporting the global advance of democracy and civilization impossible. 
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Although primarily speculative, such arguments could not have been more 
prescient. For, even as they were being introduced, the Government was already secretly 
undertaking operations in Mesopotamia in the name of long term imperial security that, 
as the statesmen behind their planning and implementation well understood, would likely 
prolong and intensify the war in addition to compromising their commitment to 
'righteous disinterestedness' in entering the fray. Although the British public would not 
become aware of the full implications of the political and military campaign to take 
Mesopotamia until the details were revealed by the UDC in 1917, by that time, as the 
following discussion will show, the UDC and ILP had done everything within their 
power to ensure that such a revelation, when it inevitably came, would be interpreted as a 
confirmation of the Government's illegitimacy as a democratic institution. 
This chapter examines the parallel development over the first half of the war of 
two competing ideas about the role of the British Empire in the pre- and postwar worlds. 
On the one hand, the anti-democratic manner in which the policy of occupying and 
dividing Ottoman territories as spoils of war among the Allied Powers was made and 
undertaken clearly reflected an enduring sense of ruling class entitlement to determine the 
scope and progress democracy at home as well as the political development of peoples 
abroad in the name of British inter-imperial supremacy. On the other, the dissenting 
left's identification of precisely such an approach to imperial policy as the root cause of 
the collapse of European democracy into a state of 'Prussianism' established a platform 
of imperial reform demanding a reimagining of the imperial' civilizing mission' as a 
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genuine force for international democracy in the postwar world and of Great Britain as a 
'nation without possessions.' 
In 1893 ,journalist and evolutionary theorist Grant Allen and socialist editor 
Andrew Reid attempted to capture in an edited volume the range of political ideas then 
coalescing into what they called The New Party.4 "Somewhat inaccurately called 'The 
Labour Party' ," according to the contribution of socialist journalist and author Robert 
Blatchford, the New Party was comprised of five component parts, the Fabians, the 
Social Democratic Federation, the Labour Church, the Independent Labour Party and 
"the unattached supporters of 'The Cause' .,,5 The goal of the New Party, he and other 
contributors asserted, was to unify these socialistic left-wing collectives under one 
political banner. Although the need for the New Party as such would be surpassed by the 
evolution of the ILP and the formation of the Labour Representation Committee in 1895, 
the early views of the many contributors to The New Party on political issues demanding 
the attention of British socialists offer illuminating insights about their presumed 
preoccupation with domestic issues alone. 
For William Pollard Byles, a Liberal journalist then being drawn into the Labour 
movement, one of the key goals of the New Party was to reverse the rise of imperial 
patriotism in Britain and to revive a "spirit of Nationality" or "local patriotism" in its 
place. The identification of "England's greatness" in "the extent of our territory, the 
remoteness of our dependencies, the strength of our navy, the deadly precision of our 
arms, the impregnability of our forts, the gold in our cellars, or even the volume of our 
4 Andrew Reid, ed., The New Party Described by Same a/its Members (London: Hodder Brothers, 1894). 
5 Robert Blatchford, "The New Party in the North," in Reid, The New Party, p. 13. 
trade" by "imperialists, as self-styled patriots love to call themselves" had had a 
detrimental impact, for Byles, on the national progress both at home and abroad. 6 The 
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obsession of broadening British sovereignty had "choked the machine" of Parliamentary 
government at home, disabling statesmen from attending to the dire socio-economic 
conditions of so many Britons. Abroad, it had given legitimacy to an abhorrent policy of 
"vanquishing and exterminating native races, and then exploiting the resources of their 
country; seeking commercial gain under the hypocritical guise of civilization ... and 
killing the blacks because it is so good for the whites and for the world at large." If 
imperialism was to be had, Byles demanded, "we want a nobler Imperialism than [that] 
The imperial platform Byles envisioned for the New Party was one committed to 
the devolution of power through the stimulation of localized government from the 
metropole to the periphery of the Empire. Beginning at home, the affairs of Ireland, 
Scotland, and Wales would be devolved onto Irish, Scots, and Welshmen, followed by 
the Dominions and then India until all former British subjects "do for themselves, and do 
well, much that the joint overstrained common Parliament now perforce leaves undone, 
or does badly and ignorantly.,,8 For it was only when English statesmen had freed those 
people that they themselves would be truly free to provide for a genuinely democratic 
national experience in England.9 
Although it may be true, as Stephen Howe has argued, that anti-imperialist 
sentiment among the British left before the First World War was limited in its extent to a 
6 W.P. Byles, "Ideals: Imperial and Social," in Reid, The New Party, pp. 39. 
7 Ibid., p. 40. 
8 Ibid., p. 42. 
9 Ibid., pp. 40-42. 
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handful of Radical, Liberal, and Socialist intellectuals and in its scope to an ambivalent 
adherence to the broad principles of internationalism and pacifism,l° socialistically 
minded writers and the ILP in particular were nevertheless alive to the fact that the 
emerging class of 'new imperialists' in the late nineteenth century had identified the 
'resurrection' of British socialism as a major threat to the survival of the British Empire.l1 
Indeed, according to Bernard Porter, "strong anti-democratic and anti-socialist threads ... 
[were] common to much of the imperialist writing of this time ... raising the question of 
which-imperialism or anti-democracy-was being used to serve which.,,12 As both 
Porter and John MacKenzie, have argued, the promotion of imperial patriotism should be 
viewed as an "alternative means of social control" exercised by the ruling classes at a 
time of pronounced "unwillingness [among the working classes] to accept their 'place' in 
society.,,\3 In their critiques of its naIve or contradictory expressions, however, historians 
have tended to dismiss, with Howe, the notion that anti-imperial sentiment in early 
socialist propaganda was doing similar work in redefining a sense of British national 
identity. As the following discussion will show, the imperial critique taken up by 
dissenting writers during the war was more a continuation of prewar concerns with the . 
Empire than a break with an exclusively domestic policy focus in imagining Britain's 
future as a 'nation without possessions.' 
JO Stephen Howe, Anti-Colonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire, 1939-1964 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 27-71. See also A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in 
British Power (London: Macmillan and Co. LTD, 1959), pp. 95-109. 
11 For a discussion of the rise of imperial preservationist societies in the late nineteenth century, see John 
M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 1-14 and 147-198 and Bernard Porter, The Absent-
Minded Imperialists: Empire, SOCiety, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 
164-169. 
12 Porter, Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. 206. 
13 Ibid., pp. 167-168, and MacKenzie, pp. 1-14 and 147-198. 
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In 1900, the ILP pamphlet Imperialism: Its Meaning and its Tendency emphasized 
a crucial connection between the corruption of Britain's 'civilizing mission' into a policy 
of conquest abroad and the stifling of democratic progress at home. That is not to say, 
however, that the ILP advocated dismantling the Empire. Rather, the recent "wave of 
Imperialistic sentiment" that the authors viewed as "interrupt[ing] ... the steady 
development of home politics" had merely brought home the necessity of bringing the 
civilizing mission back into line with its ostensible aims of nurturing, rather than 
obstructing, the progress of national democracy in the world. For although "conquest 
may have opened up one civilization to another in times long antecedent to the steam 
engine and world commerce," they argued, "to-day its only effect is to crush out and 
level down all national life to the dead uniformity of an alien political routine." 
There was no escaping that the Empire was a fact of British life, however, and 
"just as there is a personal responsibility to the State," the authors explained, "there is 
such a thing as the responsibility of a State to the world ... [and] if a nation is to do any 
good in the world, it must, like an individual, believe that it has a mission."14 That 
mission, for the 'man on the street,' was for the British people, chosen by right of their 
inherent virtue and deserved power, to take a commanding position in determining the 
spheres of action of all nations in the name of sowing and tending the seeds of 
civilization in whatever underdeveloped regions they saw fit to plant the Union Jack. 15 
Though a "genuinely progressive creed" in principle, the authors insisted, the measure of 
its legitimacy had to be the extent to which "the stronger nation [could] show that its 
14 Ibid., p. 6. 
IS Ibid .• pp. 5-6. For a discussion of how working class Britons considered the Empire in the wider world 
in the years leading up to the war. see Porter. Absent-Minded Imperialists. pp. 194-226. and David Silbey. 
The British Working Class and Enthusiasm/or War. 1914-1916 (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2005). 
pp.49-68. 
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discipline has an educational effect, that it is leading the subject nation up to a full 
measure of self-government." In this respect, the authors argued, British administrations 
had invariably failed, having tended to despoil rather than develop the national 
characteristics of peoples under their rule.16 
As the many years of British rule in India and Egypt had shown, even a 
"benevolently imposed foreign law and order ... has lain more heavily upon the national 
life" than the petty factions of unstable indigenous government it had replaced in terms of 
fostering a robust and self-sustaining national political identity .17 The reason for this 
failure, the authors explained, was the tendency of the British imperialist to view 
civilization as progressing mono-linearly and of democratic government as something 
that could be coercively imposed from the outside. The abject confidence of the 
imperialist in the superiority of his own culture had blinded him to the fact that "there is 
not only one good civilization but many" or that it was "not only impossible for one 
nation to civilize another by governing it ... [but] wrong that it should attempt to do SO.,,18 
For "conquered nations," the price of 'western civilization' was incalculably high, 
amounting to the unavoidable death of the national spirit. For even if such a nation is 
"docile and obedient," the authors argued, "its national initiative dies out and further 
progress becomes impossible," while "if it is active and clings tenaciously to its own line 
16 Ibid., p. 8. 
17 llllil., pp. 8-9. For a discussion of nineteenth century intellectual perspectives on the relationship 
between British imperialism and the progress of civilization, see Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and 
Empire; A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 77-110. 
18 Ibid., p. 7. 
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of development its government is not an education, but a conflict between rival social 
ideals and dissimilar stages of civilization.,,!9 
The authors stressed, however, that the cost of imposing British law and order 
abroad was equally high for the "Imperial nation," with such acts of cultural desecration 
and political suppression ultimately sanctioned by this 'civilizing mission' assuredly 
doing violence to the human instincts and political principles undergirding its own 
democratic culture. As the state of fin de siecie inter-imperial relations had clearly 
shown, they argued, "the acquisition of territory and its defense when acquired, hard] 
turned Europe into an armed camp.,,20 In Britain, as elsewhere, the necessity of 
reorienting the political economy toward a constant state of preparation for inter-imperial 
war had led to the enthronement of 'militarism' in the place of industry and citizenship as 
the determining principle for the course of domestic and foreign policy in Britain. The 
final consequence of such a trend for the world at large, it was prophesied, would be "not 
an extension of the area of civilization, but an increase in the number of dead nations," as 
the underdeveloped world was devoured by its more 'civilized' neighbors, themselves 
gradually degenerating into nothing more than armed camps of conscripted citizenries 
rivaling over whatever territory remained left to conquer?! As their own experiences and 
legacy should have taught them, it was simply not "possible for a self-governing people 
to rule a subject race and yet keep its own love of liberty ... no nation can play the part of 
the despot (even the benevolent despot) abroad, and that of the democrat at home" 
forever without the principle of the later being poisoned by the practice of the former.22 
19 Ibid., p. 8. 
20 ThW. 
21 Ibid., p. 9. 
22 !1lli1., p. 10-11. 
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In the wake of the Boer War, imperial preservationists began to push even harder 
for a more direct hand from the government in preparation for eminent inter-imperial 
wars. Such organizations as the National Service League (NSL) campaigned for a more 
compulsory approach than before, seeking to institute a four-year term of mandatory 
military training for all men between the ages of eighteen and thirty.23 In challenging the 
notion that the principles undergirding British imperial sovereignty were something 
worth preserving, ILP member and writer for the Social Democratic Foundation (SDF) 
Clarence Henry Norman took up the plight of colonial subjects in Natal and West 
Australia whom he described as "our fellow-sufferers from capitalist rule languish under 
worse oppression than ourselves" in his SDF pamphlet Empire and Murder. Building off 
popular outcry over the 'Natal Executions,24 and the publication of Dr. Walter Roth's 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Condition of the Natives of Western Australia in 
1905,25 Norman asserted that 
As it is directed to-day, the march of civilization coincides with the degradation of 
human kind, rather than its ennoblement ... Those who boast of "civilizing" the 
native races to-day apply the term to hide the fact that they are imposing on those 
races a system of torture and assassination, worthy of the Spanish Inquisition or 
the Chinese Boxers; they are busily engaged in murdering, not men, but the souls 
of men; not a few heretics, but the souls of races. We are told that the aim of 
civilization is to teach the ignorant the high ideals to which mankind should aspire 
- especially to impress on the heathen mind the magnificence of the spectacle of 
23 For a discussion of the expansion of the NSL after the Boer War, see R. J. Q. Adams and Philip P. 
Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-18 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1987),pp.6-10. 
24 The 'Natal Executions' involved the sentencing to death of at least thirteen Africans over the murder of 
two policemen during a riot over the imposition of a new poll tax in the colony of Natal in south-eastern 
Africa in February, 1906. Viewed as the beginning of the Bambatha Rebellion, the decisions leading up to 
and including the poll tax, the imposition of martial law ,the trials, and the executions all came under 
debate during and in the wake of the uprising. For a consideration of the 1906 uprising in relation to 
British colonial policy in Africa generally, see Paul S. Thompson, An Historical Atlas of the Zulu Rebellion 
of 1906 (Scottsville, South Africa: Privately Published, 2001). 
25 Chief Protector of the Aborigines in Australia Dr. Walter Roth was tasked by the government of 
Australia to investigate claims of maltreatment of Aborigines in late 1904. His 1905 report was a scathing 
exposition of abuse including enforced servitude in the pearling industry and the trafficking of Aboriginal 
women by British administrators. 
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all men receiving even-handed justice - British justice! We admire the courage of 
those who contend that this is the chief justification for the civilization process, 
and we accept the implied challenge, knowing only too well the strength of our 
case. 26 
Paralleling the failure of the recent Liberal government to address "the filthy squalor and 
saddening misery that we see and feel around us" at home and the perversion of the 
civilizing mission abroad, Norman declared that "In the history of the world of 
Humanity, civilization is what the Liberal Party is in the political history of England - a 
sham.,,27 
In 1907, MacDonald's Labour and the Empire similarly identified "a revulsion of 
the popular feeling against the feeble policy of Liberalism in international affairs" as the 
source of the pro-Empire movement, and its popularity, in Great Britain.28 Treating the 
rise of the imperial preservationist movement and collapse of the principles of the 
'civilizing mission' as parallel and related developments, MacDonald traced their advent 
to the 1870's, when Disraeli successfully turned frustration with Liberalism's failure to 
meet the demands of an increasingly competitive global economy into a renewed thirst 
for imperial greatness. Unfortunately, he argued, that frustration had been translated 
"from being a mere expression of discontent to being an opposition to the free trade, the 
internationalism, the humanism, upon which must be founded the colonial and world 
policy of a democratic State.,,29 As a result, any standards of 'British justice or honor' in 
26 C. H. Norman, Empire and Murder, (London: Social Democratic Foundation, 1906). 
27 Ibid. 
28 For a discussion of MacDonald's views on the Empire generally, see James Meadowcroft, 
Conceptualizing the State: Innovation and Dispute in British Political Thought 1880-1914 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 185-93; and Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to 
Colonialism in Africa, 1895-1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp. 185-190. 
29 Ramsey J. MacDonald, Labour and the Empire (London: George Allen, 1907), p. 14. 
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imperial administration were brushed aside as Britain's 'New Imperialists' rushed to 
squeeze every drop of wealth, power, and prestige out of their Empire. 
The development of democracy in territories under British rule was not only 
abandoned, MacDonald insisted, it was systematically crushed in the name of 
maximizing profits and minimizing overhead even at the cost of transforming free 
peoples into serfs or even slaves?O In explaining this transition, MacDonald retraced the 
steps of British imperial expansion to show how inter-imperial competition for foreign 
markets had driven British tradesmen to abandon any sense of fair play in favor of the 
more expeditious methods of exploitation, often followed by Government assisted 
domination occasionally resulting in annexation. The result, he argued, had been the 
coordinated devolution of foreign, domestic, and imperial policy alike into brutally 
"unsympathetic and unimaginative" mechanisms of British imperial supremacy, now "in 
declared hostility to democracy" both at home and abroad, should it stand in the way of 
that endeavor.31 Nevertheless, he professed the Labour movement's commitment to its 
own vision for the future of the Empire, suggesting that "the British Empire under 
democratic custodianship can be a powerful element in the maintenance of peace and the 
promotion of the international spirit," if the reins could be taken out of the hands of 
bureaucrats and financiers ("the mind behind imperialism with more to say in foreign 
relations than the Foreign Secretary of all the King's ministers put together," in 
MacDonald's view32) and put into the hands of the British people?3 The primary goal of 
Labour's imperial policy, MacDonald and Norman assured their readers, was to infuse 
30 Ibid., pp. 16-20. 
31 l!:W1., p. 15. See also, Paul Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness. Patriotism and the British Left. 
1881-1924 (Woodbridge and Rochester, 1998), pp. 69-71. 
32l!:W1., p. 21. 
33l!:W1., p. 37. 
"the Juggernaut car of Empire,,34 British imperialism had become with the tempering 
balm of British democracy in an attempt to bring the Empire and the nation alike back 
into line with the essential principles of British national culture before it dragged them 
into an inter-imperial war for global domination. 
Although historians disagree on whether the decline of Liberalism as the main 
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party of opposition in Britain began sometime before the outbreak of the war or over its 
course, few would question Asquith's concern at its outbreak that his liberal credentials 
remain intact as a wartime Prime Minister.35 By 1914, two Liberal administrations had 
kept the gathering movement for 'military preparedness' for just such a conflict in 
political check because they believed that the general public, strongly opposed to any 
form of compulsory training or service, would never support it. 36 Now, with the clouds 
of war gathering, tensions between what Nicoletta Gullace has described as a "broadly 
liberal paradigm that regarded free will as central to the constitution of a patriotic and 
moral citizenry" at the heart of British Liberalism and the inherent "distrust of democracy 
and the potential radicalism of the masses" shared by most Conservative leaders were 
coming to the fore over the immediate necessity of assembling an army, but also over the 
aims and manner in which the war would be prosecuted?7 
Less than a fortnight into the war, in almost a caricature of the imperially minded 
'enemy at home' disparaged by the ILP for decades, First Lord of the Admiralty and 
34 Norman, Murder and Empire. 
35 For a discussion of historians' perspectives on these issues, see Keith Layboum, ''The Rise of Labour and 
the Decline of Liberalism: The State of the Debate," History 80, no. 259 (1995): pp. 207-226. 
36 R. J. Q. Adams and Philip P. Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-18 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987), pp. 6-10. 
37 Nicoletta Gullace, The Blood of Our Sons: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship 
during the Great War, 1st ed. (New York: Pal grave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 101, 104-105 and 170-171. 
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staunch Liberal imperialist Winston Churchill advised the immediate conscription of all 
unmarried men and a preemptive attack on the Dardanelle Straits. According to David 
French, Churchill believed that an early British victory so near the Ottoman capital could 
fuel opposition to the war and the government throughout the empire, hastening the final 
collapse ofthe 'Sick man of Europe' and the end ofthe war alike. Moreover, the role 
played by British forces in the collapse would place the government in a powerful 
position to determine the "ultimate destination" of conquered territories, as Churchill 
would later put it, in relation to British imperial interests at war's end?8 Although alive 
its advantages both for the war and the postwar balance of power, Asquith's decision to 
scuttle Churchill's scheme reflected his concern that the government's aims for the war 
be perceived, throughout the British Empire and the world, as completely free of any 
such imperial ambitions. 
Intelligence from the Ottoman territories had been warning for some time of a 
Turco-German propaganda effort to generate a pan-Islamic jihad from Cairo to Bombay 
in which reversing British encroachment into the Dar-ai-Islam was the central message. 
Any indication that Britain intended to use the war to expand its imperial presence in 
Ottoman territories, it was feared, could spark revolt among Muslims already under 
British rule to the detriment of the war effort and even the future of British sovereignty in 
the Eastern Empire?9 On the home front, as criticisms of the recent war in South Africa 
had shown, the British public was less inclined than ever before to view wars of conquest 
38 David French, ''The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, 1914-
1916," War & Society 5, no. 1 (1987), p. 50. 
and Adams and Poirier, p. 64-66 
39 In this view, Asquith was influenced by the so-called Indo-Egypt Party of Foreign Secretary Edward 
Grey, General Kitchener, and Viceroy of India Lord Crewe, see French, p. 50 and Bruce Westrate, The 
Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1992), pp. 12-15. 
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as part of a civilizing or imperial mission worthy of their service or support.40 Popular 
hostility and organized opposition to compulsory service for the preservation of the 
empire since the end of the Boer War, most statesmen realized, demanded that the 
justifications for the war be framed as "a set of transcendent common values, including 
the sanctity of family, nation, and manly honor, [that would] inspire all eligible Britons to 
take up arms voluntarily," according to Gullace.41 Accordingly, in his calls to arms, 
Asquith screened the less noble aspects of Britain's involvement in the conflict from the 
public eye and presented his government's cause in intervening as a righteous fight for 
the principle of nationality characterized by a 'benevolent disinterest' in any form of 
imperial aggrandizement. As I have argued above, Asquith even went so far as to recast 
the role of the British Empire in the world as the most powerful force for the progress of 
global democracy and the war as the opportunity to reconfigure inter-imperial politics 
around the principle of nationality protected by an enforced adherence to the public 
right.42 Faced with the realities of fighting an inter-imperial global war, however, 
Asquith would quickly be confronted by the limitations of his Liberal principles and 
drawn into a war of territorial conquest in which conscription, and his own political 
demise, would become unavoidable. 
Dissenting writers took immediate issue with Asquith's conception of the Empire 
and its role in furthering the cause of democracy by placing their criticisms of Britain's 
imperial legacy and prescriptions for its reform at the center of their propaganda 
campaign. Among the earliest dissenting voices to take on imperial issues specifically 
40 Adams and Poirier, pp. 16-17; Gullace, pp. 100-103 
41 Gullace, p. 101. 
42 See above, Ch. 1, pp. 7-12. 
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was longstanding member of the ILP and manager of the Parliamentary Labour Party's 
organ the Daily Citizen Reginald Clifford Allen. In a speech given shortly after the war's 
outbreak and later published as a pamphlet for the ILP, Allen assured his audience that 
"Belgian neutrality or no Belgian neutrality, Britain would have been involved in this 
war" for the very plain reason that "accepting our foreign policy and our view of the 
Balance of Power, it was to our interest to join in.'043 One had merely to "look at a map 
and note how much of it is painted red," he argued, to see who the great imperial 
hegemon of the prewar world had been and thus, in his view, the party most interested in 
maintaining status quo ante of the balance of power at whatever cost.44 With many 
dissenting writers, Allen viewed with a profound sense of irony Asquith's conjecture, 
which he quoted in his speech, that 
We do not covet any people's territory, we have no desire to impose our rule upon 
alien populations. The British Empire is enough for us (Laughter and cheers) ... 
does it not follow from that that nowhere in the world is there a people who have 
stronger motives to avoid war and to seek to ensure peace? (cheers).45 
For what followed, Allen argued, was merely that the British had been "first in," having 
already '''cornered' the world" in terms of territorial conquest through wars no different 
in kind than the one then besetting them.46 Like all imperial competitors of the prewar 
world, Allen explained, Britain's domestic, imperial, and foreign policy alike had long 
rested on the simple principle of 'no change except that it be to my advantage and then by 
whatever means necessary at whatever cost to others,' a maxim he termed the 
43 Clifford Allen, Is Germany Right and Britain Wrong? (Lawrence Mansions, 1914), p. 21.ILP151191613, 
LSE. 
44 Ibid., p. 14. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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"philosophy of expropriation."47 When "all the best of the world is appropriated" and 
"there is no room for change," he pointed out, the natural growth and expansion of any 
nation becomes an act of inter-imperial aggression by default and, thus, a prelude to 
war.48 There could be little doubt, he assured his audience, that such had been the case 
with the rise of Germany to the minds of British statesmen or that the same principles that 
had guided the British Empire to the apex of the balance of power had not already 
"prevailed upon our leaders to reject their former beliefs with regard either to war in 
general, or this war in particular" in the name of maintaining that supremacy at the 
peace.49 The fact that such an endeavor was being presented to the British public as a 
crusade in defense of the rights of small powers, Allen asserted, merely proved that the 
"philosophy [of expropriation] prevails as much in our international relationships, as in 
our home organization."so 
Founder of the socialist paper Forward Thomas Johnston followed Allen's 
arguments in the ILP pamphlet Secret Diplomacy, Capitalism, and War (1915). It had 
not been "some supernatural power, some great dynamic force [that] brought this red ruin 
to Europe, as those who declare the war to have been 'inevitable' would have us believe," 
he argued, but rather the logical culmination of the intermarriage of capitalistic and 
imperial practices that had characterized the last century of European development. 
"Look over Europe," Johnston enjoined his readers, 
Profits, profits upon profits, invested abroad wherever there be profusion in 
minerals or cheap raw material in cotton or labour; the agents of one set of 
investors running into conflict with the agents of another set of investors; and then 
'delicate situations,' 'diplomatic pressure,' threats, bluff, movements of gunboats, 
47 Ibid., p. 10. 
48 Ibid., p. 16. 
49 Ibid., p. 10. 
50 Ibid., p. 11. 
and occasionally war. I do not say that all wars have been or are directly due to 
the clash of rival financial interests ... but the day is long gone when nations of 
men will murder one another for the Love of God or for Bonnie Prince Charlie; 
nowadays they will organize murder for nothing less than fair interest upon 
investment and more opportunities for extending that investment.51 
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Certainly, Britain's own expansion had been characterized by such a process no less than 
her competitors and to similar effect. In his ILP pamphlet Militarism (1915), former 
Chair of the ILP and editor of the Labour Leader Bruce Glasier challenged the popularly 
assumed "natural connection between commerce and peace" with passages borrowed 
from Sir John Seely's well-known Expansion of England, 
How came we to conquer India? Was it not a direct consequence of trading with 
India? And that is only the most conspicuous illustration of a law which prevails 
through English history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-the law, 
namely, of the interdependence of war and trade, so that throughout that period 
trade leads naturally to war and war fosters trade ... England grew more warlike at 
that time as she grew more commercial.52 
The long-term effect of this process on the practice of imperialism, as MacDonald had 
pointed out, had been the reduction of the civilizing mission to a mechanism for 
generating new markets and securing access to resources for which coercive exploitation 
and even inter-imperial war had become legitimate methods of imperial protectionism.53 
Far from the engine of global democracy, dissenting writers presented the British Empire 
as the main bulwark against the progress of civilization itself. Only a popular reckoning 
with the 'Prussianization' of British democracy it had wrought at home, they argued, 
51 Thomas Johnston, Secret Diplomacy. Capitalism and War (Glasgow: Forward Printing and Publishing 
Coy., LTD., 1915), p. 4, ILP Pamphlets. 328.61. PHM. 
52 John Seeley, The Expansion of England; Two Courses of Lectures, (London: Macmillan, 1914), p. 127, 
quoted in Bruce Glasier,Militarism (Manchester: The National Labour Press, LTD., 1915) ILP 511915140. 
LSE,p.15. 
53 See MacDonald, Labour and Empire. 
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could hope to reverse this trend from the center of the inter-imperial world outward and 
save civilization from its darkening fate. 
Dissenting writers appropriated the terms 'Prussianism' and 'Militarism' directly 
from the dichotomizing rhetoric of the Asquith administration to draw attention to the 
anti-democratic characteristics all European empires, in fact, shared in common. 
MacDonald spoke for many dissenting writers in his first publication for the UDC, War 
and the Workers (1914), in stating that, in his view, "what is known as Prussian 
militarism differs only in degree from British militarism," and, thus, "Great Britain as 
well as Prussia [will have] much to clear away as the result of the war.,,54 Like every 
'Great Power,' he reiterated, British domestic, foreign, and imperial policy had long been 
plagued by the growing influence of an imperially minded military caste that "wishes for 
war" as a means of checking the growth of rivals abroad as well as that of reformist 
movements in their own nations. 55 As Britain's own history had shown, he noted, war 
had invariably served 'Reactionary' interests, rather than the progress of such movements 
for the expansion of democracy. Even the French Revolution, he argued, had afforded 
the British Government the opportunity to crush "a strong and all-but-successful Radical 
movement ... in full swing in British politics ... [taking] half a century out of the life of 
British democracy ... and [giving] the Reaction an extension of life for thirty or forty 
years.,,56 If the current conflict was to be kept from similarly frustrating the progress of 
democracy by the forces of Reaction at home, he argued, the time had come for the 
British people to 
54 Ramsey J. MacDonald, War and the Workers (Union of Democratic Control, 1914), pp. 4 and 15. 
MorellF 1316/ 1. LSE. 
ss Ibid., p. 2. 
56 Ibid., p. 2. 
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Take from them the power to do so; shackle them with the responsibility of 
having to carry public opinion with them-not the farcical responsibility of 
consulting Parliament when wars have virtually begun, but the real responsibility 
of giving men and organizations of goodwill time to make themselves felt in the 
decisions of the nations. 57 
''To do this," he asserted, "is to be the responsibility of Labour."ss The first step toward 
mobilizing the public towards this end was to illustrate precisely how much their imperial 
patriotism had come to cost them in blood, treasure, and the very characteristics that 
defined them as modern 'free-born Britons.' 
The most complete consideration of the decent of British domestic political 
culture itself into 'Prussianism' published by the UDC and the ILP during the war was 
Glasier's two part series Militarism and The Peril o/Conscription (1915). Glasier began 
his study by defining the essential aspects of modem British identity as "the love of 
freedom - personal and political- in the liking for constitutionalism, and the sense of 
civic fellowship, together with the hatred of lawlessness, autocracy, and servility," 
characteristics and he collectively termed "British Civicism.,,59 It was no coincidence, he 
argued, that, foundational though they seemed, such attributes only truly took root in 
Britain at the closing of an epoch of imperial expansion with the defeat of Britain's main 
imperial rival at Waterloo in 1815. For it was only then that "the moneyed classes 
[became] too deeply engrossed in developing manufactures for the home market and for 
America and other lands ... to have patience with schemes of further conquest or warlike 
enterprises." While "imperialism languished" over the course of the nineteenth century, 
Glasier explained, the "rousing Liberal cry ... [of] 'peace, retrenchment, and reform'" was 
57 Ibid., p. 16. 
58 Ibid., p. 16. 
59 Bruce Glasier, The Peril oj Conscription (The National Labour Press, LTD., 1915), p. 7,lLP/5/J9J5/4J. 
LSE, and Militarism (Manchester: The National Labour Press, LTD., 1915), p. 4,ILP/5/19J5/41. LSE. 
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permitted to introduce "franchise reform, Free Trade, Chartism, the removal of religious 
inequality, public education, factory legislation, and Trade Unionism," into the British 
politicallandscape.60 Arthur Ponsonby concurred with Glasier in Parliament and 
Foreign Policy (1915), noting that the waxing of democratic practice in mid-nineteenth 
century Britain brought with it the "rapid development of democratic institutions and a 
great increase in the control exercised by the people over legislation and administration,rol 
accompanied by an awakening of the working classes to what Glasier described as their 
"titanic might" as political actors through the advocacy of the Labour movement and the 
teachings of Socialism.62 
By the final decades of the nineteenth century, however, it began to dawn on the 
ruling classes that their relative reclusion from the inter-imperial scene had permitted 
their rivals to advance in strides and that, "if Britain wished to hold the first, or even the 
second or third place" in the developing "scramble for the world's wealth" they were 
generating she would have to "work hard and perhaps even fight hard for it."63 To make 
matters worse, the rise of democracy in Britain had left the ruling classes "denuded 
almost completely of their political privileges" at home as well.64 Out of "fear of losing 
the foremost place in the scramble for the world's wealth" and the "desire ... to regain 
political command over the democracy," Glasier argued, a new "blood and iron theory of 
national greatness" was concocted by the true believers in the divine ordination of ruling 
60 Glasier, Militarism, p. 15. 
61 Arthur Ponsonby, Parliament and Foreign Policy (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1915), p. 1, 
ILP Pamphlets, 328.61, PHM. 
62 Giasier, Peril, p. 6. 
63 Glasier, Militarism, p. 16. 
64 Glasier, Peril, p. 6. 
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class supremacy at home and abroad and thrust upon the British people in the form of 
imperialist propaganda and the actual militarization of British society .65 
Glasier detailed the intellectual history of the 'New Militarist Imperialist' 
movement from the earliest enunciations of the doctrine that "war and the fitness for war 
are an integral portion of the conditions of creative advance: an essential part of the 
struggle for existence by which development proceeds" in the 1870's through to the 
"conscription agitation" in the name of British imperial supremacy emanating from Lord 
Roberts' National Service League and the Northcliffe press upon the outbreak of the 
war.66 The theoretical key to the movement, he explained, was the assumption that the 
history of civilization had been characterized by a Darwinian struggle for racial 
advancement in which British Anglo-Saxon culture had long been the forerunner in a 
race for final global hegemony. Its organizational principle was the substitution of 
enforced militarism for civicism and democracy in the name of preparedness for the 
inevitable struggles expansion and the coercive 'civilization' of their inferiors must bring. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, he illustrated with a series of quotations from 
academics, public intellectuals, statesmen, and the military, 67 how 
the notion that Great Britain was predestined to be mistress of the modem 
world ... [was] so deeply ingrained in the mind of the British people ... that they 
were hardly conscious of being prepossessed by it ... In much of our literature ... 
our church prescriptions, our art ... and our Imperialist orations, it is taken for 
granted that Great Britain is charged with the suzerainty of the seven seas and 
their adjacent continents ... [and even] in the Children's 'Empire Day' song ... the 
idea is instilled into the little ones that the earth is consecrated to the British 
65 Glasier, Militarism, pp. 16 and 19. 
66 Ibid., pp. 2,18 and 22 and Glasier, Peril, pp. 1-4. 
67 These included, but were by no means limited to the 'New Imperialists' James Ram and Germanophobe 
J. A. Cramb, the 'racial imperialist' Dr. Karl Pearson, the 'spiritual imperialist' Harold Fraser Wyatt, the 
'apocalyptic imperialist' Austin Harrison, and even the 'Anglo-Saxonist' American imperialist Theodore 
Roosevelt, as well as Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes, Earl Rosebery, and AJ. Balfour. 
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race ... they are asked to bow their head before the British flag, as formerly it was 
the custom to bow the head at the name of Jesus.68 
The chief purpose of such militarist conditioning, he argued, was the same 
everywhere it manifested itself. For all statesmen knew that the framework of their 
foreign relations was shifting from the pursuit and accommodation of territorial conquest 
to the prosecution of ever greater inter-imperial contests in which "the nation which 
devotes itself most whole-heartedly to the pursuit of war [would prove] worthiest to 
attain the greatest world power.,,69 It was no wonder, for Glasier, that the chief 
proponents of institutionalizing compulsory service in Britain, the "teeth and claws ... [of] 
the New Militarism," were also her most conspicuous imperialists and determined 
opponents of any movement to expand democracy in Britain?O For what was ultimately 
desired by the ruling classes of Germany, Austria, and Russia as it was by Britain, he 
argued, was a 
sweated army ... of men who have had no choice or will in becoming soldiers, 
who are paid coolie rates of pay and can be made to submit to the treatment of 
coolies ... that can ... be browbeaten by the military caste, and can in turn be used 
to browbeat the democracy ... they want it for the war, and for after the war. They 
want it for their Imperialist schemes abroad; they want it for their class vanity and 
political interests at home.'m 
The triumph of militarism in Britain had been made plain, for Glasier, by the eagerness of 
so many Britons to subject themselves to martial rule. The overwhelming military 
presence in Britain, formerly all but unknown unknown, now "everywhere meet[s] the 
eye," 
68 G1asier, Militarism., pp. 22-24. 
69 Ibid., p. 22. 
70 Glasier, Peril, pp. 4-5. Glasier specifically mentions Lords Milner, Curzon, and Derby, the Duke of 
Wellington, Marquis of Ormonde, and Earls of Meath, Fitzwilliam, and Winchilsea to name a few. 
71 Glasier, Peril, pp. 9 and 11. 
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One cannot walk down a street, or enter a tramcar, a theater, a church, or a 
railway station without meeting soldiers ... it is as though some foreign rule had 
suddenly fallen on us ... for as everyone who has travelled abroad knows, it is this 
very obtrusion of soldiery in public life that forms so marked a feature in 
Germany, France, [and] Russia 72 
Now that the road to global domination had finally been paved by the war, Glasier 
warned, Britain's militarist imperialists had less reason than ever to loosen their grip on 
the progress of democracy at home or abroad. 
The copestone that had long kept the edifice of aristocratic rule in Europe from 
crumbling beneath the growing weight of democracy, however, many was not the making 
of domestic, but of foreign policy. For it was through foreign policy making that the 
constant fear of war between rivaling empires, along with the working class notion that 
foreign workers were enemies, rather than allies, had been maintained. It was no 
coincidence, therefore, as founding member of the UDC Arthur Ponsonby illustrated in 
Parliament and Foreign Policy (1915), that the "method and machinery used for 
conducting foreign affairs" in Britain was also the area of Government most stubbornly 
resistant to any form of democratization, remaining not only "not in harmony with the 
spirit of democracy" that had infiltrated most other areas of Government by 1914, but 
"still conducted on more or less the same lines as they have been for centuries past.'>73 
The most conspicuously "medireval habits" characterizing the organization and practice 
of British foreign policy making, argued Ponsonby, were the strict limitation of 
applicants via an 'income test' and appointment system74 to members of the 'ruling caste' 
72 Giasier, Militarism., p. 1. 
73 Arthur Ponsonby, Parliament and Foreign Policy (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1915), p. 1. 
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in whose interests foreign policy was largely made75 and the near total exclusion of any 
form of democratic oversight, rendering the Foreign Secretary master of an elitist cabal 
"freer from any sort of outside control than any other Minister.,,76 
Following MacDonald and Thomas Johnston in setting the interests of the Empire 
in opposition to those of democracy, it made sense to dissenting writers that, as the 
primary tool of inter-imperial relations, the Foreign Office would prefer to keep its 
undertakings out of the glare of public opinion. "Secret Diplomacy," was not only, as 
Johnston asserted, "the finesse of the business, the white magic ... that keep[s] the 
audience mystified while the operator performs his tricks,,,n but also the 'blank check' 
given to diplomatists by their Governments to pursue whatever agenda was desired to its 
fulfillment regardless of the consequences any real accountability would have entailed?8 
Citing a variety of conflicts that had beset the British people over the past two centuries, 
Johnston illustrated that war itself, colonial or inter-imperial, had long been considered an 
acceptable if not advantageous outcome of such negotiations?9 As eminent philosopher 
and journalist Bertrand Russell argued in the UDC pamphlet War: The Offspring of Fear 
(1914), in the absence of such accountability, "when the Foreign Office desires to enter 
into a conflict, it can always, by selecting the facts to be revealed ... make our 
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Members of Parliament to show that "the wealthy classes; representing under five million persons, hold 
eight out of every nine seats in Parliament, whilst the working classes, about 40 million, that is to say, eight 
out of every nine of the people in the country, hold one in nine of the Parliamentary seats." 'Party Politics,' 
ILP "Coming-of-Age" Campaign Leaflet, no. 2,1914. ILP151l914154, LSE. 
76 Ponsonby, Parliament, p. 4. 
77 Johnston, Secret Diplomacy, p. 7. 
78 Ponsonby, Parliament, pp. 3-4. 
79 Johnston, Secret Diplomacy, pp. 4-15. 
89 
intervention appear as a defense of the oppressed against oppression or attack."so The 
path to the most recent war, Ponsonby asserted, had been no different, for "neither the 
decisions nor in the policy which led to the decisions was there the smallest exercise of 
any control by the people or their representatives.,,81 
With each and every belligerent thus free, as ILP Chairman F.W. Jowett phrased 
it, to "work in the dark ... [until] the secret wire-pulling, bluffing, and huckstering of the 
diplomatists result in war," only to later claim "to have struggled heroically and 
unselfishly for the preservation of peace," there was simply no way for the British public 
to know what they themselves were fighting for .82 The universal practice among 
governments of presenting their own case for wars of their own making as unassailably 
just, argued Russell, posed a "great danger to humanity" in inevitably leading to the 
proliferation of an irrational hatred and fear of all peoples by one another, a "universal 
reign of fear" anchored in a paranoid "state of mind" that he described as "barbarous, 
contrary to reason, contrary to humanity, utterly contrary to self-interest, and a return to 
the savage beneath the miserable rags of a tawdry morality.,,83 
Thomas Johnston voiced the consensus view of dissenting writers, as well as the 
heart of their critique of prewar political culture, in stating that, 
Had the people of Germany and Britain and France and Russia known ... that their 
lives, their liberties, their social aspirations were being gambled with ... that 
treaties with secret clauses were being signed ... that rival groups of financiers and 
concessionaries were quarrelling continually over the spoil of undeveloped lands, 
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and that time and time again the powder magazines were almost exploded and 
Hell let loose, Europe to-day would not have rocked as with an earthquake.84 
Moreover, as Glasier pointedly asserted, the British people were not informed of the 
dangers of their Government's foreign policy precisely because of their potentially 
negative response to it. For the advocates of the 'New Militarist Imperialism' clearly 
perceived "the feeling of repugnance to war and brutal conflict of all kinds [that] was 
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taking a deep hold on the nation ... with the growing enlightenment of the people and the 
spread of democracy" as a primary obstacle for their aims. They well understood, for 
Glasier, that "it was indispensable to the success" of their movement "that the commonly 
accepted idea that war is an evil, even if a necessary one, should be exploded."s5 From the 
beginning of the war, ILP and UDC writers complained bitterly that "one of the most 
difficult tasks at the present is to find out the real facts about the war and the causes 
which led to our being involved in it.,,86 It followed that the enforced ignorance of 
Britons about their government's role in generating the war would carry over into the 
masking of its evolving aims in prosecuting it. "No statesman in Europe," wrote C.H. 
Norman in Britain and the War (1914), "has explained definitely what the objective of 
any country participating in the war really is,,,87 their own having consistently failed to go 
beyond what Clifford Allen described as "the cant of the British Empire with its stained 
honour and its clever confusion of its interest and its duty" in their calls to arms.88 "So 
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long as the cleansing light of the sun falls sparingly on Foreign Offices," MacDonald 
warned, "the game of bluff, squeeze, and gambling risk can be carried on."89 
Reflecting back on the state of ignorance in which most Britons had been kept 
concerning the causes of the war upon its outbreak, his own included, then journalist for 
the Daily Herald William Norman Ewer would write in 1932 that, although "the man in 
the street in England could hardly have told you where Baghdad was or why ... anyone 
should be concerned about it" for most of the war, "so far as Britain and Germany were 
concerned, was very largely a war over Baghdad and Iraq." With the coming of the war, 
Ewer argued, 
the Imperialist mind saw a vision of a great new Middle Eastern Empire--another 
India-- which should be Britain's prize of war ... Not only would the seizure of the 
Middle East guard the routes to India, but the Middle East itself was to be a prize 
beyond calculation. The wealth of Mesopotamia ... would in itself more than 
repay us the cost of all the war. .. The new Empire would spread from the 
Egyptian desert to the Indian frontier, and north to the Oxus and the Caspian ... 
The British taxpayer is still paying today for the folly of the men who had that 
fantastic dream of Empire.90 
Although Ewer's conception of the "megalomaniac dream" of empire was, of course, a 
bit of an exaggeration, it points up the dualistic nature of the anti-democratic tendencies 
of imperial government stressed by dissenting writers at the time. The British 
democracy, they believed, was being deceived by their government into fighting for the 
subjugation and exploitation of other peoples abroad on the pretense that they were, in 
fact, liberating them. Kept in the dark with the rest of the British public, dissenting 
writers could only have guessed that the Asquith administration had already begun 
89 Ramsey J. MacDonald, War and the Workers (Union of Democratic Control, 1914), p. 15, 
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preemptively dividing the anticipated spoils of power and territory from Berlin to 
Bombay among their allies. But guess they did, and with a remarkable degree of 
accuracy. In the absence of concrete evidence, UDC and ILP writers organized their 
critiques around the probability that British inter-imperial policy would continue to trend 
toward its pre-war aims and in the anti-democratic manner in which its makers had grown 
accustomed. 
For dissenting writers familiar with the intrigue and ambition that had 
characterized a century of Britain's imperial relations with her Allies, such as 
MacDonald, Morel, and Brailsford, there was no question that the war being waged was, 
as Brailsford put it, "a struggle for the hegemony of the Near East ... [that] will end 
logically ... in a melting of all the frontiers of the East, and the settlement by force of arms 
of the question whether its destinies shall be governed by Germany or Russia."91 The 
question was the nature of Britain's interest in a Russian victory if, in fact, Asquith had 
no intention of taking part in the spoils himself. Should the Russians be permitted by the 
British to finally take Constantinople, MacDonald pointed out, not only would her 
"enormously enhanced ... prestige in the East. .. be [a] menace to all other Powers," but 
her brutal indifference to the inhabitants of those territories would surely "hasten into 
conflict all the big fundamental questions of race and colour which have been classed 
under the problem of East and West," sparking yet another sort of war between colonized 
peoples and their European conquerors.92 
Well before Germany had made its way into popular British literature as the evil 
'other' against which Britain's nobler imperial mission was defined, the role had 
91 Brailsford, Origins, p. 13. 
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belonged to Russia, Britain's longstanding opponent for influence in the East.93 From 
such popular novels as Rudyard Kipling's Kim and decades of coverage from the 'yellow 
press' on the intrigues of the so-called Great Game, Russia's 'historic mission' to possess 
Constantinople and ambitions in the Balkans and Persia would have been well known to 
many Britons by 1914.94 However firm Asquith's commitment to ending the war with no 
more territory than he began it may have been, there was no question for dissenting 
writers that their Russian Ally had no such reservations. Asquith's willingness to go to 
war in support of a power widely known to be driven by interests as antithetical to his 
own aims for the war as Germany or Austria, dissenting writers near universally argued,95 
begged a closer inspection of what was, in truth, driving the British onto the field. 
The ILP, for one, immediately identified Russia as "the most reactionary, corrupt, 
and oppressive Power in Europe" in questioning Asquith's choice of alliances.96 Henry 
Brailsford reserved his criticism for Asquith himself in asking, "what man in his senses 
would have suggested that the best way to serve the cause of nationality was to bring 
fresh subject races under the Russian yoke?,,97 For even in the best case of a victory for 
the Triple Entente, Brailsford claimed, Russia would be empowered to wrest, at the very 
least most of the Balkan states from Austria, meaning that 
they will pass from a higher to a lower civilization, from a system usually tolerant 
and fitfully Liberal, to one which has not even begun to grasp the idea of 
toleration, and whose answer to Liberalism is the censorship, the prison, and the 
'truly Russian' pogrom.98 
93 Silby, pp. 54-60. 
94 Ibid. and Porter, Absent-Minded Imperialists, pp. 176-180. 
95 See for example, MacDonald, War and Workers, p. 4. 
96 Independent Labour Party, The War in Europe: Manifesto of the Independent Labour Party (Manchester 
and London: The National Labour Press, LTD., 1914).ILP/5/1914/74, LSE. 
97 Henry Noel Brailsford, The Origins of the Great War (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1914), 
p. 15. Morell F/3/6/1, LSE 
98 Brailsford, Origins, p. 14. 
94 
Even on "the lower level of self-interest and Imperial expediency," Brailsford inquired, 
"have we reason to desire a world in which the Balance of Power will lurch violently to 
the side of this unscrupulous and incalculable Empire?" Within a year of the peace, 
Brailsford prophesied, "as Russia forces her way through the Dardanelles, dominates 
Turkey, overruns Persia, and bestrides the road to India, our Imperialists will be calling 
out for a stronger Germany to balance a threatening Russia" and thus calling into being 
yet another global conflagration.99 
The fears of UDC and ILP leaders that a more aggressive prosecution of the war 
was, in fact, already in the offing were not abated by Asquith's somewhat less liberal war 
aims addendum of November 1914 that British forces "shall never sheath the sword that 
we have not lightly drawn ... until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally 
destroyed" and that, in aligning themselves with Germany, Turkish statesmen had "rung 
the death-knell of the Ottoman dominion, no only in Europe but in Asia."lOo A hint of the 
policy implications of this announcement appeared in the Manchester Guardian on the 
same day, with the news that British operations off the coast of Mesopotamia, begun in 
secret a few weeks earlier, had 
ceased to be a campaign for securing the head of the Gulf, for Basrah ... has now 
been occupied ... the main object of this campaign, no doubt, is to prevent Turkish 
troops in Mesopotamia from going to the assistance of the Damascus Corps ... but 
the area of military activity also, no doubt, indicates the sphere of political interest 
that may be claimed by the Power conducting the campaign on the break-up of 
Turkey.lOl 
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The Guardian's observations and the concerns of dissenting writers could not have been 
more prescient, for the negotiations of the territorial spoils of that break-up had already 
begun. 
It should be noted here that Asquith's initial commitment to limiting the scope of 
the war and the amount of territory occupied by British forces during its course is largely 
born out by the available evidence and the assessment of historians. As John Turner has 
argued, it was Asquith's stubborn fidelity to the Liberal principle of volunteerism that 
had obstructed a more aggressive opening prosecution of the war that, Asquith believed, 
would have hastened the need for conscription.I02 Similarly, Edward David has argued 
that it was precisely Asquith's adherence to the belief "that the war was being fought to 
preserve certain established political beliefs ... and that such principles should not be 
violated even in the cause of national victory" that would ultimately drive his Liberal 
opponents into alliance with those who believed "that all should be sacrificed to 
expediency in winning the war [and] that the end of victory was more important than the 
means used to achieve it."I03 Just as the UDC and the ILP had warned, however, it would 
be the legacy of balance of power diplomacy and the demands of inter-imperial alliances 
that would determine the course of the war and the nature of its settlement, not the lofty 
declarations of their Liberal Prime Minister. 
As early as September 1914, Russia's traditional ambition to take Constantinople 
and fears of British and French duplicity had led Tsar Nicholas II to inform his allies of 
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his intentions to use the war to claim that city for his empire. 104 According to A. L. 
MacFie and Keith Wilson, although Grey would certainly not have welcomed the idea of 
an inter-imperial Europe dominated by an empowered 'Cossack Empire' expressed in 
dissenting propaganda, two other considerations took precedence in his policy decisions. 
For MacFie, Grey recognized that any deviation of Russian troops from the main Western 
front in a bid to take Constantinople before their British rivals beat them to the punch 
would have demanded an immediate compensatory increase in British recruitment and 
the threat of a manpower crisis his government simply could not afford. For Wilson, 
Grey's foremost concern was "that Britain remained an imperial power, and on good 
terms with the only great power that could threaten India, directly or indirectly" at war's 
end.105 When Ottoman statesmen chose to align themselves with Germany in early 
November, Grey had little choice but to inform Russian Ambassador Alexander 
Benckendorff that, to the mind of the British government, "the conduct of the Turkish 
Government ... [has] made a complete settlement of the Turkish question, including that 
of the [Dardanelle] Straits and Constantinople, in agreement with Russia 
inevitable ... whether or not Turkish rule is overthrown in the course of hostilities.,,106 
When Russian statesmen solicited a guarantee from Grey that spring by way of a 
formal agreement to recognize one another's claims in the Ottoman territories after the 
war, along with those of France, Asquith was forced to acknowledge that, if "for one 
reason or another, because we didn't want more territory, or because we didn't feel equal 
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to the responsibility, we were to leave the other nations to scramble for Turkey without 
taking anything for ourselves, we should not be doing out duty.',I07 Accordingly, on 
April 8 1915, Asquith appointed a Committee on Asiatic Turkey under the chairmanship 
of Maurice de Bunsen to ascertain the parameters of British desiderata in the region, their 
final report reflecting Asquith's view that, despite their reluctance to do so, "events [had] 
passed beyond our controL .. compel[ling] us for good or ill to claim our share in the 
disintegrating Turkish Empire.,,108 Because British claims amounted to domimince in the 
Persian Gulf generally and because they were not at war with Persia, her territorial 
desideratum were in the vilayets of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Although the progress 
of British operations in the East would make the de Bunsen Committee Report a dead 
letter within a few months of its submission, its findings nevertheless corroborate the 
assumptions being made by dissenting writers about the 'official mind' of the 
government on the future of the Eastern Empire. 
As the UDC and ILP had been warning from the beginning of the war, the de 
Bunsen Committee reported that claiming territory in the East was the only way to 
guarantee that it would not be claimed by enemy or ally alike at war's end.109 Echoing 
Brailsford's depiction of the 'war for the Empire of the East,' the Committee stated that 
the Eastern Question was approaching its 'final settlement' during the war and that, as a 
result, 
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whether of zones of influence or of partition, certain areas will be claimed and 
absorbed by France and Russia. Whether these areas be large or small, they will 
in due course follow the inevitable law and extend beyond the limits originally 
assigned to them, if the territory beyond their borders is desirable in itself, and is 
in the hands of an incapable and stagnant administration. If therefore British 
administration ends, say at Kuma, the day will come when the real master of 
Baghdad and owner of Mesopotamia will be France or Russia, and once more the 
direct menace of a rival European Power will challenge our supremacy in the 
Persian Gulf.1l0 
In defending Britain's right to hold influence in the Gulf, the Committee expressed even 
more clearly than the ILP's Imperialism (1900) or MacDonald's Labour and the Empire 
(1907) the purely self-referential or even tautological nature of British justifications for 
maintaining and expanding imperial rule. "Our claim to a share in settling the destiny of 
Asiatic Turkey," the committee asserted, 
is valid because it springs from one of the cardinal principles of our policy in the 
East, our special and supreme position in the Persian Gulf. From that principle, 
and from the developments, often unconscious, of the policy necessary to 
maintain it, other claims and aspirations have arisen; but therein lies their 
justification .111 
The Committee held no illusions about the implications of dismantling the Ottoman 
Empire for Asquith's war aims or the duration and intensity of the war. The plan "to 
dismember most of Asiatic Turkey," they argued, 
would mean prolonging the war far beyond the fall of Constantinople. At that 
moment we might be able to get a fairly satisfactory peace, but we should not get 
the Turks to yield Armenia, Cilicia, Syria, Mosul, and Mesopotamia, without 
further fighting ... The character of the war would be changed. ll2 
In order to minimize the political backlash of such a transition, the Committee 
recommended a scheme that would ostensibly be more in "consonance with the political 
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theories of the Allies ... [and] more consistent with our original attitude in regard to the 
war" than outright partition and annexation.!13 Apart from a few areas of especial 
strategic interest, the five Ottoman provinces of Anatolia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, and 
Iraq would become separate administrative zones with local governments under British 
oversight and protection.114 Such a scheme, it was determined, would guarantee the 
predominance of British influence in the regions while minimizing actual commitments 
of men or money and avoiding offending the national aspirations of Ottoman subjects 
where they existed. Moreover, they explained, even if the scheme collapsed completely, 
there is always a good chance of there arising several autonomous States ... under 
a nominal suzerainty of the Sultan ... [which] it will be noticed ... [will] 
correspond with the areas allotted ... under partition or zones of interest [to the 
Allies] ... we are thus favourably placed, in the event of the complete breakdown 
of the scheme, for securing our political and commercial interests, and indeed 
there seems no valid reason why the di vision of Turkey into these [zones] need 
necessarily preclude an understanding among the Allies as to the areas in which 
each of them claims to have special interests. 115 
On the very day the Committee on Asiatic Turkey was called into being, Charles 
Trevelyan decried the logic undergirding its findings in a Times article declaring that 
days of "Home Rule ... iniquitous partitions ... [and the imposition] of alien governments" 
that had characterized Britain's imperial civilizing mission were coming to an end. It 
was, in fact, the very principles undergirding Asquith's war aims, Trevelyan argued, that 
had accelerated the "craving for national development" among subject peoples the world 
over into formidable movements for national independence. Having already 
"demonstrably failed by every standard which regards the happiness and prosperity of the 
people as the true criterion," Trevelyan insisted, the pretense of Home Rule or indirect 
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colonial government had little hope of ever satisfying these renewed and expanded 
aspirations for recognition of nationality and independence among peoples who believed 
that Asquith's principle of nationality applied to them as equally as it did to Belgium or 
even the powers of Europe. The question now to be faced was whether the British people 
or their Government were "prepared to apply [their] principles universally." Trevelyan 
feared that they reverse was true, noting that "in the last few months the anti-liberal 
forces have been gathering strength," the Times now 'jeering' at the idea, once the 
beating heart of Britain's call to arms, that the war was being fought for the rights of 
small nations like Belgium and not for the postwar dismemberment and imperial 
absorption of the Central Powers. 116 
In The War and the Far East (1915), MacDonald pointed out that such aspirations 
were not limited to potential additions to the Empire, but extended to the peoples and 
territories already under its rule. In what read like a direct retort to Asquith's celebration 
of Indian imperial patriotism in his calls to arms, MacDonald referenced a variety of 
Indian newspapers reflecting the view that India had entered the fray at Britain's side not 
out of any real sense of imperial patriotism, but from the desire to realize its "dream of a 
restoration of nationalist and racial authority and a vindication of itself by force and in 
war. .. fighting on terms of equality with Western men."ll7 India's participation in the 
war, he argued, had fostered a popular awakening among Indians generally to their own 
sense of national identity, instilling "a 'new vision' of equality, and of an independence 
within the Empire won by service in the hour of need" and arousing" a 'new self-
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consciousness'" that had brought long held but "far off ultimates, ideals, [and] goals ... 
down to immediate demands.,,1l8 Although, as Asquith had emphasized, India did not 
hesitate to take up arms when called by the Empire, Indian journalists lamented that, even 
in the wake of such a gesture of solidarity, 
England cannot get rid of the idea that 'India has no future before her in the 
history of modem humanity except as a dependency of Great Britain,' and that 
has prevented her from understanding the enthusiasm of Indian loyalty which 
claimed the right to serve an Empire in which it intended to be a self-governing 
part.1l9 
In the face of such an expression of loyalty, maturity, and commitment to the ideals for 
which the British Empire ostensibly stood and entered the war to defend, asked 
MacDonald, "are we prepared to ask [India] to come and sit at the fireside of our Empire 
on equality with our own daughter States?" and, even further, 
Is self-government the ideal of British rule? If it is, let there be a substantial 
contribution made to it now. Let the assumptions of a permanent ruling class, 
controlling the political destinies of a permanently subordinate people, disappear. 
Let the Indians be taken into the system of government as co-operating equals.120 
The price of failing to recognize this responsibility, he argued, would be dire. For "the 
greater the service which a subordinate State gives ... the greater will be the energy ... put 
into its demands for freedom." The 'hand of the bombmaker,' he argued, would not be 
occupied with defending Britain's imperial interests abroad forever. l2l 
The failure of the British Government to recognize, let alone reward, the evident 
maturation of national ideals among its subjects with actual political rights was, of 
course, merely an echo of the long standing arguments of many dissenting voices about 
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the conditions of the working classes at the home. Just as Asquith had employed the 
example of Indian zeal to serve as a prod to compel the volunteerism of British nationals, 
so too did dissenting writers use the example of their aspirations for self-government to 
link the metropolitan struggles with ruling class domination to those taking place 
throughout the imperial periphery. In Nationality and Patriotism (1915), C.H. Norman 
emphasized "a plain contradiction between Patriotism and Imperialism" in principle.122 
For, in addition to a common sense of national unity, an essential component of national 
existence, he argued, was the freedom from external impairment of that existence. At 
home, he argued, "the ruling classes ... believe that their political existence depends upon 
militarism; their economic privileges upon the right of exploiting the labour and assets of 
the community,,,I23 while abroad, the Empire has only proven its ability to "crush the 
nationalities composing it [and] ... the attach[ment] ofthese peoples to systems of 
government which are repugnant to them" in a manner totally "contrary to the modem 
spirit of national self-government."I24 
With the debate over conscription already raging by mid-1915, Norman linked the 
conscription of life from British workers with the conscription of lands from colonized 
peoples in a cycle of imperial exploitation and oppression fueled by wars of conquest that 
benefited no one but the propertied ruling classes who invariably employed the language 
of patriotism and nationality to rally popular support for their exploits. What the war 
signified, for Norman, was the culminating blowback of centuries of ruling class 
aggrandizement at the expense of the lower classes now being called, once again, to 
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defend them and the myriad peoples they had conquered. For as history had shown, 
"Imperialist domination eventually provokes an overwhelming combination against that 
nation which has been seeking to crush the world under its rule."125 Answering the call of 
imperial patriotism, he asserted, only empowered the very forces seeking to make war in 
the name of their own supremacy, the "enemy within the gate" that, "however 
desperately and courageously [the working classes] may fight any foreign foe ... will not 
guarantee them any portion of British soil except the pauper's grave.,,126 Using the 
example of the Irish, "a people whose nationality has been impaired by British rule,,,127 
Norman noted that patriotism, or the "passion impelling a person to serve his country 
either in defending it from invasion ... or in upholding the rights and liberties of the 
people ... against tyrannical infringements," compelled the Irishman to deny England, his 
oppressor, access to his personal service in protecting the very inter-imperial system that 
perpetuated and justified his oppression. Similarly, the true patriot and adherent to the 
principle of nationality, he argued, should also logically "applaud the efforts of the native 
inhabitants of Egypt, Ireland, the Indian races, the Cypriots, and the Maltese, to eject 
their British rulers ,,,128 the "one belligerent that has had to meet an actual revolt among its 
subjects" over the course of the war.J29 
The hypocrisy of the imperial patriotism expected by the ruling classes of their 
voiceless subjects, Norman argued, illustrated the connection between "the unhealthy 
system of class rule" at home and the "outstanding evil" of imperialistic militarism 
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abroad. 130 A genuine national experience was not available anywhere in the British 
Empire precisely because of the diversity of national spirit it, quite literally, sought to 
contain. J3J Only "under an Empire organized upon autonomous principles of self-
government and national freedom," argued Norman, could the national spirit of such 
subjugated peoples as the Irish, Egyptians, or Indians "survive and ... reach a high degree 
of development.,,132 
At the ILP's annual conference for 1915 that April in Norwich, its leaders were 
taking such sentiments to their logical conclusions in resolving to fight for "the ultimate 
abolition of the system of subject peoples" itself, broadly adopting from the recent 
resolution of the Conference of Socialists of Neutral Countries at Copenhagen the 
universal "recognition of the right of self-determination of the nations" and opposing "in 
the strongest way possible ... every violent annexation at variance with the right of self-
determination of the peoples."J33 Going even further, the Conference declared its 
opposition even to "the system of establishing 'spheres of influence' or protectorates" 
calling on the people to demand that their government "refuse national support to the 
securing of contracts and concessions abroad" designed to promote the exploitation of the 
lands and peoples to which they pertained at the settiement.J34 This approach to the peace 
was being bolstered by its expression in other nations, as the Guardian illustrated in 
publishing the manifesto of the Committee of the Social Democratic Party in Germany 
130 Ibid., pp.7-16. 
131 Norman writes that, "one may be fairly confident that the diversity of races in the British Empire will 
prevent any permanent status of British citizenship being established on a recognised principle throughout 
the Empire ... One cannot expect, short of a magical transformation, that the spirit of democracy and 
nationality, with all its healing balm upon racial antagonisms, could ever weld together the natural, 
religious, and racial differences between a Hindu and a Yorkshire miner." Ibid .. p. 5. 
132 Ibid., p. 5. 
133 Independent Labour Party ,ILP Report of the Annual Conference held at Norwich April. 1915 (London: 
Independent Labour Party, 1915), p. 5 and 120. 
134 Ibid., p. 92. 
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proclaiming its longstanding struggle "against the policy of Imperial expansion and its 
consequences" and "rais[ing] anew [its] sharpest protest against all efforts and 
declarations in favour of the annexation of a portion of a foreign country and the 
suppression by force of another people ... the people desire no annexation. The people 
desire peace.,,135 In the months to come, other socialist and liberal organizations in 
Germany, France, and Belgium would add their voices against the introduction of 
expansionist war aims from their governments.136 Hints of Britain's own expansionist 
agenda continued to trickle in over the course of 1915 as well, most directly with the 
Guardian's publication of the claims of the German Ambassador to Rome to have been 
privy to documents revealing that "the Near East is to be divided as spoils of war" with 
the Russians taking Constantinople and the Balkans while "the English will get Asia 
Minor, Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia reserving the right to expand her Egyptian 
frontier, and the Aegean Islands.,,137 Such rumors were given some credence by the tight 
control of the Government over any news concerning its ongoing campaign in 
Mesopotamia, of the which the Guardian regularly complained.138 The duplicitous 
manner in which securing British control over the destiny of the Ottoman territories was 
being undertaken, however, reached well beyond even the most imaginative dissenting 
speculations on the government's hidden agenda for the war. 
Kristian Ulrichsen, has described the British occupation of Mesopotamia during 
the war as "the final fling of nineteenth-century colonial campaigning" and, indeed, the 
135 Manchester Guardian June 28 1915. 
136 Manchester Guardian, July 15 1915, January 28 and 261916, and July 1916. 
137 Manchester Guardian, July 15 1915. 
138 See for example, Manchester Guardian, September 30,1915. 
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campaign reflected many of the aspects of Britain's colonial legacy enumerated by 
dissenting critics of imperialism.139 For nearly a century, successive British governments 
had been enhancing their influence among tribal leaders in the Persian Gulf region 
generally as a counter balance to encroaching rival powers and the waning authority of 
the Ottoman government they had less and less interest in 'propping up' .140 By the late 
19th century, German ambitions to divert Britain's standing sea-lane trade route between 
London and the Levant, India, and Far East to an overland railway from Baghdad to 
Berlin were perceived by the British as an encroachment upon markets they had come to 
regard as exclusively their own.141 In Secret Diplomacy, Capitalism, and War (1915), 
Thomas Johnston pointed up this tension over influence in the Persian Gulf as a key 
factor in the alignment of British foreign policy against Germany. Once British 
diplomats, having long "been at the same game themselves, ... promptly smelled out the 
fact ... that German Capitalists would be allowed to build the Baghdad Railway," 
Johnston argued, they responded precisely as the balance of power would have dictated, 
concluding an Anglo-Russian "agreement to 'protect' Persia" from German 
encroachment that effectively divided the region between them. 142 At home, these 
139 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914-1922," The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 30, no. 2 (April 2007), p. 350. 
140 For a discussion of Britain's strategic policy of supporting the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against 
Britain's European rivals in the region, see David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the 
Modern Middle East. 1914-1922, 1st ed. (New York: H. Holt, 1989), p. 27. For their close attention to the 
tribes of the Persian Gulf states, see Anton Mohr, The Oil War (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1976), p. 
123. 
141 W.W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1957), p. 22. Also see Paul K. Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and 
Commission (Cranbury: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press: Associated University Presses, 1994), p. 33; 
Philip Willard Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development (London: Kegan Paul, 2004), p. 51; Stephen 
Hemsley Longrigg, 'Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social. and Economic History (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), p. 66; and Aaron S. Klieman, "Britain's War Aims in the Middle East in 1915." 
Journal of Contemporary History 3, no. 3, The Middle East (July 1968), p. 237. 
142 Johnston, Secret Diplomacy, p. 12. For a study of the Baghdad Railway in British policy see Stuart A. 
Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia: 1903-1914 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976). 
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diplomatic developments were accompanied by the proliferation of propaganda 
characterizing Germany as a war-mongering behemoth, a propaganda move dissenting 
writers identified as well in line with trend toward militaristic preparation for a bid for 
global domination already in motion. For ILP leaders Philip Snowden and J.T. Walton 
Newbold, it was no coincidence that loudest voices for taking direct action against 
Germany over these issues were Britain's 'New Militarist Imperialists' and their 
associates in armaments manufacture seeking to profit politically and monetarily from the 
so-called 'Great German Naval Scare' of the early twentieth century .143 
A key concern of British statesmen about German ambition in the Middle East 
was the matter of access to Persian and Mesopotamian oil. First Lord of the Admiralty 
Winston Churchill had been convinced of the importance of oil to Britain's future naval 
supremacy for years by the time he brought Asquith around to the necessity of securing 
an independent supply in 1913.144 In the months leading up to the war, the heavy handed 
manner in which the British Foreign Office attempted to force the concession of 
controlling interest in the Baghdad Railway project and the development of future oil 
production in the region seemed to confirm German suggestions and Ottoman fears that 
an era of British domination in the region was only just beginning.145 When negotiations 
143 J.T. Walton Newbold, How Asquith Hellped the Armour Ring, (Manchester and London: National 
Labour Press, LTD, 1914), p. 2-3 and 6, ILPI51l914152, LSE. Also see Brock Millman, Managing 
Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 16-17. 
144 For Churchill's obsession with British control of Persian oil, see Sara Reuger, "Persian Oil and the First 
Lord: A Chapter in the Career of Winston Churchill," Military Affairs 46, no. 3 (October 1982): 134-138. 
145 For a discussion of British interest in Mesopotamian oil in relation to the Baghdad Railway Project, see 
Paul K. Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission (Cranbury: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press: Associated University Presses, 1994), pp. 31-48; For a discussion of 
oil as a factor in the origins of the First World War, see F. William Engdahl, "Oil and the Origins of the 
Great War," History Compass 5, no. 6 (2007); For an Ottoman perspective on the costs and benefits of 
British and German alliance in the months leading up to the war, see Mustafa Aksakal, "Not 'by those old 
books of international law , but only by war': Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War.," 
Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 15, No.3 (2004). 
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for that concession collapsed with the opening of European hostilities in the summer of 
1914, Grey warned his Turkish counterparts that their only hope of surviving the war as 
an imperial power would lie in either neutrality or an alliance with the British. l46 Even as 
Grey's messages were being conveyed, however, British forces were already moving into 
the Persian Gulf in anticipation of a Turko-German alliance.147 With British prestige, 
predominance of influence, and access to Persian oil all at stake/48 as Ewer would reflect 
after some eighteen years of British occupation in Iraq in 1932, "it was natural enough 
the very moment Turkey trailed behind Germany into the war, Great Britain leapt with 
both feet on Iraq .,,149 
The expansion of what began as a limited holding operation on the southern coast 
of Mesopotamia into a full-blown occupation of the region was both a classic case of 
what MacDonald had condemned as 'man-on-the-spot imperialism' nearly a decade prior 
and prewar balance of power diplomacy tactics at the heart of dissenting critique. l50 Over 
decades of playing the Ottoman periphery against metropolitan authorities, British 
administrators had not only cultivated the loyalty of local tribal leaders but encouraged, 
indirectly and directly, the development of a network of grass roots Arab nationalist 
networks from Mecca to Cairo and Damascus.lsi From the beginning of operations, 
Brigadier W. S. Delamain and Indian Expeditionary Force 'D' (lEFD) were ordered to 
keep the Amir of Najd and the Shaikhs of Muhammareh and Kuwait, well informed of 
146 Klieman, p. 238. 
147 Davis, p. 31. 
148 These are the three main reasons for the British occupation of Iraq according to Davis, pp. 31-33. 
149 Daily Herald Oct. 4,1932. 
150 MacDonald, Labour and the Empire, pp. 39-42. See also Thornton, pp. 111-112. 
151 For discussions of pre-war Anglo-Arab relations of this nature, see Ghassan R Atiyyah, Iraq 1908-1921 
A Political Study (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1973); James Jankowski and 
Israel Gershoni, eds., Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York: Colombia University 
Press, 1997); and Bruce Westrate, The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 
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their intended movements and to allow a favorable political situation on the ground be 
their guide in determining when and how far to advance in country.152 Perhaps driven by 
their own ambition, these long-standing Arab clients pushed the British to move inland, 
claiming that "the [IEFD's] ability to make headway against the Turks without further 
delay would make all the difference in the attitude of the neighboring Arabs.,,153 Ottoman 
forces retreating in advance of the British, however, were taking the entire state apparatus 
of government and security with them, leaving massive vacuums of authority and 
services in their wake that the IEFD would have an increasing amount of difficulty 
filling. Nevertheless, in spite of the desperate conditions for local Mesopotamians 
created by their advance ,154 the campaign's Chief Political Officer Sir Percy Cox reported 
his superiors in London in December 1914 that, to his mind, his instructions to 'hang fire' 
at Basra would surely lose the day. The time had come, he urged, to end Turkish rule in 
Mesopotamia once and for all by announcing publically that the British intended to make 
their occupation permanent and to expand that occupation up to Baghdad at the earliest 
opportunity.155 
The reluctance of London to permit such an advance was grounded in what 
Viceroy of India Lord Crewe referred to as "grave international considerations," or the 
standing agreement among the Allies to put off dividing the spoils of war until after the 
victory .156 It was no coincidence that the Cabinet finally agreed to expand the operation 
152 Instructions to Delamain, Mesopotamia Commission Report, p. 13. See also, Davis. p. 54 and 
Mohammad Gholi Majd, Iraq in World War I (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 2006), pp. 84-
85. 
153 Majd, p. 85. 
154 In this respect, Majid's study is particularly illuminating for the insight offered by rarely used American 
consulate documents. 
155 Davis., pp. 54-55 and 57-58 and Majd, pp. 93-94. 
156 Davis, p. 56. For a discussion of the early Allied agreements concerning Turkish territory, see Atiyyah, 
p. 121. 
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in size and scope along the lines suggested by COXl57 a mere fortnight after receiving the 
aide-memoire from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Dmitriyevich Sazonov in early 
March 1915 expressing the Tsar's intention to "scrupulously respect ... the special 
interests of France and Great Britain ... with reference to other regions of the Ottoman 
Empire," in exchange for Grey's recognition of Russian claims to Constantinople.lss 
Accordingly, the Indian Expeditionary Force was reorganized as an army corps under the 
command of General Sir John Nixon, a commander "well known for his support for 
offensive strategy," according to David,159 and given a new operations agenda that later 
investigations would deem "a landmark in [the campaign's] history" in sanctioning 
taking "complete control of the lower portion of Mesopotamia" and authorizing the 
development of "a plan for a subsequent advance on Baghdad."I60 
From the summer of 1915 until the end of the war, the campaign in Mesopotamia 
would push northward toward Baghdad and Mosul with an almost brutal disregard for the 
trials and suffering of British and Indian troops or the desperation of Mesopotamians cut 
off from outside trade and service networks by occupation security measures.161 Like the 
policy decisions that had led to it, the horrors of the occupation were veiled, in both 
Mesopotamia and Britain, behind a screen of censorship and propaganda in which the 
'salvation of ancient Babylon' was celebrated as the first great victory of the war.162 The 
157 For a discussion of this expansion and its aims, see Davis, pp. 68-72. 
158 Aide-Memoire from Russian Foreign Minister to British and French Ambassadors at Petrograd, 19 
February/4 March 1915, in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East; a Documentary 
Record (Princeton, N J: Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 7-8. 
159 Davis, p. 68. 
160 Mesopotamia Commission Report CAB1l9126, NA, p. 16. Nixon himself would later testify that "the 
orders given to me when I was appointed to command were to take the offensive rather than remain on the 
defensive." quoted in Davis, p. 72. 
161 See Majid, pp. 380-395. 
162 Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in 
the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Chapter 5. 
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righteousness of such an endeavor was belied, however, by the secret policy maneuvers 
undertaken to ensure a successful campaign both for the war and after. By 1915, British 
administrators throughout the Middle East had long been in quiet communication with 
representatives of an emerging Arab secessionist movement emanating out of Cairo and 
Damascus. 163 Although the British tended to view the aspirations of these men for a 
independent state comprising all Arabic speaking peoples as little more than the 
hopelessly grandiose ambitions of local headmen, the value of a pro-British pan-Arab 
uprising for the war and an alternative leadership nucleus for after the war became 
increasingly apparent the deeper British forces pushed into Arabic speaking territories. l64 
Over the fall of 1914, the Foreign Office warmed up to the idea of an Arab revolt and 
sanctioned the opening of communications with the most promising candidate for leading 
it, the Sherif of Mecca Sayyid Husayn bin Ali al-Hashimi.165 By the end of 1915, the 
infamous series of notes exchanged between High Commissioner of Egypt Henry 
McMahon and Sherif Husayn had more or less contracted an exchange of Arab force 
against the Ottomans for British recognition of an ambiguously defined Arab state at 
war's end.l66 
Grey perceived, correctly, from the beginning of negotiations with Husayn that 
Paris would view them as a scheme to push France out of the Levant. French Ambassador 
to London Paul Cambon was, however, quick to perceive the opportunity of using the 
163 For discussions of pre-war British engagement with Arab nationalist movements, see George Antonius, 
The Arab Awakening: The Story o/the Arab National Movement (London: Kegan Paul International, 2000), 
pp. 126-127, and Atiyyah, pp. 86-107 and 131; Westrate, pp. 12-13; and Davis. p. 63. 
164 Atiyyah, pp. 86-107. 
165 As the guardian of the Islamic holy places in Mecca, Sherif Husayn held a great deal of authority locally 
and legitimacy as a representative of Arab interests throughout the Arab speaking world. His son Abd 
Allah bin al- Husayn had already communicated his father's willingness to discuss the terms for such 
action to Kitchener two years earlier. See Antonius, pp. 126-7 and Atiyyah, p. 131. 
166 The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence is reproduced in Hurewitz, pp. 13-17 and Antonius, pp. 413-
427 For a discussion of the correspondence, see Antonius, pp. 164-184. 
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agreement to ultimately gain "formal and official recognition of our rights to Syria."167 
Furthermore, the British having appeared to be "in a panic" to "hold out a concrete goal 
Husayn," according to Edward Fitzgerald, seemed to bode well for French aspirations in 
ta Syrie integrate in terms of "keep[ing] the maximum amount of territory outside the 
Arab kingdom and obtain[ing] the maximum number of privileges within the sphere of 
influence that will be assigned us," in the view of Cambon's assistant and interlocutor for 
the French for these negotiations, Fran~ois Georges-Picot.l68 By the end of 1915, formal 
negotiations over the Allied division of territory in the Middle East were well underway 
between Picot and former British Consul at Istanbul Sir Mark Sykes. Unlike the 
agreement with Husayn, however, the negotiations between Britain and France would be 
quite specific, clearly designating the spheres of influence in which each would have the 
right to establish whatever form of administrative development they saw fit across the 
vast majority of Husayn's imagined Arab state.169 
While the duplicitous tactic of guaranteeing British recognition of both Arab 
nationalist and Allied imperialist sovereignty in the contested territories of the Ottoman 
Empire was finding its formal expression at the end of 1915, so to was its opposition. 
However ignorant the dissenting left may have been of the actual negotiations, by the end 
of 1915, their efforts to obstruct precisely this sort of secret, balance of power diplomacy 
had, according to Robbins and Harris, begun to seriously "undermine the reputation of 
167 Cambon to Rene Viviani Oct. 21, 1915,quoted in Fitzgerald, p. 708. 
168 Fitzgerald, pp. 710-712. 
169 For a scholarly discussion of these negotiations, see Edward Peter Fitzgerald, "France's Middle Eastern 
Ambitions, the Sykes-Picot Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915-1918," The Journal of Modern 
History Vol. 66, no. 4 (December 1994): pp. 697-725. For the text of the resulting Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) 
Agreement for the Partition of the Ottoman Empire: Britain, France, and Russia, see Huweritz, p. 18-22. 
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the men who had taken the country into battle, and ... discredit the official explanations 
for the war ... [and] succeed in launching the idea of 'peace by negotiation'" in the United 
KingdomPO As the above discussion has attempted to illustrate, a key component of 
dissenting propaganda was the case for imperial reform based on evidence of the 
corrupted legacy of the civilizing mission and the promise of a new era of peace through 
imperial democratization. The argument, inherent in this platform, that the Asquith 
administration's idea of 'imperial democracy' was little more than a contradiction in 
terms was given no small amount of credibility by the transition from a voluntary war 
effort in the name of liberation to a compulsory war effort in the name of territorial 
acquisition only beginning to make itself known in the spring of 1915. 
Over the next two years, the dissenting left would gain an increasing amount of 
support for their campaign to force an 'Asquithian' peace on the British government. It 
would, in fact, be the government's unwillingness to openly declare its evolving aims for 
the war that would ultimately undermine its legitimacy as the expansionist policy 
tendencies discussed above gradually became known to the British public. As the 
preemptive division of the Ottoman territories among the Allied powers in particular 
became known in 1917, the dissenting leaders found themselves in an ideal position to 
capitalize on the public distrust of the government that had grown as the British war 
effort evermore closely resembled that of their militarist and expansionist enemies. 
170 Robbins, p. 68 and Harris, pp. 88-92. 
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Chapter 3: The Collapse of Legitimacy 
In War and the Workers, one of Ramsay MacDonald's earliest publications for 
the Union of Democratic Control, the future Labour Prime Minister predicted an 
impending power shift in Britain in which the "reactionary interests" responsible for the 
outbreak of the war will have "added to their influence and power" through its 
prosecution while the demands of total war on the British people "shattered the 
foundation of the democratic mind and entangled the highways of democratic advance ... 
[leaving] the democratic movement confused, broken and subverted" by wars end.1 Not 
even MacDonald could have foreseen, however, that, less than a year into the war, such 
circumstances would have led to what Arthur Ponsonby described as "the end of the 
Liberal Party as we have known it.,,2 
Although the causes of British Liberalism's demise have been debated by 
historians, most have agreed that it was during this period that its popular legitimacy as 
the main party of opposition to British Conservatism began to shift toward Labour and 
that such dissenting organizations as the UDC and the ILP played no small role in 
midwifing that transition? Indeed, the advent of Britain's first coalition government in 
May 1915, to which Ponsonby was referring, would mark the beginning of the end of the 
political relevance of the British Liberal Party for the duration of the century and beyond. 
1 Ramsey J. MacDonald, War and the Workers (Union of Democratic Control, 1914), p. 2. Morel FJ3/6/l. 
LSE 
2 John Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict. 1915-1918 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992), p. 62. 
3 For a historiographical consideration of this debate, see Keith Laybourn, "The Rise of Labour and the 
Decline of Liberalism: The State of the Debate," History 80, no. 259 (1995): pp. 207-226. For the role of 
the dissenting left in reviving and unifying the Labour movement, see Marvin Swartz, The Union of 
Democratic Control in British Politics During the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 
147-169; Paul Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British Left. 1881-1924 
(Woodbridge and Rochester, 1998), pp. 119-141; John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A 
History (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 24-59; Robert Edward Dowse, Left in the Centre; the Independent 
Labour Party. 1893-1940 (London: Longmans, 1966), pp. 20-34. 
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The notion that the collapse of British Liberalism represented a triumph for the Labour 
movement, however, would have seemed incredulous to dissenting leaders, who tended 
to view the Labour movement's support for the war effort under Asquith and Lloyd 
George alike as proof of the extent to which the 'spirit of Prussianism' had colonized the 
political imagination of the British people. Although they would contribute to both, the 
goal of UDC and ILP leaders during the war neither the resuscitation of the Labour Party 
nor the destruction of the Liberal Party. Rather, as the self-proclaimed and sole party of 
opposition to the 'Prussianizing' effect of inter-imperial relations on British politics, 
dissenting leaders sought to re-invent the democratic movement in Britain as an engine 
for the democratization of the inter-imperial world as a whole, beginning with the 
metropolitan heart of its most powerful empire. 
It has been a central argument of this dissertation that key figures in the postwar 
Labour movement established their political legitimacy during the war by demonstrating 
the illegitimacy, not of anyone party, but of British imperial democracy itself as a system 
of government. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that, as two coalition governments 
struggled to make the transition from Asquith's defensive war to 'enthrone the public 
right' in Europe to a total war for Britain's imperial survival under Lloyd George, 
dissenting writers seized upon the 'extenuating necessities' of imposing universal 
conscription, occupying long-coveted territories, and the preemptive bartering of those 
territories for a new postwar balance of power as evidence they needed to prove that 
British imperial democracy had degenerated into the very engine of global domination 
they were, ostensibly, fighting to defeat. Just as the full extent and cost of the veiled 
expansionist agenda of the government was becoming known in Britain, largely through 
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the efforts and propaganda of dissenting leaders, the emergence of Woodrow Wilson as 
the global spokesperson for a negotiated internationalist peace and the anti-imperial turn 
of Russia under Bolshevik rule imbued the dissenting movement with new legitimacy. 
Although electoral evidence of Labour's triumph over Liberalism would not make itself 
apparent until the 1920's, dissenting leaders could, and did, claim to have prevailed over 
'Prussianism' in Britain by the end of the war in having finally forced Lloyd George to 
publically adopt an internationalist, rather than an inter-imperialist, approach to ending 
the war and settling the peace in January 1918. 
According to Keith Robbins, the greatest fear of dissenting leaders at the outbreak 
of the war was that the government would adopt an expansionist agenda without giving 
the Parliament or the people the opportunity to fully consider its implications for 
Britain's national interests or the future peace of Europe.4 An imperialistic agenda for the 
war, they believed, would surely prolong and intensify it as well as demand the 
imposition of compulsory measures bound to set the democratic movement back for a 
generation.5 Before the first calendar year of the war was out, pressure from opponents 
of Asquith's policy of containing the scope of the war to that which could be managed by 
a voluntary war effort alone had already begun to steer him into new theaters of war in 
the East where not only' real military victories,' but strategic leverage in the final 
settlement of the new balance of power could be achieved. Although Asquith believed 
that compromising on his commitment to fighting a defensive war, rather than one for 
4 Keith Robbins, The Abolition o/War: The 'Peace Movement' in Britain, 1914-1919 (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1976), pp. 48-49 and 70-71. 
5 See for example, MacDonald, War and the Workers; Bruce Glasier, Militarism (Manchester: The National 
Labour Press, LTD., 1915), ILP 511915140, LSE; and C. H. Norman,Nationality and Patriotism 
(Manchester and London: The National Labour Press, LTD., 1915), ILP1511915170, LSE. 
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imperial gain, would permit him to maintain his commitment to the principle of 
volunteerism as the basis of the war effort at home, his efforts to maintain a Liberal 
approach to an inter-imperial war would spell the end of his administration, his personal 
political relevance, and, indeed, his Party. 
Initially, opposition to Asquith's commitment to a voluntary war effort had been 
tempered by the overwhelming number of volunteers he had managed to inspire. With 
those numbers flagging and no significant headway being made on any front of the war 
by Christmas, key members of Asquith's own Cabinet began calling for more direct state 
controls over production and enlistment at home and a fresh aggressive approach to 
prosecuting the war abroad by the New Year.6 As John Turner and Amanda Capern have 
shown, by January 1915, even Asquith had come to see that his purely defensive 
approach to the war was in need of revision.7 According to R. J. Q. Adams and Philip 
Poirier, however, Asquith remained convinced that the imposition of industrial and 
military compulsion an expanded war effort would demand would surely "split the 
Cabinet, split the House of Commons, split both political parties, and split the nation," 
creating a political crisis which his administration would not survive.s For Turner, long-
standing enemies of Asquith's 'New Liberal' approach to domestic politics were equally 
alive to such dangers for his administration and poised to force the issue as a means of 
ousting both him and his Party from government.9 
6 Edward David, "The Liberal Party Divided 1916-1918," The Historical Journal 13, no. 3 (September 
1970), p. 510 
7 Turner, pp. 62-63 and Amanda L. Capern, "Winston Churchill, Mark Sykes and the Dardanelles 
Campaign of 1915," Historical Research 71 (February 1998), p. 111. 
8 Quoted in R. J. Q. Adams and Philip P. Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-18 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987), p. 16. 
9 Turner, Chapters 2 and 3, especially pp. 56-61; Adams and Poirier, pp. 64-66 and 85-88; and R. J. Q. 
Adams, "Asquith's Choice: The May Coalition and the Coming of Conscription, 1915-1916," The Journal 
of British Studies 25, no. 3 (July 1986), pp. 243-263 
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Asquith's decision to revive Winston Churchill's scheme to take the Dardanelle 
Straits in early 1915 was a direct result of this political tension. tO The strategic 
advantages of a successful campaign, as Churchill had imagined it, were beyond 
question. l1 With one act of 'gun boat diplomacy' by his navy off the coast of 
Constantinople, Churchill argued, he could incite a disabling internal revolution in 
Turkey, open the supply routes to the Russian Front and expose remaining the Central 
Powers to attack from the South, and lay open the "glittering prize" of the territorial 
spoils of the Ottoman Empire for the taking "after barely a shot had been fired."t2 As I 
have argued above, Asquith initially scuttled the campaign out of fear that even its 
success would be interpreted by potential volunteers at home as a betrayal of his liberal 
aims for the war and by the still neutral Ottoman leadership and millions of Muslim 
subjects under British rule as a act of wanton imperial expansionism into the Dar al 
Islam.13 With his political principles now under siege from the opposite direction at 
home, conscription quickly becoming an unavoidable reality, and negotiations for the 
postwar division of Ottoman territories already underway, however, the Dardanelles 
Campaign began to seem less like political suicide for Asquith and more like a 'silver 
bullet' for his war effort, if not British Liberalism itself. 
iO For a discussion of Churchill's initial proposal and Asquith's decision to scuttle it, see Chapter 2, pp. 12 
and 13 above and Amanda L. Capern, "Winston Churchill, Mark Sykes and the Dardanelles Campaign of 
1915," Historical Research 71 (February 1998): 108-118; David French, "The Origins of the Dardanelles 
Campaign Reconsidered," History Vol. 68, no. 223 (June 1983): pp. 210-224; and David French, "The 
Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, 1914-1916," War & Society 
5, no. 1 (1987): 45-61. 
11 As The Times pointed out shortly into the campaign on February 19,1915. The strategic benefit of the 
surrender of Constantinople and the collapse of the Turkish war effort, the reopening of the Black Sea as a 
throughway for supplying the Russian Front, and the final alliance of neutrals, such Italy or the Balkan 
States with the Allied Powers would have been "scarcely necessary to point out." 
12 French, p. 216 and Capern, pp. 111-116. 
13 See Chapter 2, pp. 13 and 14 above and French, p. 50 and Bruce Westrate, The Arab Bureau: British 
Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 
pp.12-15. 
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Once in the hands of military planners, however, the campaign quickly evolved to 
include a full-scale Eastern assault that would require the transition to a compulsory war 
effort at the outset.I4 Utterly contrary to Asquith's intention to use the campaign to save 
his administration from the political fallout conscription would surely bring, the already 
beleaguered Prime Minister refused to sanction the troop deployment that even Churchill 
had come to view as crucial to the campaign's success. I5 When the campaign, begun in 
February, collapsed into a prolonged pitched battle over the spring of 1915 with 
casualties reaching into the tens and, eventually, hundreds of thousands, Asquith's 
enemies, rightly so for Amanda Capern, held him, and his principles for the war, 
personally responsible for the catastrophe. Nevertheless, Asquith continued to obstruct 
the transition from a voluntary to a compulsory war effort that, for most statesmen, was 
quickly becoming an obvious inevitability.I6 By May, however, it had become clear to 
Asquith that his 'silver bullet' had failed to hit the mark. Faced with Liberal and 
Conservative leaders alike struggling to contain backbench revolt in lieu of his 
resignation, on May 15 Asquith acquiesced to Lloyd George and Bonar Law's suggestion 
of a coalition government in the name of preserving the unity of the nation, the 
Parliament, and even his own Liberal Party .17 
For dissenting leaders, the Asquith coalition was not merely a confirmation that 
'anti-Liberal' forces were gaining power and influence as a result of the war, as 
14 Such expansionist designs were emanating from First Sea Lord Sir John Fisher. For a consideration of 
these plans, see A. L. MacFie, "The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914-1918," Middle Eastern 
Studies Vol. 19, no. 1 (January 1983), pp. 52-53 and John Turner, British Politics and the Great War: 
Coalition and Conflict, 1915-1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press,I992), p. 57. 
15 Capern, pp. 111-114, MacFie, pp. 52-53, and Turner, p. 57. 
16 Adams and Poirier, pp. 75 and 77-78; Turner, pp. 58-61; and Edward David, "The Liberal Party Divided 
1916-1918," The Historical lournal13, no. 3 (September 1970), p. 510. 
17 Turner, pp. 58 and 61; Adams and Poirier, pp. 77-78. 
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MacDonald and Charles Trevelyan had warned,18 but as Ponsonby expressed it, "the end 
of the Liberal Party as we have known it.,,19 For it was not merely Asquith, but the 
principles of British Liberalism that were being called into question by the 
administration's new partners. It was only a matter of time, Ponsonby privately lamented 
to Trevelyan, before those partners would use their position to impose the coercive state 
controls the needed to fight the expansionist war they wanted,zo Moreover, the dwindling 
of Parliamentary opposition to such measures meant that dissenting writers could expect 
a far more vigorous campaign by the state against their efforts to protect British citizens 
from their long-term implications?1 
Nevertheless, dissenting leaders were also alive to the advantages the coalition 
held for their movement. As one disillusioned member of the Liberal party expressed to 
Trevelyan, the many Liberal critics who had been hesitant to call out their leaders for fear 
of undermining the legitimacy of their party would now "revel in the new sense of 
freedom [the coalition] gives us all ... [for] no one on earth can pretend that we were 
elected to support this Government.,,22 Trevelyan agreed, and commented that the very 
goal of conscripting Britons for a more aggressive and expansionist war effort would "fill 
with disgust and indignation numbers of Liberals and Labourmen, who will never again 
look to their leaders who force it upon them as people fit to lead.,,2J UDC leaders were 
particularly hopeful that the well-known hostility toward conscription among even pro-
18 See for example, Trevelyan in the Labour Leader April 8, 1915; MacDonald, War and the Workers, pp. 
1-3; and Union of Democratic Control, The Morrow of War (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 
1914), p. 14, LSE Morel/FJ3/5/J. 
19 Turner, p. 62. 
20 Ibid. and Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics During the First World 
War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 66-67. 
21 Swartz, pp. 68-69 and 235-237. 
22 The words are R.D. Denman's, quoted in Swartz, p. 66. 
23 Ibid., p. 236. 
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war Labour movement representatives would now steer local Trade Union and Labour 
councils back into friendlier relations with the theretofore ostracized ILP and through it, 
the UDC and pro-peace movement as a whole?4 
Seeking to maximize the benefits of their new position as the leading alternative 
to what they viewed as an increasingly alienating and 'Prussianistic' trend in British 
government, UDC and ILP leaders launched a coordinated 'peace initiative' in the 
immediate wake of the coalition comprised of a series of national speaking tours covering 
over 16,000 miles in which thousands of leaflets, pamphlets, books, articles, and 
periodicals were distributed to as of yet untapped local trade councils and Labour party 
groups around the United Kingdom. By mid-fall, the goal of unifying the disparate 
elements of dissent into a single movement under the UDC/ILP banners had effectively 
doubled the number of Labour organizations affiliated with the UDC, raising of its 
overall membership to over 300,000?6 In their efforts, I argue, dissenting propagandists 
were given a significant boon by the tendency of pro-compulsionist statesmen to react to 
the coalition, the failures in the Dardanelles, and the rise of the pro-peace movement in 
precisely the anti-democratic and imperialistic manner the dissenting left had predicted 
they would. 
Statesmen already convinced of the immediate necessity of more compulsory 
measures for an expanded war effort were sorely disappointed to find themselves kept as 
24 Ibid., pp. 235-237. For Trade Union views on conscription at this time, see Adams and Poirier, pp. 114 
and115. 
25 Swartz, p. 59-60,90 and 236 and Sally Harris, Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of 
Democratic Control, 1914-1918 (Hull]: University of Hull Press, 1996), p. 83. 
26 Robbins, p. 68 and Harris, pp. 88-92. 
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"muzzled, uninformed, and impotent" by Asquith as they had been before May 15th ?7 
Even statesmen not fully committed to a compulsory war effort before the coalition, 
however, were beginning to recognize the utility of the issue as a means of ousting the 
inert and yet seemingly immovable Asquith?8 It was no coincidence that, as Cabinet 
Secretary Maurice Hankey privately noted, the "people who want compulsory service 
don't want Asquith, while those who want Asquith don't want compulsory service.,,29 By 
standing so firmly on the issue, Asquith himself had made the case for compulsion a case 
against the efficacy of his own Party principles and not only in relation to his 
management of the war. 
A few weeks into the coalition, South African High Commissioner-cum-Tory 
statesmen Lord Alfred Milner wrote a letter to the editor of the Times leaving little doubt 
of his view that victory would be impossible without immediate and direct state control 
over recruitment and munitions production and that the flagging British war effort was a 
direct result of a lack of firm leadership from the Asquith administration. Milner gave 
voice in his letter to the suspicion, shared by many pro-compulsionist statesmen 
according to David Silbey,30 that an untapped pool of thousands of able-bodied 'shirkers' 
had been denying their government its right to their service. He defended these men, 
however, as having been "unjustly denounced as 'slackers,' or 'cowards,' when they are 
simply ignorant, or bewildered ... or sorely puzzled to choose between conflicting duties" 
to their families and their nation. How could they discern the dire need for their service, 
27 Adams and Poirier, pp. 64-66 and 85 
28 Ibid., pp. 64 and 88. 
29 Adams, p. 263. 
30 David Silbey, The British Working Class and Enthusiasmfor War, 1914-1916 (London; New York: 
Frank Cass, 2005), p. 30. See also Nicoletta Gullace, The Blood of Our Sons: Men, Women, and the 
Renegotiation of British Citizenship during the Great War, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
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asked Milner, when everyday they see all around them "others similarly situated, or who 
could join the colours at a much smaller personal sacrifice, stay at home." For what these 
men suffered, Milner argued, was not a lack of patriotism or bravery, but a lack of 
leadership. Even in the case of "the 'real slacker' ... the man who obviously ought to go 
and has no reasonable excuse for shirking," he asked, "does it lie in their mouths to 
reproach him, who are themselves so slack that they are afraid to compel him to do his 
duty, though they have the power?" 
The voluntary system so tenaciously clung to by Asquithian Liberals in the name 
of preserving "our famous ... 'liberty of the subject'" was, for Milner, "a clumsy and 
inadequate instrument" at best, if not "the root cause of nine-tenths of the hitches, delays, 
and blunders" of the war effort which Asquith, nevertheless, remained "afraid to 
discard." As it stood, the voluntary system had already begun to denude the nation of its 
most patriotic, heroic, and courageous men while permitting "only men of average or 
inferior spirit and sense of duty to carry on the race." State control, in contrast, could be 
more organized and selective in calling out "men whose greatest value is as soldiers in 
preference to those who can contribute more to the successful conduct of the war in a 
civilian capacity." In short, he argued, "the State ought not to be obliged to tout for 
fighting men. It ought to be in a position to call out the number it wants as and when it 
wants them, and to call them out in the right order. .. and the nation is ready to obey the 
order. It only needs the captain on the bridge to give the signal,,31 
Despite Asquith's reluctance to give that signal, the coalition's new Minister of 
Munitions David Lloyd George had already begun transitioning domestic production for 
31 Times May 271915. 
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the war effort into what Adams has called "the greatest experiment in state control in 
British history to that time.'032 Lloyd George's efforts to put British labour more tightly 
in the harness for the war effort at home over the summer and fall of 1915 were 
paralleled by those of Walter Long, a leading pre-war voice for compulsory military 
training from the Tory benches, to rally statesmen behind a national registration program 
that, they hoped, would midwife conscription into being as well?3 By October, Long's 
efforts had resulted in a report claiming that well over two and a half million eligible 
Britons had yet volunteered for service?4 The news was unfortunately preceded by a 
series of catastrophes in the Dardanelles and Loos over the fall involving the loss of 
thousands of British troopS?5 Faced with such an alignment of forces and facts against 
him, according to Adams, Asquith finally began the gradual climb down from his 
opposition to conscription that would result in the passage of Britain's First Military 
Service Act in January 1916 calling forth all unmarried men between the ages of 19 and 
The threat of conscription, of course, had been at the forefront of dissenting 
propaganda from the beginning of the war. When volunteerism began to wane and 
compulsion to loom ever more threateningly, UDC and ILP writers were already 
mobilized to come to the defense of conscious objectors. In contrast to Milner's 
conception of the 'bewildered and ignorant shirker,' dissenting writers characterized the 
trailing off of volunteers as part of a political awakening spanning the full scope of the 
32 Adams, pp. 247-248 and Adams and Poirier, p. 93-94. 
33 Adams and Poirier, pp. 94-96. 
34 Ibid., p. 98 for description. 
35 Ibid., p. 104. 
36 Ibid., pp. 104-5 
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British Empire. With the waning of the 'war psychosis' by the New Year, they believed, 
the "people were beginning to think again" and not just about the trials of the war?7 
Rather, the expanded scope of the war and the looming threat of conscription was 
inspiring would-be volunteers to think harder on precisely what fighting for British 
supremacy in a new balance of power would get them as national and imperial subjects. 
The perceived persistence of prewar attitudes opposed to the expansion of political or 
economic opportunity, argued dissenting writers, portended that, despite their great 
sacrifice, they would get very little. 
As Philip Snowden pointed out in Parliament and the subsequent publication of 
his speech in the ILP pamphlet Who is to Pay for the War?, the surge of volunteerism 
from the working classes had in no way shifted the government's tendency to privilege 
the interests of business and the ruling classes in their favor. In his speech, Snowden 
criticized Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George's decision to impose a 30% 
hike in taxes on common commodities to pay for the war effort as both impractical and 
inegalitarian. A flat rate tax, he argued, ignored the vast gap in income across the classes 
with the result that those already hardest hit by the war would be paying the most in 
relation to their overall income while more wealthy Britons were required to sacrifice a 
mere modicum of lUxury. 38 Moreover, while the government was taking out foreign 
loans to keep up with the costs of supplying the war effort, the very British industries 
being paid through those loans were seeing record profits. Why, he asked, had the 
37 Robbins, p. 68. 
38 Snowden calculated that the average wage-earning household would now be paying nearly a third of its 
yearly expendable income in taxes. Philip Snowden, Who is to Pay for the War? (Manchester: The 
National Labour Press, LTD., 1915), p. 2. LSE ILP151l915172 
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government chosen to break the very backbone of the war effort to obtain the one 
resource they did not have when it was so readily available elsewhere?39 
In his reply, Lloyd George merely disparaged Snowden's arithmetic and chided 
him in suggesting that, "You cannot go into a great war and say to the vast majority of 
the people of this country; 'You need not give up anything' ."40 As the foremost 
contributors of both money and men, Snowden rejoined, the wage-earning classes were, 
in fact, being asked by the government to give up everything. The question that Lloyd 
George refused to face, for Snowden, spoke to the very heart of British socialism's raison 
d'€tre. "Is it right," he inquired, "that some people should be left with an enormous 
spending power after their taxation is paid, while other people are taxed on wages and 
income which are insufficient to provide the necessaries of life?,,41 That those in power 
continued to believe it was, for Snowden and others, was an illogic reflective of an 
archaic and yet persistent ruling class tendency to perceive people that did not own 
property as being property themselves.42 
Moreover, the scope of the war was being expanded, deliberately in the view of 
dissenting writers, to include the destruction, occupation, and dismemberment of the 
Central Powers in the name of British inter-imperial supremacy.43 Of all British people, 
argued C. H. Norman in the ILP pamphlet Nationality and Patriotism (1915), the wage-
earning classes were best positioned to see the inherent opposition of national and inter-
imperial interests. For despite the success of British governments in expanding the reach 
39 Philip Snowden, Who is to Pay for the War? (Manchester: The National Labour Press, LTD., 1915), p. 
14. LSE ILPI51l915172 
40 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
41 Ibid., p. 16. 
42 For a discussion of the perception of individuals as property in relation to the war, see Clifford Allen, Is 
Germany Right and Britain Wrong? (Lawrence Mansions, 1914).ILP 51191613, LSE 
43 Asquith had, of course, said as much upon Turkey's declaration of alliance with the Central Powers in 
November 1914. 
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of British imperial influence to some twenty times the size of the British Isles in half as 
many years, "the housing problem [has remained] as acute as ever, and the British 
workman has not benefited by these expansions of the Empire, though he has played a 
great part in depriving the owners of [their territories].,,44 The increasingly belligerent 
attitudes taken up by British statesmen and the pro-war press, argued Norman, only 
demonstrated how little the immense sacrifice already being made by the working classes 
meant to their government. As a result, he argued, 
the reluctance to enlist which has been exhibited in many parts of Britain, apart 
from the growth of a deep-seated conviction that all wars are vulgar and immoral, 
has been partially caused by the knowledge, which is slowly dawning on the 
British masses, that. .. [even] supposing Britain conquered and occupied 
Germany, not the slightest benefit would accrue to the British workman.45 
Even more acutely aware of the opposition of national and imperial interests than the 
British working classes, of course, were British imperial subjects. As MacDonald's ILP 
pamphlet War and the Far East (1915) pointed out, the reluctance to volunteer was 
evident even among Asqutih's most celebrated imperial patriots, the armies of British 
India, and for reasons quite similar to those of the working classes. Quoting a variety of 
Indian newspapers, MacDonald conveyed the frustrations of Indian subjects with the 
government's unwillingness to view their volunteerism as any indication of their political 
maturity. As the Bengalee had explained, "While the war is slowly dragging its wearied 
and murderous steps from week to week ... the loyal enthusiasm that it evoked at its 
44 C. H. Norman, Nationality and Patriotism (Manchester and London: The National Labour Press, LTD., 
1915), p. 8,/LPI511915170, LSE 
45 Ibid., p. 8. 
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commencement in this country ... has been waning among all sections of the 
community.,,46 The reason for this waning, the Bengalee continued, was that 
spokesman of the Indian Bureaucracy and the Anglo-Indian community in the 
Press have now told us, almost in plain English, that our men fighting for their 
King-Emperor at the front are mere mercenaries whose fighting value is not 
indigenous and Indian, but being entirely due to the training of British officers ... 
[and that] India has no future before her in the history of modern humanity except 
as a dependency of Great Britain.47 
It was no coincidence that Lord Milner was not only the typ.e of Tory imperialist 
statesmen, but the very man ILP writers like Bruce Glasier had predicted would lead the 
charge to impose compulsory measures upon British citizens and subjects as a means of 
suppressing precisely such sentiments.48 Milner, perhaps foremost among men of his ilk, 
had been well trained in the art of subjugating men in the name of expanding and 
enhancing British imperial domination over his long career in the imperial periphery. In 
addition to being "among the most insistent of Conscriptionists," as Glasier pointed out, 
"Lord Milner was also, characteristically enough, the man above all others responsible 
for the introduction of Chinese slave labour into South Africa." Similarly, "Lord 
Curzon," also a staunch compulsionist for Glasier, "is chiefly remembered for having 
during his term of office as Viceroy of India nearly caused a rebellion in Bengal by his 
repressive policy.,,49 For men of this mind, argued Glasier, the war was an ideal 
opportunity to obtain at home what they had so masterfully orchestrated abroad, 
a sweated army ... of men who have had no choice or will in becoming soldiers, 
who are paid coolie rates of pay and can be made to submit to the treatment of 
46 Ramsey J. MacDonald, The War and the Far East, Labour and War Pamphlets no. 14 (London: 
Independent Labour Party, 1915), p. 8. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Milner is mentioned by name in this context by Bruce Glasier, Resist the Foreign Yoke oj Conscription!, 
ILP "Coming of Age" Campaign Leaflet, no. 7. (Manchester and London: The National Labour Press, 
LTD.,1914). LSE ILP/51l914/33 and in Bruce G1asier, The Peril oj Conscription (The National Labour 
Press, LTD., 1915), p. 9. ILP 5/1915/41, LSE. 
49 Glasier, Conscription, p. 5. 
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coolies ... they want it for the war ... they want it for their Imperialist schemes 
abroad ... they want it for their class vanity and political interests at home.50 
The imagery of the transformation of the British working classes into 'coolie 
slaves' spoke directly to the dissenting contention that the civilizing mission of the 
British Empire had begun to achieve its own antithesis with the war. Rather than using 
the Empire to channel the democratic progress being made at home onto less developed 
peoples, it had done the reverse in forcing 'free-born Britons' into the imperial harness in 
the name of inter-imperial domination. As MacDonald, Norman, and others had noted 
from the beginning of the war, the efficiency with which the exigencies of inter-imperial 
war had subjugated and even destroyed the progress of democratic movements was such 
as to suggest that the war had been manufactured as "a deliberate scheme by the ruling 
classes of Russia, Britain, Germany, and, to a lesser degree, France, to engulf democratic 
progress and economic reform in oceans of blood.,,51 It should come as no surprise, I 
argue, that, as the future of an idealized imperial democracy grew ever darker beneath the 
clouds of total inter-imperial war, the level of public commitment to Asquith's 
"enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics" 
demand from the government by dissenting leaders would grow ever more extreme in 
direct proportion. 
Toward the end of 1915, dissenting activism had begun to pay noticeable 
dividends in terms of public support for the idea of a negotiated peace.52 By every 
account, public frustration with the humiliating defeats of 1915, rising casualty rates, and 
50 Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
51 MacDonald, War and the Workers, pp. 1-2 and Norman, Nationality and Patriotism, p. 15. 
52 Harris, pp. 120-121 and Swartz, pp. 149-150. 
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the looming threat of conscription had translated, as dissenting leaders hoped it would, 
into more public support for the peace movement generally, even from the primarily pro-
war Trade Unions. 53 With affiliations, and supportive crowds, growing, E. D. Morel, for 
one, was confident that Britons were coming to see the "indissoluble connection" 
between foreign policy and domestic problems dissenting writers had been popularizing 
from the outbreak of the war.54 As Harris, Swartz and others have shown, dissenting 
leaders tightened the frame of their propaganda accordingly to reflect a clear and unified 
program for the peace that their growing support base could mobilize behind. 55 
Historians have given less emphasis, however, to the broadened scope of compulsory 
limitations on inter- and intra-imperial policy that, I argue, lay embedded within that 
program. 
On February 23, 1916,just a few weeks after the announcement of the First 
Military Service Act, UDC and ILP leaders Snowden, Trevelyan, and Ponsonby 
challenged the government's request for an additional £400,000,000 in war credits56 with 
an unprecedentedly bold critique of its fidelity to Asquith's original aims for the war in 
Parliament. Throughout the debate, Snowden, Trevelyan, and Ponsonby repeatedly 
emphasized "the noble ideal set forth by the Prime Minister in his Dublin speech of a real 
European partnership based upon the recognition of equal rights, established and 
enforced by the common will" as foremost among "the wholly disinterested motives 
53 See for example, Harris, p. 120; Swartz, p. 70-75 andI47-14; and Robbins, p. 93. 
54 Swartz, p. 150. 
55 The program for a negotiated peace was drafted at a UDC Executive Committee conference attended by 
Liberal and Labour leaders and formulated around the principles of C.R. Buxton's 'Terms of Peace' and 
H.R. Brailsford's 'A Peace by Satisfaction.' Harris, pp. 120, 122 and 134-5; Swartz, p. 70-5; and Robbins, 
p.93. 
56 This credit would bring the total to over £2,000,000,000. 
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which have prompted the people of this country to support the War.,,57 For Snowden, the 
notion that such an ideal could be achieved through "that undefined, and to me 
incomprehensible, something which is indicated by the crushing of Germany" that had 
recently pervaded the government's pro-war rhetoric was nothing short of "sheer 
madness."SS 
Quoting a variety of international journals, Snowden and Trevelyan juxtaposed 
the loose talk of British statesmen in the popular press about destroying and partitioning 
enemy territories59 with the view that even Germany not only "wishes for peace" but that 
"this wish is not limited to the social democrats ... [and that an] increasing number ... are 
ready to make peace 'without annexations' ."60 If, Trevelyan reasoned, Asquith was, as he 
himself had said, "ready to discuss proposals of a serious character for a general peace," 
and if he remained committed to his original aims for the war, the growing conviction 
"that we are out on a policy of conquest and aggression ... can be easily made good.,,61 
All that was required, Snowden and Trevelyan insisted, was for Asquith to "translate into 
more definite and precise language his Guildhall speech," in which his aims were 
originally expressed,62 and to put those aims "into some kind of concrete proposal and 
held up to Europe, in lieu of the rather vague declarations about the crushing of 
Germany.,,63 
S7 Speeches on February 23,1916 Hansard's vol. 80. cc. 714 and 719. For other examples, see cc. 732 and 
741. 
58 Ibid., cc. 718 and 719. 
59 Drul., cc. 719 and 729-730. 
60 Ibid., cc.722-725 and 728. The quoted phrase is from cc. 728. 
61 Ibid., cc. 731-732. 
62 Ibid., cc. 725 
63 Ibid., cc. 732. Also, see Harris 134-137. 
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In his reply, Asquith merely disparaged the political legitimacy of dissenting 
opinion. 64 His reply to their demand that he state his aims for the war, however, was 
nevertheless telling for its omission of his call to arms speeches in favor of his 
declaration, three months and nearly 900,000 volunteers into the war effort, that 
'We shall never sheath the sword, which we have not lightly drawn, until 
Belgium-' and I will add Serbia- 'recovers in full measure all, and more than 
all, which she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the 
menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are 
placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of 
Prussia' - this is the language I used- 'is wholly and finally destroyed.'65 
Ignoring completely the contrast, for his dissenting detractors, with his earlier speeches, 
Asquith asked with wry derision, "what is there wanting in clearness or directness in this 
language? How can I make it more full? How can I make it more intelligible?,,66 
Obliging the Prime Ministers rhetorical request, Ponsonby suggested that he 
openly support the universal interdiction of annexation at the peace. For "it is not the 
supremacy of Great Britain that I believe any of us desire," he reminded Asquith, 
It is the peace of the world ... I maintain that the policy of aggressive German 
militarism is annexation ... If by our terms of peace we defeat that and we prevent 
annexation of any invaded territory, then I say we have defeated the policy of 
German militarism.67 
This simple gesture of good faith on the part of Asquith was, however, not so simple as 
his detractors alluded. The new Concert of Europe the Asquith administration had been 
working to build was, by and large, a renewed balance of power characterized by the 
64 Speeches on February 23,1916 Hansard's vol. 80., cc. 734. -737. His exact words were "I should not 
like it to go forth to the world that the two hon. Gentlemen, to whom we have listened with weB-deserved 
consideration, are the spokesmen of any substantial body of opinion in this country. I doubt very much 
whether either of them speaks for his own constituents. I am perfectly certain that they do not speak for the 
democracy of Great Britain." 
6S Ibid., cc. 734. -737. 
66 Ullil., cc. 734. -737. 
67 Ibid., cc. 739-741. 
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same sort of secret diplomacy and policies of conquest that dissenting writers believed 
had generated the war to begin with. The British government had already formally 
promised to recognize various spheres of influence among its allies throughout the 
territories of the Central Powers. Moreover, hundreds of thousands in British lives and 
sterling had already been shed over their occupation including Britain's own share 
stretching from the Persian Gulf into the heartland of Fertile Crescent. By 1916, even 
restating aims that had formed the very foundations of Britain's cause for the war had 
become, for Asquith, politically untenable. His reluctance to do so, followed by that of 
his soon-to-be successor, Lloyd George, I argue, merely fueled the demand from 
dissenting propagandists that the aims not only be stated, but codified into a new regime 
of international law and embodied in a formal League of Nations. 
Despite the appearance of the idea of a 'United States of Europe' in the earliest 
wartime publications of the ILP and UDC,68 there is an historiographical consensus that 
most pro-peace British Radicals, Liberals, and Labourites, and specifically UDC leaders, 
as John Callaghan put it, "were not really interested in a League of Nations.,,69 One 
reason for this consensus is that, as Henry Winkler has shown, dissenting writers tended 
not to develop their conceptions of the League into specific plans for a functional 
international institution. Nevertheless, I contend that Winkler's conclusion that this 
shortcoming reflected the Labour movement's traditional "indifference to the world of 
diplomacy and foreign policy" misreads the function of the idea of the League of Nations 
68 See, for example the ILP's, Manifesto on the War (1914) and the UDC's first statement of purpose in the 
Manchester Guardian, September 14, 1914. 
69 See, for example, John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History (London: Routledge, 
2(07), pp. 30-31 and Keith Robbins, The Abolition o/War: The 'Peace Movement' in Britain. 1914-1919 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1976), pp. 54-55. 
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in dissenting propaganda?O Like most of the dissenting left's peace demands, the idea of 
a League of Nations was a signifier for the shortcomings of the prewar inter-imperial 
political system that also doubled as an idealized political goal taken directly from the 
war aims of the government itself, but that dissenting writers firmly believed the 
government would ultimately prove incapable of achieving. Contrary to Winkler, I argue 
that the pairing of democratic oversight for British foreign policy making at home with 
international oversight of inter-, and later, intra-imperial relations abroad under a League 
of Nations provided an institutional expression for the 'indissoluble connection' between 
foreign and domestic policy dissenting leaders had been emphasizing for their working-
class readers from the outbreak of the war.71 
The fact that outlawing the annexation of territory was at the center of the League 
idea for dissenting writers from its earliest inception is one often overlooked by 
historians. The UDC was quite clear in its Cardinal Points, however, that democratic 
control meant "democratic control of foreign policy"(2); that democratically controlled 
foreign policy should "not be aimed at ... maintaining the 'balance of power'" but rather 
"the establishment of a Concert of Europe"(3); that a policy of conquest and territorial 
transfer, the "raison d' etre" of the balance of power, should be outlawed by that body (1); 
and that European empires should be disarmed, presumably to force the adherence to 
inter-imperial arbitration (4).72 The ILP similarly linked "territorial aggression and 
national abasement" as reciprocal problems meant to addressed by workers "press[ing] 
70 Henry R. Winkler, Paths Not Taken: British Labour and International Policy in the 1920's (Chapel Hill 
and London: The University of North Carolina, 1994), p. 11. For the renewed interest among dissenting 
writers after 1917, see Henry R. Winkler, The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain: 1914-1919 
(New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1952), pp. 167-198, especially pp. l70 and 176. 
71 Swartz, p. 150. 
72 Manchester Guardian, September 14, 1914. 
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for frank and honest diplomatic policies, controlled by themselves" at home and 
demanding "the establishment of the United States of Europe" abroad in its early 
Manifesto on the War (1914).73 
As the British government seemed to drift further toward a balance of power 
settlement for the war in its rhetoric, the scope and significance of the League idea in 
dissenting propaganda grew in direct proportion. By 1916, H. N. Brailsford could write 
that, in his view, the only "alternative to Areopagus is Armageddon."74 Explaining 
precisely why this was occupied a number of dissenting speakers, lecturers, and essayists 
over the 'spring peace offensive' of 1915. In early 1916, one of the most prolific public 
speakers for the UDC and ILP, the philanthropist and Liberal politician Charles Roden 
Buxton, published collections of his own 1915 lectures and those of his colleagues 
reflecting what the British countryside had likely been hearing from UDC and ILP 
leaders about the war, the peace, and Britain's future as a leader in the coming 
international community. 
In Buxton's Towards a Lasting Settlement, the social theorist, economist, and 
UDC member J. A. Hobson suggested that the answer to the problem of modern war lay 
not in the reformation of inter-imperial but rather intra-imperial relations. It went 
without saying, for Hobson, that "powerful economic needs and interests," and not the 
principles of liberty, nationality, and humanity, were the true engines of war. Less 
obvious, however, was the fact that the source of international tensions sprang from the 
73 ILP Manifesto on the War in Europe. 
74 H. N. Brailsford, "The Organization of the Peace," in Charles Roden Buxton, ed., Towards a Lasting 
Settlement (London: G. Allen & Unwin ltd, 1915), p. 156. The Areopagus was a council of elders in 
Athens, Greece before the 5th Century S.C.E. that operated similarly to the Roman Senate. Interestingly, it 
also functioned as the main court for homicide for Athens and was built above a temple where, allegedly, 
murders could find temporary sanctuary. 
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"economic relations of civilized with uncivilized or undeveloped countries." For it was in 
those "backward places," outside the parameters of any 'public law' of Europe, that 
liberty, in the sense of a freedom of economic and political development, had become a 
prize of conquest, rather than a benchmark of the progress of civilization, and led to the 
gradual closing off of the globe into contested imperial quadrants to the detriment of 
peace and progress?5 It followed, for Hobson, that if imperial powers mutually agreed to 
designate their own colonies, protectorates, and dependencies, in addition to as of yet 
unclaimed territories, as a single "joint international protectorate" under the supervision 
of a "permanent International Council" and open to completely free trade for all, "this 
single agreement would go farther to secure a peaceful future for the world than any other 
measure.,,76 
Hobson was exceptional in that he had already published his own pamphlet for 
the UDC dedicated to explicating the form and function of A League o/Nations (1915).77 
However, his sentiments were echoed, and with more energy, throughout Towards a 
Lasting Settlement?8 A related point on which all were similarly agreed was that the 
greatest obstacle to an international, rather than an inter-imperial balance of power 
settlement for the war was pervasiveness of the idea in Britain that national interests were 
fundamentally and inherently opposed to the progress of foreign nations. Centuries of 
inter-imperial relations grounded in mutual suspicion and fear, argued historian, social 
activist, and UDC member G. Lowes Dickinson, had led to a global political system 
75 J. A. Hobson, "The Open Door," in Charles Roden Buxton, ed., Towards a Lasting Settlement (London: 
G. Allen & Unwin ltd, 1915), pp. 89-90, 92 and 94. 
76 Ibid., pp. 105-108. 
77 J.A. Hobson, A League of Nations (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1915). Morel FJ3/6/J, 
LSE 
78 See in particular H. N. Brailsford, "The Organization of the Peace" and G. Lowes Dickenson, "Basis of 
Permanent Peace." 
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based on conquest, intrigue, and the ultimate goal of global domination at the level of 
government and a purely artificial sense of national rivalry at the level of popular 
opinion. 79 European history, argued H. N. Brailsford, had been characterized by war 
because under such a system, European governments had "never [learned] how to 
provide for large changes without war ."so As a result, the conquest and retention of 
territory, the main currency of inter-imperial power, Dickinson explained, had also 
became an important aspect of national pride. "The English insist in this war, and 
genuinely believe," Dickenson argued, 
that they are fighting against German, not/or English domination. But how do 
they feel when, as a matter of fact, they acquire territory? They did not go to war 
for it. No! But they are very glad to have it ... They feel a pride in thinking of the 
number of the population of their nation, the number of 'black' men they 
vicariously govern. They do enjoy, in that gross way, the sense of power ... The 
lowest form of patriotism, and its commonest form, is but a larger egotism.S! 
For Dickenson, this 'mind of imperial patriotism' was inherently antagonistic to all other 
nations for the threat to 'national security' they potentially posed. A "truer nationalism 
and a finer patriotism," he argued, "demands international organization" in defense of the 
principles of nationality and democracy shared by all peoples. National security, he 
insisted, impossible to obtain by war, "can only be obtained by international agreement; 
and international agreement requires the international mind."s2 
In addition to being the key to international security, accepting that the principle 
of nationality should apply universally, even to 'undeveloped regions,' was also the key 
to cultivating the international mind. The contribution to Buxton's volume of suffragist 
and writer Violet Paget, writing under the pseudonym Vernon Lee, argued that "the very 
79 Dickinson, pp. 11-12. 
80 Brailsford, "The Organization of the Peace," p. 153. 
81 Dickenson, p. 21. 
82 Dickinson, p. 35. 
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essence of the democratic principle is to consider men and women as wills and not as 
chattels; and the progress of democracy ... implies also that inhabitants do not belong to 
territory, but territory to inhabitants." It followed, for Paget, that "to transfer a province 
is therefore as undemocratic as to sell a slave ... the democratic principle absolutely 
rejects the notion of a military victory having 'fruits' ."83 As Buxton pointed up, the 
"nationality principle is merely another form of the democratic principle," which, as the 
"essential doctrine of Liberalism," aspires to the attainment of "'the independent 
existence and free development' of all the peoples.,,84 Elsewhere, important socialist 
leaders like the ILP's Fenner Brockway were making similar statements about the 
principled responsibilities of socialists to ensure a lasting peace by ensuring that, in the 
postwar world, "the nations advanced in the arts of civilization would go to the primitive 
peoples not to exploit but to assist, not to impress upon them their particular forms of 
civilization but to encourage them to develop according to their own national genius.,,85 
The singular act of denying "the right of conquest" at the peace, Buxton argued, would be 
a "precedent of priceless value for the future" for removing the stakes of the' gamble of 
war' from the table. More importantly, however, 
the solid fact that none of the combatants in this greatest of all wars had 
succeeded in establishing its right to any territory by might alone, would remain 
permanently in the consciousness of mankind, and would profoundly influence 
their thoughts when the possibility of another appeal to the hazard of war was 
beginning to be considered.86 
83 Vernon Lee, "Democracy and International Relations," Lasting Settlement, pp. 207-8 
84 C. R. Buxton, "Nationality," in Lasting Settlement, pp. 40 and 53. The internal quotes mark a phrase, 
often quoted by dissenting writers, from Winston Churchill .. 
85 Fenner A. Brockway, Socialism for Pacifists (Manchester and London: The National Labour Press, 
LTD., 1916), p. 53. LSE ILP15/1916 
86 Charles Roden Buxton, Shouted Down! Lectures on the Settlement of the War, intended to be delivered at 
Devonshire House, Bishopsgate, London on January 3rd, 10th, and 17th, 1916 (Manchester and London: 
The National Labour Press, LTD., 1916), p. 6, Pamphlet no. 328.624, PHM 
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Calls for the destruction, dismemberment, and, presumably, the reallocation of 
territory from the Central Powers were, obviously, fundamentally opposed to such 
principles. Equally opposed, however, was the reluctance of the government to come out 
in the open at the national and inter-imperial level, with its actual aims for the war. It 
was absolutely crucial, in the name of peace but also in defense of democratic principles 
in Britain, argued the pamphlet The ILP and the War, that the British democracy ask their 
government, 
What are we fighting for now? 'Until the military domination of Prussia is 
wholly and finally destroyed,' says the Prime Minister. But what does that mean, 
and how much longer must useless slaughter continue? Let the Governments 
state in plain language what they are aiming at, so that the peoples may judge.,,87 
The UDC magazine, concurred, opening one of its earliest issues in February 1916 with 
an article by well-known suffragist F.W. Pethick Lawrence entitled "Why Not State 
Terms?" in which the author called for the government to 
abandon vague phrases about the ends of the war, and ... state categorically and 
publicly what are the definite objects for which the war is being prosecuted, and 
what are the terms on the satisfaction of which, this war can be brought to an 
end ... in order that we and the other peoples of the allied nations may ... be able to 
express an opinion as to whether they contain all that we want, and nothing more 
than we are prepared to go on fighting for.,,88 
At the ILP's annual conference that April, Chair and Labour MP F. W. Jowett took the 
developing 'State the Aims' campaign to the level of a political platform for the ILP by 
tabling an amendment that 
the Government should ... make a public declaration disavowing all plans of 
conquest and dismemberment and intimating the willingness of the Allies to 
f>7 Independent Labour Party, The fLP. and the War, I.L.P. Position Leaflet, no. 1 (Manchester and 
London: The National Labour Press, LTD., 1916), fLPI511916122, LSE. 
88 The UDe Magazine, February 1916. 
accept the good offices of neutral nations for the purpose of arriving at a 
settlement between the belligerents .,,89 
No doubt, by "the good offices of neutral nations," Jowett meant those of American 
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President Woodrow Wilson who had,just a few weeks before the conference, declared 
his own government's preference for a decidedly internationalist settlement for the war. 
In late May 1916, Woodrow Wilson publically offered his own principles for a 
lasting settlement of the Great War at a League to Enforce Peace banquet in Washington 
D.C. that would breath new life, as well as international legitimacy ,into the dissenting 
peace movement. His views clearly echoed those of dissenting writers in insisting, 
I.--That every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under which they 
shall live like other nations. 
II .--That the small States of the world have the right to enjoy the same respect for 
their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that the great and powerful 
nations expect and insist upon. 
111.--That the world has the right to be free form every disturbance to its peace 
that has its origin in aggression and the disregard of the rights of peoples and 
nations.90 
It was upon these principles, and these principles alone, he inferred, that the United States 
was willing to become a partner in orchestrating a lasting settlement to the war, if not 
intervene in the conflict itself. 
Although the views put forward by Wilson would come to be inextricably 
identified with him personally, Sally Harris and Lawrence Martin have shown that 
dissenting leaders in contact with members of Wilson's administration had been working 
89 lLP Report of the Annual Conference held at Newcastle-on-Tyne. April. 1916 (London: Independent 
Labour Party, 1916),p.8. 
90 The Times, May 29,1916. 
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tirelessly to convince the American President to come out publically in favor of their 
shared agenda for months.91 Norman Angell, according to Harris, even advised Wilson to 
employ the UDC tactic of quoting the lofty aims for the war put forward by European 
leaders in its early hours, such as Asquith's conception of the 'enthronement of the public 
right,' as a means to embarrass them into accepting his proposed arbitration toward those 
ends.92 Emboldened by Wilson's speech, UDC writers moved forward with the campaign 
for a negotiated peace with renewed energy, organizing a Peace Negotiations Committee 
to direct the national propaganda effort and openly challenged the government's 
reluctance to even state its peace aims, let alone engage in actual negotiations.93 
Over the course of 1916, however, the ability of the government to 'come clean' 
about its aims was dwindling by the week. According to Turner, the Cabinet had already 
privately concluded the December prior that simply outlasting the enemy was hopeless 
and that only a massive offensive while Britain still had the forces to make it could save 
them from being "forced by economic and financial constraints to accept an unfavourable 
peace or the mediation of a forbiddingly unbiased American President.,,94 Accordingly, 
the First Military Service Act from January was expanded in May to include married men 
as well. Contrary to the government's insistence that the war was not being prolonged 
for imperial gain, the Asquith coalition had formalized its secret agreements with Russia 
and France to divide the territories of the Central Powers into spheres of influence and 
occupation after the war mere days before Wilson's speech. Moreover, while British 
91 Harris, p. 137 and Laurence W. Martin, "Woodrow Wilson's Appeals to the People of Europe: British 
Radical Influence on the President's Strategy," Political Science Quarterly 74, no. 4 (December 1959): 498-
516. 
92 Harris, p. 137. 
93 Ibid., p. 139. 
94 Turner, pp. 82-3 and 126. 
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forces were dying by the thousands in their attempts to complete the occupation of 
Britain's shares of the spoils in Mesopotamia, Arab forces under the Sherif Hussein's son 
Amir Faysal were just setting out to take possession the remaining territories already 
promised to France. 
As Secretary of State for War over 1916, Lloyd George intensified the focus of 
the war effort in the Eastern theaters where 'real victories' could be quickly and 
definitively achieved and British morale reinvigorated; tightened governmental controls 
of industrial production and recruitment at home to shore up the amount of force Britain 
could bring to the field; and consolidated the decision making power of the War Council 
down to a few like minded statesmen with near autocratic powers to streamline the 
effectiveness of British strategy making.95 With key Conservative and Liberal members 
of government and Parliament gathering behind him, Lloyd George was in a key position 
to finally oust Asquith when his commitment to a balance of power settlement for the war 
began to shift, for Peter Yearwood, toward favoring a stronger postwar Anglo-American 
alliance.96 
In September 1916, Lloyd George established his position in relation to both 
Asquith and Wilson in an interview with an American journalist, declaring that 
now that the fortunes of the game have turned a bit, are not disposed to stop 
because of the squealing done by Germans or done for the Germans by probably 
well-meaning but misguided sympathizers and humanitarians ... Germany elected 
to make this a fight to a finish with England ... Now we intend to see that 
Germany has her way. The fight must be to a finish-to a knock-out. .. The 
whole world-including neutrals of the highest purposes and humanitarians with 
the best motives-must know that there can be no outside interference at this 
stage. Britain asked no intervention when she was unprepared to fight. She will 
95 !!:llil., pp. 112-151. 
96 Peter J Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy, 1914-1925 (Oxford, UK 
; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 29. 
tolerate none now that she is prepared until the Prussian military despotism is 
broken beyond repair.97 
In the weeks to follow, differences of opinion on the wisdom of Lloyd George's 
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statements would draw much clearer lines of political division in the Parliament, leading 
to a clearer gathering of force behind him and ending in early December with statesmen 
across party lines threatening their own resignations in lieu of Asquith's. 
On December 18, Wilson responded to Lloyd George's sentiments with his first 
'Peace Note.' In terms that seemed directly inspired by dissenting propaganda, a "double 
answer to radical prayers," according to Kenneth Calder,98 Wilson lamented that, apart 
from general terms and declarations, "the concrete aims for which [the war] is being 
waged have never been definitively stated" by any of the belligerent powers.99 Moreover, 
he pointed out, taken from their own public statements, it would seem that aims of all 
belligerent powers were virtually identical to one another, being namely 
to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure 
against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great 
and powerful States now at war ... to secure ... against the recurrence of wars like 
this and against aggression of selfish interference of any kind ... [and to prevent] 
the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power 
amidst multiplying suspicions. lOo 
Echoing the dissenting demand that the government state its aims for the war, Wilson 
claimed to feel "altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a 
97 The Times, September 291916. 
98 Kenneth J Calder,Britain and the Origins o/the New Europe, 1914-1918 (Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), p. 80. 
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(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), pp. 12-14. 
100 llllil., p. 14. 
144 
comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for 
the peace of the world."JOJ 
The reply of the Allies to Wilson, submitted on January 10 1917, claimed that it 
would be 
impossible at the present moment to attain a peace which will assure them 
reparation, restitution, and such guarantees to which they are entitled by the 
aggression for which the responsibility rests with the Central Powers and of which 
the principle itself tended to ruin the security of Europe.J02 
The terms expected by the Allies included restorations and indemnities for every territory 
encroached upon by the Central Powers as well as the liberation of all peoples currently 
under their subjugation, but also, significantly, "the restitution of provinces or territories 
wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations."J03 In 
other words, in the view of dissenting writers, the Allies expected that the principle of 
nationality would apply to the punishment of the Central Powers, but not to their own 
claims to the spoils of the war.104 
Using the vagaries of the Allied reply to his advantage, Wilson expressed his 
satisfaction with its terms, declaring in the American Senate on January 22 that "both of 
the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not 
be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their 
antagonists." He added that the absence of such intentions opened the door to precisely 
the type of peace he had in mind, which, he took the opportunity to emphasize, "must be 
101 I.lllil. 
102 "Entente Reply to President Wilson" January 10, 1917 in James Brown Scott, Official Statements o/War 
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a peace without victory" and not merely "a struggle for a new balance of power" in 
which 
no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that 
every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of 
development--unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great 
and powerful ... [and] henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw 
them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish 
rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without.los 
In short, Wilson used the moment to clarify the demand of the United States that the 
belligerent powers "adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the 
world."I06 
UDC and ILP leaders turned out in force to capitalize on the renewed national 
interest in the idea of a negotiated peace generated by President Wilson and the vast 
distance the government had come from its original aims for the war over the course of 
1916 at the third reading of the consolidated funds bill in Parliament on February 20 
1917. Ponsonby opened the debate with the accusation that Lloyd George had effectively 
eliminated all control of the House of Commons over his office, inferring that the new 
Prime Minister believed he had inherited a 'benevolent autocracy,' rather than a 
democratic government.107 He insisted that the House deny him that right and face the 
obvious contradiction between the professed aims of their statesmen for the war and the 
actual facts on the ground before voting to continue to fund the war effort. Reiterating 
the oft-heard denials of Lloyd George himself that he was "not fighting a war of 
105 "Address of President Wilson to the Senate," January 22, 1917 in James Brown Scott, Official 
Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December J 9 J 6 to November J 9 J 8, Pamphlet Series of the 
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conquest," Arthur Ponsonby followed with his evidence to the contrary. "We know," he 
claimed, 
that an agreement has been made with Russia by which Constantinople and the 
Straits are to go to Russia ... Syria to France ... and Western Asia and the territory 
round Smyrna to Italy ... that the German Colonies are not to be returned to 
Germany ... that the continued endeavour ... [and] great sacrifice in Mesopotamia 
means that that region will fall to the British Crown. Egypt and Cyprus ... have 
fallen to us ... when you sum up the whole territory, that something like 1 ,500,000 
square miles will be added to the British Empire. 108 
There was in all this, for Ponsonby, "a direct contradiction" with the original aims for the 
war, implying that the government was deliberately veiling its developing expansionist 
agendas now in motion. It was no wonder, he inferred, that the rest of the world believed 
that "we are indeed out for a war of aggression."I09 
Trevelyan emphasized the long-standing disregard of both the Asquith and Lloyd 
George coalitions for the demands of the British people for a clear statement of its aims 
for the war until "the same demand was put forward ... [by] President Wilson ... a person 
who could not be disregarded" so easily as the British democracy. 110 Seeming to speak 
to Wilson's more optimistic interpretation of the Allied reply to his 'Peace Notes,' 
Trevelyan inquired whether the reply was, in fact, "the whole policy" of the government. 
For, "if we are out for a war of conquest," he argued, "our people ought to be told, and 
told by the Prime Minister. The world ought to be apprised of a radical change of 
intention, and our people ought to discuss and sanction it.,,111 
Snowden was even more direct in emphasizing Trevelyan's point about the 
suppression of information about the kind of war the British people were being asked to 
108 Ibid., CC. 1180 and 1185. 
109 Ibid., CC. 1181. 
110 Ibid., CC. 1188 and 1189. 
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fight. Noting the recent prosecution of "an ex-Member of this House" for publishing a 
pamphlet describing the role of British foreign policy in causing the war, Snowden 
reiterated the very points made in the publication in his speech and disparaged the 
statement at his trial that "it did not matter whether these statements were true or not. 
That was not the point. Whether they were true or not, they ought not to have been made. 
They might prejudice recruiting.,,1l2 The purpose of the punitive measures instituted by 
the government, he asserted, were "to hide the truth from the nation, and to prevent those 
who believed that they knew the truth of the genesis of this War from declaring what they 
believed to be the truth."I13 
The same policy persisted, argued MacDonald, in the planning of the settlement. 
It was not only deplorable that the current and late governments had attempted to solve 
their "complicated set of international entanglements" by saying '''Let Russia have 
Constantinople, but do not tell the people of this country that the agreement has been 
come to' ," he argued, it was short-sighted and delusional policy planning. For, as the 
long history of inter-imperial rivalry pointed up by Snowden had shown, it was "plain as 
a pikestaff," for MacDonald, "that we cannot assume that the present division of 
European Powers is going to last for ever ."114 Even if a lasting balance of power could be 
achieved, insisted Ponsonby, 
I do not want to see my country come out of this War a mere winner in a struggle 
for supremacy. I want to see my country the chief agent in the establishment of a 
new order founded on international justice and framed to promote a durable 
international peace.115 
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Liberal MP Richard Lambert concurred, but but also pointed out that foregoing a policy 
of conquest was not enough. Collectively, the Allies alone had already occupied nearly 
half of the earth's land surface and around a third of its population in the form of 
protectorates, colonies, and dependencies. "So long as you have these protectorates," he 
argued, "so long will there necessarily be a thirst. .. to acquire those kinds of 
protectorates and territories, and until you have taken away the temptation ... I maintain 
that it is absolutely impossible to hope for permanent peace.,,1l6 Lambert, for one, was 
"as anxious as anybody can be to see something in the nature of a League of Nations set 
up in the world" to facilitate that transition from inter-imperial war to international peace. 
The scope of his vision for the League also clearly reflected the growing tendency among 
dissenting writers to look beyond the addition of new territories toward the liberation of 
long standing possessions of the British Empire. ll7 
Supporters of Lloyd George, who had left the House just before the debate, 
denied outright any sort of imperialistic agenda for the war. Nevertheless, they 
undertook to preemptively justify any annexations that might take place at war's end. 
The dissenting members, they argued, were "confusing the objects with which we went to 
war with the results which will follow from our victory." Like the expenditure in blood 
and treasure, the British had not gone to war for territorial gains, but, as Conservative 
Member Ronald McNeil pointed out, "a transference of territory from the enemy ... is 
clearly necessary ... if we are to carry out the very objects which from the first have been 
announced as our purpose, and to which the hon. Member himself called attention.,,1l8 
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d1l9 f h . Loyal supporter of Lloyd George Colonel Hamar Greenwoo went even urt er III 
accusing dissenting speakers of desiring the breakup of the British Empire itself. Coming 
to the defense of the Empire, Greenwood offered his own justifications for extending its 
sovereignty. 
I know that wherever the British territory has been extended it has been better for 
the people over which the British flag has flown, and there is no part painted red 
that has not benefited by the coming of the British ... It is the great glory of our 
race that wherever we have extended the Empire we have carried there benefits 
unheard of by the peoples over which we govern, and we have carried to them a 
sense of justice that no other race possesses, a sense of honesty and 
incorruptibility of administration which every other country in the world envies 
and endeavours to emulate.120 
For Chancellor of the Exchequer Bonar Law taking of Germany's colonies away from 
her was purely a matter of punishment for taking Europe into war. "It is necessary ," he 
insisted, "to make nations that commit those crimes find that they do not pay. That is 
what we are fighting for."J2\ Irrespective of such justifications, over the remainder of 
1917 the government's resistance to state its aims for the war would deteriorate along 
with the domestic, inter-imperial, and international tolerance of its presumed aspirations 
for a renewed Anglo-Centric balance of power. 
In May 1917, the equipoise of power envisioned by Lloyd George for the postwar 
world was significantly undermined by the overthrow of the Tsarist regime in Russia and 
a startling declaration of revised aims for the war and the peace by the revolutionary 
government. In addition to advocating an early negotiated and even separate peace with 
119 According to M. F. Seedorf, Greenwood was so famous for his ability to redirect Parliamentary debate 
away from criticism of his Party leader through evasions and denials that to engage in such practices 
became known as 'telling a Greenwood.' See M. F. Seedorf, 'The Lloyd George government and the 
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the Central Powers, the new government also demanded a "general peace which shall not 
tend toward either dominion over other nations, the seizure of their national possessions, 
or violent usurpation of their territories-a peace without annexation or indemnity and 
based on the right of nations to decide their own affairs.,,122 
Immediately upon receiving word of the Russian declaration, Snowden tabled a 
motion in Parliament that the British government welcome the "declaration of the new 
democratic Government of Russia, repudiating all proposals for imperialistic conquest 
and aggrandizement" by issuing "a similar declaration on behalf of the British democracy 
and join with the allies in restating the Allied terms in conformity with the Russian 
declaration." Together with the recent entry of the United States into the war, he argued, 
the "real inspiration and motive of the Russian Revolution was the objection of the 
democracy to a continuation of the war for Imperialistic ambitions." The aims conveyed 
in the Allied reply to Wilson's 'Peace Notes,' a work of "Imperialism and conquest, 
naked and unashamed" for Snowden, were now in contradiction not only with the 
original aims for the war and the will of the British people, but with half of Britain's 
Allies. Asquithian loyalist Hastings Lees Smith agreed with Snowden, stating that, with 
the expansionist ambitions of Russia now rescinded, "the next move towards peace lay 
with this country .,,123 
Parliamentary objections to making such a declaration of Allied unity on 
territorial issues included the instability of the new Russian regime, the vagueness or 
uncertainty of their policies at such an early stage, and, for Conservative peer Robert 
Cecil, the obvious existing conformity of British aims for the war with those of both the 
122 "Statement of the Reorganized Russian Provisional Government on its Policy with Respect to War 
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new Russian government and President Wilson. "We entered upon this war with no 
scheme of Imperialistic conquest or aggrandizement," Cecil stated, and "at the present 
stage of the war it is equally true that no one desires anything of that kind."I24 Asquith 
concurred with Cecil, but added that it was Snowden and men of his ilk that were 
confusing the issue with vagaries and not the British government. Further justifying the 
possibility of annexations after the war, he argued that the goals of emancipation of 
subjugated peoples and imperial annexation were not only not antithetical, but 
unavoidably linked. The achievement of "a durable and honourable peace, which 
consists in the emancipation of enthralled and oppressed populations from the despotism 
and its attendant sufferings under which they have hitherto laboured," Asquith argued, 
"would either not be accomplished at all or accomplished most inadequately unless 
annexation in that sense of emancipation were thoroughly carried out by the Allies." 
Similarly, he reasoned, control of certain territories "for the purpose of retaining strategic 
positions" did not amount to imperialistic aggression, but merely "self-protection and 
defense against future attack." "Not only is [annexation] legitimate," Asquith suggested, 
but it "commend[s] itself to our conscience and to our intelligence ... [as well as] the 
purposes for which we drew the sword in this war." With "the ground thus explored and 
these ambiguities removed," he suggested, there was "no substantial difference" between 
his early or later aims for the war and the proclamations of President Wilson, the Allied 
reply, or the recent statements of the new Russian government. Despite such conformity 
of Allied principles for the war, however, the House voted 238 to 32 against Snowden's 
resolution that they be openly declated.l25 
124 Ibid. 
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The triumph of the Russian democracy had a radicalizing effect on the dissenting 
left and the Labour movement as a whole. That June, more socialistically minded 
dissenting leaders like MacDonald and Snowden were leading voices at the Labour and 
Socialist Convention held at Leeds for the express purpose of not only giving support to 
the new regime in Russia, but following her example. According to Stephen Graubard, 
the positions taken by these leaders at the Conference, "seemed suddenly to have 
abandoned years of 'parliamentary' preaching ... to agree to a resolution creating 
extraparliamentary Soviets with sovereign powers" within the British Isles.126 When 
Lloyd George obstructed the attendance of British Labour representatives at an 
international conference of socialists organized in support of a negotiated peace along the 
lines set by the Russian government that August, Parliamentary Labour Party Chair 
Arthur Henderson resigned from the Cabinet in protest. This act of defiance, according 
to Keith Robbins, not only rectified Henderson's defiled status in the Labour Movement, 
it elevated him to become one of its most influential figures for the duration of the war.J27 
With support for the new regime in Russia and dissenting identification with it at 
its height, the Bolshevik coup d'etat that November brought even more extreme aims for 
the peace and even more damning evidence against the government's conformity with 
those aims. Within twenty-four hours of taking power, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin announced 
on the floor of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets his intention of initiating "an 
126 Stephen Richards Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1924, Harvard historical 
monographs 30 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 38-39. 
127 Robbins, p. 139. On this topic generally, see J.M. Winter, "Arthur Henderson, the Russian Revolution, 
and the Reconstruction of the Labour Party," The Historical Journal 15, no. 4 (December 1972): 753-773 
and Jonathan Davis, "Left Out in the Cold: British Labour Witnesses the Russian Revolution," 
Revolutionary Russia Vol. 18, No.1. (2005): pp. 71-87. 
153 
immediate peace without annexations and without indemnities."l28 In contrast to 
Asquith's definition of annexation, Lenin clarified that 
By annexation ... the government. .. understands any incorporation of a small or 
weak nationality by a large and powerful state without a clear, definite, and 
voluntary expression of agreement and desire by the weak nationality, regardless 
of the time when such a forcible incorporation took place, regardless also of how 
developed or how backward is the nation forcibly attached or forcibly detained 
within the frontiers of the state, and, finally regardless of whether or not this 
nation is located in Europe or in distant lands beyond the seas.129 
To continue the war as it had been waged, he argued, "simply to decide how to divide the 
weak nationalities among the powerful and rich nations which had seized them would be 
the greatest crime against humanity ."130 As Erez Manela has argued, although Lenin 
might have been easier to dismiss as merely a radical revolutionary earlier in the war, 
Wilson's proclamations imbued his position with new legitimacy. 
On the very day Asquith attempted to justify the potential annexation of enemy 
territories as an act of 'imperial benevolence,' a report was published by a special 
commission organized under his own coalition government that would largely decry the 
legitimacy of any such notions. Originally sanctioned by the War Council in late 1915 to 
investigate alleged inadequacies in supply transport and medical facilities for British 
forces in Mesopotamia, the series of commissions that would contribute to the 
Mesopotamia Commission Report of 1917 provided a scathing analysis of the origins and 
mismanagement of what Kristian Ulrichsen has referred to as "the final fling of 
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nineteenth-century colonial campaigning" for the British Empire. l3l Upon its publication, 
even the staunchly conservative and pro-war Daily Telegraph would refer to the report as 
"the most melancholy, the most damnatory, and the most humiliating document produced 
in connection with the war.,,132 For dissenting writers, the report provided the clearest 
evidence to date of the persistent indifference of British statesmen to the impact their 
aspirations for imperial aggrandizement from the beginning of the war had had on the 
interests of British subjects and citizens throughout the Empire. 
As Paul Davis has shown, public and Parliamentary outcry over complaints, 
trickling past government censors into Britain, of the daily suffering British troops had 
been forced to endure under the "rigid economy" imposed on the Mesopotamia 
Campaign led Viceroy for India Harding to sanction an independent inquiry in late 1915 
'before it was forced upon the government'.133 With early investigations underway by 
late December and even more damning reports of mismanagement and suffering coming 
in over the spring of 1916, Asquith's enemies in government took advantage of the 
opportunity to highlight his failures as a Liberal wartime Prime Minister. 134 Edward 
Carson, a leading Conservative critic of Asquith who personally "set himself up as a 
scourge of what he considered mismanagement and inefficiency at the highest level," 
according to David Powell, took the investigations to the next level in July with the 
formation of a Special Parliamentary Commission to look more deeply into the matter.135 
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Under the coalition government, however, the campaign in Mesopotamia was 
refitted and resupplied for the purpose of taking and holding Baghdad and all points 
south, "the first time in the war (but not the last)," for Davis, "that military operations 
were authorized for the express purpose of extending the British empire.,,136 By the time 
the Mesopotamia Commission Report was published a year later, the Times could 
truthfully report that "the first thing to remember about [the Mesopotamia Commission 
Report] is that it bears little relation to present conditions.,,137 Nevertheless, the findings 
of the Report claimed that the disastrous decision to advance toward Baghdad in 1915 
was "based on political and military miscalculations, and attempted with tired and 
insufficient forces, and inadequate preparation." Although the commanders on the spot 
bore some weight of responsibility, the Report determined that the ultimate 
"responsibility must be attributed to the political powers in London since they made 
decisions on the principle that they should decide military policy.,,138 The ILP's Labour 
Leader took the assessment even further in insisting in that "we must not lose sight of the 
important fact that it is not only individuals, but a system which is at fault.,,139 
As the Labour Leader pointed out, "no document published in this generation has 
created such a profound sensation as the Mesopotamia Report."I40 The Times agreed, 
calling the Report "one of the most distressing documents ever submitted to 
Parliament.,,141 Presumably, one of the reasons the findings of the Commission were so 
shocking was the absence of any real news coming in from Mesopotamia from the 
136 Paul K. Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission (Cranbury: 
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beginning of the campaign. The Manchester Guardian had been questioning the silence 
of the government on the progress of the campaign for months, noting in its 
characteristically suggestive tone that, although the campaign was being "conducted 
entirely from the resources of India" and in territory that would become "valuable 
principally as an outlet for the surplus population of India," the British people were "just 
as eager to know about the fortunes of our Indian army in Mesopotamia as they were to 
hear the details fo General Botha's conquest of South-west Aftica.,,142 The Herald was 
more direct with its criticisms in the months leading up to the release of the Report, 
publishing Irish Parliamentarian John Dillon's critique of 'the Censorship' on issues 
pertaining to the Eastern campaigns in particular. Newspapers that tended to report 
"what was acceptable to the Government," such as "the Times, the Daily Mail, and the 
Morning Post," Dillon declared, "got full scope, no matter how false the information, 
even known to the Government to be false, while other newspapers, which desired to tell 
unpleasant truths, were sat upon by the Censor and compelled to keep silence.,,143 
Indeed, the Times foreign correspondent in Mesopotamia, Edmund Candler, had 
been publishing suspiciously celebratory depictions of the "peaceful progress" of British 
forces breathing new life back into the long decrepit backwater the "Garden of Eden" had 
become under the Ottomans.l44 The "ceaseless demand for more and more despotic 
control of British lives by irresponsible Government, with the suppression of discussion 
as to the use made of those lives by that Government," Dillon concluded, was 
142 Manchester Guardian, September 30,1915. 
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"Prussianism with a vengeance.,,145 With the truth about the "criminal blundering which 
condemned thousands of men to the indescribable horrors they endured" finally revealed, 
the Labour Leader reported, "public feeling" was so vehement in its demands for the 
summary punishment of the chief criminals ... [that] the Government cannot avoid 
taking drastic action ... The country has trusted these men with millions of lives 
and the story of the Mesopotamia campaign shows how recklessly they use them, 
and how incompetent they are to undertake any serious task. l46 
Dissenting writers were quick to take full advantage of such an opportunity. 
In the ILP pamphlet The Mesopotamia Scandal (1917), T. D. Hutchinson stressed 
the attribution of responsibility to the government itself, echoed in the Labour Leader and 
the Herald, by illustrating the underlying motives for taking Mesopotamia in the first 
place. Referring to the campaign as the Mesopotamian "Oil-Pipe Operations," 
Hutchinson pointed out that "Lloyd George was one of the most prominent members of 
the Cabinet during the Mesopotamia mess," that the initial purview of the campaign had 
been to "protect the oil-installation at Abadan ... [which] belonged to the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, in which the British Government had recently become large shareholders," 
and that the decisions to either send or restrict the supply of reinforcements or to advance 
further in country were largely determined by the Secretary of State's perception of the 
threat to those installations.147 Not only were such motives concealed, Hutchinson noted, 
but also the price being paid by the British people for their accomplishment. Had not 
Asquith himself claimed in the fall of 1915 that "during the whole course of the war ... a 
series of operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly conducted, or with better 
145 The Herald. March 10, 1917. 
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prospects of final success," than those then driving "the Turks ... back up the Euphrates 
and the Tigris"?l48 
For the editors of both the Labour Leader and the Herald, however, the 
implications of the scandal were of even broader scope. Snowden drew particular 
attention in the Leader to the punishing conditions inflicted upon Indian troops fighting 
under British colors as identical to "the spirit and the methods [British administrators] are 
accustomed to employ in the government of India." The crucial issue, however, was not 
merely that the British administration in India had been proven to be "an incompetent, 
intolerant, and callous bureaucracy ... not fitted to be trusted with any responsibility ," but, 
rather, why it had been permitted to become so. For, in Snowden's view, 
What happened in Mesopotamia will happen anywhere and everywhere if 
politicians and officials are not subject to democratic control. The evils of our 
own Government spring from the same causes. Where there is public control in a 
government department there is efficiency and right dealing. Where there is 
bureaucracy and secrecy there is inefficiency and intrigue.149 
The story of British working class citizens and Indian subjects valiantly fighting and 
dying for the British flag while being denied by their government even the most basic 
needs of any force in the field or a knowledge of the base imperialistic aims for which 
they suffered, was but a snapshot of the larger story of the failings of Britain's purported 
imperial democracy. 
Writing for the Herald, George Lansbury gave voice to the ILP's increasing 
identification of working class struggles with those of British imperial subjects 
everywhere in lauding Commission member Josiah Wedgewood's Parliamentary motion, 
tabled shortly after the submission of the Report. The "war of democracy against 
148Thkt., pp. 2-3. 
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autocracy," Wedgewood argued, had justifiably inspired in all peoples the will to protect 
the principle of nationality against that of tyranny. The valiance of the Indian volunteers 
in defense of this principle, he insisted, now demanded that "our mission to extend self-
government to subject races without regard to our advantage" be given "proof of our faith 
by extending to the peoples of India a generous measure of self-government and the 
assured prospect of complete freedom within the union of the British Empire." The 
Indian people, he reasoned, "have as good a right to determine their own future as have 
the people of Servia [sic] or Montenegro ... They are as advanced and as civilized as the 
people of China or Japan, and as those on whose behalf we are said to be fighting in the 
Balkans." To deny them that right, he concluded, would be "the story of Ireland all over 
again, only on a larger scale."lso 
The dissenting critique of the government's 'brutal indifference' to such issues 
and opinions was further confirmed when the findings of the Report were debated in 
Parliament that July. "The most remarkable thing" about the Parliamentary debate over 
the Report, the Manchester Guardian would comment "was that the Prime Minister 
showed a great deal of irritation at being bothered with the question at all.,,151 Not only 
did members of the government express their contempt of the idea that their management 
of the campaign had been in any way 'criminal,' but even suggested, as Foreign Secretary 
Arthur Balfour put it, that "the criminals ... are not Lord Hardinge nor the Secretary of 
State for India. They are the Commission" for their condemnation of government 
officials "over matters of relative triviality.,,152 As Davis has shown, dissenting leaders 
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came to the defense of the Commission in force in both Parliament and print.153 As 
Snowden would lament in the Labour Leader, however, the results "could not have been 
more unsatisfactory." Lloyd George's speech was singled out by Snowden as "an 
amazing declaration." 
he asks in effect that those responsible ... should not only go unpunished, but 
should be left in positions where they may be able to bring similar misfortune 
upon thousands of others. He denounced the press and the public for taking so 
much notice of the disclosures of this committee. He declared ... that the House of 
Commons was wasting its time ... by bothering about such a relatively unimportant 
matter ... He begged the House of Commons to rise above these paltry things, and 
to say to the Government, 'Get on with the war'. 154 
In the Manchester Guardian, Trade Unionist and Labour MP J. H. Thompson reported 
that the fact that "the Government did not deal promptly and effectively with those 
responsible regardless of rank and position ... [had] profoundly affected our people, 
whose husbands, sons, and brothers had been the victims of such blunders.,,155 The 
suggestion that such views were widespread appeared to be born out, for the Times, by 
such examples as the motion of the Miner's Federation at Glasgow, which 
viewed with regret and indignation the action of the Government in this country 
in not bringing to trial and punishment the persons culpably responsible for the 
awful loss of life and misery endured by our troops in Mesopotamia as made 
known in the official report, and declares that such treatment of persons in high 
places as compared with the rigorous discipline meted out to private soldiers is 
not conducive to inspiring that confidence in the Government of the country so 
essential to a successful prosecution of the war. This, he said, was one of the 
most distressful things of the war, and it was followed in is opinion by a more 
disgraceful thing when the House of Commons allowed the matter to drop.l56 
"The motion," the Times reported, "was unanimously adopted.,,157 
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Just as Lloyd George suggested they do, dissenting writers and leaders' got on 
with the war' as they understood it at home. Already, as reported at the ILP's annual 
conference that April, their Peace Negotiations Committee had already held over six 
hundred meetings nationally, established over eighty local community groups, obtained 
around a quarter of a million signatures, and distributed over three million leaflets.l58 
With national interest in the issues raised by Wilson's 'Peace Notes,' Russia's abdication 
of annexations and indemnities, and the revelation of the Mesopotamia 'Oil-Pipe scandal, 
dissenting writers focused their attentions on the related issues of forcing the government 
to 'State the Aims' for which they now fought and to ensure that those aims were bereft 
of any sort of expansionist agenda. 
The UD.C. Magazine, which was launched with the 'State the Aims' campaign in 
the wake of the first consolidated funds debate in Parliament in February 1916, was 
unabashed in its accusations that the government had made the reallocation of enemy 
territories a primary war aim, disguised as the liberation of small powers, and had no 
intention of ending the war without the power to distribute those territories as it saw fit. 159 
British action in Mesopotamia in particular, "for which such special and heavy sacrifices 
have been made and which strategically and economically is a prize we are, it appears, 
not likely to relinquish," for Arthur Ponsonby, had demonstrated that the war was "now a 
war of aggression" for the British Empire.l60 "Is it any real surprise that the Central 
Powers wish to go on fighting," asked Cocks and Ponsonby, now that they were "fighting 
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for their very existence against a plan of deliberate dismemberment?,,161 Ramsay 
MacDonald was particularly vehement in his refutations of the government's 
justifications for annexation as a form of 'imperial benevolence.' "Of course liberation is 
not annexation," MacDonald pointed out, "but its opposite" and the bewildering language 
of liberation used by the government was nothing more than a smoke screen for a policy 
that was, in his view, not only "frankly annexationist," but anti-democratic in its 
presentation to the British people as anything otherwise.162 The fact that Britons had not 
only been led into a war of conquest under the false pretenses of a war of liberation, 
argued Trevelyan, but kept in that war through the same duplicitous propaganda 
vindicated the UDC's early emphasis on demanding the interdiction of annexation as its 
first Cardinal Point.l63 Similar sentiments were expressed in the Labour Leader, the 
Herald, and in a variety of UDC and ILP pamphlets.l64 Even those who still believed 
with conviction that "our war aims are not disfigured by any taint of predatory 
Imperialism," such as the Guardian's Henry Bentinck, nevertheless argued 
161 ThiQ. 
surely we have a right to be told what we are fighting for ... with regard to Turkey 
and the near East. We have three armies in those regions. What are they fighting 
for? The liberation of subject peoples or the transfer of territory form one Power 
to another without the consent of the inhabitants? If the former be our object, 
then the project for the transference of large portions of Asia Minor as spoils of 
war to one of our Allies is entirely unjustifiable.l65 
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The government's reaction to the dissenting campaign was also indicative of its 
progress over the course of 1917. As Swartz has shown, surveillance of dissenting 
activists expanded sharply after the Russian Revolution in the spring of 1917 and 
developed into a full-blown 'witch-hunt' by the end of the year. l66 For Harris, Lloyd 
George made crushing British dissent, particularly of the Labour variety, his personal 
vendetta, bringing the full weight of both the National War Aims Committee and the 
Defense of the Realm Act against them.167 Lloyd George's hostility to dissenting opinion 
was, for Brock Millman, a reflection of the force in public opinion against the 
government being generated by it. l68 As Millman pointed up, the Lloyd George coalition 
was in clear preparation stages for a full-scale domestic revolt by early 1918, suggesting 
that the efforts of dissenting writers were, for the government at least, actually 
threatening to ignite a Russian style socialist revolution at home. 169 UDC and ILP writers 
complained bitterly of the disregard for democracy and free-speech exhibited by the 
campaign of repression directed at them by the government. They also offered it up, 
however, as proof that the government's aims were precisely as they were described by 
the dissenting activists they had arrested on trumped up charges and the publications they 
had seized in illegal raids. 
In the fall of 1917, following the Bolshevik coup d'etat in Russia, Commissar of 
Foreign Affairs for the new Russian government, Leon Trotsky seemed to answer the 
prayers of beleaguered dissenting writers in Britain by announcing the eminent 
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publication of the secret Allied agreements to divide the territories of the Central Powers 
among them at war's end.l7O On November 26, three days after they were published in 
the Russian papers Izvestia and Pravda, the Manchester Guardian published its 
translations of the formal agreements of the Allies indicating the precise details of the 
territorial settlements meant to define the parameters of the new balance of power in the 
postwar world.17l On December 6, the Labour Leader dedicated an entire issue to the 
discussion of the treaties, providing maps and commentary detailing precisely how the 
territories comprising the present day Middle East were to be divided and reallocated in 
the new postwar balance of power envisioned by their own government. In an 
accompanying article, Snowden declared that 
The publication of these secret treaties also places beyond all dispute the 
Imperialistic character of the war which is being waged by the Allied Powers. It is 
the existence of these treaties which has tied the hands of the British government, 
and prevented them from making an honest and open declaration of their war 
aims ... [they] show how the people of all the belligerent countries have been 
deceived by their respective Governments into supporting a war ostensibly 
entered upon and prosecuted either for defense, for the future security of 
civilization, or even for freedom, but secretly carried out to satisfy lust of power 
and the greed of Imperialists and financiers. 172 
In the Herald a few days later, Brailsford wryly commented that, concerning Britain's 
share of Mesopotamia, "we alone, with our usual sense for realities, have occupied what 
we claim."173 
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171 Manchester Guardian, November 26, 1917. 
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On December 19 1917, Ponsonby took up the matter in Parliament, offering a 
detailed account of both the agreements and the denials of key statesmen, made around 
the very dates they were formalized, that such agreements either existed or were even 
contemplated. Ponsonby concluded by declaring to Foreign Secretary Balfour, 
you have prostituted the original disinterested motives for which this country 
entered the war, and you have substituted for them a mean craving for vengeance 
and punishment, a sordid desire for gain, an arrogant demand for imperial 
aggrandizement and domination, and this without the consent of the people and 
behind the backs of the people, secretly, surreptitiously, making declarations all 
the while deceitful and false. 174 
In reply, Bafour dismissed the fervor being raised over agreements that were never 
intended to be binding or, in any event, had been made irrelevant by the new regime in 
Russia. "A grosser travesty of the facts does not exist," Balfour declared, than the 
suggestion that "our aims are selfish or as the camp phrase is 'imperialistic,' and that 
Great Britain for purely selfish objects is prolonging the war." Referring to Ponsonby's 
speech as equal to a "propaganda account for the enemy," Balfour shifted the blame to 
Russia, arguing that 
the then Russian Government made a claim to Constantinople, we were carrying 
on together a great struggle for a great aim and we acquiesced ... What is there in 
that which is in the slightest degree inconsistent with any profession of faith made 
either by ourselves or on our behalf by President Wilson?175 
Charles Buxton spoke for dissenting opinion of Balfour's evasion of the issues in his 
response to the Parliamentary debate the next day in the Labour Leader. "The upshot of 
the whole business," Buxton explained 
is that our Government has made, behind the backs of the people, proposals and 
agreements involving direct or indirect annexations without reference to the 
wishes of the populations concerned, while in its public utterances it has given an 
account of its war aims which was not only incomplete, but grossly deceptive. 
174 Times, December 20,1917. 
175 Times, December 20,1917. 
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Whilst it was talking about a war for self-defense, for the sanctity of treaties, for 
democracy, for a secure and lasting peace, it was secretly putting its hand to 
agreements which would give lie to these high-sounding phrases. In the Note of 
January 10, 1917, on the Allies' war aims, the word 'liberation' is applied to the 
races of Austria-Hungary, and the word' enfranchisement' to the races of Turkey. 
In the actual arrangements made or proposed, no such words appear, and the 
districts specified for partition do not correspond with the boundaries of 
nationalities.176 
Just a few days after the publication of the Secret Treaties in the Manchester 
Guardian, a most unlikely supporter of the dissenting left made himself known in the 
equally unlikely pages of the Daily Telegraph. In addition to having served as Viceroy 
for India, Governor-General of Canada, Secretary of State for War, and Foreign 
Secretary, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, the fifth Marques of Lansdowne, had been the very 
architect of the Anglo-French Entente Cordial that so many dissenting writers had 
identified as the first diplomatic steps down the road to the Great War. On November 29 
1917, he took what he hoped would be the first steps toward ending that war by 
publically expressing his advocacy for a negotiated peace at the earliest possible moment. 
UDC and ILP writers were, understandably,jubilant.177 In addition to being a 
much respected elder statesmen, Lansdowne's long-standing opposition to many of the 
domestic principles for which dissenting leaders stood only amplified the significance of 
his alignment with them on the issue of the peace. Lloyd George was, equally 
understandably, furious. 178 Like the intervention of Woodrow Wilson, Lansdowne's 
letter imbued the dissenting campaign with the legitimacy he commanded as 'too 
important a personage to be ignored'.179 As Swartz has shown, the Letter enabled the 
176 Labour Leader, December 20, 1917. 
177 See Robbins, pp. 149-153; Swartz, pp. 192-194; Harris, pp. 161-162; and Turner, p. 249. 
178 Robbins, p. 150. 
179 Harris, pp. 161. 
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UDC to bring significantly more pressure to bear on the government to make a statement 
of its war aims over the last two months of 1917. This pressure was further amplified, for 
Harris, by the beginning of negotiations for a separate peace on the principles of self-
determination, open foreign policy, and 'no annexations and no indemnities,' between 
Germany and Russia at Brest-Litovsk on December 9.1SO 
By the end of December, the British Labour Movement offered its own 
alternative to the silence of the government on the matter of its war aims with a formal 
declaration of its own set of aims for the peace. Drafted by Sidney Webb of the Fabian 
Society, revised by a committee of members from the UDC, the ILP, and the PLP, the 
Memorandum on War Aims was a document comprised of the influences of key 
intellectual figures across the spectrum of the Labour Movement in 1917 and represented 
as the will of British labour generally. As Swartz has shown, however, it also signified a 
clear moment at which "the Union of Democratic Control could rightly assert that British 
Labour was following its lead in foreign policy.1S1 The chief aims of the memorandum 
were stated as "the complete democratization of all countries; the frank abandonment of 
every form of 'Imperialism'; the suppression of secret diplomacy and ... the placing of 
foreign policy ... under the control of popularly elected Legislatures; ... the universal 
abolition of compulsory military service in all countries; ... [and] the limitation of ... 
armaments." IS2 The Memorandum offered a detailed examination of the most disputed 
territories and, coming to those dealt with in the Secret Treaties, commented that, in order 
to avoid their becoming "mere instruments either of exploitation or militarism," but 
ISO Ibid., p. 183. 
IBI The 'Memorandum on War Aims' in Arthur Henderson, The Aims of Labour (8. W. Huebsch, 1918), 
pp.83-90. 
182 !lli.Q., pp. 83-90. 
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recognizing that "it is impracticable to leave it to the peoples to settle their own destinies" 
it was insisted that "conformably with the policy of 'no annexations' they should be 
placed for administration in the hands of ... a League of Nations."I83 The Herald went 
even further in suggesting that such principles applied equally to all peoples, including 
those considered to be British imperial subjects. "The question of Turkey in Europe and 
Asia," argued the Herald, 
together with the right of nations to govern themselves according to their own 
wishes and desires, must apply to the Turks and Egyptians, Persians and Indians, 
and nearer home to Ireland, as well as to other nations. There can be no colour or 
religious bar to liberty. The crimes of the Ottoman Government in Armenia are 
no worse than the crimes of the late Russian Government in Georgia ... nor greater 
than the crimes committed by all the Great Powers in their dealing s with what 
they are pleased to describe as 'subject races'. We hope organized Labour will 
see that the demand for freedom is one which is worldwide, and must be applied 
to all the peoples of the world. l84 
As 1917 drew to a close, Lloyd George and the War Cabinet pondered the 
problem of war aims and concluded by early January that a statement was indeed 
unavoidable and that it would need to be on lines, for Keith Robbins, of an 'ultra-
democratic' character. On January 5 1918, Lloyd George opened an address to the 
Trades Union Conference with the recognition that "when the Government invites 
organized labour ... to maintain the might of their armies in the field, its representatives 
are entitled to ask ... about the purpose to which this precious strength is to be applied."ls5 
Addressing the many points raised by dissenting leaders in the press and Parliament, 
Lloyd George revised the position taken in the Allied reply to Wilson's 'Peace Notes' in 
a conciliatory tone markedly softer than his characteristic commitment to the 'knock-out 
blow,' in which the destruction and dismantlement of the Central Powers played no role. 
183 Ibid., p. 87. 
184 The Herald, December 22, 1917. 
185 "Statement of British War Aims by Prime Minister Lloyd George, January 5, 1918," in Scott, p. 231. 
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Specifically addressing the contentious issue of annexations raised by the revelation of 
the Secret Treaties, Lloyd George committed the government to what amounted to an 
abrogation of those agreements in stating that Constantinople would remain in Turkish 
hands, the Dardanelle Straits would be internationalized, and that the Turkish possessions 
in the Middle East, "Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine [were] in our 
judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national condition."l86 
Lloyd George's January 5th speech was, of course, the product of a wide variety of 
influences, not least of which the Prime Minister's own mercurial political nature. 
Against the arguments that Lloyd George acquiesced to the pressures brought to bare by 
Wilson, Lenin, and the dissenting left to definitively commit the British government to a 
policy bereft of imperial ambition in the name of inter-imperial peace, David Woodward 
has argued that the "right of center British government" led by Lloyd George was never 
as closed off to the idea of a negotiated peace on such terms as is usually implied and that 
a compromise peace had always been considered 'on the table.'l87 Sally Harris has 
pointed out that, though the international and domestic pressure to make such a statement 
was indeed felt at Downing Street, "the speech reflected the popular mood of the 
moment ... Lloyd George was notoriously unpredictable in his views, paid little heed to 
political principles, preferring, whenever feasible, to align himself with current popular 
opinion."l88 A. P. Thornton has argued that Lloyd George was keen to present his 
democratic credentials to a constituency he felt might be slipping away from him,189 
while Marvin Swartz has argued that the threat of domestic unrest was a far more 
186 Ibid. 
187 David R. Woodward, "The Origins and Intent of David Lloyd George's January 5 War Aims Speech," 
The Historian Vol. 34, no. 1 (November 1971), p. 39. 
188 Harris,p. 197. 
189 Thornton, p. 158. 
significant influence, for which his speech was meant to be an unavoidable 
conciliation.l90 
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This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that Lloyd George's commitment of 
the British government to the internationalist or even anti-imperialist principles in his 
speech was a crucial goal for dissenting writers from the outbreak of the war and one that 
the government staunchly resisted practically to its end. Although the Prime Minister 
would very soon retract the essential spirit of his statements, his speech nevertheless 
publicly committed the British government to a policy of no annexations that would give 
dissenting statesmen a basis for attacking the imperialistic approach the government 
would take at the actual peace settlement. The dissenting position for the peace 
settlement was made even more advantageous a few days later with Woodrow Wilson's 
declaration of his fourteen points for the peace before the American Congress. 
Although the actual influence of the dissenting left on Lloyd George's decision to 
transition from a balance of power approach to the peace to one friendlier to what 
historians would come to refer to as a 'Wilsonian' vision for the postwar world, what is 
clear is that dissenting propaganda during this period generated something of a popular 
movement for the principles at the heart of their propaganda, and the beginnings of a 
'spirit of decolonization' in the name of British liberty. As the next chapter will 
illustrate, the empowerment of the British democracy to weigh in on matters of imperial, 
inter-imperial, and international policy would lend significant leverage to the dissenting 
campaign to limit the maneuver of imperially minded statesmen to 'get what they want' 
in conquered territories at the peace settlement. In so doing, I argue, they would also 
190 Swartz, pp. 196 and 1 g']. 
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disable the perpetuation of Victorian imperial ideals in interwar British policy toward the 
postwar community of nations it now anticipated facing. 
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Chapter 4: The Problem of the Peace 
Even as Lloyd George publicly committed the British Empire to a 'Wisonian 
Peace' before the Trade Union Congress in early January 1918 key members of his staff 
were already engineering a policy for the peace designed to keep control of the territories 
occupied during the war in British hands at all costs. It is an irony of history that some of 
Britain's most committed and experienced imperial administrators would have chosen to 
accomplish that goal by erecting ostensibly self-governing nation-states in those regions. 
William Roger Louis has suggested that British statesmen planning for the territorial 
settlement of the First World War could 'hardly have foreseen' that the decision to 
appropriate the principle of self-determination as a means of preserving postwar imperial 
sovereignty would result in "the shattering of the British Empire into independent and 
sovereign states" by the century's end.) It seems equally intuitive, however, to say that 
they would not have settled on such a dangerous precedent for the future of imperial 
sovereignty as the catalyst for its preservation if less risky options had been available to 
them. 
Historians have tended to emphasize 'Great Power politics' and, particularly, the 
pressure brought to bear by American President Woodrow Wilson, in explaining the 
Lloyd George administration's reasoning for getting into the nation-making business in 
the Middle East. 2 Although the empowerment of internationalism as a political principle 
1 Louis goes as far as suggesting that such a possibility was beyond the imagination as late as the settlement 
of the Second World War. Wm. Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, 
and Decolonization (London: LB. Tauris, 2006), p. xi. 
2 Significant works that reflect this perspective include Peter J Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace: The League 
of Nations in British Policy, 1914-1925 (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Zara S 
Steiner, The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt 
to End War (London: J. Murray, 2001); George Louis Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace 
Conference, with Papers on Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Colonial Settlement (New York: Macmillan Co., 
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on the global level was indeed influencing British policy making, the role of dissenting 
writers in translating that influence into a formidable political platform of opposition at 
home has too often been overlooked. The British government's transition from secretly 
negotiating the division and annexation of enemy territory with their Allies to openly 
advocating for the creation of independent nation-states in those regions did not happen 
over night. Rather, as this chapter will show, it was comprised of a series of concessions 
made by the British government in the face of persistent dissenting critique that tended to 
take the form of deepening commitments to guaranteeing the postwar independence of 
Arabic speaking territories that would result in the 'mandate solution' adopted in Paris in 
1919. 
By the final months of the war, the Lloyd George administration had been brought 
to see that the legitimacy of the pre-war inter-imperial system was collapsing from the 
metropoles of Europe to its furthest peripheries. The government's embrace of 
internationalism, I argue, was firmly grounded in the belief of its statesmen that even the 
most naIve idealist (be they nationalist, socialist, or internationalist) would be forced to 
reckon with the indispensability of, at the very least, an imperial framework of 
administrative authority in the developing world to stave off its collapse into chaos after 
the war. This chapter seeks to show that dissenting leaders and propagandists played a 
crucial role in forcing British statesmen to give substance and legitimacy to the fa~ade of 
self-government they had hoped to impose in the conquered territories. In so doing, I 
will show, dissenting leaders indirectly empowered the Arab clients through whom the 
government had intended to rule at the Peace settlement, but also the very nationalist 
1923); Duncan H Hall, Mandates, Dependencies, and Trusteeship (New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1972); 
Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). 
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movements the British would struggle to suppress in the postwar Middle East. Through 
these developments, the growing opposition to imperial rule emanating out of the British 
occupied Arabic speaking territories came into conversation with the anti-imperial 
rhetoric of the dissenting left that would characterize the domestic and peripheral 
parameters of inter-war anti-colonialism in the British Empire. 
Lloyd George's war aims speech of January 1918 rarely appears in the 
historiography without some explanation for the volte face of the 'official mind' toward a 
'Wilsonian' peace settlement that it seemed to reflect? It is, perhaps, because of the very 
completeness of the speech's embrace of a Wilsonian agenda for the peace, however, that 
historians have tended to overlook its underlying message about the inter-dependence of 
international security and imperial power. For, embedded in Lloyd George's acceptance 
of a negotiated internationalist peace in principle, I argue, was the qualifying assertion 
that total Allied victory and the reestablishment of an Anglo-centric balance of power in 
Europe were not the antithesis of such a settlement, as dissenting propagandists had 
claimed, but rather its sine qua non. 
Going beyond the demands of dissenting propagandists, Lloyd George not only 
restated the government's commitment to upholding the principle of nationality at the 
peace, he broadened its definition to include the right of all peoples, regardless of their 
state of national development, to "self-determination or ... government by consent of the 
governed." Concerning the 'much discussed' inter-Allied Secret Treaties preemptively 
dividing the Ottoman Empire among them, Lloyd George somewhat ambiguously 
declared that "new circumstances ... have changed the conditions under which those 
3 David R. Woodward, "The Origins and Intent of David Lloyd George's January 5 War Aims Speech," The 
Historian Vol. 34, no. 1 (November 1971), p. 39. Yearwood, pp. 45-46, Harris, p. 197, Swartz, pp. 196 and 
197, Thornton, p. 158. 
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arrangements were made." He followed, however, with the definitive admission that "the 
days of the Treaty of Vienna are long past" and that "no treaty of peace can be worth the 
paper on which it is printed ... [if] government by consent of the governed [was not 
made] the basis of any territorial settlement in this war.,,4 From the capitals of Eastern 
Europe, to the tribal village-councils of Africa, to the heartland of the collapsing Ottoman 
Empire, he declared, guaranteeing the development of indigenous self-determination 
against competitive imperial exploitation was, in his view, the surest means to a lasting 
peace for the postwar world. It was for these principled aims, he proclaimed, that "the 
British Empire" would be willing to negotiate peace, but also for which "its people are 
prepared to make even greater sacrifices than those they have yet endured.,,5 
The key to Lloyd George's position, however, was that none of the original 
belligerent powers apart from the British Empire were prepared to commit to, let alone 
enforce, such a guarantee. The "deplorably vague" peace pledges from the Central 
Powers, he pointed out, had all been "perfectly clear and definite" on one point alone: 
their demand for the restoration of their territorial possessions at war's end. Singling out 
Africa and the Arab world where, un-coincidentally, British territorial claims would 
prove least negotiable, Lloyd George assured his audience that Germany had no intention 
of "submitting the future of [her African] colonies to the wishes of the ... profoundly anti-
German ... natives themselves" and that Ottoman statesmen fully intended to keep "the 
question whether any form of self-government is to be given to Arabs, Armenians or 
4 Times of London, Jan 07,1918. The 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna attempted to settle the political 
tensions arising from the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the collapse of the Holy Roman 
Empire by defining an acceptable balance of power among the empires of Europe through the reallocation 
of contested territories. 
5 Times of London , Jan 07, 1918 
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Syrians entirely a matter for the Sublime Porte." In abandoning the Allies she had 
dragged into the war in favor of a separate peace, Lloyd George intimated, even Russia 
had also potentially condemned her western borderlands to "rule by the Prussian sword" 
and "a condition of complete economic and ultimate political enslavement to Germany.,,6 
Although France's expansionist intentions were well known, they were, tellingly, not 
discussed? 
Whether Lloyd George desired or even believed in the possibility of a genuinely 
internationalist settlement or not, he certainly did not believe that the inter-imperial 
tensions and rivalries that had characterized European politics for centuries were likely to 
vanish at the invocation of the League of Nations.s Imperialism and internationalism 
were not antithetical systems for Lloyd George because the survival of the latter 
necessarily required the framework of power that only the former, and particularly the 
British Empire, could provide. Lloyd George had little doubt that most Britons also 
tended to view their own support for total victory and an internationalist settlement as 
similarly complimentary.9 Accordingly, Lloyd George's 'fight to the finish' approach to 
the war and his plans for a 'balance of power' settlement went on largely as they had 
before his speech. Within a month, he had reiterated his Supreme War Council's 
commitment to a total Allied victory over immediate diplomatic negotiations.1O Victories 
from British and Arab forces in Palestine over the holidays were accordingly rewarded 
6 Times of London, Jan 07, 1918 
7The reasons for this will be discussed below. 
8 On this topic, see Peter J Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace, pp. 20-22. 
9 Keith Robbins, The Abolition of War: The 'Peace Movement' in Britain, 1914-1919 (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1976)., pp. 153-155, Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics 
During the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 203, and Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace, 
p.48. 
IOFor a discussion of this declaration in Parliament, see 13 February 1918 Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates vol 103 ccl48-149. 
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with renewed forces by the spring to take Damascus while plans to make a second 
attempt to take Baghdad and begin building Britain's 'New India' in Iraq continued to 
develop in this direction. ll 
Nevertheless, Lloyd George's public acquiescence to the demands of dissenting 
activists also signified a turning point at which popular opinion, perhaps for the first time 
in British history, began to directly influence how British imperial policy was being 
made.12 As Lord Curzon lamented that April to his Eastern Committee, then considering 
the future of British policy in Middle East, in the wake of "the Prime Minister's statement 
that the status of Mesopotamia among other countries would be settled at the Peace 
Conference ... our policy [in Mesopotamia] might have to be adapted to certain formulae, 
such as that of 'self-determination' ," which, he noted, had become "increasingly used as 
a watchword" in public debate over the settlement.13 Fearing that "the word 'annexation' 
[might] appear too inauspicious" under the circumstances, Curzon and his Committee 
pondered whether "a terminological variant, such as 'perpetual lease,' or 'enclave,' might 
be found, both to safeguard the reality which we must not abandon, and to save the 
appearances which the occasion might require.,,14 Curzon left no doubt, however, that, 
11 For an account of the progress of the 'Arab Revolt' through Palestine and Syria, see George Antonius, 
The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (London: Kegan Paul International, 2000), 
pp.216-242. For the conquest of Baghdad, see Paul K. Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian 
Campaign and Commission (Cranbury: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press: Associated University 
Presses, 1994), pp. 112-172. 
12 For the growth in support for the Labour movement as a whole during this period, see Chris 
Chamberlain, "The Growth of Support for the Labour Party in Britain," The British Journal of Sociology 
Vol. 24, no. 4 (December 1973): pp. 474-489. For the role UDC and ILP campaigning played in this 
growth, see Catherine Ann Cline, Recruits to Labour: The British Labour Party, 1914-1931 (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1963). 
13 Eastern Committee Minutes, 5th meeting, April 24, 1918. NAiCABI27124121 , p. 12. Curzon was referring 
to Lloyd George's speech of January 1918 in which he stated that Mesopotamia was entitled to her 'own 
separate national condition' and that her status would be determined by international forum at the Peace. 
14 Eastern Committee Minutes, 5th meeting, April 24, 1918. NAiCABI27124121 , p. 12. 
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regardless of the watchwords characterizing the settlement, in determining the fate of 
British interests in the Ottoman territories, "international control must be resisted.,,15 
It was no coincidence that Lloyd George's appropriation of the pro-
internationalist platform from his dissenting critics was accompanied by an all out 
offensive from his administration against the UDC and ILP in 1918.16 For just as Lloyd 
George was attempting to publicly subjugate the principles of an internationalist 
settlement to the interests of the Empire, dissenting propagandists were expanding the 
scope of commitment to internationalist principles they were demanding from the 
government in dangerous ways. By the spring of 1918, 'liberating' contested territories 
from the imperial rule of Britain's rivals alone was no longer enough in the view of 
dissenting leaders. If an internationalist peace was going to take root, the process had to 
begin at home with the voluntary application of the principle of nationality to the British 
Empire's own possessions.17 If the Lloyd George administration proved unwilling or 
unable to make such a commitment, then Lloyd George WOUld, quite simply, have to go. 
The most compelling evidence that the government had no intention of taking 
even the first step toward such a settlement, as Philip Snowden argued with energy in 
Parliament and the press over the spring of 1918, was the Lloyd George administration's 
refusal to annul or even acknowledge the continued existence of its formal claims to 
15Ibid. 
16 For a discussion of Lloyd George's assault on the dissenting left, see Brock Millman, Managing 
Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 271-296 and 304-306, 
Swartz, pp. 178-180. 
17The tendency in the historiography has been to deemphasize the significance of anti-colonial or anti-
imperial tendencies in dissenting propaganda. See, for example, Stephen Howe, Anti-Colonialism in 
British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire, 1939-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 27-81. 
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territory in the Ottoman Empire as designated in the Secret Treaties.1s Short of such a 
gesture, Snowden warned, "if the Government do not realize the state of feeling in the 
country" concerning its commitment to a negotiated internationalist peace, they now 
faced a "real danger of revolution" among Britain's labouring classes.19 
In important respects, the simultaneous revelation and repudiation of Allied 
claims to Ottoman territories by the Bolshevik government in 1917 had served as a 
fulcrum in dissenting propaganda for the transference of the principle of nationality from 
foreign territories alone to British imperial possessions. A crucial component for this 
transference, however, would lie in the British government's attempts to legitimate its 
territorial claims, as well as the anti-democratic manner in which they were made, as, in 
the words of radical journalist and socialist activist J. T. Walton Newbold, part of British 
Liberalism's "historic task ... of liberating populations oppressed by alien tyranny.,,20 
For, in the view of important dissenting writers, the obvious contradiction between such 
language and the facts on the ground in Mesopotamia brought into sharp relief the 
duplicitous manner in which the government had traditionally deployed the language of 
Liberalism, if not an inherent contradiction at the heart of British Liberalism itself. In 
facilitating this revelation, the example of the Russian Revolutions had also pointed up 
the clearest path to correcting the situation by forcibly imposing democratic control of the 
government's foreign and domestic policy through popular revolution. 
In his ILP pamphlet Capitalism and the War (1917), Newbold presented the 
'liberation of Mesopotamia' ostensibly being undertaken by the British government as 
18 Hansard's 13 February 1918 vol 103 cc. 195 and Philip Snowden, Why the Governments Cannot Make 
Peace (Manchester: The National Labour Press, LTD., 1918). LSEIILPI51l91S134 
19 Hansard's 13 February 1918 vol 103 cc. 195. 
20 J.T. Walton Newbold, Capitalism and the War (Manchester and London: The National Labour Press, 
LTD., 1917), p. 10. LSEIILPI5/1917139. 
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evidence of British Liberalism's paradoxical pairing of the ideal of political emancipation 
and the practice of exploitative conquest dating back to the birth of British democracy 
itself?l The "creed of the capitalist class," for Newbold, British Liberal ideals emerged 
as the clarion call for a "war for Liberty and Democracy" against the "reactionary 
political forms" of "the Crown and the landed nobility" of seventeenth and eighteenth 
century Britain. 22 Nevertheless, the victory of British Liberalism merely imbued the 
capitalist elite with "all the social and political power" they needed to dominate the 
labouring classes at home for generations thereafter?3 Echoing the arguments of Hobson 
and MacDonald, Newbold illustrated how maintaining a class hierarchy at home 
grounded in capitalist principles eventually necessitated the abandonment of laissez-faire 
trade practices abroad in favor a policy of conquest and the birth of a competitive inter-
imperial global economy.24 Even as their government pursued its global bid to "control 
the governments of other countries ... to defend their own interests and injure those of 
their rivals," the appeal of the language of imperial liberation only grew for the British 
people, Newbold argued, precisely because Britons generally believed themselves to be a 
"politically free" people imbued with genuine "democratic sympathies" and a mission to 
effect "the universal application of their ideals."25 
21 Ibid., pp. 46. 
22Ibid., pp. 4. 
23 Ibid., pp. 4. 
24 Because "all lands where capitalism has prevailed for some time" faced the related problems of 
"marketing their surplus production ... and maintaining the rate of interest on their growing accumulations 
of capital," competition for foreign markets grew exponentially from the eighteenth century forward, 
forcing capitalist governments to tum to "expeditionary forces and invading hordes, instead of commercial 
travelers and selling agencies" and to abandon laissez-faire trade practices in favor of simply "control[ingJ 
the governments of other countries ... to defend their own interests and injure those of their rivals." 
Newbold, pp. 4 and 46-47. For MacDonald on this topic, see Ramsay MacDonald, Labour and the Empire 
(London: George Allen, 1907) and Labour and International Relations (Derby: The Derby and District 
I.L.P.Federation, 1917) LSE, ILPI5/1917131. For Hobson, see J. A. Hobson, Imperialism, a Study,(London, 
G. Allen & Unwin ltd., 1902). 
25 Newbold, pp. 2,4, and 46-47. 
181 
Mesopotamia, for Newbold, offered an ideal example of the consequences of how 
the government "practices Liberalism away from home" for democracy both at home and 
abroad?6 Inter-imperial interest in Mesopotamia stemmed, Newbold explained, from the 
fact that, 
three of the most valuable commodities known to modem commerce can be 
obtained by whichever group of capitalists can secure the exploitation or 
development of Mesopotamia and the adjoining British zone of Persia ... there is 
the petroleum for motor and marine transport, and for industrial power; cotton for 
the mills of Lancashire, and com for the wheat-pits of the world's com 
exchanges ?7 
It was the pursuit of these spoils by European concessionists that had ultimately rendered 
the Ottoman Empire "no longer able to stand alone, and mortgaged to the hilt ... with its 
resources ear-marked, and its future development become the booty for which the 
investors and contractors ... wrangle and struggle.,,28 As the latest comer to the Great 
Game, Germany's promise to politically and economically 'liberate' the Ottomans from 
such encroachment carried more weight than Great Britain's, though her intentions were 
no less self-interested?9 When matters finally came to blows, the British government 
naturally "conjured up" the 'spirit of the Glorious Revolution, the Declaration of 
Independence, and the Rights of Man' to "march in the Allies' War for the emancipation 
of the world," for this was the language upon which it had always depended to guide the 
British people into the harness of imperial wars?O Now it would be the British who 
would come to Mesopotamia "to liberate its populations, oppressed by alien tyranny, and 
26 Ibid., pp. 4. 
27 Ibid., pp. 10 and 11. 
28 Ibid., pp. 7-10. 
29 For a discussion of Ottoman views on choosing an alliance with Germany over Britain, see Mustafa 
Aksakal, "Not 'by those old books of international law, but only by war': Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve 
of the Great War.," Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 15, No.3 (2004): 507-544. 
30 Newbold, pp. 1 and 2. 
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to save them from Turkish misrule and from German exploitation." No doubt, in the 
tradition of British Liberal imperialism, the "benevolent protection and generous credit to 
develop the latent resources of the country, to reclaim it from the wilderness, and to make 
it safe for democracy" would take the form of "spheres of influence and protectorates.'>3J 
Taking his tongue from his cheek, Newbold assured his readers, that "the entwined 
banners of Britain and France had been set upon the corpse-strewn shores of Gallipoli" 
and "the tragedy of the Dardanelles [and] the horror of Mesopotamia ... had been endured 
by the exploited repositories of labour-power" for nothing more than "La Patrie et Ie 
pouche" of Britain's capitalist ruling elites.32 
In the true spirit of the Glorious Revolution and the Rights of Man, however, the 
recent triumph of the "Russian democracy" had not only unveiled the anti-democratic 
practices and policies of the Tsarist government, they had overthrown it.33 As the UDC 
argued in Suggestions for Terms of a Peace Settlement (1917), the revolutionary 
government's repudiation of the Secret Treaties had proven that "no Government can 
afford to lay itself open to the charge of prolonging the war for the purpose of annexing 
new territory, either in Europe or outside Europe" without facing consequences at 
home?4 With Russia's annexationist claims to Constantinople now moot, the UDC 
illustrated, the path had been opened to "internationalize ... [one of the] great trading 
waterways of the world" instead of rendering it the contested possession of a single 
31 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
32Ibid.,pp.I-2and 14. 
33 For a discussion of dissenting views of the Russian revolution, see Stephen Richards Graubard, British 
Labour and the Russian Revolution. 1917-1924, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); Swartz, pp. 
147,157-8,160-170, and 196; and Paul Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness. Patriotism and the 
British Left. 1881-1924 (Woodbridge and Rochester, 1998), pp. 142-166. 
34Union of Democratic Control, Suggestionsjor Terms oja Peace Settlement (London: National Labour 
Press, 1917), pp. 3-4. 
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power.35 Considering the obvious benefit of this development to international peace, the 
UDC argued, the remaining Secret Treaties "should be prohibited by international 
agreement, and should be regarded as void.,,36 In their place, dissenting writers 
demanded a "policy of international control over the Ottoman Empire" to ensure "the 
maximum of freedom for the various nationalities" concerned as well as to prevent 
rivalry over their possession from disrupting the peace process or igniting a Second 
World War. 37 
It was in the wake of the Russian example that dissenting leaders began to present 
the Labour movement, led by the 'peace party,' as a legitimate alternative to Liberal, 
Conservative, or Coalition government?8 As Ramsay MacDonald asserted in a 1917 
public lecture to the Glasgow ILP branch published later that year as Patriots and 
Politics, "The Labour Party was formed, not to put men into the Cabinet ... produce a 
better Factory Act, a better Wages Board, a better Housing Act. .. but [to] combine the 
whole of the working class into a great governing authority following a real Labour 
policy that will lift us all up into higher and higher levels of human excellence.,,39 In 
other words, MacDonald stated, "the purpose of the Labour Party was to make Cabinets, 
not to patch them.'o4O With a negotiated internationalist settlement already at the center of 
their propaganda and the forefront of the public imagination, UDC and ILP propagandists 
intuitively organized their political platform around such issues. The coming peace 
35Ibid., p. 5. 
36Ibid., p. 7. 
37Ibid., pp. 5 and 6. 
38 For a discussion of the dissenting left's shift from critique alone to establishing itself as a legitimate 
political alternative, see Swartz, pp. 199-216, Sally Harris, Out o/Control: British Foreign Policy and the 
Union 0/ Democratic Control, 1914-1918 (Hull]: University of Hull Press, 1996), pp.l58-131, and 
Robbins, pp. 137-175. 
39 Ramsey J. MacDonald, Patriots and Politics (Manchester: The National Labour Press, LTD., 1917), pp. 9 
and 10. LSE/ILP/5/1917/32 
4OIbid., p. 9. 
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settlement, in the view of even the Executive Committee of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party, as they expressed in the 1917 publication Labour and the New Social Order, 
represented more than just an opportunity to reorganize the political landscape of Europe, 
it portended the "The End of a Civilization," in which the Darwinian "individualist 
system of capitalist production" that had driven the nations and empires into war along 
with "the very basis of the peculiar social order in which it has arisen" would itself be 
"buried with the millions whom it had done to death.,,41 
In dichotomous terms that echoed the developments in Russia, MacDonald recast 
the debates over territorial settlements in 1917 as a divergence of 'aristocratic' and 
'democratic' principles generally. Quite simply, he stated in his ILP pamphlet Labour 
and International Relations (1917), 
aristocracy goes for imperialism; democracy tries to liberate people ... it does not 
regard people as the personal possession of any man, any house, or any nation. It 
regards them from the point of view of self-government, and it asks for people to 
settle the form of their own government.42 
In terms of boundary settlement in contested territories, this meant that "the democracy ... 
must settle them in accordance with nationality ... [and] historical affinity." In short, he 
stated, "if you are a German, go to Germany; if you are English, remain in England ... if 
you are French, then no foreign power can justify you in being taken from your French 
allegiance.,,43 More significantly, however, MacDonald argued that the same principles 
applied to all peoples under imperial rule as well. "If you are Irish ," he declared, "yes, be 
Irish and take Home Rule.,,44 Even in India and all of "those parts of the world that we 
41 Arthur Henderson, The Aims of Labour (B. W. Huebsch, 1918), p. 92. 
42 Ramsey J. MacDonald, Labour and International Relations (Derby: The Derby and District I.L.P. 
Federation, 1917), p. 7. LSEIILP15/1917131 
43 Ibid., p. 5. 
44Ibid. 
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possess with lower races populating them," he insisted, "more Home Rule, more self-
government, and more and more freedom" generally should be the policy of the British 
imperial democracy.45 
Even if only as a political platform of critique, the notion that the principle of 
nationality or self-determination should be applied universally, even to the possessions of 
the British Empire, was beginning to draw wider and more vocal support. When Arthur 
Henderson's replacement as Chair of the PLP George Barnes insisted in that "the present 
war was a war fought in order to secure the rights of nations to live their own lives in 
their own way without interference from their neighbours" upon taking office in August 
1917, for example, the Herald reported that he had been drowned out by "shouts of 
Ireland and India" from his audience. The Herald followed up the report, however, with 
a critique of the view, which it associated with men like Barnes and Foreign Secretary 
Balfour specifically, that, "if Irish people are discontented it is because they are stupid 
enough not to be able to appreciate the blessings of British rule." Nor were "the British 
people" spared by the critique, who, "in their relations to subject races," according to the 
Herald, "always go on the assumption that British administration and British methods are 
something other nations should thank God for receiving at the hands of the favoured 
British people. We appear unable to realize that in the case, say, of Ireland it is the Irish 
people alone who are the best judges of what is good for themselves.'>46 
In December 1917, Trotsky threw down the gauntlet to the Allied powers over the 
issue in declaring that, "it is clear that the demand that the right of self-determination be 
given to the peoples who are a part of the enemy States, and to refuse their right to 
45Ibid., p. 7. 
46 Herald, August 23,1917. 
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peoples of their own States of their own colonies would mean the putting forward of the 
programme of the most cynical Imperialism." If the Allied Powers genuinely believed in 
the principle of nationality, he argued, they should demonstrate that belief by "giving of 
this right to the oppressed peoples of their own States." Their reluctance to do so, he 
declared, only proved that "they are not less suspicious and hostile in regard to the 
principle of national self-determination than are the Governments of Germany and 
Austro-Hungry .,,47 Even before Trotsky's declaration had made it into the British press, 
however, such sentiments were already becoming a characteristic aspect of dissenting 
propaganda. At, practically, the moment Trotsky was making his announcement, the 
Herald was directly linking the issue of territorial settlements at the peace with that of 
imperial possessions, arguing that 
the question of Turkey in Europe and Asia, together with the right of nations to 
govern themselves according to their own wishes and desires, must apply to the 
Turks and Egyptians, Persians and Indians, and nearer home to Ireland, as well as 
to other nations. There can be no colour or religious bar to liberty .... we hope 
organized Labour will see that the demand for freedom is one which is 
worldwide, and must be applied to all the peoples of the world and if 
Constantinople and the Dardanelles Straits are to be internationalized, so also 
must all the great highways be free and open for the use of the world--the Panama 
and Suez Canals, the Straits of Dover, and also the Straits of Gibraltar.48 
The ILP formally endorsed this universalistic approach to the principle of self-
determination at the peace at its Annual Conference in April 1918, declaring 
We cannot commit ourselves unreservedly to those parts of the [Labour Party's 
Memorandum on War Issues] which deal with territorial adjustment... Our main 
criticism of the Memorandum is, that while it accepts the principles of self-
determination and the right of nationalities to self-government, it applies these 
principles only to territory in the possession of the Central Powers, and appears to 
47Trotsky's declaration was published in fuJI in the Herald, January 12,1918. 
48 Herald, December 22,1917. 
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tacitly deny the rights of subject races and peoples to self-government and self-
determination who are under the domination of the Allied Governments.49 
ILP MP for Bow and Bromley John Scurr further moved that the conference recognize 
that "the demand of the Indian people be recognized as equal partners within the British 
commonwealth is essentially democratic, and that to realize the ideal each country must 
have the opportunity of self-determination. This Conference, therefore, demands that a 
measure of granting self-government to the Indian people be placed on the Statute Book 
at the earliest opportunity," which the conference proceeded to pass into resolution.50 
Even this was not enough for the editors of the Herald, who stated that "self-
determination means self-determination; and unless we are willing for Ireland and India 
to leave the British Empire altogether, if they wish to, and unless we say so explicitly, we 
cannot press for self-determination upon Austria or Germany or Turkey." 
Principles aside, advocating for the application of self-determination to Ireland, 
arguably Britain's first and longest held colonial possession, and advocating it for 
Mesopotamia, then still only partially conquered and largely unknown territory for most 
Britons, were two very different things. Without requiring dissenting propagandists be 
full-fledged advocates for decolonization, however, the political advantages of this tactic 
can be clearly seen. In light of the legitimacy of even Ireland's claims to determine her 
own destiny by the logic of the government's principled aims for the war, Lloyd 
George's unwillingness to openly repudiate his government's claims to Mesopotamia as 
designated in the Secret Treaties, even after they had been repudiated by Russia, gave 
clear indication of the actual limits of the government's commitment to internationalist 
49lLP Report of the Annual Conference held at Leicester April, 1918 (London: Independent Labour Party, 
1918), p. 17. 
soIbid. 
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principles for the peace. The Willingness of dissenting leaders to call for the liberation of 
even Britain's oldest and closest imperial possession, irrespective of whether they 
actually believed that to be possible or even desirable, galvanized their credentials as an 
internationalist party prepared to bring the British Empire into an internationalist future. 
As Brock Millman has shown, domestic and industrial grievances building over 
the early years of the war had begun to seize the institutional framework and 
methodology of critique established by the UDC and the ILP by 1917.51 Already, Lloyd 
George's term as Prime Minister had been characterized by an unprecedented 
development of domestic surveillance and persecution of dissenting voices in order to 
overcome their influence popularly. By 1918, his administration had been driven beyond 
these targeted measures by degrees of popular agitation warranting the complete 
reorientation of home defense planning around the possibility of a Bolshevik style 
revolution among Britain's labouring classes.52 In the wake ofthe Supreme War 
Council's February 1918 declaration that, "the only immediate task before them lay in the 
prosecution, with the utmost vigour. .. of the military effort," Philip Snowden warned the 
Parliament that the Lloyd George administration was inviting such a revolution onto their 
doorsteps.53 In his ILP pamphlet Why the Government's Cannot Make Peace (1918), 
Snowden openly called for it to begin. It is significant that British claims to 
Mesopotamia were at the heart of his reasoning. 
As the baseline of commitment to internationalist principles, "no peace" of any 
kind, Snowden argued, would be "possible until these Secret Treaties have been 
absolutely repudiated" by the British and the French as they had been by Russia. The 
51 Millman, 168-196. 
52 Millman, pp. 271-296 and 304-306. 
53 Hansard's 13 February 1918 vol 103 CC. 195. 
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'repeated assurance' from the government that the Secret Treaties still stood and that 
neither Britain nor France had any intention of receding from them meant, for Snowden, 
that "the present Governments of Great Britain and France can never make peace.,,54 
Therefore, he reasoned, "the statesmen responsible for making them must be driven from 
power and influence and deprived of any opportunity for again abusing the trust and 
responsibility which they have enjoyed.,,55 
The present British Government must go ... and its fall will bring with it the 
equally impossible Government of France. A Government must take its place 
which will not be encumbered by commitments to the impossible aims of the 
Secret Treaties. It must be a Government with clean hands ... a Government 
which can honestly declare: 'We desire no territory, we desire no dominions.' 56 
Irrespective of which party or class was at its helm,57 the ultimate goal of such a 
government should be that "the plain men and women of the world, unskilled in the arts 
of diplomacy ... must have their say," the clearest means to such a goal would be the 
establishment of a "Society of Nations for the safeguarding of the world's progress 
towards complete social democracy.,,58 Snowden's inclusion of repudiating the desire for 
dominions with that of territory was indicative of both the universality of his vision as 
well as the point from which he believed it should begin. 
There is irony in the fact that, by 1918, some Britain's most committed and 
experienced imperialists came to view making a case for the creation of the first post-
colonial nation-states in the formerly Ottoman territories as the key to preserving British 
54 Philip Snowden, Why the Governments Cannot Make Peace (Manchester: The National Labour Press, 
LTD., 1918), pp. 4 and 6. LSEIILPI51l918134 
55 Ibid., p. 4. 
56 Ibid., p. 6. 
57 Snowden was critical of Labour, Liberal, and Conservatives alike. 
58 Ibid., p. 7. 
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imperial sovereignty in the postwar world. Perhaps even more ironic was the degree of 
success, in the short term at least, that the Lloyd George administration would have in 
effectively 'inventing the Middle East' as a novel set of internationally legitimate 
imperial protectorates between late 1918 and 1920. In most cases, historians interested in 
how the British Empire came into the business of nation-making in the Near or Middle 
East have overlooked domestic dissent and indigenous opposition in emphasizing' great 
power politics' as the primary problematic the Lloyd George administration was seeking 
to overcome through the 'mandate solution' at the Peace Conference.59 From early on, 
however, concern for how British policy in Mesopotamia would be interpreted by the 
British and Arabic speaking publics clearly shaped the manner in which the region was 
conquered, administrated, and represented as a political entity. As Lord Curzon would 
intimate to his Eastern Committee in late 1918, the greatest advantage the government 
had in making its case for a 'British Mesopotamia' was the fact that it had been making it 
to the British and Arabic speaking public from the beginning of the occupation itself.60 
59 See for example, Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace; Steiner, The Lights That Failed; Margaret MacMillan, 
Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War (London: J. Murray, 2(01); 
George Louis Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, with Papers on Egypt, Mesopotamia, 
and the Colonial Settlement (New York: Macmillan Co., 1923); Hall, Mandates; Quincy Wright, Mandates 
Under the League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). 
6OLord Curzon presents an interesting figure for examining self-determination as a political tactic on the 
international stage. Curzon inaugurated his political career with a maiden speech in Parliament attacking 
the logic of Home Rule and the legitimacy of Irish nationalism, positions that would characterize his 
position from then on. Curzon was similarly staunchly opposed to the idea of expanding suffrage and 
headed the Anti-Suffrage League in opposition to granting the vote to women. While Viceroy of India in 
the closing years of the 'Great Game,' Curzon gained a significant, perhaps unparalleled, amount of 
experience in 'state-making' as a solution to the inter- and intra-imperial problems that characterized the 
end of the nineteenth century. A great believer in the supremacy of the British in the Persian Gulf, Curzon 
was instrumental in the establishment of an unofficial British protectorate in Kuwait in 1899. In 1901, 
Curzon presided over the formal partitioning of the North-West Frontier Province as a way of isolating the 
problematic Pashtun tribesmen from the rest of the Raj. Similarly, Curzon also oversaw the partition of 
Bengal in 1905 into Hindu and Muslim provinces as a means of better managing their progress and 
disabling political agitation. In each case, the creation of separate regions run indirectly through local 
'puppet rulers' provided the added advantage of creating a buffer against Russian encroachment into 
British India. 
191 
From as early as 1912, Consul General for Egypt, Horatio Kitchener and his aids 
had been quietly and cautiously cultivating a relationship with a growing clique of pan-
Arab nationalists increasingly disaffected by the exclusionary nature of Ottoman pan-
Turainian attitudes toward rule in their Arab possessions.61 With at Ahd and at Fatat, two 
of the earliest organized movements for the emerging pan-Arab movement emanating out 
of Damascus ,62 Kitchener identified Sharif Husayn bin Ali, ruler of the Hedjaz, as a prime 
candidate for alternative leadership in the Arab territories and began courting his loyalties 
with promises of British support for an Arab rising, should one occur, but also for an 
independent Arab state in its wake.63 The promise of British support both encouraged 
pan-Arab nationalists in their petitions for Husayn's leadership as well as softened 
Husayn's reluctance to moving against the Ottoman state, of which he considered himself 
a loyalist, if a somewhat disaffected one.64 
From within a clique of British administrators in Cairo, a vision for the British 
Empire in the Middle East built upon the experiences of colonial administrators in Asia 
and Africa emerged comprising a form of indirect rule through Arab clients and the 
creation of states that would be dependent upon, but not formally a part of, the British 
61 For a discussion of Arab disaffection with Ottoman administration over the end of the nineteenth-
century, see Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), Chapter 2. For early British cultivation of this discontent, see Bruce Westrate, The Arab 
Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1992), Chapter 2. 
62 For Arab perspectives on the promise of British and Hashemite support for the movement, see Ameen 
Fares Rihani, Muluk Al- 'Arab, Aw, Rihlah Fi Al-Bilad Al- 'Arabiyah (Bayrut: al-Matba'ah al-'Ilmiyah, 
1929), Chapter 1. 
63 Westrate, pp. 12-16. See also, Timothy Paris, Britain, the Hashemites, and Arab Rule: 1920-1925 
(London: Frank Cass, 2003) and C.Ernest Dawn, From Ottoman ism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of 
Arab Nationalism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), Chapter 1. 
64 Westrate, pp. 16. 
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imperial system.65 Although this approach raised a considerable amount of tension 
among administrators over its implications for the future of British rule generally,66 the 
concessions to Arab nationalism and the future Arab state became a clear advantage for 
Curzon in constructing his 'British case' for controlling Mesopotamia at the Peace 
Conference. 
Curzon left no doubt of the significance of Mesopotamia to the future of imperial 
sovereignty generally in his opening address to the Eastern Committee in November 
1918. The "very difficult task," Curzon instructed the Committee, 
of preparing for the Peace Conference the case in regard to the Turkish territories 
that have passed into our occupation or under our sway ... [is] about the most 
responsible matter that any body of Ministers or officials can be charged with in 
connection with the war ... [for] upon the fate of these territories and the way in 
which our case is presented to the Peace Conference, and the form of 
administration to be set up, will depend not only the future of the territories 
themselves, but also the future of the British Empire in the East.67 
Curzon admitted that "at first sight, anybody looking back upon the panorama of the last 
two or three years ... of various conflicting voices uttered ... [and] different policies ... we 
have committed ourselves to ... cannot help being a little confused.,,68 After all, in 
actualizing British claims to supremacy in the Persian Gulf, two British governments had 
also been forced to contend with conflicting expectations from British dissenters, Arab 
65 The colonial administrator most often attributed with the earliest conception of 'indirect rule' that would 
come to characterize British engagement with the possessions is High Commissioner for Nigeria Lord 
Frederick Lugard. See Weldon C Matthews, Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab 
Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine (London; New York: LB. Tauris, 2006), pp. 20-21 
and Wm. Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization 
(London: LB. Tauris, 2006), Chapter 2. For the most complete discussion of the 'Arab Bureau' see 
Westrate. 
66 For these tensions specifically, see Timothy Paris, "British Middle East Policy-Making after the First 
World War: The Lawrenthian and Wilsonian Schools," The Historical Journal 41 ,no. 3 (September 1998): 
773-793. 
67 Eastem Committee Minutes, 39th meeting, November 27,1918. NA/CAB/27/24. p. 162-3. 
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nationalists, Ottoman preservationists, French imperialists, Russian imperialists and anti-
imperialists, and American internationalists. He reassured the committee, however, that 
the task of "draw[ing] together and weav[ing] into a single whole all the scattered 
threads" of British policy in the region would reveal "that all we have done in the past 
has tended towards a goal by no means so obscure as one might think at first sight.,,69 
Moreover, he prophesied, with a bit of finessing, arranging for postwar British rule in 
Mesopotamia could be done in a manner that "would amount to a guarantee of good 
government to everybody concerned.,,70 The reason this was so, I argue, is that the 
British government's preferred tactic for overcoming public criticisms or even opposition 
to its policy of imperial conquest in the Ottoman territories from either British or Arab 
peoples was to publicly commit itself, if only by minute degrees, to their eventual 
political liberation. 
Beginning with the earliest public declaration of British aims in Mesopotamia, 
given by Viceroy of India Charles Hardinge in Basra on February 4,1915, Curzon argued 
that the rather ambiguous declaration clearly suggested "a very definite promise" that, 
although "there was no assurance that we intended to remain ... in no circumstances 
would those territories then occupied be given back to the Turks.'o71 As Curzon well 
knew, Hardinge desired the permanent elimination of the Ottomans to open the way for 
the creation of a 'second Egypt' in Mesopotamia through large-scale Indian colonization 
after the war.72 Nevertheless, his declaration served to assuage the immediate fears of 
Mesopotamian notables that permitting or even abetting the advance of British forces 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 163 and 165. 
71 Ibid. p. 163-4. 
72 Robert J. Blyth, The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858-1947 (New 
York: Pal grave Macmillan, 2003), p. 137 and Davis, Ends and Means, pp. 65-66 and 100-101.. 
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would result in retribution from returning Turkish administrators after the war.73 In 
Britain, the press release published in the Times a mere four days later served to quell 
suspicions of the government's motives by presenting Harding's declaration as a 
response to the popular demand among the notables of Basra that "the British occupation 
would be permanent.,,74 Hardinge's apparent restraint in refusing to accommodate that 
demand beyond holding out "the assurance that the future will bring ... a more benign 
rule" to Mesopotamia would have seemed, for most Britons, clearly in line with 
Asquith's 'benevolent disinterest' in imperial gain for the war .75 
Curzon gave some detail as to the actual agreement made between Sharif Husayn 
and High Commissioner for Egypt Sir Henry MacMahon in late 1915 and early 1916 
negotiating Britain's guarantee of an independent 'Arab state,' of deliberately ambiguous 
extent and definition, in exchange for Husayn's promise of tribal support against the 
Ottomans where he could rally it and political support for British interests in the region, 
also ambiguously defined, after the war.76 Playing upon the ambiguities of the 
agreement, comprised of notes exchanged between Husayn and MacMahon over several 
months, Curzon indicated that a clear case could be made that the British had, in fact, 
promised "to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within ... practically 
all the Arab-inhabited territories from Mersina and Adana down to the Persian Gulf' 
73 Mohammad Gholi Majd,lraq in World War I (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 2006), p. 93 
and Davis, Ends and Means, p. 54. 
74 Times of London, February 8,1915. 
75 Times of London, February 8, 1915. 
76 For a discussion of the MacMahon-Husayn Agreement, see Abdul Latif Tibawi, Anglo-Arab Relations 
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Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations, 1914-1939. Cambridge: 
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while maintaining the right to impose "a special measure of administrative control" over 
the regions of British interest in Mesopotamia?7 
As Curzon envisioned it, the "special measure of administrative control" would 
amount to "a British protectorate in everything but the name;" an "Arab Facrade" in which 
such regions as Mesopotamia would be "administered as an Arab province ... in 
accordance with existing laws and institutions" under a staff of "local rulers or 
governors," but actually run through a shadow administration of British officers taking 
their orders from London. 78 The advantages of the Arab Facrade were manifold and 
understood by the committee through such dispatches as High Commissioner for Egypt 
Sir Reginald Wingate's discussion of the subject presented to the Committee the June 
prior. As Wingate illustrated, organizing British policy around the facrade of "giving a 
civilized and sympathetic government" and "safeguarding the nationalist aspirations and 
legitimate rights of the Arab people" would likely elicit "the consent of the populations 
[which] must be obtained to the form of government we shall prescribe for them ... if we 
are faithfully to practice the principles of our Alliance against the Central Powers, and to 
submit proposals that will commend themselves to the Allied Councils.,,79 Moreover, by 
operating through an alliance with Sharif Husayn, the British would have "no difficulty in 
obtaining ... by treaty, all the terms of which need not be made public, such guarantees of 
preferential treatment as will prevent other European Powers ... from acquiring 
concessions to buy land, create banks, build a railway etc."so 
77 Eastem Committee Minutes, 39th meeting, November 27,1918. NA/CAB/27/24. p. 163-4. 
78 Ibid., p. 164. Emphasis added. 
79 Wingate to Balfour, June 11th, 1917, NAICAB127122149. 
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With Sharif Husayn's son Faysalleading the so-called 'Arab Revolt' alongside 
British forces in Palestine and Syria and, Curzon believed, being ostensibly "in favour of 
the British in Palestine ... of the British in Irak, and of a purely nominal Arab 
administration there," the faith of British policy makers in Husayn's intention to support 
the British case seemed well founded.8! Accordingly, Curzon continued, Lieutenant-
General Stanley Maude was instructed to announce to the people of Mesopotamia upon 
taking Baghdad in March, 1917, that it was "not the wish of the British Government to 
impose ... alien institutions" upon them, but rather that "the Arab race may rise once 
more ... to be united with [their] kinsmen in the north, east, south, and west, in realizing 
the aspirations of [their] race.,,82 As Curzon suggested, the announcement was "intended 
to indicate" British support for "some sort of Confederation of Arab States in that part of 
Arabia" as had been promised to Husayn.83 
The press release published in the Times immediately following Maude's 
declaration, however, suggests that the announcement was intended to convey something 
more to the British public. To begin with, Maude referred to Sharif Husayn as the 'King 
of the Hedjaz' for the first time in a public statement that strongly indicated a formal 
alliance between the British government and that 'state,' only recently designated as such 
largely by Husayn's revolutionary status.84 Secondly, the announcement was 
accompanied by King Husayn's formal statement of congratulations to Maude for the 
"liberation [of Baghdad] from the criminal hand of the Turanians," for which he 
8] Eastern Committee Minutes, 39th meeting, November 27,1918. NAiCAB127124. p. 164. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 For a discussion of the relationship between the status of Husayn and the Hedjaz, see the Minutes of the 
Eastern Committee, November 21,1918, NAiCABI271241157-8. 
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repeatedly praised god, and the British government's reciprocating exchange of thanks 
with him.8S 
The uncharacteristic attention drawn to the moment in Britain did not end with 
that announcement, however. In the weeks to follow, Maude's victory was memorialized 
as inaugurating the' salvation of the Garden of Eden' with the designation of April 13 as 
'Mesopotamia Day,' complete with national fundraisers and parades in which, according 
to the Times, "nearly everyone in town seemed to have one of the medals with the camel 
device hanging from red, white, and blue ribbon, or a bunch of the 'apples of Eden' .,,86 
The Times followed up with a series of articles by Mesopotamia correspondent Edmund 
Candler describing the benevolent resuscitation of progress in Mesopotamia as British 
officers gave order to anarchy, settlement to tribal feuds of long standing, and the means 
to rebuild the glory of ancient Babylon to its long suppressed peoples.87 As Mohammad 
Majd has shown, the startling contradiction of Candler's reports with the utter destitution 
Mesopotamian Arabs were actually experiencing under British occupation was more 
clearly reflected in Maude's proclamation a few months later that "any non-military 
persons caught taking photographs of any kind are liable to the punishment of death."ss 
A glimpse of those conditions would, of course, become public knowledge with the 
publication of the Mesopotamia Commission Report that June. The fa~ade of Britain's 
85 Times ojLondon, March 19,1917. 
86 Times oj London , April 14, 1917. 
f>I See, for example, Times oj London, May 19 and June 20, 1917. On the topic of the salvation of 
Mesopotamia as a war aim, see Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations 
of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press,.2008), Chapter 5. 
88 Majd, p. 360. 
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policy of benevolent liberation would similarly collapse a few months later with the 
revelation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the Fall of 1917.89 
That Curzon would refer to the Sykes-Picot Agreement as "unfortunate," 
"embarrassing," and "hanging like a millstone" around the neck of the Committee more 
than a year before Woodrow Wilson would even become aware of its existence speaks to 
importance the Committee attached to how British policy was being perceived both at 
home and in the Arab World.90 As previous chapters have shown, the revelation of the 
Secret Treaties ignited months of intense public debate over war aims in Britain resulting 
in Lloyd George's January 5 speech recognizing the right of the Ottoman territories to 
nationality.91 A similar message was delivered to Husayn the day before Lloyd George's 
speech by Head of the Arab Bureau in Cairo Commander David Hogarth declaring that 
"the Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of 
once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs 
themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this 
ultimate unity in view.,,92 No doubt, the renewed commitment to the MacMahon-Husayn 
Agreement was influenced by Faysal's threat to end the Arab Revolt upon hearing of 
Sykes-Picot in the fall of 1917. Faysal's aggressive reminder to the British that the Arabs 
were fighting for their independence and unity and not for the substitution of one imperial 
overlord for another elicited a series of telegrams from the British denying Sykes-Picot 
89 I discuss these developments in Chapter 3. 
90 Eastern Committee Minutes, 39th meeting, November 27,1918. NAiCAB127124. p. 163. The UDC 
reported Wilson's denial of any knowledge of the Secret Treaties as late as October 1919 in that month's 
issue of the UDC's Foreign Affairs, More11F6119, LSE. 
91 I discuss these developments in Chapter 3. 
92 Report of a Committee on Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, Cmd. 
5974 (1939),p.48. 
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outright and assuring him and his father of their shared investment in future Arab 
independence .<J3 
When these renewed promises were made by the Lloyd George administration to 
the British and Arab people in January 1918, policy planners in London began re-
engineering their approach to how Mesopotamia was to be managed as both an 
administrative and a publicity problem. Just as Curzon was encouraging his Eastern 
Committee to come up with a more attractive term for annexation, Deputy Under 
Secretary of State for India Sir Arthur Hirtzel similarly advised Acting High 
Commissioner for Mesopotamia Sir Arnold Wilson that, 
it is very important that you ... should know what are the real political tendencies 
here at this stage of the war ... Entirely different currents are flowing now and we 
must shape our course to them if we are going to get what we want in Iraq. The 
old watch words are obsolete, and the question is how we are to secure what is 
essential under the new ones. This thing can be done, but a certain re-orientation 
is necessary. The 'Arab fa~ade' may have to be something rather more solid than 
we had originally contemplated.94 
Perhaps understandably, Wilson, who had been busily realizing his own vision for a 
'New India' in Mesopotamia, was deeply hostile to what he perceived as a loss of control 
of the Arab fa~ade as an imperial tactic, and he was not alone. 95 
Although the potential collapse of the 'British case' for maintaining imperial 
sovereignty in the Ottoman territories before the international community at the Peace 
Conference was a key concern for imperial planners, the possibility that the case would 
be made only too well, to the detriment of imperial sovereignty in principle, was also a 
93 Beatrice Erskine, King Faisal of Iraq: An Authorised and Authentic Study (London: Hutchinson, 1933), p. 
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and Stoughton, 1959), p. 73-4. 
94Hirtzel to Wilson March 12, 1918 Sir Arnold Wilson Papers BLiADDI524551C 
95 Wilson, Arnold T. Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1914-1917, a Personal and Historical Record, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 240-241. 
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serious consideration. Commenting on Wingate's call for a more robust Arab Fa~ade in 
June 1917, Director of Military Intelligence Sir George Mark Watson Macdonogh 
warned that, although it was "necessary to disguise [our Arab] policy by sympathetic 
treatment of Arab aspirations and to keep in view our relations with the Arabs after the 
War" it was equally imperative that whatever degree of self-government was to be 
implemented "be regarded as a means to an end and not an end in itself.,,96 Writing to 
Political Secretary Sir John Evelyn Shuckburgh nearly a year later, seasoned Political 
Officer in Mesopotamia Richard Marrs scoffed at the simplistic dichotomization of the 
Victorian ideal of 'good government' into either the brutally exploitative "German idea" 
of colonial rule or the naIve "American-peace-term-socialist-Bolshevik-idea" of 'self-
government' then being promoted by pacifist propagandists. 97 Like Wilson, Marrs 
personally considered Mesopotamian Arabs to be backward peoples incapable of 
managing their own affairs.98 Actually adopting a "policy of self-determination for the 
Arab (without camouflage)" in the region, he argued, would be tantamount to throwing it 
away when what should be done was to "make no bones about it but simply occupy the 
96 Observations by Director of Military Intelligence on Sir R. Wingate's dispatch, July 6, 1917. 
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country and rule it with an eye to justice, benevolence, and progress.,,99 Fearing that, "in 
trying to make the camouflage seem real," British policy makers had come to believe in 
their own rhetoric of regenerating Mesopotamia under Arab auspices, Marrs inquired of 
his superior, "don't you think" that in policy planning at least, "the 'noble lie' will be 
better than the 'lie in the soul,?"IOO 
To A. T. Wilson's horror, on November 8, 1918, the British and French 
governments jointly declared their shared goal of "the complete and final liberation" of 
Syria and Mesopotamia to be followed by "the setting up of national governments and 
administrations deriving their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice 
of the indigenous populations." For the first time, Curzon indicated, the British had 
formally "brought on to the tapis the idea of self-determination" and openly "encouraged 
all those unfriendly to us to think that an Asiatic rather than a British form of government 
might be set Up."IOl As Britain Cooper Busch has shown, however, in wringing what 
amounted to an emergency propaganda statement out of the French, the Anglo-French 
Declaration "was bought only at the price of the first actual steps of the French political 
and administrative control in Syria which the ... declaration was designed specifically to 
avoid." 102 
George Antonius has argued that the main reason for making the Anglo-French 
Declaration was to rein in Faysal's increasingly nationalistic activity upon taking 
Damascus that October. Once the city had been taken, Field Marshal Edmund Allenby 
informed Faysal that his victory would be rewarded with British oversight until the end of 
99 Marrs to Shuckburgh, April 3, 1918. BUUPSII 111 34IPJ3591l918. 
100 Marrs to Shuckburgh, April 3, 1918. BUUPSIl 1I1341P13591l918. 
lOl Eastern Committee Minutes, 39th meeting, November 27,1918. NAiCAB127124. p. 165. 
lO2Busch, p. 197. 
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the war, whereupon control would be transferred to France.loo Faysal responded through 
a series of acts of defiance, including the declaration of Syrian independence and an 
attempt to extend that status to Lebanon within days of his victory. Tensions between 
Faysal and AlIenby quickly found expression in nationalist agitation in Damascus and 
Beirut that Faysal claimed he would be hard pressed to contain without some sort of 
reassurance from the British that their alleged annexationist arrangements with France 
were not in fact being realized. 104 
As Busch has shown, however, by November 1918, the British had been in 
negotiations with the French over an alternative statement of policy to reduce the 
blowback of the revelation of Sykes-Picot by the Bolsheviks for months.lOs A crucial 
difference between the position of the British and the French often overlooked in 
discussions of the Anglo-French Declaration is the presence of organized opposition to an 
annexationist agenda at home. As the above has shown, dissenting attitudes toward Lloyd 
George's unwillingness to publicly annul Sykes-Picot, which the Anglo-French 
Declaration was tantamount to achieving, could not have been less friendly.l06 In France, 
however, no such organized opposition existed. To the contrary, the imperialist 
movement was in full swing over the course of the war and in full support of annexations 
in Syria.107 Even weeks after the Anglo-French Declaration had been made, the French 
remained "most tenaciously" committed to the terms of Sykes-Picot which, in the view of 
Curzon and the Committee, meant that the British government would remain "bound hard 
103 Erskine, p. 91 and Malcolm B Russell, The First Modern Arab State: Syria Under Faysal. 1918-1920, 
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and fast by this deplorable Agreement."los Although the announcement of the Anglo-
French Agreement would serve its purpose in assuaging, for the time being, the fears and 
dissenting activities of Faysal in Damascus, the concessions the British had been forced 
to make to the French to get it only exacerbated the looming problem of French 
ambitions at the Peace Conference and the potential political fallout it portended. 
As Foreign Affairs Lord Robert Cecil noted to the Committee shortly after the 
Anglo-French Declaration was made, Britain remained desperately dependent upon the 
support of the United States, which, he pointed out, "will only support us if they think we 
are going in for something in the nature of a native Government, and there are signs ... 
that the Americans are not so friendly disposed to us as they were, certainly as we hoped 
they would be in these matters." 109 Worse still, "Hussein," Cecil warned the Committee, 
"is very suspicious of anything which leads him to think that [the Allies] are not in 
earnest in setting up in some form or another an Arab Government" and that any 
indication that he "did not trust our pro-Arab feelings ... would have a very disastrous 
result at the Peace Conference."llo Like the dissenting propagandists at home, Faysal 
remained deeply suspicious of the Lloyd George administration's commitment to Sykes-
Picot and had made clear his intention to obstruct it. III 
lOS Eastern Committee Minutes, 39th meeting, November 27,1918. NAiCAB127124. p. 163. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
III Although Faysal had been accepted by the British for his seeming willingness to represent British 
interests as his own as much for his notoriety or legitimacy, as the Conference approached, the location of 
Faysal's loyalties came increasingly into question. In a preparatory interview with Shuckburgh in late 
December, Faysal assured his advisors that, although he remained confident that the British Government 
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At the height of the Eastern Committee's conundrum that December, Field 
Marshal Jan Smuts introduced an approach to the Peace Conference that promised to 
resolve most of the tensions involved. Beyond merely presenting the 'mandate solution' 
for the territorial problem for which he is widely credited, Smuts suggested that the his 
government come to terms with the fact that the inter-imperial system of governments 
and politics as they knew it had come to an end and begin re-thinking the role the British 
Empire would play in the international system that was to come. "Our old historic 
policy ... to maintain the balance of power" Smuts argued, had been made obsolete by the 
war. With "the defeat of Germany and the disappearance of Russia and Austria," he 
argued, the balance of power had given way to a "new tripartite game" with "only three 
first-class Powers in the arena of world-politics-The British Empire, France and the 
United States." The question they faced, he asserted, was whether "to side with France or 
America as a matter of large policy" in the postwar world. France, he argued, was by far 
the less attractive choice. 112 
The reason Smuts rejected France as a postwar ally out of hand was precisely 
because of her tenacious commitment to balance of power politics and diplomacy. Smuts 
described France as an historically "bad neighbour" of a characteristically "militant and 
imperialist ... temperament" and tending toward policies with "a nasty trail of finance and 
concession-hunting over them." It was reasonable to expect that France would use the 
peace to stake her claim as "mistress of the Continent" as well as "the principal heir to 
suggesting that the British fulfill their obligations to their Allies at their own expense and not that of the 
Arabs, that if the British did acquiesce to the French, it would only confirm the apparent post-war weakness 
of the British, and that such a course of events would shortly lead to a war between the Arabs and the 
French. Interview between Faysal, Shuckburgh, and Lawrence December 27, 1918 
BUUPS/1111411P51 19/1919, Doc 5341 
1l2War Cabinet. Our Policy at the Peace Conference. Note by General Smuts. For the King and War 
Cabinet, December 03,1918. NAICAB /29/2. 
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the Turkish estate." Her goal, he prophesied, would be to "keep Germany in a state of 
humiliating subjection" and to compel "Syria and Asia Minor and Upper Mesopotamia" 
to her will, creating "a hopeless atmosphere for future peace and international 
cooperation." The immediate problem this attitude posed for the British, Smuts suggested 
was that attempting to accommodate French aims for the peace would place British 
statesmen "in flagrant contradiction to all our openly professed ideal war aims."113 
Should the British tum to the United States instead, however, her difficulty with France 
would instantly become an unprecedented opportunity. 
Already, he pointed out, the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
had begun to drift, economically and militarily, into a semi-dependent relationship with 
the United States. Fighting this natural gravitation seemed pointless, to Smuts, especially 
considering Britain's own dependence on American economic, military, and political 
support. Rather, Smuts encouraged "the King and the War Cabinet" to view "the two 
great democratic Commonwealths" of the US and the British Empire as being 
ideologically and historically linked "in a common destiny."114 The coming Peace 
Conference presented an historic opportunity for "signalizing" a new world order around 
Anglo-American cooperation precisely because of the opposition of President Wilson to 
French ambitions for the settlement. French designs in the Ottoman territories, Smuts 
pointed out were "a direct negation of the policy which President Wilson stands for" 
which he would naturally be forced to veto.11s lf Wilson could return to the American 
Congress with an established League of Nations, Smuts asserted, "I believe he will be 
satisfied, and will be prepared to drop some of the other contentious points he has 
113 !.l2iQ., p. 36 
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unfortunately raised.,,116 By standing behind Wilson and against the French, Smuts 
suggested, the British had the power to give Wilson the only thing he desired from the 
Peace. 
Among the 'contentious points' raised by Wilson was the legitimacy of imperial 
sovereignty for the postwar world taken up and transformed into a major political issue at 
home by the dissenting left. Looking past the principles and platforms of critique, 
however, Smuts pointed out the obvious fact that the "break-up, on an unprecedented 
scale, of the old political system of Europe" had also created a massive and variegated 
sovereignty crisis "le[aving] behind large derelict territories and set[ting] free many small 
peoples who are politically untrained and either incapable of or deficient in power of self-
government.,,117 If the League of Nations hoped to keep the global sovereignty crisis 
created by the collapse of half the world's empires, Smuts anticipated, it would 
necessarily require the aid of those that were left. In short, Smuts theorized, should the 
League of Nations be given responsibility for the development of territory X., "in 
exercising governing functions in respect of territory or people X, it will have to depute 
State A., to act as its agent of mandatory subject to general instructions which will lay 
down the limits within which the interference of A. in the affairs of X. is to take place." 
Although the state acting in the name of the League would be subject to certain 
limitations of maneuver, the system would nevertheless "give most of the greater Powers 
the chance to control or administer some territory or territories." Using the League as a 
means of designating that authority would make Wilson's, perhaps naIve, dream "a 
practical reality from the very commencement of the new order. .. and thereby secure us 
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the goodwill and support of President Wilson at the Conference ... [while] prevent[ing] 
arrangements being carried through which are not in our interests nor in the general 
interests of Europe or of the countries to be parceled out.,,1J8 
As Curzon saw it, Smuts' vision for the postwar world largely diffused the threat 
to British interests posed by either France or the United States and permitted British 
statesmen to meet the expectations of both Britons and Arabs for an internationalist 
settlement. As he put it at the next Committee sitting a few days after Smuts' 
memorandum, 
when we sit down to the Peace conference, President Wilson might say, and 
might get us out of a great difficulty by saying, 'Here we are inaugurating a new 
era of free and open diplomacy; the various States of Europe have bound 
themselves by all sorts of unscrupulous secret engagements in the earlier years of 
the war; before we enter into any arrangements for the future let us sweep all 
those off the board; let the Sykes-Picot Agreement go, the Agreement with the 
Italians go, and let us start with a clean slate?'1J9 
Through such an approach, Curzon concluded, the British delegates would now be free to 
"play self-determination for all it is worth wherever we are involved in difficulties with 
the French, the Arabs, or anybody else, and leave the case to be settled by that final 
argument knowing in the bottom of our hearts that we are more likely to benefit from it 
than is anybody else," to which Cecil, Smuts, and the Committee heartily agreed;120 
As the Peace Conference approached, the criticisms of dissenting leaders reflected 
the sensitivity of the Lloyd George administration to any sort of democratic interference 
in managing the peace settlement. Writing for the UD.C. Magazine just before the 
118Ibid., p. 37. The mandatory system gestured at in this memorandum would, of course, be famously 
refined in Smuts' publication The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion. 
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Conference that January, Seymour Cocks informed his readers that the manner in which 
the government was already compromising democratic principles at home affirmed the 
UDC's suspicions that it was merely "preparing the way for a secret and undemocratic 
peace."l21 Against the protestations of Parliament, Lloyd George chose to deny British 
representatives the right to weigh in on the selection of delegates for the Conference, 
ensuring, for Cocks that they would be "men of the type" of Curzon, Balfour and Lord 
Reading, "statesmen of whose ability there is no question, but of whose democratic 
sympathies there is, to say the very least, considerable doubt." Rather than ending the 
wartime censorship of Foreign Press cablegrams with the conclusion of hostilities, as 
President Wilson had done, Lloyd George insisted it remain in place until after the peace 
had been concluded. Moreover, while Lloyd George publicly acknowledged that the 
settlement would be a 'principle item' for the general election later that year, "at the very 
same time the Censor was sending a private and confidential letter to important editors 
asking them in the name of the Prime Minister not to discuss various vital issues of the 
Peace Settlement at all." All told, Cocks suggested, Lloyd George seemed to be doing 
his utmost "to withhold from the people the information they need in order to arrive at 
any well-informed judgment upon the various issues which will be discussed and settled 
at Versailles." 
Although Wilson had declared himself "in favour of 'open covenants of peace 
openly arrived at' ," Bonar Law, Cocks reported, had replied definitively in the negative 
when asked in Parliament "whether the Government would use its influence to secure 
that the sittings of the Peace Conference shall not be held in secret." When asked if he 
121 UDe Magazine, January 1919. LSEIMoreIlF61I6. 
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"intended to take steps to secure that any agreement .for peace should in general 
principles be in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the members of the 
House," the very minimum of democratic consideration, Bonar Law replied that "the 
Government must, I think, be the interpreter of the views of the House and the nation in 
this matter." In short, British democracy would be not only disallowed from influencing 
the manner in which the peace would be settled, they would remain completely in the 
dark about its organization until well after the fact of its completion. Cocks was "quite 
certain," considering the great lengths to which the Cabinet had gone to veil its 
undertakings at Versailles, that "we shall have the diplomats at their old work again, 
disposing of territories without any reference to the wishes of the peoples, just as they did 
at the Congress of Vienna ... this sort of diplomacy flourishes in the darkness."122 
Writing for the Herald in early January, Henry Brailsford warned his readers that, 
although "the Balance of Power [seemed] broken beyond all repair" by the war, the 
victorious Allied leaders were not the enemies of the balance, but its architects. All that 
the removal of the Central Powers from the equation had accomplished, Brailsford 
argued, was to allow their rivals to operate "without the prudence and without the 
restraints which accompany an equipoise of force" that had existed, however 
precariously, in the years before the war. Lloyd George's determination to advance his 
peace agenda "without check from public opinion" as well only verified, for Brailsford, 
that postwar international government would amount to little more than "a despotism 
which continues the old politics of interest, force, and Imperialism" if left to the 
victorious Allied leadership. Describing the settlement to come, Brailsford predicted that 
122 llllil. 
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Four of five Great Powers would meet together, compose their rival interests, and 
then, with unlimited force behind them, call upon the rest of mankind to ratify 
their decisions ... The new Concert will use force all the world over-to intervene 
in Russia, to partition Turkey, to administer derelict Empires, to put down any 
brand of Socialism of which it disapprove ... to govern all that once was Austria, 
Russia, and Turkey, all Africa and much of Asia as well ... it will sanctify power 
in a new and sinister sense.l23 
As the Conference got underway, the Herald produced a series of articles submitted by 
its entire editorial staffl24 confirming the inauguration of a "World Government by Star 
Chamber" dominated by the self-same "rulers and diplomats" who had so recklessly 
committed their "peoples to courses bound to end in war" in the first place. As was 
inevitable under such statesmen, the Herald argued, the "old system which it was the 
object of the war to destroy is actually now in operation in Paris in full vigour." Already, 
international government was "reducing democracy to a farce of a tragedy" as the 
citizens of Allied nations were denied even a basic knowledge of the policies their 
government was adopting and territorial settlements were made "without the knowledge 
of the people whose destinies are thus being settled for generations, it may be for 
centuries."l2S Just like the imperialist aims that had caused and prolonged the war, the 
realization by European statesmen of their "grandiose dreams of imperial might" would 
only be 'sprung upon a restless world' as a/ait accompli only after the 'Hush-Hush 
Peace' had long been settled.l26 
In rallying against the British government's suppression of their voice at the 
Peace Conference, dissenting leaders were far from alone. As Erez Manela and others 
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have shown, the sheer breadth of global demand for representation as the Conference 
approached necessitated a rather strict scheme for defining precisely who would be 
permitted to attend and in what capacity that left a large number of aspirants bitterly 
disappointed.127 The problem became a particularly acute one for the Lloyd George 
administration as it was faced with nationalistic demands for representation from literally 
every comer of the Empire. In managing this demand, the British government took 
unprecedented steps toward formally codifying, in many respects for the first time in its 
history, the many components of the British Empire in relation to one another and to 
outside powers.128 Although these steps were taken as a matter of expedience and 
necessity in the name of British imperial interests in the moment, they would also be the 
harbingers of the Empire's prolonged demise. 
The variegated and contradictory manner in which the Lloyd George 
administration managed the demand for intra-imperial representation is especially 
interesting when considered in relation to the creation of what was arguably the first post-
colonial nation-state of the Hedjaz by the British delegates. In addition to the British 
democracy itself, significant demands for individual representation were made by 
Canada, South Africa, Australia, India, and Egypt. As American scholar and founder of 
the International Labour Organization James Shotwell pointed out in 1937, the 
accommodation of such a variety of claims posed two related problems. On the one 
hand, permitting the delegates to attend as independent representatives would have called 
127 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
128 As American scholar and founder of the International Labour Organization James T. Shotwell had 
argued as early as 1937, however, "the most revolutionary act of the Paris Peace Conference" was not the 
invention of the modem nation-state, but the unprecedented designation of the British Empire as "a 
sovereignty among the other sovereign States" for the first time in its history. James Thomson Shotwell, At 
the Paris Peace Conference, by James T. Shotwell (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), pp. 414-
415. 
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forth a clear contradiction with British imperial sovereignty in those regions. On the 
other, including them all under the umbrella of the British Empire would have meant an 
embarrassing preponderance of 'British' votes on the Council.129 In either event, the 
contradictory claims of India and Egypt for independence from the Empire and those of 
South Africa and Australia for the right to expand it into new territories would have 
devastated Curzon' s 'British case' for postwar imperial sovereignty. 
After much heated debate during the Preliminary Peace Conference at Paris in 
mid-January, the objecting American delegates finally conceded to accord a special status 
to Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India equal to that of the more 
important small powers, such as Belgium or Serbia, but collectively designated as 
Plenipotentiary Delegates of the British Empire.130 In other words, the Dominions were 
made full members of the League of Nations but remained non-sovereign states under the 
auspices of the British Empire.!31 As a mere Protectorate, Egypt was given no such 
accommodation, but rather was placed under marshal law against the protestations of its 
nationalist leadership who were either jailed or deported.132 Each of the 'White 
Dominions' were to be represented by their respective Prime Ministers and 
accompanying plenipotentiary delegates. For India, however, where no Premiership had 
been established, Secretary of State for India Edwin Samuel Montagu acted as 
129 Ibid., pp. 414-415. 
130L. C. Christie "Notes on the Development at the Paris Peace Conference of the Status of Canada as an 
International Person,"July I, 1919 NAICABI29180. 
13l Shotwell, pp. 173, 174, and 414-417. 
132 Manela, pp. 63-76 and 141-158. 
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representative, accompanied by two Indian plenipotentiaries Satyendra Prasanno Sinha133 
and Maharaja Ganga Singh of Bikaner "carefully chosen" for their presumed pliancy.134 
On January 18, the very eve of the Peace Conference opening, Balfour insisted 
that the Hedjaz be admitted to the Conference as a "constituted state," rather than simply 
a "state in the process of formation," and be given two full delegates.135 Moreover, he 
requested the alteration of the first two articles of the Peace Conference Regulations 
limiting the representation of "states neutral, in the process of formation, or currently in 
state of rupture with enemy states" to sessions discussing questions directly relating to 
their destinies in order to allow the Hedjazi delegates to be present and speak at crucial 
closed sessions relating to the British case for the Middle East generally.136 Even more 
extraordinary, the Hedjazi delegates, Faysal ibn Husayn and Rustum Hayder, were 
recognized as authoritatively speaking for "all Arab peoples" in the formally Ottoman 
territories comprising present day western Saudi Arabia, Palestine/Israel, Syria, Lebanon, 
and Iraq. 137 
Recalling his experiences as Faysal' s Chief Political Secretary in the weeks 
preceding the Conference, Hayder offered some additional insight into the willingness of 
the British not only to place known anti-imperial nationalists in a position of speaking in 
\33 Satyendra Prasanno Sinha was a British-trained lawyer from a wealthy Hindu family. Sinha was a 
prominent member of the Indian government from 1903 and, upon completing his duties as a representative 
at the Peace Conference, was appointed as the first Indian Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India 
as well as the first Indian member of the British House of Lords. 
134 Maharaja Ganga Singh of Bikaner was reformist ruler of Bikaner, now Rajasthan, who commanded the 
Bikaner Camel Corps in France, Egypt, and Palestine and served as the only non-Anglo member of the 
Imperial War Cabinet during the First World War. 
135 United States Department of State, Council ofTen Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States: The Peace Conference, 1919. Volume III (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1943), p. 599 
136 Ibid., p. 600 
137 For discussions of inflating the status of Husayn, Faysal, and the Hedjaz for the Conference, see Minutes 
of Eastern Committee November 21, 1918 PRO, CAB 27124 and Note from Foreign Office to Hussein to be 
delivered through Lawrence, November 8,1918 BL, LlPSI11/1411P5119/1919, Doc 4997 
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favor of British policy, but to effectively create a state in the process. Despite the 
"riotous madness" surrounding the arrival of President Wilson in Europe for the 
Conference, not to mention his global popularity as the face of internationalism, Hayder 
was ambivalent. Preliminary negotiations had led him to believe that, "like the French, 
America now wishes to delay full independence" in the contested territories.J38 
Presumably referring to the concept of mandatory tutelage, Hayder worried that, despite 
Wilson's lofty rhetoric, "the blunder of the eighteenth-century; the division of Poland" 
was about to be repeated "with the Arab Nation."J39 
The reception of Hayder and Faysal in Paris, by the government and the press, 
had been cold and disparaging. l40 Hayder speculated on the differences between the West 
and the East that might justify the Western presumption that Arabs somehow required 
their tutelage to survive as a nation in the supposedly dawning "century of freedom and 
independence." He seemed to find irony in the vehement intolerance of Islam as 
backward "fanaticism" exhibited by the supposedly rational and intellectually free 
European Christians when it was they who were attempting to impose their forms of 
thinking about government and politics on others while Muslims were seeking their 
political independence.141 In the end, he concluded, it was simply the presumption that 
"Western blood" was inherently superior to "Eastern blood," with reason or logic playing 
no part in the matter. 142 
138 Rustum Haydar, Mudhakkirat Rustum Haydar (Beirut: aI-Dar al-'Arabryah IiI-Mawso'llt, 1988), pp. 195 
and 197. 
139 JJ:ili!., pp. 197. 
140 Ibid., pp. 199. 
141 Ibid., pp. 198-9. 
142!1llil., pp. 198-9. 
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Recalling Faysal' s conversations with the French delegates in January, Hayder 
noted that although they claimed to have no desire to annex Syria, they did not hesitate to 
infer that, should Faysal attempt to force their hand by demanding too much too soon, as 
Egypt had done to the British, Syria would suffer the same fate as the Egyptians by the 
hand of the French.143 
Although the French delegates did not raise significant objections in the moment, 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephan Pichon had already made his views on the 
equivalence of rights between smaller and greater powers known to the British 
government the November prior. Anticipating just such a move, Pichon protested that 
the "Little Powers of recognized States and those in process of formation ... are not 
equivalent ... the Great Powers had not yet agreed on their views as to representation of 
various categories of belligerents ... enemies and neutrals ... it will be necessary to define 
who shall sit and at what kind of meeting." Concerning Faysal in particular, Pichon 
stated that, 
He cannot speak in the name of Arab populations who cannot in the present state 
of things be freely, validly and seriously consulted: Congress must therefore 
remain quite free to examine Arab question alone or after hearing this Delegate of 
King of Hedjaz. No Arab kingdom has been recognized by Allied Powers as a 
whole ... Arab kingdom or kingdoms have therefore no real existence and have at 
present only a hypothetical character even between France and Englandl44 
British Ambassador to France Lord Derby was instructed at the time to assuage French 
fears by diffusing the significance of Faysal's role and status as merely "the 
143 Ibid., pp. 225-226. 
144 BL, LlPS/llIl411P51191l919, Doc. 5248 Mr. Grahame (Paris) to Foreign Office, November 241918 
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representative of our co-belligerent and Ally King Hussein" at the Conference in a purely 
advisory and observational capacity.145 
Despite having 'invented' the Hedjaz as a nation, the British Empire delegates 
nevertheless made every effort to convince President Wilson that imperial annexation 
was preferable to the issuance of mandates. Delegates from South Africa and Australia 
objected that the mandates system was merely an unnecessary complication that would 
hinder bringing 'good government' to colonies so long denied it by the Germans. 146 
Clemente Simon, of the French representatives, praised the civilizing spirit of France's 
imperial legacy ,arguing that, now "all the great Powers worthy of the name, considered 
their colonies as wards entrusted to them by the world ... higher moral principles now 
guided the nations.,,147 Lloyd George pointed out that, far from profitable ventures, 
Colonies, as far as Great Britain was concerned, did not mean a division of spoils, 
but rather the incurring of expenditure. Great Britain had no Colony from which 
a contribution towards the national expenditure was obtained. He thought the 
same consideration would present itself were the mandatory system applied to 
Mesopotamia, Syria, and other parts of the Turkish Empire. Whoever took 
Mesopotamia would have to spend enormous sums of money for works which 
would only be of profit to future generations. It might pay in the future, but who 
was to pay at present?"I48 
In reply, Wilson expressed his frustrations with the rhetorical haggling that amounted, in 
his view, a "negation in detail--one case at a time--of the whole principle of 
mandatories.,,149 There was no question, to his mind, that, despite the arguments to the 
contrary, the spirit of internationalism and that of imperialism were "radically different ... 
145 BL, LlPS/11/1411P5119/1919, Doc 5248 FO to Lord Derby November 23,1918 
146 United States Department of State, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. 3, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 
745-7 
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ideas." For whereas either might be "exercised in the same spirit and under the same 
conditions ... the former assumed trusteeship on the part of the League of Nations ... the 
latter implied definite sovereignty" of one power over another. This state of affairs, he 
inferred, had led directly to the war that had brought them to the table in the first place 
and would, if permitted to revive, force a "return to the system of competitive 
armaments" and render the League of Nations helpless to perform the task it had been set 
of guaranteeing real international security and "a laughing stock" in the eyes of the 
world. l50 The mandatory system, like the League itself, Wilson reminded his opponents 
had arisen in response to "the feeling which had sprung up all over the world against 
further annexation.,,151 Dismissing derisive speculation on the details of the mandate 
system, Wilson insisted that, lest "the League of Nations be discredited from the 
beginning," a public commitment to trusteeship specifically over annexation must be 
unanimously made.152 Among the somewhat begrudging acceptances, Lloyd George's is 
telling. "As far as the British Empire was concerned," he stated, "most of the conquests 
had been accomplished by British troops, and as far as those territories were concerned 
Great Britain would be prepared to administer them under such conditions as might be 
laid down by the League of Nations.,,153 
In contrast to the ambiguous and, at times, arbitrary manner in which nations and 
empires had been defined in relation to one another for the Conference, on February 6, 
1919 Amir Faysal delivered what was arguably the most comprehensive case for national 
sovereignty heard before the Council ofTen. Defining the region for which spoke, 
ISO Ibid., p. 765. 
151 Ibid., p. 741. 
152Thi.Q., p. 742-43. 
153 Ibid., p. 764. 
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Faysal asked that the Council choose to recognize the right to independence of "all the 
Arabic-speaking peoples in Asia, from the line Alexandretta-Diarbekir southward."I54 
"The Arabs," Faysal reminded his mostly European audience, "were an ancient people, 
civilized and organized at a time when the nations represented in this room were 
unformed." The natural frontiers and resources of the Arabic-speaking world, he argued, 
had nurtured and sustained the linguistic, racial, social, and economic homogeneity that 
had characterized it from the birth of civilization to the present.J55 Although "Arab 
religious differences were being exploited" by European powers for centuries as a means 
of dividing and conquering them, in the struggle for their own collective independence, 
Faysal argued, the Arabs had experienced "welding of the faiths, in their common service 
of the principle of nationality."I56 
The enduring unity and "capacity to play their part in the world" of the Arabs had 
been inarguably demonstrated, he suggested, by the many "Syrians, Lebanese, Hejazis, 
Mesopotamians, Palestinians, and Yemenis" that had organized and fought together along 
side the Allies in the Eastern Theater of the war. As legitimate belligerents, and 
therefore, legitimate victors in the war, the Arabs had suffered their share of losses in the 
name of their own independence, which they had, in fact, already declared upon entering 
154The Alexandretta-Diarbekir line ran in a slightly North-Eastern direction from the city of Alexandretta, 
located near the North-Eastern tip of the Mediterranean Sea, into the South-East Turkey to Dairbekir, 
located due North of the Eastern border of present day Syria. This ambiguous demarcation could, 
potentially, have been meant to include all of the present day nation-states of Syria, Palestine/Israel, Jordan, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar, The United Arab Emirates, and Oman with the 
possibility of intentionally excluding most of Iraq, Palestine/Israel, and Saudi Arabia. However, in his 
rationale for the claim to independence, Faysal makes clear claim to independence for all Arabic-speaking 
peoples. Minutes of the February 6th meeting of the Council of Ten in United States Department of State, 
The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, vol. 3, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p.889. 
J55United States Department of State, The Paris Peace Conference. 1919. vol. 3, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 
891 
1.56 Ibid. 
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Damascus.157 The gesture of respect and political maturity they had exhibited in lowering 
their flag to make way for "temporary Military Governors," he informed the Council, 
would never have been made had they known that it would be perceived as "in 
compliance with a secret treaty."I58 
Concerning the matter of mandates, Faysal admitted that the infrastructure of 
government for the Arab state would "have to be buttressed by the man and material 
resources of a great foreign power," but stressed that this necessity had been made so by 
centuries of European encroachment and exploitation.159 Although assistance was needed 
and welcomed from "everyone who wished them well," the Arabs "could not sacrifice for 
this help any of the independence for which they fought," and Faysal "hoped no Power 
imagined that it had the right to limit the independence of a people because it had 
material interests in their country ."160 He asked the Council of Ten that, "on the principle 
of self-determination," the Arab provinces be permitted to determine for themselves the 
"nature of the assistance they required," requesting that, in the case of any ambiguity, an 
international inquiry be made to determine the wishes of the peoples concerned. 161 
When asked by Wilson if the Arabs would prefer one or many mandates, Faysal 
responded that "his principle was Arab unity. It was for this that the Arabs had fought. 
Any other solution would be regarded by the Arabs in the light of a division of spoils 
after a battle.,,162 The "future confederation of liberated Arabic speaking Asia" Faysal 
157 Ibid. 
158Ibid., p. 890. 
159Faisal's statement to the Council ofTen, January 1,1919 BL, UPSlll/1411P5119/1919, Doc. P77 1/19 
160 Minutes of the February 6th meeting of the Council of Ten in United States Department of State, The 
Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. 3, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 891 
161 Ibid. 
162 Palestine, "for its universal character" was left to the side for "mutual consideration of all parties 
interested." Minutes of the February 6th meeting of the Council of Ten in United States Department of 
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envisioned, however, had no imperial ambitions nor wished to impose itself upon any 
peoples. If some parts of Lebanon, he offered by way of example, wished to retain their 
independence from surrounding regions their wishes would be respected and they would 
be welcomed to participate in the confederation if they wished.l63 This was the spirit in 
which Faysal asked the Council and the League of Nations envision their support of the 
Arabs, "not to force your whole civilization upon us," as he had phrased it in his written 
statement to the Council, "but to help us to pick out what serves us from your 
experience," although in return for such benevolence, the Arabs could "offer you little 
but gratitude."I64 "The Arabs had tasted slavery ," he lamented, and it was their hope that 
"the Conference would not thrust them back into the condition from which they had now 
emerged.,,165 
Speaking a few days later, Faysal's co-delegate for the Hedjaz, Rustem Haidar 
was more direct in his views of the mandate. 
There is a word in the text which seems to me rather vague--the word 'Mandate'. 
What does it mean? We do not exactly know. And yet on the interpretation of 
that word will depend the future of all the nations which, till today, have been 
oppressed by tyrants ... For the present I only wish to say that the nations in 
whose name I speak intend to remain free to choose the Power whose advice they 
will ask. Their right to decide their fate in the future has been recognized in 
principle. Very well! But you will allow me to say, Gentlemen, that a secret 
agreement to dispose of these nations has been prepared about which they have 
not been consulted ... I express the wish that the Powers interested in this question 
should declare on the first opportunity that this agreement concluded without their 
assent should of full right be pronounced null and void. l66 
State, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. 3, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
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166 Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No.3, Plenary Session February 14,1919 discussing Art. 19 
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Many dissenting writers initially welcomed the announcement of the acceptance 
of the mandate principle as a victory for the principles of democracy and nationality on a 
global level. As the Herald reported, the "decision that the German Colonies and 
Mesopotamia are to have their fate decided by the League of Nations" clearly meant that 
"Wilson is winning." It was "not only fair but essential to say," however, "if the right 
prevails at the Paris Conference, it will be because of the pressure of Labour ... and a 
steady and continuous pressure of rank and file opinion evincing itself in propaganda, in 
resolution, in what is called 'unrest' .,,167 For it had been British Labour that had 
"demanded ... the internationalization of all of Africa, and for self-determination for the 
Asiatic countries." If "Syria and Mesopotamia and Arabia are to have self-government if 
they wish it," the Herald reasoned, it would be because of the efforts of Labour-minded 
Britons. l68 
The Herald was also suspicious, however, of Lloyd George "behaving more like a 
socialist Premier than the leader of a Tory Government" at the Conference 169 and 
recognized the possibility that "that the whole 'mandatory' business is intended as mere 
dust in the eyes of Labour." It was the responsibility of Labour, therefore, "to ensure that 
the offer of self-government to the people of the Turkish Empire is a genuine one, and 
that it is not perverted into a mere device of transferring them by vote of some tame 
Peace Conference, 1919, vol. 3, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 229. 
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packed assembly to the rule and exploitation of one of the Powers ... that the 'mandate' is 
a reality, the 'trusteeship' a fact.'o17O 
This responsibility was compounded by the potential precedent the mandates had 
set for the future of democracy throughout the British Empire. For, "at the worst," the 
Herald anticipated, "the definite admission by the Powers that Syrians and Arabians are 
'fit' for self-government is enormously important for it renders unanswerable the claim of 
India and Egypt to Home Rule." Comparing Amir Faysal to the Conference delegate for 
India, Lord Sinha, the editors noted that Faysal was "a Federalist" who legitimately 
represented the desires of the Arab people that "that each part [of the Arab speaking 
world] shall be self-governing" and that they do not desire the country developed for 
them-they wish to do this for themselves." In contrast, "Lord Sinha, although an 
Indian, represents the British Government. The people of India have had no voice in his 
selection, neither have the Indian rulers of those parts of India which have remained 
under Indian rule." If, in fact, the British government was sincere in its support of Faysal 
and "the [Arab] Confederation is set up ... the news of a new sort of government and 
administration ... will reach India, and the movement in that country will get on very 
quickly," begging the question, the writer openly wondered, of "whether, after all, this 
sort of thing is the beginning of the end of white domination in the East.,,171 
The fact that the League of Nations had chosen, in the end, to apply the mandate 
idea "exclusively ... to the conquered colonies and territories of our enemies" was, 
according to J. A. Hobson writing for the UDC Magazine, an affirmation that the 
"perpetual autocracy of the foreign Ministers of the five great Allied Powers" remained 
170 Herald, February 8, 1919. 
171 Herald, February 22,1919. 
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in full force at the heart of the League. Was not such an ostensibly "a just and humane 
tutelage," he inquired, "equally applicable to the backward protectorates of the Allies.,,172 
At the ILP's annual conference that April, Philip Snowden, characteristically, 
took the critique a bit further in his opening address from the Chair. The mandatory 
system, he declared, was little more than a camouflage for the "determination on the part 
of the respective Allied Powers to secure the imperialistic aims embodied in the Secret 
Treaties.,,173 The National Administrative Council of the ILP concurred, referring to the 
"wranglings between the Allies about the division of the spoils of war" as a perversion of 
"President Wilson's fourteen points" and proof "of the I.L.P. contention that the war was 
essentially imperialist and capitalist in its aims and objects.,,174 Although the map of the 
world had been redrawn from Paris, railed R. C. Wall head , "there was not a single people 
in the whole of the world," the British democracy included, "that had been consulted for 
one minute by any of their governments and rulers so far as the peace that was then being 
concluded.,,175 
However, Snowden declared, although they had not yet realized it, the leaders of 
the "old order of class domination and economic slavery" had invited their own demise to 
their doorstep. For in "shattering" the expectations of democracy around the world, the 
Allied governments had inspired the "new forces and new ideas" that were animating a 
"new democracy." "The world," Snowden declared, "and not a geographical area, is the 
new nation. That is the idea that is inspiring the world revolutionary movement." 176 
172 U DC Magazine, March 1919 LSEIMorel/F61l7 
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Accordingly, an "emergency resolution" was called for to address "not only [the 
situation] with Ireland but the system of repression [as a whole] including Egypt and 
India.,,177 The draft submitted combined the imperial issues of Ireland, Egypt, and India 
in demanding "the withdrawal of British troops from Ireland, and the recognition of that 
form of Government which is desired by the Irish people," declaring that "the claims of 
the Indian and Egyptian peoples to self-government as essentially just," and insisting 
"that they be granted at the earliest opportunity." 178 
Speaking on the subject of the peace settlement at the Socialist International 
Conference at Berne that February, Ramsay MacDonald warned his audience that "there 
was no greater danger to any cause than that everyone should profess to believe in it. 
Everyone believes in the League of Nations now.,,179 MacDonald disparaged the League 
as a "Holy Alliance which would be imposed upon [the people], dressed up in a 
democratic garb and appealing for confidence in democratic language." What was 
needed, he declared was "a League of Peoples not of Peers ... and a court to which all 
oppressed nations could come, bring their complaints, make their charges and ask for 
judgment, and where they will be assured of receiving justice, fair play and an 
honourable judgment."lso By 'all oppressed nations,' MacDonald assured his colleagues, 
he meant also those under British rule. Singling out Ireland, India, and Egypt 
specifically, MacDonald sought to clear the air of any misconceptions as to Labour's 
attitude toward British possessions in declaring himself and British Labour "in favour of 
a system of control for the colonies established by international guarantee under the 
177 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
17800., p. 75. 
179 John de Kay, The Spirit of the International at Berne (London: Published by the Author for Free 
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League of Nations ... not for the purpose of applying it to other peoples and empires, but 
honestly to apply them to the British Empire and trying to make the empire a lever for the 
liberation of all the peoples that come under its sway.,,181 It was in this respect, he 
argued, that the efforts of the Berne delegates had the potential of remaining "memorable 
forever in history for having taken the first substantial step towards the union of the 
whole human race." 182 
The resolutions of the Conference on territorial questions were telling in their 
interventionist tone. Arguing that the "arbitrary and enforced union of people of different 
nationality in a single State has been and will always be a cause for international disputes 
and therefore a danger to peace," the Conference declared "the nationality question [a 
matter of] international importance." 183 As the main embodiment of international law , 
the League of Nations was meant to ensure that 'nationals' remained free to "decide to 
which State they will belong within the League of Nations," experienced "a minimum of 
national rights," and were free to "exercise of the rights of free self-determination" in 
preparation for membership to the League of Nations. As a means of insuring this 
relationship between the League and 'disputed territories,' the Conference specifically 
took a stand against "any attempts to falsify the application of the principles hereby 
proclaimed" and specifically rejected 
1) The rights of the victors to the spoils of war and all the agreements by which 
States have been drawn into the war with the object of increasing their territory at 
the expense of other nations 
2) The fixing of frontiers according to military or strategical interests 
3) Forced or veiled annexations claimed on the ground of so-called historic rights 
and so-called economic necessity 
181 Ibid., p. 60. 
182 Ibid., p. 38. 
183 "General Resolution on Territorial Questions" Berne Conference, in de Kay,. pp. 85 and 86. 
4) The creation of 'faits accomplis' by the military occupation of disputed 
territories 
5) The establishment of any economic or political sphere of influencel84 
In closing, the Conference "appealed to the working-classes of every country to exert 
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themselves to the utmost to compel their governments to respect these principles in the 
interests of the conclusion of a lasting peace." 185 
Just as dissenting leaders were organizing to use the precedent of the mandates to 
full political advantage, Lord Milner and the British Empire Delegation were diligently 
working to overcome precisely the kind of limitations of the sort the Berne Conference 
was attempting to impose. Writing on the subject that March, Lord Milner prodded the 
delegates to "clear our minds as to what we wanted" out of the mandates "before an Inter-
Allied Commission was appointed to decide who were to be the various mandatory 
Powers, and what the nature of the authority to be conferred upon them."I86 
Milner acknowledged that developing the mandate principle would be tantamount 
to "opening a new chapter in International Law." Legal details, however, were not his 
primary concern ("I leave it to the lawyers to say where the 'sovereignty' will in any case 
reside"). What did concern him most, he explained was how "to get rid of the existing 
sovereignties." For, "before we can apply any new system of government to these 
countries," he reasoned, "we must get hold of them."I87 The key, for Milner, was to 
arrange for the Central Powers to cede the territories in question to the Allied Powers 
184 Ibid. 
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directly before the assignment of mandates came before the League. In this way, he 
concluded, the mandatory powers "will be in the position of a man receiving a property" 
already in his possession, albeit "subject to certain servitudes."l88 
There was no question for Milner that the destiny of the mandated territories would 
be determined by imperial powers, rather than nationalist aspirations. Balfour's analysis 
of the pretense of self-determination, proto-national status, and assisted development was 
particularly scathing. 
Where and what are these 'independent nations'? Are they by chance identical 
with Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine? If so, the coincidence with the Sykes-
Picot arrangement is truly amazing, for no such idea was present to the minds of 
those who framed it ... it never occurred to them that they had to deal at all with 
nations in the modern and Western sense of the term ... Are we [now] going 
'chiefly to consider the wishes of the inhabitants in deciding which [mandatory 
power] is to be selected? We are going to do nothing of the kind ... they may freely 
choose; but it is Hobson's choice after all.189 
For Balfour, the question of which powers would take responsibility for which territories 
was one already determined by a long history of inter-imperial relations in which 
complex systems of influence and patronage had been long established. Abandoning the 
practical efficiency of that framework in the name of an overly idealistic conception of 
self-determination, he believed, was not only the very height of naivete, but an 
unconscionable neglect of political and practical realities that no statesmen with a 
modicum of experience in extra-national government could even entertain. 190 
Milner's engagement with the problem of boundaries was also telling. He 
recognized that in defining the mandates, "ethnic affinity will no doubt be regarded as a 
188 Ibid. 
189 Balfour Respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia NAlF01406141. Also see Wm. Roger Louis, 
"The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the Mandates System, 1919-1922," International Organization 
Vol. 23, No.1 (Winter 1969), pp. 88-89. 
190 Ibid. 
228 
basic principle" to the mind of League committees and indigenous peoples. However, 
such affinities tended to obstruct the neat division of territory among interested powers. 
In the proposed state of Armenia, for example, "different, and indeed hostile races are 
intermixed. On the other hand we have in fixing the boundaries of Syria and 
Mesopotamia, to deal with the exactly opposite problem, viz: how to escape or at least to 
minimize the administrative difficulties of dividing authority over one and the same race 
between two different mandatory Powers." The case of Arabia was particularly 
problematic in relation to inter-imperial competition after the peace. As was well known, 
"declarations made by several of the Allied Powers with regard to Arabia amount to a 
promise of complete independence," meaning that the assignment of an Arabian mandate 
to Great Britain "would appear to be running counter to her own declarations about 
independence and sovereignty." Nevertheless, "no other Power could be made the 
mandatory without infringing the rights of Great Britain. Arabia is, therefore, apparently 
a special case, which needs to be dealt with by some other means than treating it as a 
mandated territory.',191 
Despite these concerns, the allocation of the mandated territories in almost 
precisely the manner desired by the British and French governments and, tellingly, 
designated by the Secret Treaties, would be achieved with remarkably little difficulty. 
By April 1920, the lines drawn through ethnic, religious, and economic communities 
throughout the formerly Ottoman territories in the name of European imperial interests 
would be formally approved by the League of Nations at the San Remo Conference. As 
the next chapter illustrates, however, circumventing the very framework of international 
191 Memorandum by Lord Milner for the British Empire Delegation March 8,1919 NAIADM/116/3247 doc. 
15. 
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law and principles undergirding the territorial settlement the British were attempting to 
legitimate would give Arab nationalists precisely the legal tools they would need to 
dismantle imperial legitimacy in their respective states over the inter-war period. It was 
no coincidence that the most influential advocates in support of their efforts would be the 
leaders of the British labour movement and international socialism generally. 
Writing in 1918 as an advisor to the British government on the Middle East, 
eminent British historian Arnold Toynbee had warned Shuckburgh that the events of the 
war would bring the interests of socialism and Islam closer together. The affirmation of 
international legitimacy experienced by the Turkish and the Arabs through their alliances 
with Germany and Britain respectively was not dissimilar, Toynbee argued, from that 
experienced by the Bolsheviks in their victory over the Tsar. Because of its long history 
of suppression and exploitation, global Islam, he warned, was an ideal conduit for the 
Bolshevik critique of capitalism and imperialism. Through Bolshevik propaganda, 
Russian and Indian Muslims had already come to "believe themselves to be face to face 
with the same enemy - namely, 'Capitalism', or in other words the European Middle 
Class, which they regard as the exploiter of the labouring class in Europe and of the 
Moslems in the East. Scratch the Tartar and you find the Bolshevik!"l92 "The Islamic 
consciousness," he argued, "like the European Labour Movement, is a growing 
international force ... passionately demanding that the principle of 'No Annexations' 
(neither 'open' nor 'veiled ') shall be applied to Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan."l93 
Once the mandates had been officially allocated in May 1920 and the Ottoman 
192 "The Formula of 'the Self-Determination of Peoples' and the Moslem World." Arnold Toynbee to 
Shuckburgh at the Intelligence Bureau, Department ofInformation January 11,1918, BLiLlPSI1 1114115072 
193 Ibid. 
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Empire formally dismembered, the UDC Magazine announced that "the last item in the 
process of carving up the world on the basis of Mr. Asquith's and Sir Edward Grey's 
Secret Treaties of 1915-16 has now been settled ... and Lord Curzon's old dictum that the 
western boundary of India was the Euphrates has been exceeded by the facts. It is to-day 
the Mediterranean. To the British Empire of the East is now added the British Empire of 
the Middle East."I94 Attributing the settlement directly to the "insatiable ... lust of Empire 
among the ruling classes of Britain," the UDC lamented that "the point has been reached 
when our people are like to die of a surfeit of Empire" at what was imagined to be the 
height of international sentiment. For, in addition to having "Ireland in a state of war, 
Egypt kept down only by force, and India seething with discontent," the British people 
now faced a "Turkish Treaty [that] creates as many potential wars as it contains 
clauses.,,195 
The next month's issue dedicated a special supplement to "India and the Empire," 
in which the opening article declared that "Britain stands on the threshold of one of the 
gravest crises in her imperial history ," 
Upon the series of events, culminating in the Amritsar massacre ... has come the 
Turkish Treaty ... it violates in most flagrant fashion the principle of nationality and 
self-determination ... affronts Mohammedan ... religious sentiment in its 
profoundest depths. It breaks innumerable pledges given to India, and to the 
world ... [and] makes a Turkish war in which the Arabs-also flouted by the 
Treaty-will probably make common cause with the Turkish Nationalists 
inevitable .196 
In addition to uniting in cause the Arab and the Turkish nationalist, the editors argued, 
the "blunders and follies of the past five years have united Hindu and Mohammedan in 
194 U.D.C. Magazine June 1920. 
195 Foreign Affairs June 1920. 
196 "India and the Empire" Foreign Affairs June 1920. 
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India, just as they have united Copt and Mohammedan in Egypt." Although "the working 
man in this country may not at first sight perceive that the religious convictions of 70 
millions of Indian Mohammedans concern him in the least," they were, in fact his duty to 
consider and respect. The British worker was a member of the British Democracy, and 
"British Democracy is responsible for the Empire. It may dislike the Empire. But the 
Empire is a fact, and the responsibility is a fact. And so long as the Empire exists, the 
British Democracy will pay for the mistakes in imperial policy committed by its rulers, 
just as it pays for their mistakes in foreign policy. And imperial policy can never be 
separated from foreign policy: it is, indeed, part of it." Moreover, the "policy of imperial 
expansion coupled with repression to which our present rulers appear to have committed 
themselves" and the working classes had tacitly accepted, had put "22,846 British troops 
in Constantinople, 32,068 in Egypt, 23,014 in Palestine, and 70,603 in Mesopotamia, and 
they are costing us at the present moment just under £40 millions sterling." It was a short 
cry from the present situation to one of open conflict that would, once again, demand a 
conscripted army in Britain. 197 
A series of articles then set about critiquing the Turkish Treaty from the related 
perspectives of Indian Muslims and British Labour. Leaders of the Caliphate Movement 
such as Muhammad Ali and Said Husayn explained to British readers how putting aside 
the jurisdiction of the Caliph in favor of "non-Muslim control in any shape or form in the 
'Island of Arabia' as divined by Muslim religious authorities ... including, as it does Syria, 
Palestine and Mesopotamia besides the Peninsula of Arabia" amounted to a violation of 
the foundational premise of respect for religious principles and practice at the center of 
197 Ibid. 
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Anglo-Indian relations, of the pledges given to Indian and Arab Muslims as well as the 
British people by the British government over the course of the war, and of the principle 
of self-determination for which the Peace generally and mandates specifically stood. 
Muhammad Ali, head of the Khilafat Movement, used strongly socialistic language to 
describe both Islam and its attachment to the Caliph as inherently internationalist, 
socialist, anti-imperialist, and decidedly more modem-minded than the 'rights of 
conquest' approach to the Peace taken by imperially-minded British statesmen seeking to 
complete the archaic task of the Crusades in taking down the Ottoman Empire in the 
name of Anglo-Saxon Christian world supremacy.l98 
Stressing the imperialistic attitudes of British statesmen and its incompatibility 
with self-determination, Leland Buxton stated that "there is nothing surprising in the fact 
that the Prime Minister should have insisted once again on violating the principle of self-
determination, but it is somewhat surprising that he should have pursued a policy which 
is suicidal from the Imperial point of view .,,199 Why, asked' Q' in "Self-Determination 
and the Turkish Treaty," had Lloyd George disregarded his obligation to respect the 
standing rights to religious freedom as well as the emerging rights to self-determination 
of his Muslim subjects and subjected the British people to the wave of violent animus 
such actions portended? The answer for 'Q.', the editors of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Khilafat leadership was the same: "There is oil in Mosul, and the only self-determination 
that is therefore possible, is that the British shall demand a mandate in 
198 "An Imperial Crisis: The Significance of the Indian Khilafat Delegation," by A.R.S; "Islam and the 
Khilafat," by Muhammad Ali; and "The Relations of Great Britain with the Muslims of India as they are 
Affected by the Turkish Treaty," by Said Husayn, in Foreign Affairs June 1920. 
199 Leland Buxton "The Turkish Treaty" Foreign Affairs June 1920. 
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Mesopotamia. Verily, as a member of the Indian Khilafat Delegation has said, the Prime 
Minister is pouring Mosul oil over the troubled waters of Mesopotamia!,,2°O 
The reaction to the issuance of the mandate in Mesopotamia was immediate and 
would largely confirm the fears and criticisms expressed by the dissenting left. As Amal 
Vinogradov has shown, the prolonged disruptive impact of the occupation on political 
and socio-economic life in Mesopotamia had raised tensions as high as the appearance of 
Faysal at the Peace Conference had raised expectations of independence in 
Mesopotamia?OI When regional notables affiliated with various sectarian, regionalist, 
and nationalist movements approached their local British administrators in Shamiya in 
June 1920 to protest the mandate and declare independence, they were, unsurprisingly 
rebuffed. By early July, three fourths of the country had risen in an 'insurrection' that 
would last for months, costing hundreds of British lives and tens of thousands of pounds 
to put down. 
In Mesopotamia, the 1920 uprising would quickly come to symbolize the birth of 
Iraqi nationalism in opposition to British imperialism, a status it still retains for many 
Iraqis?02 For the dissenting leaders then taking the reins of the British Labour movement, 
it would signify the vindication of their critique of the war, the peace settlement, and 
British imperial democracy. As the next chapter will show, the Mesopotamia Rising of 
1920 galvanized the connection dissenting writers had been attempting to make between 
200 "Self Determination and the Turkish Treaty," by Q and "Oil versus Honour" by Paris correspondent with 
commentary from the Ed.s of Foreign Affairs 
201 Amal Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 3, no. 2 (April 1972): 123-139. 
202 Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley: 
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the struggles of the British people for a genuinely democratic political system, nationally 
and internationally, and those of imperial subjects throughout the British Empire working 
against the legitimacy of the imperial government from the periphery . 
235 
Chapter 5: A Potemkin State? The Early Influence of the British and Iraqi Press 
on the Anglo-Iraqi Nation Making Project 
In what is presumably an apocryphal story, in the late 18th century, minister to 
Russian Empress Catherine II Grigory Potyomkin allegedly constructed hollow fa~ades 
of villages along the banks of the Dnieper River in order to satisfy the visiting Empress' 
expectations that the Crimea was a possession worthy of the cost of its conquest. The 
'Arab Fa~ade' of self-government for Mesopotamia devised in 1917-1918 served a 
similar function for British policy planners desiring to satisfy the expectations of the 
international community, but also their own British and Arab subjects, about the future of 
the Anglo-Iraqi nation making project. Unlike Catherine II, however, the British and 
Iraqi press proved increasingly intent on forcing the British government to either suffuse 
the fa~ade with real popular political power or come clean about its deception and face 
the consequences of public opprobrium. 
Although policy planners had already come to terms with the necessity of erecting 
some form of self-governing administration in Mesopotamia,! the widespread riots in 
response to the announcement of the Mandate in the summer of 1920, led to the 
determination that, within the limits of "the safeguarding of our obligations and interests 
as Mandatory ," the Arab Fa~ade would need to be "as completely Arab as possible.,,2 By 
most historical accounts, this formula did indeed describe the character of the Anglo-Iraqi 
government, namely that it was as self-governing as it could be up to the point of 
endangering British interests in protecting the delicate framework of Iraqi political life 
I Hirtzel to Wilson March 12 1918 in BL. Sir Arnold Wilson Papers/ADD/52455/C 
2 'Mesopotamia. Appointment of Sir Percy Cox as High Commissioner: Instructions of His Majesty's 
Government, September 01 1920. NA. FO 371/5229/£10758 
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from external and, most importantly, internal threats? Although British imperial and 
interimperial interests certainly did define the limits of Iraqi self-government repeatedly 
and dramatically over the course of the mandate, the significant and sharply focused 
pressure the popular press in both Britain and Iraq brought to bear on the British 
government to keep the advancement of self-government in Iraq flush up against those 
limits has been underappreciated.4 
In the aftermath of the 1920 rising in Iraq, an ongoing British political and press 
campaign determined to expose the occupation of Iraq as an anachronistic imperial 
adventure out of conformity with the principles of the League of Nations and an 
emerging body of nationalistically minded Iraqi journalists with similar goals in mind 
seemed to discover one another and the leverage that each other's existence might lend to 
their localized efforts. Moreover, this discovery occurred in the midst of an Empire-
wide, indeed a global, 'national awakening' among subject peoples from Dublin to Delhi 
that imbued with legitimacy the internationalist and constitutionalist language being used 
3 The most significant studies of the mandate period in Iraq are the following. Philip Willard Ireland's 
'Iraq: A Study in Political Development (London: Kegan Paul, 2004) was originally published in 1937 and 
reflects the impressive knowledge and access to official documents Ireland had from his time spent at the 
Baghdad Residency in the British service and his close relationship with many of the key actors. Peter 
Sluglett's Britain in Iraq 1914-1932 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976) updates Ireland's work with official 
government documents and other archival materials made available after the 50 year moratorium had 
elapsed. As such, Sluglett's work offers a broader survey of British inter-departmental relations and their 
influence on the direction of policy in Iraq. Most recently, Toby Dodge's Inventing Iraq: The Failure of 
Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Colombia University Press, 2003) makes a careful 
examination of British perceptions, characteristically erroneous, of Iraqi social, economic, and political life, 
how those perceptions led to disastrous policy planning, and how the failure of the Anglo-Iraqi nation 
making project necessitated the introduction of an unprecedentedly insidious, in Dodge's view, form of 
imperial control through 'the despotic power of the Royal Air Force.' 
4 Although the role of popular opposition to the mandate in Iraq emanating out of Britain is gestured to in 
most works on the period, it is almost invariably presented as a monolithic demand for economy from the 
British taxpayer. Similarly, the opposition of the Iraqi press to British rule in Iraq is usually represented as 
a blanked opposition to any form of foreign rule occasionally finding articulate expression over one 
particular issue or another or as the mouthpieces of Iraqi politicians. A significant exception to this 
tendency is the first chapter of Orit Bashkin's The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) which offers a snapshot of the visions of the Iraqi state held by 
prominent Iraqi editors garnered from her reading of their daily newspapers. 
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by the British and Iraqi press to undermine the logic of the occupation. This chapter 
seeks to illustrate the liberalizing influence these campaigns had on British policy making 
in Iraq on the one hand and the power to expose the reality of Iraq's essentially colonial 
status on the other when the limits of British flexibility were repeatedly reached. As 
British administrators and politicians would learn to their cost, resorting to the 
suppression of self-government in Iraq in such moments would have lasting 
consequences for perceptions of the legitimacy of the Anglo-Iraqi nation making project, 
if not the legitimacy of British imperial democracy itself, in the early years of the 
interwar period. 
In his biography of Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson, Acting Civil Commissioner for 
Mesopotamia from 1915 until Sir Percy Cox returned to fill that role in 1920, John 
Marlowe aptly described Wilson as, and entitled his book, Late Victorian.s Having served 
in administrations in India, Persia, and Mesopotamia since 1903, Wilson learned his trade 
from old-guard India men and shared their faith in a Victorian conception of British 
imperial rule as a necessary force for order and progress in a world characterized by 
uneven development and inter-imperial competition.6 Wilson would describe himself in 
1920 as "a rank imperialist whose trade for the last 12 years has been the acquisition of 
territory and influence in these parts;' and he shared the view of his superiors that British 
rule and expansion was justified by the protection it offered indigenous peoples from 
Britain's less politically enlightened imperial rivals, as well as their own political 
5 John Marlowe, Late Victorian: The Life of Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson (London: Cresset P, 1967). 
6 For a discussion of a Victorian approach to empire, see John Darwin, "Imperialism and the Victorians: 
The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion," English Historical Review Vol. 447 (June 1997): pp. 614-642. 
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immaturity? It was an irony not lost on Wilson, who would entitle his autobiographical 
account of his service in Mesopotamia A Clash of Loyalties, that his unwavering 
commitment to Victorian imperial ideals would ultimately spell the end of his otherwise 
illustrious military career.8 Wilson's zeal for the construction of 'New India' in 
Mesopotamia enjoyed over three years of relatively free reign, however, before it became 
a serious liability for his government's sudden embrace of internationalism in the spring 
of 1918.9 
Like many of his generation and background of imperial service, Wilson 
understood the value of indirect rule and acknowledged the desire among indigenous 
peoples for political power as a natural and even a positive sign for a region's 
development. He also viewed indigenous self-government as the final step in a long 
process of imperially guided political maturation, however, and considered the notion 
that any peoples were possessed of an inherent right to self-government a self-indulgent 
and idealistic fantasy that willfully ignored centuries of field experience to the contrary. 
Accordingly, Wilson had followed the 'Indian model' in dutifully granting key 
Mesopotamian notables, educated urban elites, and tribal sheikhs some authority over 
various sections of the population. As late as 1920, however, Wilson continued to insist 
that his experience of governing through these local clients had only confirmed the fact 
7 Wilson to 10, 3 June 1920, BL, UPS/lOl756 
8 Arnold T. Wilson, A Clash of Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1917-1920, a Personal and Historical Record 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1931). 
9 For Wilson's account of his efforts, see Arnold T. Wilson, Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1914-1917, a 
Personal and Historical Record (London: Oxford University Press, 1930) and Arnold T. Wilson, A Clash 
of Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1917-1920, a Personal and Historical Record (London: Oxford University 
Press,1931). For an alternative interpretation privileging Iraqi perspectives, see Ghassan R Atiyyah,/raq 
1908-1921 A Political Study (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1973). 
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that the Arabs of Mesopotamia were not only "unfit to govern themselves," but "equally 
unfit for a voice in the forming of the Government" they would receive.1O 
In the weeks following Lloyd George's January 1918 declaration of intent to 
recognize Mesopotamia's entitlement to her 'own separate national condition,' Arthur 
Hirtzel, head of the India Office's political department, informed Wilson of the kind of 
policy changes he would be expected to implement in Mesopotamia as well as the 
reasoning for the transition. Hirtzel stressed that Wilson's understanding of "the real 
political tendencies [in England] at this stage of the war" was "no less important" than his 
government's understanding of "the possibilities and probabilities on the spot" that had 
thus far guided him. "Entirely different currents are flowing now," Hirtzel explained, and 
we must shape our course to them if we are going to get what we want in 
Iraq. The old watch-words are obsolete, and the question is how we are to secure 
what is essential under the new ones. This thing can be done, but a certain re-
orientation is necessary.11 
"The 'Arab fa~ade'" in Mesopotamia, Hirtzel warned, "may have to be something rather 
more solid than we had originally contemplated.,,12 
Wilson's resistance to this transition has been well documented and is usually 
attributed to his belief that short-term crises of political interest in London should not be 
permitted to derail generations of imperial development in the east. J3 As Philip Ireland 
has shown, at each step in the transition toward a firmer Arab Fa~ade in Iraq, Wilson 
expended great effort to reorient his government's approach to policy in the region 
10 Wilson to India Office, 3 June 1920, BL, UPS/1O/756. 
11 Hirtzel to Wilson March 12 1918,BL, Sir Arnold Wilson Papers/ADD/52455/C. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Timothy Paris, "British Middle East Policy-Making after the First World War: The Lawrenthian and 
Wilsonian Schools," The Historical lournal41, no. 3 (September 1998): 773-793. 
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around his own goals.14 He fumed over the dangerous implications for his administration 
that the promise of self-determination contained in the Anglo-French Declaration of 
November 1918 threatened, warning that such language might lead to an Arab State, but 
"not on the lines desired by H.M.G." and "by revolution and not by evolution.,,15 When 
requested in the winter of 1918 to gauge public preference in Mesopotamia for various 
kinds of government, Wilson returned instead a carefully managed plebiscite reflecting a 
popular desire for the indefinite continuation of British protection, which he culled from 
his most important Arab clients.16 
By the fall of 1919, Hirtzel was forced to take a firmer tone with Wilson, if one 
not altogether unsympathetic to his point of view, offering a clearer vision of the 
precarious state of opinion on imperial administration as a form of government at home, 
internationally, and throughout the Empire. Wilson's ideal of "Mesopotamia as the 
model of an efficiently administered British dependency or protectorate," Hirtzel 
informed him, "is dead." Not only was it dead in Mesopotamia, Hirtzellamented, but 
"the same idea is dead in India and is decomposing in Egypt." A "new order of ideas" 
now reigned over British imperial policy making in general, ensuring that "things are 
going to be contrary to our most cherished hopes." Hirtzel agreed with Wilson's attitude 
that "we must do what we can to put on the brake, and save all we can out of the 
wreck.,,17 He assured him, however, that even this would require far more adaptability 
of methods and ideas toward accommodating Arab nationalist aspirations than Wilson 
had shown. 
14 Ireland, pp. 176-200. 
15 Wilson to Percy Cox, June 29, 1920 in BL, Sir Arnold Wilson Papers ADDI524551A 
16 Memorandum by Young 18 July 1920 in NA, F0137115228. On the plebiscite, also see Paris, 
"Lawrenthian and Wilsonian Schools," pp. 778 and Ireland, pp. 166-175. 
17 Hirtzel to Wilson,July 191919,BL, Sir Arnold Wilson Papers ADD 52455 C. 
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You are going to have an Arab State whether you like it or not, whether 
Mesopotamia wants it or not ... you appear to be trying, impossibly, to stem the 
tide instead of guide it into the channel that would suit you best. When we get our 
mandate these disjectia membra will have to be co-ordinated into something 
organic ... you are also going to have a lot of people in Mesopotamia whose heads 
will be full of absurd ideas from Syria and heaven knows where ... and a use must 
be found for them ... Otherwise we shall have another Egypt on our hands l8 
Hirtzel would continue his attempt's to 'reform' the intransigent Wilson toward 
"swimming with the new tide" in British political perspectives toward imperial 
adventures, "which is set towards the education and not the government of what used to 
be subject peoples."l9 In emphasizing the fact that Arab self-government was 'not an 
administrative question but a political question,'20 Hirtzel informed Wilson in early 1920 
that the Lloyd George administration was facing immanent collapse, that it would 
"almost certainly be succeeded by a Labour Gov.t, who will hold very different views on 
imperial and financial questions," that "the politico-industrial situation in this country" 
was verging on a Bolshevik style revolution. As a result, Hirtzel speculated, "it is quite 
in the cards that there will be a demand for withdrawal" from Mesopotamia?l What was 
wanted with the direst necessity, Hirtzel stated, was 
some modicum of Arab institutions which we can safely leave while pulling the 
strings ourselves: something which won't cost very much, which Labour can 
swallow consistently with its principles, but under which our influence and 
economic and political interests will be secure. Therefore it is a time for cutting 
down all ambitions and for reducing all responsibilities within the narrowest 
Iimits.22 
Wilson was unequivocal in his replies to such enjoinments. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Hirtzel to Wilson September 17 1919, BL, Sir Arnold Wilson Papers ADD 52455 C. 
20 Paris, p. 782. 
21 Hirtzel to Wilson February 03 1920, BL, Sir Arnold Wilson Papers ADD 52455 C. 
22 Ibid. 
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Apart from being 'wholly unjustifiable interferences' in his administration ,23 
Wilson complained in April 1920, permitting London politics to degrade the character of 
his administration in Mesopotamia had led to an approach to imperial governance that, in 
his view, "has neither honour, prospects, permanence, nor hopes of successful 
accomplishment.,,24 The principles undergirding Article 22 of the League of Nations that 
seemed to be guiding the transition away from 'responsible government,' he argued to 
Hirtzel in the same month, were "based upon a fallacy" and written without an 
understanding of their "practical effects" they would surely have on the ground?5 It was 
for this reason, he informed Montague, that 
when I get orders and am satisfied that they are issued after consideration of all 
relevant facts, I obey them ... [but] facts must be faced at both ends. My sole 
object is to prevent H.M.G. from embarking without full knowledge upon a 
course which I believe must precipitate a situation which will involve unexampled 
disaster here and in Persia and may not end there?6 
Accordingly, when Wilson was alerted to the impending announcement of the allocation 
of the mandates at San Remo in April 1920, he preempted it with his own announcement 
in which he eliminated any reference to representative indigenous institutions being 
considered. Similarly, in June, Wilson delayed the announcement of the government's 
intention to establish an Arab Council of State under an Arab presidency and to 
promulgate a constitution in consultation with native representatives. When he did 
publish the announcement weeks later, Wilson eliminated all references to the Council or 
constitutional committee as being representative or in consultation with the Iraqi people?7 
Finally, when confronted that June with the demand for Iraqi independence from a 
23 Wilson to Cox January 02 1920, BL, Sir Arnold Wilson Papers ADD 52455 A. 
24 Wilson to Montagu April 10 1920, BL Sir Arnold Wilson Papers ADD 52455 C. 
25 Wilson to Hirtzel April 15 1920. BL, Sir Arnold Wilson Papers ADD 52455 C. 
26 Wilson to Montagu April 10 1920,BL Sir Arnold Wilson Papers ADD 52455 C. 
27 Paris, pp. 780-782. 
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delegation of fifteen representatives of numerous Iraqi societies organized in opposition 
to what they viewed as a veiled form of British colonization, Wilson addressed them as a 
"malcontent clique and dismissed their demands as impractical and premature."zg Within 
a few days of this rebuff, anti-mandate protests had developed into riots along the 
Euphrates. Within a fortnight, the conflagration would grow beyond the control of 
British forces to contain. 
The causes of the 1920 rising in Mesopotamia have been debated by historians. 
Most agree, however, that some combination of tribal frustration with the disruption of 
regional power relations privileging the Iraqi urban elite ,29 the fear among Shi' a ulema of 
being subjugated to the authority of either the Sunni minority or non-Muslim 
Europeans,3o and a widespread despair at the collapse of Iraqi services, trade relations, 
and the standard of living3! under the occupation permitted a multiplicity of grievances to 
coalesce into a general rising?2 Wilson's explanation for the origins of the rising, in both 
his dispatches and his book, has been criticized for its privileging of Pan-Arab nationalist 
propaganda emanating out of Syria as the primary force driving what would have 
otherwise been disconnected and even oppositional grievances into a single organized 
movement reflecting something approaching Iraqi national identity, the existence of 
which he would have resoundingly denied. By his own account, however, Wilson seems 
also to have been concerned with the popular perception of the British Empire as having 
28 Amal Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics ," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 3, no. 2 (April 1972), p. 135. 
29 For this view, see James Aylmer Lowthorpe Haldane, The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920, 
(Edinburgh and London, W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922). 
30 Vinagradov attributes the pervasiveness of this view to Elie Kedouri's 'Reflexions sur l'historie du 
Royaume d'Iraq (1921-1958)', Orient, No. 11 (1959) pp. 55-79. Vinogradov, p. 124. 
31 This is the view of the rising taken by Ghassan R Atiyyah in Iraq 1908-1921 A Political Study (Beirut: 
The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1973). 
32 For an historiographical overview of interpretations in English and Arabic, see Vinogradov. 
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been weakened by the war and, therefore, unable to defend its interests against 
international opprobrium, anti-colonial nationalism, and even the discontent of the British 
people. 
As early as the spring of 1919, Wilson had begun to warn the India Office that 
key Iraqi members of Faysal's Arab government in Damascus, such as future Iraqi Prime 
Ministers, Ja'far al Askari and Nuri al Said, had been "conducting active secret 
propaganda ... with a strong anti-foreign bias" through networks of friends and family in 
anticipation of their return to Iraq to establish "an Arab Government on the lines of what 
they hope to have in Syria." Already, Wilson pointed out, his carefully cultivated 
network of pro-British Iraqi clients were viewing British tolerance of this as tacit support 
for the Pan-Arab union of Syria and Iraq such propaganda popularized and demanding 
Wilson's assurance that their aspirations to power under a British administration would 
not be usurped by such upstarts?3 Wilson's inability to give the pro-British element in 
Iraq his assurance that "Sheikh Feisal and his adherents are to have no part in 
Mesopotamian politics and that we forbid their coming here," 34 despite his efforts to 
obstruct such propaganda, called Wilson's intention or even ability to make good on the 
power-sharing arrangements he had been negotiating with them?5 Wilson's suspicions 
that officials in London valued the appearance of Faysal's cooperation more highly than 
the practical relationships he had been building on the ground seem to be born out in 
Foreign Office minutes criticizing Wilson's 'dubious attitude' toward Lloyd George's 
33 Wilson to Montagu May 21,1919, BL. UPSIU1l401P49371l919. 
34 Ibid. 
35 For discussions of a Sherifian vision of Iraq and the relationship between Sherifian ideas about Syria and 
Iraq, see Ofra Bengio "Faysal's Vision of Iraq: A Retrospect," in Asher Susser and Aryeh Shmuelevitz, 
eds., The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World: Essays in Honour of the late Professor Uriel Dann 
(London: Frank Cass, 1995). 
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pro-Sherifian policy and arguing that preventing Mesopotamian members of Fay sal' s 
regime from returning home would merely "exacerbate their already none too pro-British 
tempers." Better, it was reasoned, to allow "Fay sal and other Arab propagandists ... to 
ventilate their views up to the point at which such ventilation becomes dangerous to the 
maintenance of order. This point does not appear to have been reached."36 
Wilson and his Political Officers stationed throughout Mesopotamia were 
particularly sensitive to the internationalist language beginning to appear in propaganda 
reflecting a far more anti-colonialist than Iraqi or even Arab nationalist tone. By early 
1920, British police reports were warning that "the advance of the Bolsheviks" and the 
impact it had had on international relations were among "the chief topics of 
conversation" in the coffee houses.37 Even more worrisome was the representation of the 
Bolsheviks as the chief opponents of the "savage wolves of Europe" in their quest to 
colonize all of Asia and "British imperialism" in particular as committed to "keeping 
Asiatic nations in a state of eternal thralldom." The promises of American President 
Woodrow Wilson, it was argued, had been "violated in the most shameless and flagrant 
manner" by Britain and France at the peace, "dishonouring the American President" and 
resulting in the denial of independence to all Muslim states?8 Mustafa Kemal's success 
in pushing British and French forces out of Turkey seemed to confirm for pro- and anti-
British elements alike that the British Empire was hanging on to its possessions by a 
thread. "Bolshevism and rebellion," one Political Officer reported in April 1920, "are the 
topics of conversation everywhere; and 'Pan-Arab' is gradually merging into 'pro-
36 Minute by Garbett October 18, 1919 BUUPSIllIl5916982T9. 
37 Mesopotamia Police Reports for 1920. BL. UPSIlO vol. 2 no. 5 p. 143 
38lllli!. p. 126. For a discussion of regional views of Woodrow Wilson's vision for postwar 
internationalism, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International 
Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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Turk.' ," threatening to explode into "open demonstration if not actually open revolt in the 
near future."39 
The announcement of Britain's intention to accept a Mandate for Mesopotamia in 
April 1920, according to police reports, considerably stirred the "Pan-Arab Class" in Iraq 
who interpreted it as "an indication of the pressure that must have been brought to bear 
on Britain to necessitate such a declaration" when either independence or a British 
protectorate was expected.40 A few days after the announcement, Political Officers noted 
that a "general gloom seemed to have settled over the 'political world'" among pro- and 
anti-British elements alike. From Pan-Arab corners, it was reported, overheard 
conversations about the formation of a "FIDA-IYYIN society (in which men offer to die 
for the cause)" were being considered as well as nationalist societies whose "duty would 
be to rid the country of certain officials-British and Arab-who stand in the way of 
Independence ."41 
Examples of the collapsing relationship between British officers and the tribes 
began to appear around the same time. As on Political Officer reported that May, "in 
reply to the request for the return of stolen property," local headmen of the Jaghaifa tribe 
sent a signed letter "addressed to the British people" that was most disturbing in its 
attention to the contradictory nature of Britain's policy in Mesopotamia with 
internationalist principles as a justification for disobedience.42 
The letter is obviously the work of an educated Iraqi and it quotes Wilson, Lloyd 
George, Lord Grey, and other persons who are quite beyond the ken of the 
signatories. He states that General Maud promised on entering Baghdad that 
Mesopotamia would be for the Arabs. The same promise had been repeated by 
39 Mesopotamia Police Reports for 1920, BL, UPSI10 vol. 2 no. 14 
40 Mesopotamia Police Reports for 1920, BL, UPSlfO vol. 2 no. 15 
41 Mesopotamia Police Reports for 1920, BL, U PSI10 vol. 2 no. 16 
42 For a discussion of tribal perceptions of Anglo-Iraqi relations before 1920 see Atiyyah, pp. 71-79. 
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various Politicians at various times. We are today in the 20th Century and you 
cannot treat us like sheep as you do the Egyptians and Indians. The Iraqui are you 
say unchanged and savages and cannot manage themselves, it is we Iraqui who 
are the brains of the Arab nation and who freed Syria. Why do you give Armenia 
independence, is it because they are of your own religion? Two members who 
spoke on behalf of the Muslims at the Peace Conference were English! You are 
given a short time to clear out of Mesopotamia if you don't go you will be driven 
out. He who takes the sword will not yield to words!43 
When such sentiments began to find more violent expression that June, Wilson 
placed the blame squarely on the British government, but also on the British people. In a 
stormy telegram to Hirtzel, Wilson argued that it was criticisms of the occupation in the 
British Parliament and press that had convinced Iraq's more extreme nationalists "that we 
are not prepared to stay here against popular will, from which it follows that if popular 
sentiment is adequately excited against us we shall in practice withdraw, Article 22 
notwithstanding." Despite every effort by Wilson to ensure, as per his instructions from 
the beginning of his tenure in Mesopotamia, that "we should in practice exercise a 
considerable degree of effective control over the destinies of the country ," he had been 
undermined by his own superiors' repeated and contradictory declarations to the Arabs of 
Mesopotamia and the people of Britain that they intended to "impose no particular 
institution upon the country, except such as the people should adopt of their own free 
will." As a result, the government had instilled a sense of entitlement to self-rule in a 
people who, by Wilson's account, "had for 200 years been autocratically governed ... few 
of whose leaders could read and write, and practically none of whom could speak a 
foreign language, had ever travelled further than Constantinople, or had ever held high 
Offices in any Government." In other words, a people Wilson had every reason to believe 
43 Telegram from 51st Brigade to Civil Com of Baghdad May 141920. BL. UPS/ll/174/P4819/1920 
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could have been brought into an effective British administration if he had been permitted 
to complete its construction. Moreover, Wilson argued, the government's failure to head 
his warnings had all but confirmed suspicions of Britain's imperial weakness as 
"extremists at Baghdad [were being] encouraged by our lack of success on the 
Euphrates ... and are endeavouring by their activities so to influence public opinion 
against us, as to create a sentiment hostile to us in districts at present orderly.,,44 
The 1920 rising in Mesopotamia could not have come at a more opportune moment 
for dissenting leaders then endeavoring to maneuver British Labour into the Liberal 
Party's position of foremost opposition to the Conservative Party in Parliament. That 
January, the victory of ILP member Tom Myers as a Labour candidate in the traditional 
Liberal stronghold of Spen Valley would not only herald the beginning of Labour's 
usurpation of the Liberal Party, but, as one historian put it, the beginning of modem 
British politics.45 Viewing the ILP's success in the context of current political events, the 
Daily Herald declared the victory as the "Triumphant Vindication of the Independent 
Labour Party's Policy in War and Peace.,,46 For just as they had done during the war and 
over the course of the peace settlement, dissenting propagandists had kept the British 
government's lack of conformity with internationalist principles at the forefront of their 
political propaganda. 
44 Wilson to Hirtzel,June 10 1920. BL, Sir Arnold Wilson Papers ADD 52455 C 
4S Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Labour 1920-1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
46 Labour Leader, January 081920. 
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In the months leading up to the Spen Valley by-election, UDC and ILP writers had 
focused on Lloyd George's support of the Greek occupation of Smyrna in the summer of 
1919 as the most recent evidence that the quid pro quo of territory for wartime alliances 
defined by the Secret Treaties of 1915-1916 continued to govern the Allied approach to 
the postwar settlement. In addition to reflecting, "a sickening mixture of religious 
fanaticism and capitalistic greed," as H.N. Brailsford put it in the Daily Herald in April 
1920, Lloyd George's support for the Greek incursion into Turkish territory was nothing 
short of the "unblushing imperialism" that had characterized the British government's 
"predatory policy" in the region generally since the war's end. This newest addition to 
the "crazy patchwork of little States" being created in the former Ottoman territories by 
the Allied Powers, Brailsford argued, cared not at all for the untold suffering it brought to 
the indigenous inhabitants involved, for the exasperation of Anglo-Muslim relations 
already at the breaking over the Kaliphate Question, or the incitement of fresh wars it 
portended, not only with Turkey, but with Britain's own imperial subjects. Rather, the 
sole concern of the Lloyd George administration was British control of oil reserves, 
railway concessions, and air routes throughout Western Asia that had driven British 
policy in the east since the outbreak of the war .47 Philip Snowden concurred in the 
Labour Leader, predicting that the "impudent manner" in which "Great Britain has stolen 
the rich old lands of Asia Minor" and permitted her Greek and French allies to share in 
"the proceeds of the exploitation" would leave every state and people in the region 
"grievously disaffected" and looking for "the first opportunity, by resort to arms, to 
defeat its purpose.,,48 
47 Daily Herald April 10, 1920. 
48 Labour Leader May 13 1920. 
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As information about Mesopotamian oil became more widely known in the spring 
of 1920 the subject of oil became more prominent in Labour propaganda. In March, the 
ILP's weekly pamphlet for public speakers identified Lloyd George's public 
befuddlement at withdrawing from a region possessed of such "great possibilities" as 
Mesopotamia's "rich oil deposits,'>49 as "the first definite confession by Lloyd George 
that peace settlements for the Turkish Empire will be governed by considerations of oil." 
Speakers were also given the estimated cost of the opening year of the occupation, listed 
at 18,572 British troops, 51,428 Indian troops, and £ 19 million pounds sterling, all spent 
"to enable some private company to secure oil," according to ILP writers.5O 
The announcement of the agreement between the British government and the Royal 
Dutch Shell Company over oil production in Mesopotamia on May 7 caused the Times to 
question Lloyd George's faith that the Mesopotamia mandate would pay for itself after 
all, in light of the fact that Dutch Shell was based in the Netherlands and that, 
presumably, the lion's share of the profits would go to Holland.51 The agreement only 
emphasized, for Brailsford, the fact that "that the main objectives of both sides" in the 
Great War had always been "the coal-fields and the oil-wells, the trade routes, and the 
ruin of competitors." If, in fact, the British government cared ajot for the principle of 
nationality, Brailsford continued, "if we are 'trustees' for the people of Mesopotamia it 
follows that the profits won from the oil belong to it and not to us." Moreover, he 
reasoned, "every argument for the nationalization of coal in this country tells at least as 
strongly for the nationalization of oil in Mesopotamia." It was the duty of the Labour 
movement, he insisted, to "boldly advocate the Socialist solution" universally and to 
49 For the original speech, see Times of London March 26 1920. 
so I.L.P. Weekly Notes for Speakers, No. 50. April 1st , 1920. PHM, 1MJ J29 JLP. 
51 Times of London, May 07 1920. 
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declare that, just as British coal belongs to the British people and not some corporate 
conglomerate, "the natural wealth of Mesopotamia belongs to its inhabitants" as well.52 
Labour propagandists like Fenner Brockway left no doubt of their awareness that 
"Oil" promised to rival coal in its importance to industry, transport, and war, and "was 
already becoming to this century what steam was to the last" in terms of fueling the 
engines of progress.53 Like so many natural resources before it, however, oil was also the 
new engine of inter-imperial competition and war. For Brockway in particular, the 
parallel of Britain's alignment of French and Dutch oil groups "within the scope of the 
British concern" to the exclusion of American oil interests with the Triple Entente's pre-
war attempts to exclude German ambitions from all points East was "too close not to be 
noted as a warning.,,54 Snowden less subtly presented the crisis between the United 
States and Mexico over control over Mexican oil and, indeed, the Anglo-American 
tensions being created by Britain's attempts to monopolize Mesopotamian oil as evidence 
that "oil is going to be the bone of international contention, and for the control of this 
commodity wars are going to be fought, and the peoples of different countries bidden to 
hate and kill each other.,,55 No doubt, Snowden speculated in early June, reports of 
widespread restlessness in Mesopotamia were early indications that Britain's intentions to 
secure control of "the richest deposits of oil in the world" in the northern provinces of 
Mesopotamia were beginning to conflict with regional ambitions for self-government.56 
In articulating the official view of the Labour Party on the progress of the League of 
52 Daily Herald, May 12 1920. 
53 Fenner A. Brockway, How to End War (London: Independent Labour Party, 1920), p. 7. LSE, 
ILPI51l92017 
54 Ibid. 
55 Labour Leader, May 271920. 
56 Labour Leader, June 17 1920. 
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Nations in May 1920, the Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions 
(LPACIQ) offered a survey of undeveloped regions around the world to illustrate the 
bankruptcy of League principles in the face of imperial interests.57 Although the 
LPACIQ report addressed Cyprus, Dodecanese, Smyrna, Thrace, Egypt and Armenia, its 
writers reserved "special censure" for the latter two. The determination to impose a 
mandate on Mesopotamia stood in stark contrast to the treatment of "the Armenians, the 
one people in the Middle East who had consistently and urgently asked for the good 
offices of a mandatory power." Not only were the Armenians "not placed under a 
mandate, the three Allied Powers virtually washed their hands of them and left them to 
their fate." In Egypt, by contrast, "where the unanimous demand for independence [is 
heard] among every class and denomination," the popular will was baldly "violated by 
the imposition of a British protectorate and practical incorporation of Egypt into the 
British Empire," despite the political maturity of the Egyptian state. The mandates 
themselves which, the LP ACIQ suggested, "might have marked a turning point in the 
relations between Western and Oriental peoples," had been "reduced to a mockery" by 
their complete disregard for the wishes of the peoples they were designed to assist as well 
as the wishes of the people who would be responsible for their assistance. For, despite 
the enormous cost of the Mesopotamia mandate to the British people, Lloyd George had 
undertaken its procurement "without consultation through constitutional and democratic 
channels," Parliamentary or otherwise. The specter of oil only laid bare the "exploitation 
and monopolization in interests of the mandatory at the expense of the mandate" already 
57 The Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions Summary of Attached Memorandum 
on the Turkish Treaty, Memo no. 141a, May 17 1920. PHM LPACIQ Memos. 
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underway. 58 
Although Labour activists were certainly the earliest and most articulate opponents 
to Lloyd George's approach to the mandate in Mesopotamia, they were not alone. 
Somewhat ironically, it was Asquith, the Prime Minister responsible for the invasion of 
Mesopotamia in the first place, who took up the charge to limit British responsibilities in 
the region to an absolute minimum as a matter of fiscal responsibility as early as March 
1920.59 The Times occasionally chimed in through its coverage of the increasingly public 
challenges by Asquith and his supporters to the mandate, paying particular attention to 
the "huge expenditure," the government's tendency to operate "without obtaining the 
sanction of Parliament, or even of going through the pretense of seeking Parliamentary 
approval," and, more rarely, its inability "to perceive [any] recognition of the principles 
which guided the framers of the Covenant when they devised the Mandatory system.,,60 
On June 23, however, the national movement to immediately draw down British forces in 
Mesopotamia got underway in earnest as MPs from every party discovered in their 
morning papers that Lloyd George had accepted the mandate for Mesopotamia and that 
plans to erect a provisional government there had already been announced in Baghdad the 
morning before.61 
At the Parliamentary debate later that day, Asquith condemned Lloyd George's 
circumvention of the Parliament and reiterated his support for a policy of withdrawal to 
Basra.62 He pointed out the fact that in the army estimates presented to the Parliament 
that day, there was "no trace ... of a penny to be expended in the civil administration of 
58 Ibid 
59 See, for example, The Official Report, House of Commons (5th Series) 25 March 1920 vol. 127 cc. 645 
60 Times of London, June 01 1920, see also May 30, June 14, 15,21, and 24,1920. 
61 Times of London, June 24 1920. 
62 The Official Report, House of Commons (5th Series) 23 June 1920 vol 130 cc2230 
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the whole of Mesopotamia,'063 meaning either that Lloyd George was attempting to 
falsely minimize reports of actual expenditure,64 or that his lack of concern for actually 
developing the region had placed Great Britain in "fundamental violation of the 
principles upon which we entered into ... the League of Nations.'065 It was plain in any 
event, Asquith argued, that Lloyd George's primary concern was to snatch up of the 
potential wealth of Mesopotamia before it was lost to another power, along with his own 
political skin. 66 The only "statesmanlike settlement" to the "thorny problem" of 
Mesopotamia, Asquith argued, also had the advantage of being the cheapest and the one 
most likely to permit "a clear conscience in regard to the mandatory of the League of 
Nations." Being namely, to accept a mandate only for the regions desirous of it and only 
if specifically requested by the League of Nations to do so and to turn over authority in 
what remained to a fully indigenous administration as soon as possible.67 
Lloyd George's reply that it was Asquith himself who had left his government 
with the jait accompli of a British occupied Mesopotamia they could neither annex nor 
abandon and that including her petroliferous regions in the mandate was not only good 
policy, but an obligation to Arabs and Britons alike only confirmed for his Labour critics 
the persistence of imperial principles across British governments.68 Although the Daily 
Herald was forced to admit that Lloyd George "wiped the floor" with Asquith in the 
debate,69 he nevertheless failed to answer the criticisms of Labour MPs that five years of 
imperial rule through martial law had already poisoned the well for good Anglo-Arab 
63 Ibid. CC. 2235-6. 
64lllli1. CC. 2231-2 
65lllli1. CC. 2235-6. 
66 Ibid. CC. 2235-6. 
67 l.bi.Q. cc. 2237. 
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relations and that his seeming disinterest in erecting self-governing institutions in the near 
future repudiated not only the principles of the League, but the very ideals for which the 
British people had fought the war.70 Readers had only to consider Egypt or Ireland, the 
Daily Herald suggested, to see the irrelevance of political maturity to the British 
government's willingness to release territory from its grip.71 As Foreign Affairs, the 
UOC's new monthly political magazine, saw it, Britain's allocation of the Mesopotamian 
mandat~ to itself meant merely that "Curzon' s old dictum that the western boundary of 
India was the Euphrates [had] been exceeded by the facts. It is today the 
Mediterranean ... insatiable, indeed, is the lust of Empire among the ruling classes of 
Britain.'m It was with these ideas fresh in mind that the Parliamentary Labour Party 
renewed its commitment to the application of the principles undergirding the crumbling 
mandate idea not only in Mesopotamia but in the British possessions of India, Egypt, and 
Ireland as well at its annual conference on June 24.73 
In an important sense, Labour had been linking its own political destiny to that of 
India, Egypt, Ireland, and Mesopotamia since the end of the war. In January 1920, for 
example, the Labour Leader published an expose on "ominous signs of trouble which are 
gathering among what are termed 'subject races' under British rule" specifically in 
Ireland, India, Egypt, and Mesopotamia entitled "Harvesting Hate: The Madness of the 
Rulers of the British Empire." Not only had the expectations of independence raised by 
the internationalist nature of the peace been dashed, the writer argued, but when feelings 
of disappointment naturally found expression in public protest and strikes, the Lloyd 
70 Daily Herald, June 241920. 
71 Daily Herald, June 241920. 
72 Foreign Affairs, June 1920. 
73 Daily Herald, June 251920. 
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George administration turned to brute force to contain them, "creating against England a 
volume of hatred unparalleled in history calculated to bring down the British Empire in 
blood and shame" in the process. The Labour Leader enjoined its readers to support the 
Labour movement in its aim to bring a final end to "this worn-out dream of military 
Empire by a complete overthrow of the present Government" before the backlash brought 
more war to their doorsteps?4 As news of the risings in Mesopotamia began to trickle 
into Britain in early July, the Labour Leader cautioned its readers against viewing the 
disturbances as isolated from similar events throughout the Empire. "From Ireland to 
Mesopotamia," the authors declared, "is a long way geographically, but not politically. 
They are both captives of imperialism." It was the policy of the Labour Party to clear out 
of both?5 When Winston Churchill confirmed in Parliament on July 16 that all 
communications between Basra and Baghdad had been cut for nearly a week and that 
British forces, utterly overwhelmed at that point, were unable to remedy the situation, the 
Daily Herald could justifiably lament that "the role of Cassandra is notoriously a 
thankless one. And it is no consolation at all to be able to tum and say, 'I told you so' .,,76 
With the rising underway in earnest by mid-July, Labour publications took great 
liberties in projecting the Labour movement's criticisms of imperial democracy onto the 
insurgents themselves. Unlike the British public, the Daily Herald argued, the Arabs of 
Mesopotamia were "not able to read the speeches of our statesmen ... to understand about 
mandates and about making Asia safe for democracy ... or comprehend that (in Lord 
Curzon's ringing phrase) we are knights-errant of civilization." Speaking for the Arab 
insurgents directly, the Daily Herald described their view from Mesopotamia. 
They see their rising national consciousness affronted. They see before them-
74 Labour Leader, January 291920. 
75 Labour Leader,July 01 1920. 
76 Daily Herald, July 19 1920. 
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with Egypt as a waming-a vista of government by tank and airplane. They see 
Western Industrialism and Western Militarism threatening their old civilization. 
And they have not the least intention of submitting easily to these things at the 
bidding of the Big Three, or on the assurance of the European Liberals that it is all 
for their own good. They propose-strange as it may seem to the speechmakers of 
1914-to fi~ht for their independence against the attempts of the Allies at world 
domination. 7 
On July 23, T. E. Lawrence offered a more objective, or, at the very least, popularly 
authoritative perspective of the' Arab mind' on the rising in a letter to the Times. The 
Arabs, he assured the Times, "did not risk their lives in battle to change masters ... but to 
win a show of their own." In two years of British administration, Lawrence illustrated, 
the government remained "English in fashion ... conducted in the English language ... has 
450 British executive officers ... and not a single responsible Mesopotamian." The tens 
of thousands of British troops in Mesopotamia, he pointed out, "are occupied ... not in 
guarding the frontiers. They are holding down the people." The most surprising aspect 
of the revolt, Lawrence exclaimed, was the fact that the British were so surprised by its 
outbreak?8 
Lawrence's arguments resonated with Labour writers for his emphasis on "the 
iniquities and loss involved in the attempt to impose a rule on those people which is ... 
alien to their wishes ... [and] distinctly contrary to everything our Government pledged" 
both to the Arabs and the British people. Referring to Mesopotamia as "The Ireland of 
the East," the Daily Herald insisted that Lawrence's arguments were "true of others 
besides the Arabs. Those Indians and Irishmen who fought against Germany did so in 
order to gain a fuller measure of freedom for themselves. When will the British people 
grow tired of the lying chicanery of Governments, and insist that Britain's word shall be 
her bond? That is the question Colonel Lawrence asks us all.,,79 In addition to paralleling 
77 Daily Herald, July 191920. 
78 Times oj London, July 231920. 
79 Daily Herald, July 241920. 
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the Irish revolution, for the Labour Leader the situation in Mesopotamia was also "a 
parallel to the South African War," which 
was waged for the purpose of securing the goldfields for a gang of cosmopolitan 
capitalists, and the British taxpayer is being bled and British lives are being 
sacrificed for this war in Mesopotamia solely in the interests of the syndicates 
interested in the development of the oil deposits. The political control of the 
country and the subjugation of the native population is considered to be necessary 
to secure the exploitation by foreign capitalists of the natural resources of the 
country. so 
"Why," asked the Labour Leader, "do Great Britain and France force their unwelcome 
presence on these peoples?" It was safe to assume that "killing Arabs in the Near East is 
not [being done] for the good of the people," the authors answered, "but to get access to, 
and control of, the natural resources of these countries."Sl With the very same flames of 
anti-colonial resistance already alight in Egypt and India, the rising in Mesopotamia 
seemed to herald an 'eastern awakening' that presented the British people with the two 
alternatives, according to the Daily Herald of "raising ... subject peoples ... to the status 
of partners, and transforming the Empire into a United Commonwealth" or "settling 
down to the task of subjugating them by force ... in an unending war ... that will drain 
away the power of England and France, as it drained the power of Macedon and 
Rome."S2 When the French mandate collapsed into violence at the end of July, the Daily 
Herald announced that the Allied 'Holy War in the East' was indeed igniting the 
collective "awakening" of the entire Asian continent in the face of recalcitrant European 
imperialism. "The War to end War," the authors declared, "has ended in a Peace to end 
Peace!" 
Nearly a dozen wars are now in progress in various parts of the world ... Great 
Britain is directly concerned in half-of-them and indirectly with the rest. We are 
80 Labour Leader, August 08 1920. 
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employing nearly 100,000 troops, British and Indian, at a cost of £50,000,000 a 
year to crush the Arabs in Mesopotamia, whom we are supposed to have 
'liberated' and given 'self-determination' ... 30,000 ... British troops ... are being 
used to crush the last remnants of the Turkish nation ... 23,000 more British troops 
in Palestine ... 15,000, or more, are being used to 'protect' Persia ... 32,000 ... are 
holding the people of Egypt in subjection. Repression and massacres have 
necessitated large increases in British garrison in India. And in Ireland 50,000 
British troops are vainly attempting the task of crushing the national spirit of the 
people. THE TAXPAYER HAS TO PAY for this policy of grab and greed, 
tyranny and repression, which is being carried on all over the world in the 
interests of international financiers, capitalists, and exploiters of the people. 83 
"If the taxpayer continues to pay without protest," the writers argued, linking the fate of 
the British working class to such struggles, "he will soon be asked to fight. For the wars 
are spreading. And after that he will be told to fight-in other words, Conscription." The 
"eastern awakening," in other words, necessitated a parallel awakening among the British 
working classes who must "wake up before it is too late and STOP THE WARS !,,84 
As one historian put it, the 1920 rising "fell like a bombshell upon Whitehall" and, 
"amidst increasing demands for evacuation and ... a background of war weariness and 
reluctance to accept further commitments in Iraq," inspired a scramble to "reassess their 
policies" to determine the causes and solutions to "what they regarded as a sudden and 
inexplicable outbreak."s5 In addition to over 400 British lives and nearly 2,000 wounded, 
missing, or imprisoned, the rising would cost the exchequer over £40,000,000, or twice 
the annual budget allotted for Mesopotamia.86 Philip Ireland has argued that there is no 
evidence to suggest that the rising immediately forced a wider measure of self-
government in the region and that, in fact, the disruption of order in its wake actually 
diminished the degree of Arab participation in the government anticipated by policy 
83 Daily Herald, July 30 and 31,1920. 
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planners in the spring of 1920.87 Nevertheless, the accelerated transition from years of 
excl usion from A.T. Wilson's centralized rule to an Arab staffed Council of State within 
a few months of the end of the rising that October would have seemed a stark one for 
Mesopotamian Arabs.88 It also seemed to speak directly to the characterization of the 
rising as a legitimate and even victorious anti-colonial nationalist movement for which, 
according to the Arab press, Mesopotamian Arabs had sacrificed over 8,500 martyrs. 
The man appointed to the task of stabilizing Anglo-Arab relations in 
Mesopotamia and getting an ostensibly indigenous government up and running as quickly 
and as cheaply as possible in Mesopotamia was its first Civil Commissioner, Sir Percy 
Cox. According to Ireland, Cox had built a reputation in the region as Chief Political 
Officer during the war and immediately after as a man of "dignity, wisdom and equitable 
dealing.,,89 As Cox's instructions reflect an awareness, however, the time in which an 
administrator along the lines begun by Wilson would be accepted in Mesopotamia, had 
passed, regardless of how respected its High Commissioner might have been,. Among 
Cox's foremost responsibilities before stepping foot in Mesopotamia was to make contact 
with the recently deposed King of Syria, Paysal bin Husayn and ascertain whether he 
was, as the India Office believed, "prepared in principle to accept Great Britain as 
Mandatory Power and to agree to a form of Mandate on the lines already drafted for 
communication to the League of Nations." Assuming such a confirmation could be 
made, Cox was instructed to journey to Baghdad and ascertain whether "a spontaneous 
P;/ Ireland, p. 275. 
88 In contrast to Ireland's view, G. H. Bennet's inter-departmental study of British foreign policy argues 
that the 1920 rising changed long-term thinking about policy in the Middle East "beyond recognition. G. H. 
Bennet, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-1924 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1995), p. 106. 
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demand for Feisal is forthcoming from a sufficiently representative body of public 
opinion in Mesopotamia." If so, Cox was expected to begin negotiations with Faysal to 
establish the basis on which "working relations between himself and His Majesty's 
Government" could be established. Meanwhile, Cox was to begin the process of erecting 
a provisional government from Baghdad that was to be "as completely Arab as 
possible ... subject to the safeguarding of our obligations and interests as Mandatory." 
The form of government, referred to as the 'Arab Fa~ade,' was meant to be composed of 
"Arab Ministers for each Department of State, responsible to the Arab Ruler" but with "a 
British expert Secretary" attached to each. The challenge Cox faced was to ensure that a 
sufficient degree of authority remained in the hands of himself and his staff as a kind of 
shadow government, while the fa~ade of Arab rule was presented as being not only as 
complete, but as constitutionally legitimate and fully representative as possible in the 
eyes of Mesopotamian Arabs.90 
When Cox arrived in Mesopotamia on October 1, much of the country was still in 
active rebellion. Building upon his credentials as an advocate of both top down authority, 
which appealed to the urban elite and tribal sheikhs, and Arab aspirations for self-rule, 
which had more widespread popular appeal, Cox toured the country to gather the 
perspectives of regional leaders on how best to institute the new regime and give his 
administration a more representative feel.91 On returning to Baghdad in mid-October, 
Cox drew up a list of candidates he deemed acceptable, comprised in the main of urban 
notables, for the various ministries and formally asked Sayid 'Abdur Rahman al-Gailani, 
the venerable Naqib of Baghdad, to invite those candidates to accept appointment and to 
90 'Mesopotamia. Appointment of Sir Percy Cox as High Commissioner: Instructions of His Majesty's 
Government, September 01 1920. NA, FO 371152291E10758 
91 Ireland, pp. 278-9. 
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serve as head of the provisional government they would comprise.92 With his ministers 
and head of state in place, having met and agreed upon the roles they would play in 
relation to their British advisors on November 10th , Cox announced the next day in 
Baghdad that a General Elective Assembly would be called for the purpose of erecting a 
Council of State and that the drafting of an organic law for Mesopotamia would be their 
foremost responsibility.93 Although some of the Baghdadi notables did refuse 
appointment in the provisional government, the allure of position and power and the 
promise of an independent state in the long run drew many into cooperation with the 
Baghdad Residency. 
By early November, British forces had taken the offensive throughout the country, 
inducing most of the tribal leaders involved in the insurgency to begin standing down and 
appealing for clemency. Dismissing the demands of the Shi' a ulema that all negotiations 
go through them, Cox appealed directly to the tribal leaders with the promise of a general 
amnesty and the return of their kinsmen either imprisoned or deported over the course of 
the rising.94 Cox also appealed, on behalf of the provisional government, to repatriate 
several hundred Sherifian officers from French occupied Syria as a means of legitimating 
the provisional government to the minds of Mesopotamian Arabs politicized by Sherifian 
propaganda before and during the rising as well as to pave the way for Faysal' s 
impending arrival and assumption of the Amirate.95 
Determined to maintain the appearance of an open and representative political 
culture, Cox repealed the tight censorship over the vernacular press imposed under 
92 For a discussion of the formation of the Council of State with detailed descriptions of each member, see 
'Abd al-Razzaq Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihajah Al- '/raqiyah ([S.I.: s.n.], Matba'at al-'Irfan), 1971), pp. 5-51. 
93 For the formation of the Council of State, see Ireland, pp. 277-287. 
94 Ireland, pp. 272-3 and 288-9. 
95 Ireland, pp. 288-290. 
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Wilson and intensified during the rising, inspiring an efflorescence of Mesopotamian 
newsprint culture.96 As an alternative to suppression, Cox took a page from his political 
secretary, Gertrude Bell, in channeling a pro-British view through established Iraqi 
papers, the most important of them being ai-Iraq under the editorship of veteran 
newspaper man Razuq Ghanim, selected by Bell for his moderate views for just such an 
experiment in 1917.97 The day after Cox's November 11 announcement, ai Iraq assured 
its readers that the British government intended "to confer wide privileges on the people" 
and that it was clear that the British intended to make good on its promise that 
"Mesopotamia should have an independent Government.,,98 Ghanim was careful to 
protect his credibility as a legitimate journalist and not merely a mouthpiece for the 
British government, combining his insistence that the mandate relationship with the 
British was not enslavement and that Arabs could accept British assistance in building 
their nation without forfeiting their status as patriots with his attribution of the 1920 
rising to British maladministration and their refusal to allow Arab participation in the 
government.99 By cooperating with the British, ai Iraq argued in early February 1921, 
the people of Mesopotamia stood to gain not only independence and self-government, but 
all the economic benefits of beginning national life as a major trade hub in the very heart, 
though decidedly not as a part, of the British Empire in the East.IOO 
Even before Cox's return to Iraq, the Baghdad Residency was beginning to report 
the appearance of troubling articles in the vernacular press openly opposed to the 
96 Civil Commissioner to Secretary of State for India September 11 1920. BL, UPSllll 172IP40001 1920. 
97 Bashkin, pp. 38 and Ayalon, pp. 205-6. For a discussion of early British managed pro-British 
propaganda in the Iraqi press, see Hadi Tu'mah, Al-lhtilal Al-Baritani Wa-Al-Sihafah Al- 'Iraqiyah: 
Dirasah Fi Al-Hamlah Al-Di'aiyah Al-Baritaniyah, 1914-1921, (Tawzi' aI-Dar al-Wataniyah IiI-Tawzi' 
wa-al-Nashr, 1984), pp. 201-233. 
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continuation of British rule in any form. Perhaps the earliest and certainly the most 
troublesome publication for the course of the mandate was Abd al Ghafur al Badri' s al 
Istiqlal. 101 According to Rafail Butti's early work on the Iraqi press, at Istiqlal was 
planned from Damascus as an Iraqi organ for the Syrian nationalist organization al Ahd, 
then reeling from the collapse of Faysal' s attempt at Arab government and seeking to 
take advantage of the nationalist, or at least anti-colonialist energy of the Iraqi uprising.102 
al Badri, an ex-cadet in the Turkish army known to have joined up with Faysal during the 
Arab Revolt, opened al Istiqlat on September 28, 1920 with an article emphasizing the 
importance of a free press to national independence and encouraging other writers to 
publish their minds without restraint. As would be characteristic of al Badri' s critique of 
British rule in Iraq, extracts from the British press reflecting internal criticism of British 
policy were immediately apparent, in this case, "succulent extracts from Colonel 
Lawrence's letters" recently published in the Times were included to illustrate that, even 
experts in British policy in the Arab world recognized the responsibility of Wilson's 
administration in provoking the 1920 rising.103 
A few days after al Iraq's assurance of British intentions and enjoinment of Arab 
cooperation, at Istiqlal countered Ghanim's interpretation of the mandates with the 
argument that the mandatory system itself was merely a means for the Allied empires to 
retain control of territories occupied during the war. As Iraqis under Wilson's 
administration and Faysal's experiences under the French in Syria had both shown, al 
Istiqlal argued "it is clear that in the eyes of the Allies the weak have no rights even if 
101 For an overview of Iraqi political newspapers under the mandate with a rare collection of detailed 
information about ownership and editorship, see Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, pp. 64-104. 
102 Rafail Butti, Al-Sihafah Fi Al-'Iraq: Muhadarat Alqaha (Bulaq: Jami'at al-Duwal al-'Arabiyah, 1955), 
p.58. Also see Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah. pp. 71-73. 
103 Mesopotamia Police Reports for 1920. BL. UPSI10/839/File 346711919 
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they be the allies and helpers of the strong." The "Arab Confederation" of independent 
states desired by Iraqis and Syrians alike, allstiqlal suggested, would never be permitted 
by Lloyd George because of the necessity of maintaining the good will of France to 
British international policy. Where Lloyd George had erred, however, was in failing to 
learn from the 1920 rising that, for Britain's imperial future, "danger begins from the 
Eastern countries and not from France ... especially when foreign hands are encouraging 
the great movement of the East and assisting it.104 Published out of Damascus, where he 
was exiled before the war for anti-Ottoman sedition, but closely attentive to the unfolding 
of events in his native Iraq, Baghdadi born journalist Ibrahim Hilmi's Lisan al Arab far 
out distanced allstiqlal in the vehemence of its hostility toward the British occupation. 
According to Butti, Hilmi had built a reputation for his mastery of wit and ridicule during 
his exile in Damascus, as well as a deeply rooted enmity for colonialism that, in his view, 
had strangled Faysal's government in Syria before it had been given a chance to live. lo5 
In the final months of 1920 rising, Lisan al Arab published manifesto's written by the 
tribal leaders of the rising themselves and even their instructions to insurgents wishing to 
keep the rising alive. Like al Badri, Hilmi placed the blame for the 1920 rising squarely 
on British maladministration, but went even further in defining the rising as a genuinely 
anti-colonialist movement in opposition to an equally genuine British bid "to turn the 
country into a colony."I06 With the French doing their best to suppress sedition in print in 
Syria, allstiqlal took precedence over Lisan at Arab in the Baghdad Residency's reports 
on the press until Hilmi's return to Baghdad in early 1921. 
104 allstiqlal, November 14, 1920. 
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One of the more unsettling components, for the Residency, of al Istiqlal' s 
commentary on developing Anglo-Iraqi relations in the fall of 1920 was the broad 
context of international, inter-imperial, and intra-imperial relations in which al Badri 
placed it. As Priya Satia has shown, many British administrators throughout the Middle 
East and even officials in London were possessed of an almost paranoid concern with the 
influence of Bolshevism on imperial subjects.107 As early as November 1920, al Istiqlal 
was describing "The Victory of the Bolsheviks" during the war to its readers as well as 
the ongoing contest for influence between the imperial powers of Britain and France and 
Russia in the east in which "the Allies avoid meeting Russia and egg on small nations to 
oppose her, giving them supplies." The question for Iraqis was "will they be able to do 
that in the Near East?" 108 Certainly, British intelligence officers were concerned with 
Bolshevik influence in Iraq, with one officer reporting in November that "Bolshevik talk 
is on the increase in the coffee shops, [though] the speakers know nothing about 
Bolshevism, except that it promises an opportunity of overturning the existing order of 
things ... and a chance of upsetting the power of the western nations and entirely freeing 
Islam from European influence.,,109 For al Istiqlal, this was precisely the point. For, 
although the paranoid suspicions of a Bolshevik conspiracy in Iraq existed primarily in 
the imaginations of British officials, as Priya Satia and others have shown,l1O it was not 
necessarily the ideology of the Bolsheviks that appealed to such editors as al Badri, but 
107 Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in 
the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Chapter 6. See also, John Fisher, "Major 
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rather the oppositional relationship of Bolshevism to the British Empire that held the 
attraction. 
In his coverage of Bolshevism, al Badri invariably cast it as the main international 
force opposed to Allied imperialism. Accordingly, for example, whereas "the 
Bolshevists fight for principles and beliefs," including Lenin's determination to end 
European imperialism, the Allied troops "fight for money" or, more to the point, for 
conquest. It was for this reason, al Badri argued, that "thoughtful men agree" that the 
Bolsheviks were, ultimately, "unconquerable."))) Even the British people themselves, al 
Badri suggested in reference to the Labour movement, believed as much as was apparent 
by the clear and deep inroads Lenin's ideas had made among the British themselves.))2 
By January 1921, al Istiqlal argued, Lloyd George's refusal to conform to the 
internationalist principles represented by the Paris Peace Conference and the United 
States or the anti-imperialist principles represented by the Bolsheviks had drawn 
"victorious England ... into difficulties formidable enough to destroy the greatest nation." 
American intervention in British relations with Ireland and Iraq indicates her 
intention to dominate England in the postwar world ... her internal situation is 
serious by reason of the Irish revolt, Egypt demands complete independence and 
India has united to the same end ... South Africa demands independence ... the 
Bolsheviks [were] rousing British subjects arainst Britain ... and the Labour Party 
is bent on the defeat of the present Cabinet.) 3 
When the Lord Mayor of Cork died in prison as a result of his hunger strike in the name 
oflrish independence in November, al Istiqlal proclaimed him a hero, praised his 
patriotism, and cited his sacrifice as an example for all Iraqis to revere and to follow, 
taking the opportunity to revisit its standing critique of Lloyd George's betrayal of 
111 allstiqlal, November 28,1920. 
112 alIstiqlal, December 01 and 17, 1920. 
113 al I stiq lal, January 23, 1921. 
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Wilsonian principles at the League of Nations. 1 14 In December, in an article entitled 
"What is there in England," al Istiqlal gave vivid descriptions of the terroristic tactics of 
Sinn Fein in the name of Irish independence, including the use of threatening letters, 
killing of police, and the planned use of "motor cars to transport bombers ... to blow up 
Government buildings and houses of High officials in London.,,115 The next day, al 
Istiqlal published a detailed expose on "the Irish Question which is at present engrossing 
the attention of the world" and predicted that an Irish medical student hung for the death 
of a British soldier during a riot "will probably be proclaimed a martyr" for the cause of 
Irish independence. 1 16 Even at the very heart of the British Empire, alIstiqlal 
emphasized in February 1921, the British were made to install fortifications around the 
offices of government against attack from their oldest imperial subjects. 1 17 The logical 
conclusion to be drawn from such troubles, al Istiqlal had argued from its earliest 
publications, was that the British Empire would suffer the fate of all empires engaged in 
"oppressing subject nations." Controlling some "500,000,000 souls" and "proud of her 
strength," Britain "scorns the freedom and independence of [her] subjects." As even the 
Times had only just commented, al Badri pointed out, "Iraq, this cemetery of so many 
empires bids fair to be the grave of Unionism." Like "Alexander, Rome, and Spain," al 
Istiqlal reasoned, the British Empire's "fate is inevitable."lls 
As early as November 1920, the Baghdad Residency reported observing "a 
feeling fostered by interested persons-that the British Empire is facing a crisis and has a 
\14 allstiqlal, November 21,1920. 
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tremendous opposition to face ... and a hope in the hearts of some, and a fear in the hearts 
of others, that the British Government will ultimately admit failure and evacuate Iraq." In 
particular, the report noted, an awareness in Iraq of "the campaign of economy in 
London" had given the "undue impression" that the opposition of the British public "will 
necessitate British withdrawal from these parts.,,1l9 Indeed, as early as December 1920, 
influential members of the Shi 'a ulema Muhammad al Sadr and Yusuf al Suwaydi were 
reported to be organizing a delegation to circumvent the Baghdad Residency and travel to 
London to present their case for Iraqi independence to the British government and people 
directly, if not "all the Capitals of Europe.,,120 By January 1921, al Istiqlal had already 
begun to identify individuals in the British government it perceived as sympathetic to the 
cause of Iraqi independence through clippings of Parliamentary debates. Al Badri quoted 
the Liberal representative for Hull, Commander Joseph Montague Kenworthy, for 
example, as having argued in Parliament that the Lloyd George administration had 
violated its 'sacred trust' with Iraqi people, for "instead of creating an Arab Government 
in Baghdad, the British had slain thousands of the inhabitants and exiled many more" and 
that, in his view, "a Labour Cabinet is the only solution," foreshadowing Kenworthy's 
own final conversion to Labour in the coming years. 121 
Illustrating his perception of the power of public opposition to British occupation, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies Winston Churchill took the opportunity of the army 
estimates debate in Parliament in December 1920 to blame the British press campaign to 
pull out of Mesopotamia for the outbreak of the 1920 rising. Quoting from a series of 
119 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.2 for November 30, 1920. 
120 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.3 for December 15, 1920 and February 17, 
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telegrams between himself and the Baghdad Residency, Churchill illustrated how the 
policy of strict economy demanded by the British public had limited the ability of British 
forces to keep order to the point of endangering the entire endeavor. He was certain, he 
assured the House, that "all the loose talk which had been indulged in in the newspapers 
about the speedy evacuation of Mesopotamia was a factor which provoked the rebellion" 
in the first place. Should such sentiments drive the British out of Mesopotamia at that 
moment, he stated, the chaos that would follow would not only cost the British far more 
than his estimates, it would cost them their honor for the abandonment of the 
Mesopotamian Arabs to such a fate. Although he humbly accepted "in the full" his 
personal responsibility for the spike in expenditure in the region, Churchill expressed his 
certainty that, all told, even "the wildest anti-squander maniac in the House" would be 
forced to admit that "it could not possibly have been avoided.,,122 
For its part, the Labour press worked to keep the contradiction between British 
interests in Mesopotamian oil and the principles of the mandate at the forefront of the 
public mind on the occupation. The Labour Leader kept its readers well informed, for 
example, of the growing Anglo-American tensions over Britain's seeming attempt to 
monopolize access to the oil in Mosul. "Petroleum," argued correspondent John W. 
Murby, "was rapidly becoming a ruling factor in national and international diplomacy" as 
well as casting new light on the meaning of the Great War, the principles of its 
settlement, and the future of its alliances.l23 Mandate or no, the economist George 
Horwill reported for the Labour Leader, the vested interests of the oil cartels were 
"operating as freely and as brazenly as if Mesopotamia were annexed, while the 
122 Times of London December 16, 1920. 
123 Labour Leader, February 24,1921. 
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suppression of the Arabs could not be greater if they were British subjects in revolt." 
Moreover, the entire campaign was being built upon the backs of "cheap labour from 
India and Egypt."l24 Such ideas were finding increasingly wide, if not as sharp, 
expression in the mainstream press as well. The Times, for example, clearly reflected the 
growing popular hostility toward expenditure in Mesopotamia, the belief that evacuation 
would not inspire panic in the region, but rejoicing, and the notion that all the 
government's rhetoric was merely a smokescreen to camouflage its pursuit of 
Mesopotamian Oil.l25 
The seriousness of the political situation in Britain was reflected in the frenzied 
dispatches from the Secretaries of State for India and the Colonies to Cox pleading with 
him to cut expenditure to "the absolute minimum" and informing him that in the face of 
"universal and often unreasoning demand for economy in all directions" there could be 
no guarantee of the continued support for the mandate unless "some assured prospect of 
progressive retrenchment." 126 Cox's replies were sympathetic, but not very encouraging. 
Every reduction of British forces or funds reflected the weakness or lack of resolve with 
the potential to incite opposition, he insisted, while evacuation would only lead to the 
total loss of the country, and British investments, to anarchy or foreign encroachment. By 
the end of January 1921, Cox seemed to have concluded that the threat of evacuation was 
either as real as his superiors claimed, or a pressure tactic to force him into expenditure 
cuts he could not make and offered his resignation. 127 In reply, Churchill warned Cox 
that he "would take a great responsibility" in choosing to deprive His Majesty's 
124 Labour Leader March 17, 1921 
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Government of his knowledge and influence at such a delicate moment and assured him 
that he as well was exploring every alternative solution to the conundrum from his 
position in London. 128 The result of Churchill's endeavors would be codified in a revised 
approach to British affairs in the east generally at the Cairo Conference of 1921. 
In February 1921, Churchill set in motion a series of developments designed to 
maximize British control in the Middle East while minimizing its cost beginning with the 
consolidation of British policy making in the region from the War, India, and Foreign 
Offices into a new department under his authority at the Colonial Office as Secretary of 
State for the Colonies.129 In March 1921, Churchill gathered together all of the key 
administrators throughout the Middle East to discuss how best to approach British 
relations in the region around the principle of instituting indirect rule wherever possible 
and resorting to more costly forms of direct rule where absolutely necessary. The two 
anchors for Britain's new policy in Mesopotamia clearly illustrated the centrality as well 
as the limits of representative government for Churchill's scheme. The first policy 
imperative in Mesopotamia, according to the report, was to establish the appearance of 
representative indigenous government by orchestrating, with the utmost subtlety but at 
the earliest possible moment, the popular 'selection' of Faysal as the ruler of 
Mesopotamia. The second, assuming the first could be effectively achieved, was to 
128 Churchill to Cox,January 16,1921 BL, UPS11l1l72IP379511920 
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replace the costly and cumbersome British and Indian ground forces in the region with an 
experimental program of control from the air through the recently formed Royal Air 
Force designed to keep the restless tribal hinterland from disturbing the Anglo-Iraqi 
nation making project underway in the urban centers.130 
Churchill left no question that the primary principle at the heart of his approach to 
Anglo-Arab relations in general was the reduction of its cost to the British taxpayer to the 
absolute minimum. In Mesopotamia, the enthronement of Faysal bin Husayn, Churchill 
confidently informed Lloyd George from Cairo, was "far and away the best chance of 
saving our money.,,13I Having learned a valuable lesson about imperial power, the 
limitations of popular political maturity, and the value of compromise from his 
experiences with the French, Faysal promised to be both a pliable and grateful candidate 
the position of British client in Iraq. Although not from Iraq, Faysal's leadership of the 
Arab Revolt, the foundational moment of the Pan-Arab national myth, and his "inspiring 
personality" were believed capable of "pulling together the scattered elements of a 
backward and half civilized country" into the service of his government and, especially, 
his national army. Moreover, Faysal' s awareness that the subsidies and protection his 
father Husayn enjoyed in Mecca and his brother Abdullah in Trans-Jordan would be 
"dependent upon his own good behavior" promised to make Faysal "much easier to deal 
with."132 The problem of arranging for Faysal's popular election without generating 
suspicion that he was simply a tool of the British or raising a preponderance of 
"confused or meaningless expression of Mesopotamian opinion" lay in the hands of Cox. 
]30 Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem, June 1921, p. 4-5. NA, AIRI8137 
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The confidence of the Conference in Cox's ability to accomplish this feat lay in its 
expectations that Faysal would declare his candidacy for the throne within three months 
and that the announcement "would result in such a definite expression of public feeling 
on his behalf as would make it unnecessary for us to ask the congress to discuss the 
question of the ruler, they would simply confirm directly or indirectly his nomination." 
With Faysal in place, it was assumed, any government selected by him would 
automatically be imbued with legitimacy, irrespective of the manner in which it was 
called to assemble.133 
The anticipated effect of Faysal's 'election' in Mesopotamia was put most 
succinctly by Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard in his report on air control in 
Mesopotamia for the Conference: "as a result of the selection of an Arab ruler 
satisfactory to the country, the country is free from organized rebellion, but is liable to 
ordinary spasmodic disturbances.,,134 Having received the representative Arab 
government they demanded, it was assumed, educated Iraqis at the urban power centers 
would be content. With only "spasmodic disturbances" outside of those centers to worry 
about, there was no reason to believe that control of the country could not be maintained 
by a handful of early warning intelligence operatives scattered throughout the country, 
RAP squadrons at Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul prepared to fly out and put down any 
larger risings that should occur, and an Arab army in place to defend the larger cities 
from attacks trained and supported by a few battalions of British servicemen.135 With 
Lloyd George's approval, Churchill wrote, he could begin "driving large numbers of 
133 .l1lli1. 
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troops and followers out of country and off our pay list ... as fast as I can bring them to 
port ... thus securing large savings in 1921-22."136 
In early May, at the next Parliamentary debate over Army Estimates, Churchill 
debuted his plan in brief. The Daily Telegraph was, characteristically, enthusiastic of 
the government's scheme, describing "a 'chain of autonomous States' in South-Western 
Asia, of which the British Empire will be the guardian, or, perhaps, we might say, the 
suzerain." Mesopotamia, the writers imagined, would become the central node of a web 
of "trans-continental air routes," the Suez Canal of air travel at which point "the lines 
from Britain to the Britannic East and South-East will convene."J37 The Daily 
Telegraph's description of air control was no less romantic. 
We are to understand that at a hint of trouble among the tribesmen ... the mobile 
and ubiquitous plane ... will swoop down upon a village and put the fear of the 
law into the turbulent hearts of its inhabitants. An aeroplane can track the Bedouin 
and other marauders to their lairs, and hunt them out from fastnesses which 
infantry and artillery could not reach, and where there are no roads for the tanks 
or armoured cars ... We shall no longer be pouring out millions annually for the 
maintenance of a powerful army hundreds of miles from the sea and the British 
and Indian taxpayer will be sensibly relieved. 138 
Editorials in the Times were less enamored with the scheme. As one contributor wrote, 
whether it was spent on troops, airplanes, or subsidies to kings and tribal leaders, the 
millions of pounds sterling being expended in the Middle East "to carry out the grandiose 
schemes of Pan-Arab dreamers" represented a "new and heavily subsidized Empire ... we 
cannot afford and do not want." 
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Our policy should be to keep out of entanglements in Arabia, to reduce our 
commitments in Mesopotamia to the smallest possible compass, and to declare 
that we cannot grant Rermanent subsidies to Arab chieftains any more than we can 
to the coal industry. 1 9 
An article in the Daily Herald entitled "The Muddled East" was representative of the 
Labour press' reaction to the scheme. 
Churchill's reference to Britain's "obligations of honour," the writer argued, 
harkened back to Asquith's calls to arms that had led Britain into the occupation of 
Mesopotamia in the first place and equally decried "the falsehood that has corrupted the 
whole blood-stained story of our empire." 
Always we have gone here and there progressing that we were safeguarding the 
rights of 'natives' that we could not abandon them to 'anarchy' and so forth. But 
always loot has been the object; and always our honour has been forfeited, and 
our promises broken, when they conflicted with our financial interests ... The 
pretense that we are in Mesopotamia for the health of the Arabs is too thin. We 
are there because Mesopotamia is, potentially, one of the richest countries of the 
world--particularly in oil. Mr. Churchill talks now about setting up an Arab 
Government under an Arab head: but he has to confess that the attempt of the 
Arabs to do that has been suppressed as a 'rebellion,' at great cost of blood and 
money ... Our foreign policy is radically dishonest. It is no use tinkering at it. We 
must get back to first principles and do right: and that the Coalition will never 
do. The whole thing would be perfectly simple if we really considered the 
interest of other races, instead of talking about it--and spending money on 
armaments and wars.l40 
The Iraqi press had already begun to take issue with Churchill's plans even before 
the Cairo Conference had had an opportunity to meet. Characteristically, al Istiqlalled 
the charge in early February 1921. The fact that responsibility had been transferred 
"from Milner to Churchill," or from the India Office to the Colonial Office, in the first 
139 Times of London, May 09,1921. 
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place meant, for allstiqlal, that the British "consider these countries as Colonies." The 
idea that Iraq could be made into a British colony was "laughable and nonsensical" for al 
lstiqlal in that, the Iraqi people had awakened to their national identity and "will submit 
to no foreign Government however important, rich or commercial." But also because the 
international community had already spoken and continued to speak its opposition to 
such encroachments, as the recent agreement between two former imperial powers, 
Russia and Turkey, to assist one another in "liberating the Islamic countries and India and 
giving complete independence to all Islamic peoples" had shown.141 A few days later 
after the transition, allstiqlal announced its own seven point program for the 
government, including: 
1) liberty of press, 2)freedom to hold meetings and political parties, 3) 
unconditional amnesty to political prisoners, 4) return of deportees, 5) abolition of 
martial law ,6) abolition of military courts, 7) hastening of elections without 
interference .142 
"Iraqi people," al Istiqlal declared, "cannot negotiate with a government that denies them 
this."143 
By the publication of these points, allstiqlal had already pushed Cox's 
determination to take as liberal an approach to the press as possible to its limits. With 
Lisan al Arab, allstiqlal had dogged every step of Cox's assembly of the Council of 
State over the fall of 1920 and the spring of 1921, not merely as an imperial institution, 
but as an unconstitutional one. Allstiqlal ridiculed "certain individuals roaming the 
streets and fighting with each other for a position" in Cox's Council, warning its readers 
that unless the Iraqi people voiced their demand for "a permanent representative 
141 allstiqlal, February 04,1921. 
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assembly as soon as possible," the "purportedly temporary" British appointed 
government would become a permanent fixture of the Iraqi state.l44 The policy of every 
true Iraqi, al Istiqlal insisted, should be "that Iraq has an independent Government in the 
legal and political sense of the world.,,145 By December, al Istiqlal was offering articles 
from the British Morning Post announcing that Faysal had already been offered the 
throne of Mesopotamia to prove that the Iraqi people would have no more say in the 
leadership of their state than they would in the form of government it would have. l46 
Lisan al Arab was also in agreement with al Istiqlal's suspicion of British intentions upon 
hearing the reports of Faysal' s selection for the Amirate in the British press, though 
Hilmi was even earlier and more direct in identifying Faysal as "a tool of the British" and 
warning his Iraqi kinsmen not to allow him to reign.147 In turn, al Istiqlal celebrated the 
rejection of office by men like Muzahim Beg al Pachachi, who, according to al Istiqlat, 
refused to "deny his principles for the sake of appointment," which he refused. l48 At 
Istiqlal described those who had taken position in the provisional government as men 
bewildered by the promise of power and influence and who would likely seek to 
"obliterate the thought of elections," rather than risk losing those benefits to democratic 
whims.149 Lisan al Arab followed suit, arguing that even an elected governmental body 
would be suspect under Iraq's current position, "where martial law is prevailing and the 
country is under heavy regulations." All of the "advantages of election will be lost," 
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Hilmi argued, "when it results in the success of certain individuals who may not know 
anything about the national duties except to bow and submit to might."I50 
By al Istiqlal's announcement of its seven points in February, Cox had reached 
his limit, shutting down the paper that very day and, operating through the provisional 
government, arrested al Badri and eight others, raided their offices and homes, and 
confiscated all materials relating to publication. By April, however, the number of 
applications for new newspapers had become so great that Cox appointed a committee to 
develop the Ottoman press laws for the new regime.151 Unsurprisingly, the committee 
determined the keep the strict regulation and hefty punishments for any sort of sedition or 
defamation of the state or its agents of the Ottoman laws as they were, and even raised 
the license fees. 152 
al Istiqlal's was not the only "confused or meaningless expression of 
Mesopotamian opinion," to quote Churchill, about Churchill's plans for the development 
of its government. A slightly more thorny problem was the somewhat unexpected 
interest of a handful of Iraqi notables and Sheikhs in competing with Faysal for the 
throne of Iraq. In 'preparing the ground' for Faysal's arrival, Cox had inadvertently 
sparked widespread interest in an actual 'election' of an Iraqi King. By April, the 
Baghdad Residence reported that a variety of social and political factions throughout the 
country were negotiating their support for a number of different candidates, including the 
Faysal, his brother Abdullah, the Naqib, notable of Basra and sometimes British client 
Sayid Talib, and even the Persian Sheikh of Mohammerah. By mid-April, Cox 
150 Lisan al Arab, February 22,1921. 
151 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 12 for April 24, 1921. 
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acknowledged to Churchill that "the problem" of alternative candidates had become "a 
somewhat difficult one" in that, technically, "there was no logical prima facie reason why 
we should object to [their] candidacy.,,153 Friendly suggestions from Cox to the elderly 
Naqib were enough to discourage his candidacy. Discouraging the Sheikh of 
Mohammerah required a more probing inquiry into his Persian heritage. The bullish, 
power seeking opportunist Sayid Talib was another matter altogether, but Cox found the 
opportunity in some untoward comments made by Talib at a dinner party to deport him to 
Ceylon in short order.l54 By the end of April, the Baghdad Residency could report that 
the sensation caused by Talib's deportation had the desired effect of scaring off mischief-
makers and reassuring moderates and tribal chiefs that the British intended to keep a lid 
on rampant self-promotion and irresponsible nationalism.!55 Coincidentally, on the very 
day of Sayid Talib's dinner party, the sentencing of the staff of al Istiqlal was meted out. 
For acts of sedition against the provisional government, the paper's editor, al Badri, 
received eighteen months in prison and a Rs. 3,000 fine, his senior and junior staff 
members receiving twelve months and six months respectively. The harshness of this 
first sentencing under the provisional government was clearly intended to offer an 
example to the deluge of potential critics then petitioning for licenses to publish.l56 As 
the Residency's report for the month of April reflected, the time was considered ripe for 
the announcement of Faysal's candidacy for the throne at the earliest possible moment 
and, to insure the diffusion of any "timorous feelings induced by recent events," an 
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accompanying announcement of a general amnesty for all participants in the rising of 
1920. 157 
A few days later, articles celebrating the accomplishments and heroic standing of 
Faysal and his family and arguing that, if not for their efforts, "the Arab race could not 
now demand their rights" began to appear in at Iraq.l58 Subsequent articles appearing 
that May took examples from British periodicals and Parliamentary speeches implying 
that the British government and people desired Iraq to become independent and to have 
self-government and that beliefs to the contrary were grounded in a misunderstanding 
that coming events would clear away.159 In its support of Faysal as a potential candidate 
for the throne, at Iraq described constitutional monarchies in Europe and elsewhere 
demonstrating that modem kings no longer "exercise ... tyrannical powers" but were 
"guided by the wishes of the people."I60 By June, at Iraq was offering testimonials from 
Iraqis of their desire for Faysal based on his standing in the Arab world, his 
accomplishments as a leader, and his commitment to Arab unity and independence with 
some declaring that waiting for the promulgation of a constitution and elections was 
unnecessary.161 Meanwhile, Faysal's supporters in Iraq, such as future Prime Minister 
and Sherifian officer Nuri Said, were busily writing letters to regional notables asking 
them to personally write to King Husayn to ask him to send one of his sons to govern 
Iraq.162 On June 15, Churchill delivered a speech in Parliament celebrating Iraqi efforts 
to advance their government, which the Residency reported as having "produced an 
157 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 11 for April 15,1921. 
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excellent impression ... the public as a whole [was] glad to have a lead from His 
Majesty's Government. This is indeed what they have long been asking for.,,163 The 
Residency acknowledged, however, that the relative quietude of oppositional opinion was 
not unrelated to the fact that, "since the suppression of the Istiqlal the vernacular press is 
represented only by the Iraq" and that a number of editors had already completed the 
licensing process and were poised to begin publication.l64 
By the end of June, Ibrahim Hilmi had returned to Baghdad and resumed 
publication of Lisan al Arab from there. Although Hilmi agreed with Churchill that 
Iraqis were indeed committed to advancing the progress of political life, he warned his 
readers that the advent of a constitutional monarchy and election of a Constituent 
Assembly believed to be immanent were as much a result of the realization by the British 
government that "they needed a friendly Iraq to defend their imperial interests ... in the 
face of Turkish and Bolshevik threats.,,165 In its third publication in late June, al Dijlah, 
edited by a young Iraqi lawyer named Daud al Sa'di, distinguished between Iraq's 
"natural independence" which had been accomplished by the unifying act of the 1920 
rising, and her "legal independence," which remained "temporarily bound." The power 
to break those legal fetters, al Dijlah argued, did not lay in the hands of the British, but in 
those of the Iraqi people. According to Butti, a key motivation for opening al Dijlah 
when al Sa'di did was the public debate over the selection of an Iraqi King and confusion 
over the kind of power he would wield. Accordingly, al Sa'di immediately offered 
expository essays on modern constitutional government in which all power originates 
from the national will of the people, and not cascading down from the royal will of the 
163 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 17, for June 15,1921. 
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monarch. I66"Following the way worthy of a nation which wants to live a free life," al 
Dijlah insisted, meant that the Iraqi people 
must prove that we are able to administer our own affairs ... what the nation hopes 
for is a National Congress to make a Constitutional Law ... and the establishment 
of a strong and permanent Government elected by the nation ... according to this 
law.167 
al Dijlah followed up the next day with an article demanding free elections and the 
erection of a government that would be obedient to their wishes and resistant to the will 
of those desiring to "gamble with the rights of the people."I68 Lisan al Arab concurred a 
few days later, insisting that "the nation is very anxious to hasten the elections for the 
Iraq Congress." The reason being, the writer argued, that "the existing government 
though formed of good men is considered illegal, as the nation had no part in forming it" 
and, despite the clear approval of the nation of Faysal, he had not, as of yet, been legally 
elected. It was the duty of the Council of State to arrange for a democratically elected 
Congress, which would then take responsibility for the formation of a Constitutional Law 
and arrange for the legal election of Faysal by the people of Iraq. "There is no use in a 
king without a law and a parliament, the position of which should be above that of the 
throne," the writer argued, "like Mr. Churchill, we wish for a constitutional king.,,169 Al 
Dijlah added the United States and the nations of continental Europe to the list of 
governments possessed of the kind of constitutional democracy Iraqis desired and 
criticized those who would declare Faysal King of Iraq prematurely and without a 
popular election.170 
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We oppose the idea of a coronation before the meeting of the Congress. Any king 
who is crowned in Iraq without the consent of the nation is not a constitutional 
king. We demand a king for the sake of independence not because we live the 
person of the king. The free nation of the Iraq can elect anyone they wish.l7I 
Recognizing that postponing the election of a head of state until a Congress could be 
called involved its own shortcomings, Lisan al Arab recommended a referendum be held. 
Citing examples of referendums in Europe and the United States, the writer argued that in 
lieu of a constitutional law and especially in a region occupied by foreign forces, a 
referendum was the most legitimate way of ascertaining the democratic voice of the 
people on the question of the crown.172 The paper followed up a few days later with an 
essay on the application of the referendum for the popular election of sovereigns in global 
history from ancient times to the present.173 
Fearing that a referendum would weaken Faysal' s position, according to Ireland, 
on July 8, 1921, Cox conveyed to the Council of State his impression of "an increasingly 
insistent demand on the part of the public for an immediate opportunity to decide who 
shall be ruler." In so far as he was concerned, he informed them, he would support "any 
appropriate special measures which the Council may recommend for that purpose.,,174 On 
July 11, the provisional government unanimously declared Faysal King of Iraq, provided 
that his government shall be constitutional, representative, and democratic.175 
Faced with a/aU accompli, al Dijlah and Lisan al Arab sought to preemptively 
define the powers Faysal would have as King in relation to those of the Iraqi people. On 
the day of the Council's acceptance of Faysal, al Dijlah published an article on the 
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history of monarchy as a form of government, noting that the former "tyrannous 
authority" of kings had given way everywhere to the authority of the people. "In 
England," the writer illustrated, "the king can write to no one without showing the letter 
to the prime minister." Officials of government, he argued, were the servants of the 
people, who paid them for their service.176 Lisan at Arab also offered comparative 
illustrations on various forms of government, paying especially close attention to how 
constitutional government operated in Britain.177 As was "natural in constitutional 
countries" Lisan at Arab pointed out, the ascension of a king should be followed by the 
formation of a new cabinet. Lisan at Arab expressed its hope that this would be the case 
in Iraq and that "the first Legal Cabinet" in Iraq would "consist of the best men in whom 
the nation has confidence" and established "on the firm promises given by [Faysal] to the 
nation to form a Representative Government and enjoy the privileges enjoyed by other 
free and independent countries.,,178 Lisan at Arab followed up the next day with a 
consideration of "Political Life in the West" focusing on the role of political parties in 
influencing the direction of government and offering "no doubt ... that people will form 
such parties here ... in the public interest.,,179 It was around this time that at Fallah 
opened its presses as a political science journal launched by alumni of the Istanbul 
Military College. Although invested in presenting itself as a journal of science and 
literature, at Fallah nevertheless viewed educating the public on the nature of politics its 
raison d' etre180 and opened its pages with discussions of the importance of political party 
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177 Lisan at Arab July 21 and 28,1921 
178 Lisan al Arab, August 20,1921. 
179 Lisan at Arab, August 22,1921. 
ISO Butti, At-Sihajah, p. 61. 
286 
formation to the welfare of the country including foreign examples to illustrate that 
fact. lsl 
When the first Cabinet under Faysal was formed that September, the President of 
the Council of Ministers proclaimed that "a nation cannot pursue the course of progress 
and cannot advance on the road of civilization unless it relies on a democratic, 
representative and constitutional government.,,182 Al Dijlah responded with a ramping up 
of its criticism of the presence of foreign administrators in Iraq. Iraqi representation in 
the administration, the writer argued, was ten percent at best and with poor pay while 
Indians, Persians, Armenians, and Egyptians with high salaries and subsidized rent were 
eating away at Iraqi revenues. Al Dijlah was careful to exclude British officers with the 
argument that "Iraqis are willing to accept people of a high civilization but why these 
who are no better than themselves?"I83 Already, Lisan at Arab had been arguing for 
weeks that "the Departments of Posts, Telegraphs, and Railways are full of strangers: 
Indians, Persians, and Egyptians, who might be replaced by capable Baghdadis," asking 
"if training in Financial and Political work is not going to begin now, when will it 
begin?"I84 What was needed, Lisan at Arab insisted, was the immediate erection of 
"Chambers of Commerce and the Committees to protect the rights of labour" to keep the 
"foreigners from ... sucking the blood of the natives."ls5 In September 1921, Rashid al 
Hashimi and Sami Kundah' s at Rafidan demanded that Faysal' s new cabinet make 
promulgating a law of nationality one of its first priorities, arguing that it will be 
necessary to regulate the coming elections and the problem of settlement and immigration 
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that Iraqis would surely face. l86 Having been politically weaned as "young adventures 
with the secret nationalist societies in Syria and Iraq ," according to Butti, and got their 
start under al Badri at al Istiqlal, al Hashimi and Kundah were characteristically 
provocative in their publications, for which they would pay with suppressions 
comparable only with al Istiqlal over the course of at Rafidan 's publishing life .187 Iraq 
was so saturated by the Egyptian and especially Indian subject peoples of the British 
Empire, at Rafidan argued that it was like "a colony among the Nations," noting the 
similar manner in which the French and British used foreign subject peoples to 
administer other colonies.l88 Although the insistence of the 'extreme nationalist' Iraqi 
press on the replacement of British imperial subjects, and eventually, British officers 
themselves, serving in the Iraqi government with Iraqis would be a persistent theme for 
the course ofthe mandate, in November 1921 the press' attention dramatically shifted 
with the announcement in Geneva that an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty might soon be in the offing. 
In September of 1920 Cox had been instructed to offer Faysal, should he press for 
such a document, a formal treaty arrangement between Britain and Iraq as a gesture of 
British good faith to lure him into the throne and to assuage the enmity of the Iraqi people 
for the mandate.l89 On October 10, 1921, France and Turkey provided an additional 
motivation to move beyond the mandate in defining Anglo-Iraqi relations with the 
Ankara Treaty, in which Turkey acknowledged French imperial sovereignty over Syria in 
exchange for an adjustment of the Turko-Syrian border in Turkey's favor. Turkish 
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claims to Syrian territory and France's concession to those claims, the Colonial Office 
determined, pointed up the vulnerability of Iraq, which, like Syria, had never been 
formally relinquished by Turkey, to similar claims.l90 On November 18, 1921, British 
representative at the League of Nations John Fisher undertook to preempt any such 
challenges to the territorial integrity of Iraq by announcing his government's intention to 
augment the mandate relationship with an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in which Britain would 
acknowledge Iraq as a nation inclusive of all territories designated under the mandate. 
Despite the seemingly progressive program Fisher's announcement might have 
suggested, as Peter Sluglett has noted, it marked the beginning of the end of an era of 
cooperation between Iraqis and the British.l9l 
Fisher's descriptions of Anglo-Iraqi progress and cooperation that had led to the 
decision to implement the treaty were effusive, reflecting Britain's scrupulous adherence 
to the principles of the League of Nations and the Iraqi peoples' irrepressible yearning for 
responsible self-rule at the earliest possible moment. Finding themselves, "unable to 
resist the overwhelming desire of the people of Iraq for the formation of a National 
Government under an Arab ruler ," Fisher argued, the British government offered their 
"recognition of a local sovereign whose recent accession to the throne followed upon the 
universal demand of the people of the country." Fisher then illustrated, quoting liberally 
from Faysal's accession speeches, the new King's readiness "to ensure that the 
Government of Iraq shall be carried on in strict conformity with the spirit of the Covenant 
of the League," including the immediate election of a representative constituent assembly 
to draft "the constitution of its independence" that would "define the fundamental 
190 See minute by Young in NA, C0173011615722421270 
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principles of political and social life." The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, Fisher proposed, was 
meant to acknowledge the fact that, as a nation, Iraq had already outgrown the ambiguous 
status of mandate and required something more detailed to define her relationship with 
her foremost partner and ally. That being said, Fisher was most explicit in assuring the 
League that the "spirit and the letter" of the mandate relationship would maintain and that 
the proposed Treaty will serve merely to regulate the relationship between His 
Majesty's Government, as mandatory power, and the Arab Government of Iraq. 
It is not intended as a substitute for the mandate which will remain the operative 
document defining the obligations undertaken by His Majesty's Government on 
behalf of the League of Nations.192 
Interestingly, it was Fisher's description of Iraqi progress that elicited the most 
aggressive criticisms in the British press. 
On December 27, 28, and 29 1921, the Times published a series of articles entitled 
"Mesopotamian Mystery" by their Tehran correspondent that gave the clearest expression 
in the mainstream press of arguments being made in the Labour Leader, Daily Herald, 
Foreign Affairs and ILP and UDC pamphlets with titles like Heroes, Huns, and 
Hypocrites and Democracy Done Brown for months. The articles retold the sordid 
history of Britain's struggle to keep control of the Persian Gulf, first with her imperial 
rivals, then with the League of Nations, and finally with her newfound Arab client rulers. 
The writer described the imposition of Faysal on the Iraqi people as a mockery of 
democracy and his new cabinet as a "sham government" through which the British 
intended now to force a "sham treaty," all for the sake of Mesopotamian oil. The story of 
Iraqi progress itself was a testimony to the power of vested interests to control 
governments and manipulate international perceptions. The only policy that should be 
192 "Draft of Oral Statement to be made to the Council of the League of Nations by the British 
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acceptable to the British people, argued the writer, would be to immediately evacuate the 
region and end this embarrassing, duplicitous, and expensive fiasco. J93 
The "Mesopotamian Mystery" articles caused quite a sensation in London and a 
flurry of inter-departmental dispatches on how best to react between the Foreign and 
Colonial Offices. Although an incensed Cox had drafted a point-by-point rebuttal, it was 
determined best to refrain from comment.l94 Matters would not be so easy to settle in 
Iraq, however. On the day of Fisher's announcement, Cox reported the first of a series of 
stormy meetings with Faysal in which the new King expressed his concerns that recent 
events had gone far to undermine popular perceptions of British good faith and indeed, 
his own, in erecting a legitimately self-governing state in Iraq. By ceding mandated 
territory to Turkey, Faysal argued, France had clearly demonstrated that the obligations 
of mandatory powers to the League were not as binding as the British had c1aimed.195 
Britain's failure to even object to the Ankara Agreement only validated, for Fay sal , 
popular fears that the British might choose to cede Iraqi territory to either France or 
Turkey if they determined it in their imperial interests to do so. In light of these fears, 
Fisher's announcement that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty would not abrogate the mandate 
seemed to suggest that the British were merely using the League and the mandate to keep 
control over a region they might just as easily grant independence to. If the British chose 
to "shortsightedly insist on making a travesty of treaty demonstrating that Iraq is still a 
mandated people and I a puppet King," Faysal argued, "I as King will be given a hopeless 
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task for you will incur suppressed enmity of three quarters of people of country which 
will find violent expression at any moment of difficulty and which you can only keep 
under by presumptuous force.,,196 Faysal bristled at what he perceived, according to Cox, 
to be a "loud clamour ... raised by a section of the London press for the accelerated 
withdrawal of British troops from Iraq," but even more troubling for Faysal, was the fact 
that even "his friends in Iraq are beginning to entertain doubts of his seriousness of 
purpose" and that he was, in fact, merely "a puppet in the hands of Great Britain." 197 
Over the fall of 1921 and spring of 1922, Cox reported, Faysal became 
increasingly un-budging in his refusal to admit any treaty draft that "intended to maintain 
mandatory relations ... whether it is expressed explicitly or in a camouflaged fonn." 
Contributing to Faysal's intransigence, Cox noted, was "the enonnous increase in the 
strength of nationalist sentiment" since the Fisher announcement, coupled with the 
popular unwillingness among both "the public" and "intelligent opinion" to "tolerate 
mandatory relations" in light of witnessing how "a parallel mandate has been interpreted 
or misinterpreted by the French." Faysal's fears that imposing a treaty on an unwilling 
Iraqi public would surely generate a "stonn of controversy," Cox insisted, were no 
exaggeration. Moreover, he suggested, "it seems in view of the attitude of the British 
tax-payer more prudent to secure good-will ofIraqis by giving them what they want" 
and, thus, place the "onus of failure" on them. 198 
Two days prior to Fisher's announcement at Geneva, Lisan al Arab was already 
warning Iraqis that, as subjects of the British Colonial Office, any treaty with Britain 
would "mean the acceptance of a protectorate and relinquishment of our right to complete 
196 Cox to Churchill, December 20,1921. NA, COl730108 
197 Cox to Churchill, February 8 and 14,1922. NA C01730/1916768 
198 Cox to Churchill, February 27, 1922. NA, COl730120lJ0151 
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independence ... Independent governments conclude treaties with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs alone."I99 Upon receiving word of Fisher's statement, Lisan al Arab nevertheless 
reacted with a kind of disbelief. After taking on Fisher's statements point by point to 
illustrate their incompatibility with 'complete independence,' Hilmi assured Iraqis that 
the words of Fisher's statement, "cannot as it stands be taken as a correct explanation of 
British policy in Iraq as it is in truth." Rather, "Dr. Fisher's speech was intended to 
reassure divergent opinion till the matter should be settled and justice done," by which he 
meant the drafting of "the forthcoming treaty whereby Britain would recognize the 
complete independence of the country ."200 Al Iraq as well took the statement as 
unrepresentative of British policy, arguing, erroneously, that Fisher was a representative 
of the League and, as such, "gives a general expression of the views of the League." 
British policy, al Iraq argued, should be understood, rather, from Churchill's speeches, 
which "already declared that there is no mandate in Iraq which has an independent 
National Government." There was no question that the final treaty would, accordingly, 
abrogate the mandate.201 Into the spring of 1922, Lisan al Arab and others nevertheless 
complained bitterly of the lack of information given to the people about the treaty's 
progress. "Rumours are conflicting," one writer warned, "the anxiety of the people 
should be satisfied by full information.,,202 Less ambiguously, Lisan al Arab confirmed 
Faysal's warnings to Cox in late February in stating that, "If the treaty is to ... simply 
complete the mandate, Iraq will reject it and will not admit this false mandate, which was 
the result of a bargain between the great Powers. But if it is a treaty between equal 
199 Lisan at Arab, November 16, 1921. 
200 Lisan at Arab, December 2,1921. 
201 at Iraq, December 2,1921. 
202 Lisan at Arab, February 12,1922. 
293 
Powers, the Iraq will welcome it and believe it to be a proof of the fulfillment of 
promises.,,203 
By the end of 1921, however, the Iraqi press was transitioning away from a focus 
on British promises and League principles as the foremost legitimating factors for their 
claims to independence and more towards evidence of what Iraqi writers described as a 
'global national awakening' in the peripheries and even the metropole of the British 
Empire and beyond. What began with talk of the "waking of the Arabs" in early 1921,204 
segued into a broader discussion of "awakening races" and "awakening subject peoples" 
generally by 1922.205 As al Istiqlal illustrated in early March, resisting the strangling of 
the "Arab awakening" by European powers had come to include the hope that "all 
Islamic countries ... will obtain complete independence," and even the notion that "the 
struggle of every nation is to get rid of the chains of slavery." It was increasingly for this 
universal struggle for complete independence that "the Arabs are determined at whatever 
sacrifice to attain.,,206 Al Istiqlal reported in the same month that such sentiments were 
reciprocated from abroad, with Gandhi himself including the withdrawal of Indian troops 
from Arab regions, the end of the French occupation of Syria and the establishment of 
independent governments in Palestine and Iraq among his conditions for ending the non-
cooperation in India?07 
In January 1922, al Dijlah celebrated the creation of the Irish Free State as a 
victory in such struggles, wryly puzzling over the Anglo-Irish decision to include the 
203 Lisan al Arab, February 27,1922. 
204 allraq, January 13,1922. 
lOS al Dijlah, March 5,1922. 
206 allstiqlal. March S, 1922. 
2m allstiqlal, March 14, 1922. 
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word 'Free' for, "we know of no instance in which a State is so called" anywhere else in 
the world. "Ireland," al Dijlah's editor commented, "has done what is worthy of pride" 
and "her case bares a certain resemblance to what has happened in our country ."208 In 
February, al Dijlah described a far east in recent transformation with the "rise of China 
and Japan" as European empires obliterated one another, noting that their growth had 
modified the severity of colonizing nations whose policy has also changed 
greatly. Formerly if they wanted to occupy any country they would openly 
colonize it, but now seeing that the East awakens from her deep sleep they adopt 
more ingratiating words such as friendship, etc. Time will bring wonders.209 
Unsurprisingly, the Iraqi press was particularly affected by the Anglo-Egyptian 
settlement in March 1922.210 al Dijlah emphasized the "brotherly feeling" between the 
Egyptian monarch and Faysal as well as their "mutual recognition of the independence of 
both Arab states," with "Iraq [being] the first nation to recognize the independence of 
Egypt." The writer then followed with a point-by-point account by which the Egyptians 
earned their independence through the formation of political parties and by which 
"Britain learnt a lesson in politics and has begun to show leniency to weak nations.,,211 Al 
Rafidan traced the path even further back, beginning with the education of Egyptian 
students in Europe, which at Istiqtat had been enjoining Iraqis to organize from the fall 
of 1920.212 Noting the detachment of the United States from England, Greece from 
Turkey, and the liberation of Poland, al Istiqlal argued that the Arabs had also risen, 
"their blood covered the Hijaz, Syria, Egypt, and the Iraq," in reference to the Arab 
IDI al Dijlah, February 8,1922. 
209 al Dijlah, February 13,1922. 
210 For a consideration of the impact by the Baghdad Residency, see Office of the High Commissioner, 
Intelligence Report No.7 for April 1, 1922. NA, COl730121 
211 al Dijlah, March 21, 1922. 
212 al Rafidan, March 21,1922. 
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Revolt, 1920 rising, and the Egyptian Revolution.213 For al Rafidan, the clear 
advancement of indigenous nationalism at the expense of imperial power heralded the 
opening of a "democratic era" or an "Era of Nationalism" of which the events "in Egypt, 
India, and awakened Arab countries" were proot,214 Al Dijlah and al Mufid argued that, 
by comparison, Iraq was, in fact, at the forefront of the awakening, having advanced 
remarkable quickly and effectively compared with Ireland and Egypt.215 
In April 1922, prominent Shi'a ulema called for a national conference in Karbala 
ostensibly to address the government's failure to adequately deal with the problem of the 
Akhwan raiding parties coming over Iraq's southern border from Arabia. The Residency 
held no illusions about the meeting's potential to rally 'extreme nationalist' sentiment 
against the mandate and, according to the press, made every effort to prevent the 
conference?16 Nevertheless, "all the leading people" from Mosul to Basra, over 2,000 
attendants according to al Dijlah, 217 were gathered on April 13 to hear pledges of Iraqi 
unity and loyalty to the nation in stirring speeches Iraqi politicians, scholars, and clerics 
alike.218 As Cox himself reported to Churchill, the Karbala Conference of April 1922 
was a key moment in bringing the Iraqi "people into the open and dividing them into 
pro-British or pro-Mandate and converse.,,219 
213 al Istiqlal March 24, 1922. 
214 al Rafidan, April 05, 1922. 
215 al Dijlah, April 20, 1922 and al Mufid, April 17,1920. 
216 al Rafidan, April 05,1922 (17) and al Istiqlal, April 07, 1922. 
217 al Dijlah, April 16,1922. 
218 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.9 May 1,1922. 
219 Cox to Churchill May 04,1922. NA, C017301211425. 
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One aspect of the "Mesopotamian Mystery" articles in the Times in the fall of 
1921 that nearly every Iraqi paper took issue with was the suggestion that British officials 
sympathetic with Arab nationalist aspirations, specifically Cox's political secretary 
Gertrude Bell, had in fact created nationalist sentiment where none had previously 
existed. Writing for al Istiqlal in February 1922, Shaikh Ahmad ad Daud, recently 
returned from his exile by the British for his role in the 1920 risings, commented that, "all 
thinking Arabs are in favour of and anticipate the inevitable unity of Arab countries." 
Bell, he insisted, was held in high esteem by Iraqi Arabs for having been "one of the first 
to believe in Arab policy and union," but certainly not for creating it.220 Shaikh Daud 
followed his article up a few days later revisiting the origins of the 1920 rising as both 
anti-colonialist and nationalist.221 Lisan al Arab followed suit the same day, defending 
"liberal English writers who are well acquainted with the spirit of the Arab movement 
and the reasons which moved Great Britain to support it" and rejecting "the false charge 
that the Arab movement was engineered by the Oriental secretariat." The "awakening of 
the Arabs and their desire to liberate their country ," the writer argued, "like that of other 
vital nations in history" was entirely home-grown.222 
Turning to the Iraqi people to demonstrate the veracity of such claims, the Iraqi 
press gave great emphasis to the fact that the clearest representation of genuine national 
identification as well as political maturity was not revolution, but voting. "Freedom," 
argued Shaikh Daud in al Iraq in November 1921, "is the daughter of mental and 
spiritual progress," and it was the duty of Iraqis to engage in the practice of not only 
complaining about their political situation, but working to change it through voting and 
220 allraq, February 25,1922. 
221 allraq. February 27,1922. 
222 Lisan al Arab, February 27,1922. 
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the organization of political associations?23 Despite the enjoinment of the press to 
participate, the turnout was lower than expected. However, as Hilmi explained in an 
article in Lisan al Arab entitled "There is no Democracy in the World," such was also the 
case in France where "only 27% of voters give their votes." However, "such 
indifference," he warned, "kills democracy" and he enjoined his readers to take more 
interest in the coming elections that summer.224 Despite Hilmi's disappointment, 
however, the Residency still complained that the municipal elections held that January 
had proven a real opportunity for "extreme nationalists" to get what they referred to as 
"representatives of the people," but the Residency identified as early opponents of the 
mandate, into local offices.225 
In the wake of the spring municipal elections that February 1922, Lisan al Arab 
and al Istiqlal spearheaded the movement for the formation of political parties in earnest 
for the coming elections for Iraq's first Constituent Assembly that summer. Lisan al 
Arab, the more cautious of the two, argued that parties were necessary to "express the 
views of the nation and defend its existence," to keep "the votes of the nation from going 
astray," and to give voters the information the needed to "know to whom to give his 
confidence.,,226 Al Istiqlal, which had been permitted to open for publication after a year 
of closure only days before, "proceeded at once," according to the Residency, "to sound a 
clarion note ofultra-Nationalism.,,227 On the day of what would be its second 
suppression, al Istiqlal implied that the recent municipal elections had been illegal, and 
therefore "a laughing stock" in light of the absence of laws to regulate them, a national 
223 at Iraq, November 22, 1921. 
224 Lisan at Arab, January 26,1922. 
225 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 28, for January 1,1922. 
226 Lisan at Arab, February 17, 1922. (56) 
227 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 05 for February 02,1922. 
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council to organize them, political parties to direct the people, and the freedom for those 
parties to meet and demonstrate. "None of these principles, in short," the writer argued, 
presently "exist ... if we want legal elections these obstacles must be removed.,,228 Al 
Dijlah agreed with al Istiqlal in a leader entitled "knowledge allays surprise" arguing for 
a "more active political fight more in line with the noble heroes of the military fight now 
past and placid?29 
Although Cox "agreed in principle that there must be liberty to form parties," the 
Residency was deeply suspicious of them.230 By March, however, the Residency had to 
report that "the burning question of the hour is that of the creation of political parties.,,23) 
Facing the inevitable, Cox pushed the Council of Ministers to consider methods of legally 
regulating the formation of parties in a manner that would permit him to examine their 
political programs and membership lists for anything or anyone "incompatible with the 
policy of His Majesty's Government or with the conditions of the treaty now under 
negotiation" before approving or denying their formation. He considered, however, that 
it might be more prudent to defer permission for the formation of parties until after the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty had been got through. 232 The problem, as the Residency repeatedly 
observed, was that the Iraqi papers most vehemently demanding political parties were 
also those most opposed to the mandate.233 After being shut down for nearly a month, at 
Istiqiai immediately reopened in May 1922 with a series of articles condemning the 
government's use of the archaic and anti-democratic Ottoman Press Act and Law for 
228 allstiqlal, February 19, 1922. 
229 al Dijlah, March 16,1922. 
230 Cox to Churchill, March 12, 1922. BL, LlP+S11l12121Pl10611922 
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Societies to silence the press and obstruct the formation of political parties. Such articles 
were accompanied by the ubiquitous theme of the mandate being the signing away of any 
hope of transition out of such an oppressive regime.234 
Iraq's first national election for a Constituent Assembly in mid-1922 would be a 
defining moment for Iraqi nationalism as well as the Iraqi state and, with no political 
parties to operate through, the Iraqi press became the main forum for public debate over 
the key issues. Viewing itself as the main catalyst for unifying public opinion ,235 the 
press emphasized the issues it desired to see addressed by Iraqi candidates in articles 
designed to spark public debate and demanding that office seeking Iraqis take a position 
on them and make that position publicly known. Al Iraq and al Dijlah, for example, 
aligned on the principle that "no men of Arab race should be considered as aliens" in 
Iraq236 while Lisan al Arab took the position that "Iraq will never agree to be ruled by 
people whom the English themselves consider unable to rule their own countries. ,,237 at 
Rafidan intervened with a detailed examination of British colonial power hierarchies 
from the Prime Minister all the way down through British administrative officers and 
onto indigenous officials in Egypt, India, and Iraq, noting the differences in titles of 
officers and the imperial labels of "Protectorate, Colony, and Mandate" to illustrate 
precisely who the British believed were, in fact, capable of ruling themselves and, 
therefore, might be acceptable officials in Iraq irrespective ofrace.238 
234 al Istiqlal May 05,09, and 12,1922. 
235 Orit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University 
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When oil prices began to spike in early 1922, the Iraqi press made oil a political 
issue, in which nearly every paper argued that "the Iraqi State should develop its oil fields 
for its own advantage.,,239 At Istiqtat was, characteristically, an early exponent of the 
notion that British development of Iraqi oil, though important for Iraq, must either be 
transparently used for the development of the Iraqi state or exposed as imperial 
exploitation.240 The right of the Iraqi government to assemble an army and defend its 
own borders was also made an issue by the encroachment of the Arabian Akhwan tribes 
into southern Iraq. "The Iraqis," at Rafidan warned in April 1922, 
will convince the blue eyes which look down on all and undermine the wisdom of 
the people thinking the Iraq like a bird to be frightened by [the Akhwan]. The 
Iraq will give him a lesson and he shall see that his excuses are of no avail. We 
will repeat the doings of the Egyptians.241 
The failure of the Residency or the Palace to defend the southern tribes from Arabian 
encroachment at Dijtah, at Mufid, and al Istiqlal all agreed, was but a ploy to prove that 
Iraq was in danger from outside encroachment and did indeed require the presence of 
British forces.242 When the British government finally settled a treaty with Ibn Saud in 
the summer of 1922, the agreement elicited "a virulent anti-mandate campaign ... in the 
extreme nationalist press" taking objection to the arrangement by a 'third-party' ofIraq's 
foreign relations as a mockery of her independence. The Residency anticipated that the 
"sharp definition" the agreement had given to "political antagonisms" generally was 
"likely to increase rabidly in bitterness.,,243 
At the heart of nearly every political issue under debate in the spring and summer 
239 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 04, for February 14, 1922. 
240 allstiqlal, February 21, 1922. 
241 al Rajidan, April 02, 1922. 
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of 1922 was the matter of British influence over Iraqi independence. Getting right to that 
heart, al Mufid plainly stated in early May that all "candidates should be frank and should 
either support the Mandate or complete independence, so that the people may be able to 
elect whom they require."244 A few weeks later, al Mufid made the matter even plainer in 
declaring that "the elections should be on the basis of acceptance of the Mandate or its 
rejection," noting that "all the papers ... Istiqlal, Rafidan, Dijlha" were unified in their 
opposition to it.245 Nor were the Iraqis alone, as Istiqlal pointed out, 
all the Arab press is harping on the same thing vide Egypt and Syria where the 
mandate is refused, Palestine which refuses to accept the Balfour Declaration. 
Tunis and Algeria are demanding national rights, Tripoli demands Italian 
evacuation. Here the papers ask for the elections and political parties and removal 
of martiallaw,z46 
The Residency was keenly aware of the division of Iraqi political life into the dwindling 
camp of pro-British clients and the swelling ranks of anti-mandate agitators. That May, a 
counter-attack was launched against the vernacular press with the Residency's most 
recent experiment in Arabic language propaganda, a government gazette entitled 
Baghdad Times. The mandate, Baghdad Times insisted, was "not the abrogation of ... 
Iraqi independence ... but an international guarantee of it." Claims to the contrary in the 
vernacular press, it was argued, simply misunderstood the mandate principle as well as 
the fact that Iraq was not, in fact, prepared to stand alone. Inferring that the "complete 
independence" of Iraq demanded by the "extreme nationalist elements" would mean total 
evacuation, the Baghdad Times suggested that 
One has only to read the English newspapers to realize that Great Britain has no 
wish to retain the Mandate 
for Iraq (which is an expensive luxury) for one minute longer than necessary. No 
244 al Mufid. May 09,1922. 
24S al Mufid. May 09 and 16, 1922. 
246 allstiqlal, May 18,1922. 
one would be more delighted to see the Iraq given complete independence to-
morrow than the majority of the heavily taxed British Public.247 
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On May 23, however, Churchill inadvertently reignited the mandate debate in Iraq by 
responding to a Parliamentary inquiry as to whether the Iraqi people had, in fact, rejected 
the mandate in Iraq with a simple "No, Sir,,248 Al Istiqlal seized the moment to take up 
the gauntlet thrown down by the Baghdad Times with a series of articles disparaging the 
inaccurate and insulting reportage on the election debates over the mandate in Iraq and 
condemning British intentions with examples from its own imperial struggles. In an 
article entitled "Why?" al Istiqlal rhetorically inquiring, 
Why has Mustapha Kemal urged battle ... why has Egypt sacrificed so much in 
money and lives ... why has Gandhi urged his countrymen to wake up and was he 
thrown into the bottommost prison ... why did Shahbandar and his colleagues-
nay the whole Arab Syrian population-rise and protest against oppressions 
through the French mandate ... why has Palestine urged dispatch of delegates ... 
why has Iraq awakened and set up to work? 
The answers were self-evident in their relation to British imperial policy toward those 
nations, but amounted to Britain's betrayal of her aims for the First World War, being 
"the pretense of restoring mulcted rights and liberating small nations" and now being 
engaged in the endeavor "to kill the spirit of independence and the ideas of liberty which 
have just started spreading among the weak nations in particular ."249 Al Mufid elaborated 
with an article quoting newspapers from Syria, Palestine, Tunis and others "full of news 
of the national movement in Iraq ... all comments are favorable ... and uphold the Iraq 
cause ... in a spirit of co-operation ... among all Arabs.,,250 
The Baghdad Times responded with a profoundly pedantic article entitled "Plain 
Talk" signed "Old En,gland" and addressed to "Young Arab" that directly targeted the 
dangerous political immaturity of the Iraqi press. The article began with a criticism of 
247 Baghdad Times, May 26,1922. 
248 The Official Report. House a/Commons (5th Series) 23 May 1922 vol. 154 cc.995 
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Iraqi journalists as "new to the game of political journalism and unhampered by 
traditions," as compared to the British who, in such publications as Baghdad Times, 
"stick to facts ... and avoid abuse, libel, and mud-slinging in general." Similarly, whereas 
'Old England' represented a global people, dealing with most of the worlds nations, weak 
and powerful, on a daily basis, 'Young Arab' had little knowledge of international 
relations and obligations or even the management of a state and, characteristically, was 
handling her relationship with the British immaturely. If Iraq was progressing too slowly 
for the taste of the vernacular press, the Baghdad Times argued, it was not the fault of 
England, but of Iraqis themselves. "If you really are patriotic," the writer insisted, 
instead of abusing the Britisher, why not devote yourselves for a short while to the task of 
helping the British to defend your country ... it would be so much more useful than 
wasting your time in the coffee-shops abusing the Government and the British and the 
weather and so forth.,,251 
Despite these efforts to counter anti-mandate propaganda, by May 1922, Cox and 
Churchill alike seemed to have become convinced that the democratic route to procuring 
an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty from an Arab Iraqi government was collapsing. Since April, Cox 
had been reporting that nationalist agitations against the Treaty had either broken 
Fay sal 's will to cooperate or been the result of his own secret machinations to thwart the 
mandate relationship entirely. Either way, Cox reported, "in these recent episodes 
[Faysal has] unmistakably displayed the cloven hoof ... when he is scratched deep enough 
the racial weakness displays itself.,,252 As a means of forcing Faysal' s hand and 
delivering a/ait accompli to Iraqi nationalist sentiment, Cox proposed in late April that 
251 Baghdad Times,July 12,1922. 
252 Cox to Churchill April 26, 1922. NA, CO/730/21/19083 
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an ultimatum be delivered to Faysal to either approve the Treaty without the abrogation 
of the mandate or face immediate evacuation. It is significant that Cox believed the 
ultimatum would have the "greatest value and effect" if delivered as an official response 
to a staged Parliamentary question in London, rather than merely an announcement in 
Baghdad.253 Once the announcement made it through Reuters and back to Baghdad, the 
terms of the treaty and evacuation would become clear to the public, the force of the 
threat would be amplified in coming from Parliament, and the opposition would be 
discredited.254 Although initially approved by Churchill, the plan was not carried 
through, in the main, as Churchill explained, because of the backlash such a contest 
would have elicited in Britain. "Strong public opposition to our spending money on 
Iraq," he warned, "would be revived if there were any indication that negotiations were 
breaking down." The result of such an announcement, Churchill predicted, would "almost 
certainly be, in present temper of British public, a demand for reduction of British 
commitments in Iraq.,,255 Meaning they would get evacuation whether they wanted it or 
not. 
By the end of May, however, key pro-British elements in the tribal leadership and 
their representatives in municipal posts seemed to be swaying toward an anti-Treaty 
position.256 Declarations of "the undying opposition which the Iraq nation entertained to 
the mandate" signed by important tribal sheikhs began to appear in the press as well, 
along with the suggestion that Faysal had secretly confirmed his and his Council's 
adversity to the Mandate. Although Faysal denied making such statements to Cox, he 
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nevertheless refused to pennit a public retraction?57 Inspired by the lead from the Palace, 
anti-Treaty activists undertook to send "rs. 1,500 worth of telegrams to the League of 
Nations, parliaments and press of Europe and America, as well as the President of the 
United States of America" declaring Iraqi opposition to any Treaty the British might 
attempt to force upon them. When the Residency held the telegrams up, the senders 
published them in the vernacular press and then drove them to Persia to publish them 
from there.258 Telegrams and petitions protesting against the mandate were also pouring 
in from the provinces addressed to Cox, the Naqib, and other officials while 'extremist 
agitators' encouraged the ulema of Nejef and Karbala to pronounce afatwa against the 
British and the mandate.2S9 By June, suchfatwas had in fact been declared,260 to the alann 
of Churchill, who began to demand that the Residency immediately move to halt the 
progression of the already "objectionable tone of the vernacular press" into such an 
"exceedingly violent" phase.261 
Matters came to a head in mid-August when Faysal's Cabinet presented the 
beleaguered King with its own ultimatum out of fear that the onus of either passing a 
treaty that would be unacceptable to the Iraqi people or triggering British evacuation 
would fall on their heads. "Signs of disintegration in the country due to a lack of common 
purpose in the Government," the Cabinet argued, "and consequent lack of unifonnity in 
the manner in which Government officials conducted affairs under pressure from 
extremists" had given the popular perception, voiced by "the extremists that His Majesty 
placed no reliance on the Cabinet and was not working in hannony with it" in forwarding 
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the treaty negotiations. When Faysal informed them that he did not feel a public 
declaration of support from him was necessary, the Cabinet submitted its resigation on 
August 14.262 A few days later, on Faysal's first anniversary as King, Cox was ridiculed 
as he passed by a gathering outside the Palace assembled to hear nationalist speeches 
disguised as celebratory odes to Faysal, to the roaring mirth of the crowd.263 Although 
Faysal promised to give his signature to the public apology and disassociation from the 
comments Cox demanded, the High Commissioner was, by then, convinced that only the 
force of an ultimatum backed by the real threat of evacuation could force the Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty desired by his government through, plans for which he put in motion on August 
25.264 
In an amazing stroke of luck or fate, Faysal was struck down by appendicitis on 
August 26. Two hours before Faysal was to enter the surgery, on what he seemed to 
believe might be his death bed, Cox approached him with a public declaration for his 
signature declaring his disassociation with the extreme nationalist elements for immediate 
publication, a document that would, for all intents and purposes amount to Faysal's 
declaration of support for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Refusing to make the condemnation of 
any of his subjects his last act as King, Faysal refused to sign a statement that, he 
believed would more likely "to produce revolution than stop it.,,265 Seizing the moment 
of Faysal' s incapacity, Cox immediately issued a proclamation taking over the reigns of 
government and called for the suppression of nearly every Arabic vernacular in 
publication and the arrest or deportation of the most troublesome editors and agitators. 
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He then arranged for the verbal approval of Faysal's Cabinet for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 
with the stipulation that it would also require the ratification of the Constituent Assembly 
upon its election and received Churchill's approval in tum. In recovery, Faysal was 
presented with a choice to either give his public support to Cox's actions and approve the 
progression of Treaty ratification by the Constituent Assembly or publically condemn 
them and face Cox's immediate retirement and the beginning of British evacuation from 
Iraq. On October 2, a new Cabinet was formed under the Naqib for the sole purpose of 
ratifying the Treaty, which they did on October 10, with Faysal's approval, but also with 
the stipulation that only the Iraqi people could formally approve the Treaty through an 
elected National Assembly. 
Chapter 6: Defining the Instruments of the Iraqi Government 
in the Shadow of the 'MosuI Question.' 
Cox's short-lived coup d'etat over the waylaid Faysal may have succeeded in 
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wringing the signatures of his Cabinet for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but such was merely 
the first step in the odyssey of ratification that would occupy the Baghdad Residency for 
the next four years. As subsequent events would show, the dramatic demonstration of 
British dominance in the Anglo-Iraqi nation-making project evinced by the move would 
gain only the most fragile and, for many Iraqi editors, irrelevant foothold in achieving the 
kind of treaty desired by the British government. From the summer of 1922 to the spring 
of 1926, the Iraqi press would dedicate itself to refuting the legitimacy of a treaty drafted 
by the British and coercively validated by a British appointed Cabinet and King by 
attending to every detail of the process of electing an Iraqi Constituent Assembly, 
drafting Iraqi instruments of government, and negotiating a new treaty reflective of Iraqi 
interests that only a popularly elected representative assembly could, in the end, legally 
ratify into being. The most effective weapons in the Iraqi press' arsenal would be the 
history of European constitutionalism itself and the baseline expectations for 
constitutional development among Britons, the international community, and, most 
importantly for the press' political agenda, the Iraqi people. 
In addition to illustrating the contradiction between the appearance of 
constitutional progress in Iraq and the reality of British imperial dominance, the manner 
in which the Treaty was initially signed also brought home for the Iraqi press the real 
necessity of such appearances for the British government. Historians have rightly 
identified British obligations to the League of Nations, the advantages in inter-imperial 
relations with Turkey and France in particular, the need to reduce the financial 
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obligations of the Iraqi mandate caused by anti-mandate agitation, and the need to protect 
Fay sal 's legitimacy as the head of the Iraqi state as central concerns for supporters of the 
Treaty in the British government. l For the Iraqi press, however, the Residency's 
seemingly desperate need to present the Anglo-Iraqi relationship in a genuinely 
constitutional light in spite of the baldly imperial manner in which that relationship was 
being imposed also illustrated the potential power of the Iraqi street to decry its 
legitimacy. That power was amplified, Iraqi editors were learning, by desire of a 
growing section of the British public to expose the mandate relationship for the 
anachronistic imperial adventure they believed it to be and, in so doing, force its 
dissolution. 
The path from the signing of the Treaty in Iraq in 1922 to its final ratification in 
1926 presented a series of legislative steps and popular elections that provided the Iraqi 
press with ample opportunity to challenge the constitutional legitimacy of Iraqi political 
development and to mobilize the Iraqi public in favor of a governmental system more in 
line with international standards for democracy as they perceived and chose to define 
them. The swiftness with which Iraqis of every political stripe adapted to and mastered 
the limiting parameters imposed by the Residency on Iraq's developing political 
landscape, with the daily assistance of the Iraqi press, kept British officials scrambling to 
contain the evolution of national political movements out of arguments about democracy 
and constitutionalism appearing first in the Iraqi press in which the legitimacy of the 
1 See, for example, the classic works by Philip Willard Ireland, 'Iraq: A Study in Political Development 
(London: Kegan Paul, 2004), pp. 313-318 and Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq 1914-1932 (London: Ithaca 
Press,I976), pp. 68-73; as well as more recent work by Toby Dodge, "International Obligation, Domestic 
Pressure, and Colonial Nationalism; The Birth of the Iraqi State Under the Mandate System," in The British 
and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives/ Les Mandats Frant;ais et Anglais Dans Une 
Perspective Comparative, ed. Nadine Meouchy and Peter Sluglett (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004),143-
164. 
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Treaty was a central issue. The path to ratification was also fraught with such 
unanticipated obstacles as Mustafa Kemal' s bid to reclaim the petroliferous Iraqi vilayet 
of Mosul for Turkey and the bewildering entertainment of such claims by the League of 
Nations as well as the political upset of British Labour's victory over Stanley Baldwin's 
incumbent Conservative government in the fall of 1923, all of which the Iraqi press 
attempted to turn to maximum advantage. 
This chapter seeks to show that the Anglo-Iraqi legislation and ratification of the 
Iraqi constitution, electoral laws, and international treaties defining the state were not 
merely the products of a contest of wills between the Palace and the Residency, but rather 
the products of a transnational debate in the British and Iraqi press and Parliaments in 
which the nature of modern democracy and constitutionalism was at the center. Through 
an examination of the coverage of developments in the Iraqi press, I am able to show a 
constant engagement with the principles in play that offered the Iraqi public definitive 
proof that the British were constructing a quasi-protectorate and not a quasi-state, the 
intellectual tools they needed to develop an alternative vision for the Iraqi nation based 
on international standards, and the inspiring examples of parallel liberation movements 
ongoing throughout the British Empire and even at its center to emulate and even aspire 
to lead. In the end, the Residency and the British government would ultimately succeed 
in obtaining the possession of Mosul, the retention of the mandate, and the mineral and 
political concessions they desired from the international, metropolitan, and Iraqi political 
systems they grappled with from 1922 to 1926. Nevertheless, securing the national 
borders and political framework for Iraq was a difficult and only partially won contest 
between the dwindling power of imperial interests and the rapidly expanding power of 
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public opinion in international and inter-imperial politics. For, the failure of both British 
Labour and Iraqi nationalists to block the formal creation of a quasi-protectorate in Iraq 
through the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1926 was also only a partial failure, in which crucial 
political gains would eventually culminate in the overturning of the hated Treaty under a 
second Labour government in 1929 and the emancipation of Iraq from British rule in 
1932. 
Along with the purging of seditious publications and arrest of extremist agitators 
in the summer of 1922, the Residency also permitted the licensing of Iraq's first political 
party, the Hisb al Hurr? Unlike most members of the "pro-Arab party," as the Residency 
collectively referred to advocates for 'complete independence' from British rule, Hisb al 
Hurr members were considered to have, "for the most part, vested interests in the 
country" in terms of property, wealth, and prestige and, therefore, represented "pro-Arab 
conservative interests." For the Residency, 'conservative' interests meant an investment 
in "the maintenance of constitutional government with British advice and support" that 
had galvanized the power of Iraq's landowning and business elite under the occupation? 
Permitting the formation of the Hisb al Hurr, in other words, placed a group of already 
influential Iraqis inclined to support the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty relationship against the 
criticisms of more extreme pro-Arab activists at the forefront of Iraq's emerging popular 
2 Rafail Butti describes the Hisb al Hurr as precedent setting in both its early licensing as well as its 
publication of its own paper, al Asimah. See Rafail Butti, Al-Sihafah Fi Al-'Iraq: Muhadarat Alqaha 
(Bulaq: Jami'at al-Duwal al-'Arabiyah, 1955), p. 77 
3 For a consideration of land distribution and British use of the tribal system to the Residency's advantage, 
see Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: 
Colombia University Press, 2(03), pp. 63-83 and especially pp. 101-130. For a discussion of the 
relationship between the tribal and the political elite under the mandate, see David Pool, "From Elite to 
Class: The Transformation of Iraqi Leadership, 1920-1939," International Journal of Middle East Studies 
12, no. 3 (November 1980): 331-350. 
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political landscape. Although precisely the sort of political grouping the Residency 
needed to begin the difficult work of electing governmental bodies acceptable to Iraqis, 
but also amenable to approving instruments of government acceptable to the British, they 
also feared that domestic and international developments were quickly eroding the 
middle ground on which Hisb al Hurr members stood.4 
Like A.T. Wilson before him, Cox was unsettlingly unable to give his political 
clients in Iraq definitive guarantees about the future of the Anglo-Iraqi relationship and, 
therefore, their future positions of power in relation to the Sherifian court, the rising 
fervor of 'extreme nationalism,' or, as of late September 1922, the threat of the return of 
Turkish rule in Iraq. For, in the immediate wake of his expulsion of the occupying Allied 
forces from Turkey and reclamation of Smyrna from the Greeks in mid-September,5 
Turkish President Mustafa also made known his intentions of reclaiming the entire Mosul 
vilayet for his emerging Republic of Turkey.6 Compounding this external threat to Iraq's 
territorial sovereignty was the growing clamor for the evacuation of Iraq emanating out 
of London, now that Lloyd George's reckless insistence on upholding the 'Secret 
Treaties' was, so it seemed, leading to renewed international war just as UOC and ILP 
propaganda had been predicting since the war's end. In the face of the threat of British 
4 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 22, for November 15, 1922. NA, FOl37117772 
5 For a discussion of the negative impact of Turkey's victory over the Greeks in the conflict over Smyrna 
on the Lloyd George administration, who had stalwartly supported the Greeks, see Othman Ali, ''The Kurds 
and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923," Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 33, No.3 (July 1997), pp. 
522 and G. H. Bennet,British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-1924 (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1995), Chapter 5. 
6 For a discussion of the impact of Mustafa Kemal's revolution on British policy in the Middle East, see 
A.E. Montgomery, "The Making of the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920," The Historical Journal Vol. 
15, No.4 (December 1972): pp. 775-787. For a discussion of Turkish claims to Mosul in a context of 
international relations, see Peter J. Beck, '''A Tedious and Perilous Controversy': Britain and the Settlement 
of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926.," Middle Eastern Studies VoU7, No.2 (1981): 256-276. For a 
contemporaneous discussion specifically of the legal status of Mosul in relation to international law and the 
mandates, see Berriedale A. Keith, "The League of Nations and Mosul," Journal o/Comparative 
Legislation and International Law, 3rd Ser. Vo1.8, No.1 (1926): 38-49. 
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evacuation, as the Residency summarized it, the 'conservative element' represented by 
the Hisb al Hurr faced either the advent of "an extremist and possibly unstable nationalist 
Government" not only vulnerable to internal and external threats, but already inclined to 
disempower the 'conservative element' represented by the Hisb al Hurr, or, if Iraq was 
"returned to the dominion of Turkey," the Hisb member's identification with the British 
would surely mean the loss of their future livelihood, if not their lives. 7 Even as the 
Residency collected these observations, the Minister of the Interior and a leading 
'moderate' in Faysal's Cabinet Abdul Mushin Beg al Sa'dun already seemed to be 
succumbing to pressure from the 'extremist element,' submitting his resignation on the 
grounds that "the present Cabinet does not represent the people of Iraq and that it is 
generally considered as being of British manufacture."s 
With a signed Treaty and opposition ostensibly shut down, however, Cox and the 
Residency seemed to enjoy the advantage of having only the usually pro-British al Iraq 
and the official organ of the Hisb al Hurr, al Asimah in publication in Baghdad as Faysal 
proclaimed the commencement of elections for the Constituent Assembly in the early fall 
of 1922. Al Iraq took as moderate an attitude toward the recent approval of the Treaty as 
the Residency could have hoped for in pointing out in late October that, although "not 
wholly satisfying all our demands and national rights," the Treaty relationship was but a 
temporary one "necessary in order to attain our goal and satisfy our national demands ... 
which will make us worthy to demand our legitimate rights from the civilized world." In 
the same issue of al Iraq, the Hisb al Hurr published its manifesto, which considered the 
7 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 22, for November 15, 1922. NA. FOI37117772 
8 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 22, for November 15, 1922. NA. F0137117772 
For a consideration of the relationship between Faysal and the Cabinet as well as the Cabinet's perception 
of its popular legitimacy at this moment, see 'Abd al-Razzaq Hasani, Tarikh Al-Wizarat Al- 'lraqiyah 
(Sayda: Matba'at al-' Irfan, 1953), pp. 100-110 and especially p. 110. 
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Treaty "the first step of an awakening nation to restore its glory .,,9 The key to that 
restoration, both papers argued, was to demonstrate, not to merely to the British or Iraqi 
people, but to the world that Iraqis were a politically engaged and mature people worthy 
of independence. "The civilized world to-day," al Asimah argued in its first edition, 
judges the claim of all nations to participate in a living progress by the extent of 
their appreciation of the benefits of the franchise and a nation which realizes its 
fundamental right provides the clearest evidence of its fitness to a place on the 
forefront of the nations of the world. lO 
al Iraq as well urged not only political participation, but a program of national 
politicization calling upon Iraqis with legal, agricultural, and administrative training to 
run for the Assembly and for Iraqis to put them in office based on those qualifications as 
a means of subverting the scramble of unqualified position-seekers for offices they were 
unqualified to fulfill. l1 Parents were even encouraged to bring their children to political 
meetings and voting stations "as is done in Europe so as to accustom them to care for 
their constitutional rights. All must realize the meaning of independence and national 
sovereignty.,,12 
Within days of Faysal's announcement of the elections, however, prominent Shi'a 
ulema in Kadhimain, Karbala, and Najaf responded withfatwas forbidding any 
participation in elections orchestrated by a non-Muslim power.13 Though determined to 
9 allraq, October 20,1922. 
10 al Asimah, November 5, 1922. Butti argued that al Asimah began publication as a means for the Hisb al 
Hurr to both politically mobilize Iraqis as well as to educate them about the nature of representative 
electoral political life. See Butti, Al-Sihajah, p. 77. 
1\ allraq, October 24, 1922. 
12 allraq, November 1, 1922. 
13l!:lli1. Yitzhak Nakash's The Shi'is oj Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) offers the most 
complete consideration of thejatwas, arguing that they were a product of the disappointment of the Shi'a 
ulema at Faysal's failure to promote Shi'a Sunni equality after the ulema's efforts to give Sherifian calls for 
a nationalist rising in 1920 their support, resulting in the rising of 1920, pp. 79-81. Bashkin has made a 
similar argument giving more emphasis to Shi 'a fears of future political marginalization under a Sunni 
dominated state in The Other Iraq, p. 23. 
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carry on with the elections despite the unwillingness of many Iraqis to go against the 
Jatwas, the Residency was forced to acknowledge the emergence of a more secular 
expression of their sentiment by December. Through "persuasion and threats ... by 
opponents of the Government" attributed by the Residency to the 'extreme nationalist' 
element in Baghdad, all but around 160 of 500 notables invited to decide upon Baghdad's 
electoral committees abstained from attending the meeting. Against motions to carry on 
with the selection of the committee anyway, Da'ud Sa'di, the "mis-stitched young man" 
who had been editor of the suppressed at Dijtah, according to the Residency, objected to 
the legality of the move, arguing that the failure of less than half of the electors to appear 
meant that a quorum had not been reached and the elections could not be legally held. 
When his protestations were ignored, Sa'di pushed the meeting even further from a 
quorum by walking out and taking around half of the electors with him. When the 
Cabinet attempted to classify Sa 'di 's protest as unlawful interference in the electoral 
process, it was the Hisb al Hurr that came to his defense, lodging a formal protest, 
published in at Asimah, condemning the "Government's desire to use force to proceed 
with the elections, which is contrary to Law," by which the writer was referring to the 
very Electoral Law drafted by British advisors.14 In reply to the Ministry of Interior's 
"temperate rejoinder" to the protest, published in at Iraq, at Asimah reminded its readers 
that theJatwas forbidding participation in the election themselves did not stem from mere 
'Shi 'a backwardness, but from the fear that the British intended to hoist the "iron fetters" 
of an unrepresentative Assembly on Iraq and 'strangle its independence' from within. In 
formally retracting its support for the elections as a party, Hisb al Hurr warned the 
14 See at Asimah December 27,1922 and allraq, December 28,1922. 
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government that "the whole nation is determined to refuse participation in elections 
unless they prove by action that they will realize the aspirations of the people.,,15 
Such opposition only increased over the fall and into 1923, as the Residency noted 
in January, with threatening letters and public postings emanating out of nationalist 
enclaves like the Supreme Committee of the Secret Societies of Iraq became more 
common and threatening "to reject the Anglo-Iraq Treaty ... overturn the present Cabinet 
and replace it by one composed of extreme Nationalists 'in whom the nation has trust,' ... 
remove all advisors and bring about the severance of relations between King Faisal and 
the Colonial Office.,,16 Despite the efforts of the Residency to push through with the 
elections regardless, such opposition would continue to obstruct their completion until 
February 1924. 
One explanation for the drift of the Hisb al HUff and at Asimah toward an 
'extremist' position, and the enlivening of the opposition in Iraq to elections they 
perceived as being unfairly influenced by the British or pro-British elements in Iraq,17 can 
be found in political developments in Great Britain. For the British were also engaged in 
a popular election in the fall of 1922 and the advent of the Conference at Lausanne that 
November to forge a settlement between the Turkish and Allied governments, and in 
particular to refute Turkey's claims to the Iraqi territory of Mosul, had become a 
15 at Asimah, December 29, 1922. 
16 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 02, for January 15,1923. NA,Jo/37119009 
17 The focus of most historians of this period on the negotiations with Faysal over the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty or 
to the Jatwas have generally overshadowed any attention to perceptions of the constitutionality of the 
elections addressed in the Iraqi press. See, for example, Sluglett, pp. 75-78, Ireland, pp. 370-390. Dodge, 
for example, largely ignores the press in Iraq and argues that "From 1923 until 1926 the persistent problem 
faced by [the Residency] ... was how to make use of the two main conduits of influence, the king and the 
Council of Ministers, without undermining the Iraqi government's credibility with the population. 
Relations between [the Residency] and Faysal were crucial." Dodge, p. 26. 
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significant election issue.'s Although the Daily Telegraph was correct in identifying, 
with the British public generally, Mosul as "the one city the possession of which ... will 
decide the fate of the Congress" at Lausanne, the writer was mistaken in assuming the 
"blank and total incuriosity with which Mosul in its turn regards the Conference.,,'9 For 
as the Residency noted with slight exaggeration that November, the announcement of the 
Lausanne Conference itself had sparked such a sensation in Iraq as to "almost entirely 
obliterate ... the signing of the Treaty and the preparations for the elections ... from the 
public mind."zo In fact, al Iraq, having got wind of the Turkish claims to Mosul through 
the Times of London, had already been making the case for the inclusion of Mosul in Iraq 
for weeks?' Even the pro-British al Iraq, however, faced the facts of the situation in 
identifying oil, and not the irrefutable historical, ethnic, linguistic, economic, spiritual, 
and political ties of the Mosul vi/ayet to Iraq, as the primary factor in the case?Z Al 
Asimah put the matter even more plainly and historically in arguing that "the Arabs do 
not deserve to become the Poland of the East... We trust that the nations which assemble 
in Lausanne, and especially Great Britain ... will not permit the matter of the frontiers of 
Iraq to be made a question of bargaining. ,,23 
It was not merely the international community's commitment to internationalist 
principles that concerned the Iraqi press, however, but the commitment of the British 
people to standing against the return of any part of Iraq to Turkish rule, and for good 
18 Although historians have gestured to the significance of Lausanne to the 1922 general election in Britain, 
little attention has been paid to the impact of that election on Iraqi sensibilities concerning Anglo-Iraqi 
relations. See Sluglett, Britain and Iraq, pp. 78-79. and Othman Ali, "The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace 
Negotiations, 1922-1923," Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 33, No.3 (July 1997), p. 522. 
19 Daily Telegraph, December 19, 1922. 
20 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report, No. 22 for November 15, 1922. NA. F0137I17772 
21 See, for example, allraq, November 04, 06, 07,08,13,1922. 
22 alIraq, November 8,1922. 
23 al Asimah, November 16, 1922. 
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reason. Iraqi historian Rafial Butti has argued that from the Iraqi press' attention to the 
Times of London alone, editors could gather a very clear picture of popular attitudes in 
Britain toward their government's policy in Iraq that reflected a widespread disapproval 
of both the Treaty and the manner in which it was approved in Iraq as well as a general 
faltering of support for the continuation of the mandate, though the Residency suspected 
that the press were in receipt of a far broader set of clippings from British daily 
newspapers.24 The run up to the conference at Lausanne during the general elections in 
Britain in the fall of 1922 was especially characterized by a storm of criticism in the 
British press over policy in the Middle East generally, of which the Labour press was the 
most penetrating and vehement. By the end of 1922, even al Iraq was expressing its 
concern that High Commissioner Cox undertake his pending mission home to advise the 
incoming Bonar Law administration as an 'emissary of the Iraqi people' not merely to the 
British government, but the British people as well. Cox alone, al Iraq argued, had come 
to know "the soul of the Iraqi people" as he observed the profound progress Iraqis had 
made under extreme circumstances and could, therefore, "explain to the British people 
the hopes of the Arab nation which desires true independence" as he would "explain to 
British politicians the true facts of the position of Iraq." That position, al Iraq explained, 
was one of mutual dependence, for just as Iraq "cannot dispense with the help of a 
powerful nation such as Great Britain ... the need which Great Britain has for an alliance 
with Iraq in order to protect India" must also be understood?S Cox himself certainly 
understood the threat evacuation posed for the pro-British element in Iraq, which he 
conveyed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in January 1923 in requesting that "in 
24 Butti dedicates an entire section of his book on the Iraqi press to the Times of London and its impact on 
Iraqi perceptions of the Anglo-Iraqi relationship. See Butti, At-Sihafah, p. 97-100 in particular. 
25 at Iraq, December 27,1922. 
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view of the attitude of the London papers ... received here this mail" he might have 
authorization to "assure Faisal and others here that the purpose of the conference at which 
my presence is required is to find satisfactory basis for continuance of our task here and 
not to discuss feasibility of abandoning it.,,26 
With the general elections culminating in September 1922 amidst the growing 
threat of war with Turkey, Leonard Woolf raised the specter of oil and oil interests for 
British voters as a crucial force seeking to shape international politics in its favor?7 Even 
the United States, "by tradition and ... by natural inclination, the least imperialistic ... of 
all great Powers," according to Woolf, had been engaged in a policy of supporting 
revolutionary movements in Mexico against every governmental regime since 1916 that 
attempted to declare the petroleum of Mexico the property of the Mexican nation. 
American oil cartels, Woolf illustrated, had come to drive the American government into 
imperialistic policies, "the oil interests have seen that no Mexican Government shall be 
recognized by the U.S.A. until they get one which will protect the American oil 
interests." Where as in America, capitalism was the primary force driving imperialistic 
policies in Mexico, in Britain, oil was perceived more as "an instrument of military 
power." The threat of war was equal to the threat of being denied "control [of] the 
supplies which alone will make warships move, armies march, and, in the end, guns 
shoot." The explanation of the British government's tenacious refusal to 'quit 
26 Cox to Secretary of State for the Colonies, January 01,1923. NA, COn30/37/230. 
27 The attention of the Labour movement to oil as a political issue is almost never raised in historical 
monographs, even in those dealing specifically with Britain's oil policies during this period. For a typical 
example, see Charles More, Black Gold: Britain and Oil in the Twentieth Century (London: Continuum, 
2(09), especially pp. 1-68. For a general survey of the role of oil in Anglo-Iraqi relations, see Helmut 
Mejcher, Imperial Questfor Oil: Iraq 1910-1928, St. Antony's Middle East monographs no. 6 (London: 
Published for the Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College by Ithaca Press, 1976). 
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Mesopotamia' despite the threat of war with Turkey it had now generated, was the fact 
that Mesopotamia was Britain's most promising claim to a permanent supply of oil.Zf3 
In the New Leader that October, H. N. Brailsford ridiculed Lloyd George's claims 
to be fighting for the freedom of the Dardanelle Straits and the safety of Christian 
minorities in formerly Ottoman territories. One could "hardly recognize in this simple 
minded altruism the habitual mind of Downing Street," Brailsford noted, arguing that, in 
any event, even in times of peace "it will be easier ... to retain the oil of Mosul ... when 
the Sultan looks from his palace window at the muscles of our IS-inch guns ... or recover 
the British oil properties at Baku ... if Dreadnoughts may anchor off Batoum."z9 As far as 
Lloyd George's concern for the fate of Christian minorities in Syria and Iraq, Brailsford 
argued that Turkey was already clamoring for a "re-drawing of the frontiers of our 
mandated area of Mesopotamia." The obvious solution, he argued, was to insist on an 
adjustment the frontiers to accommodate ethnic groupings, ceding the Kurdishrrurkish 
populated areas of Mosul to the Turks in exchange for Turkish concessions of territory to 
Russian Armenia. "There is just one obstacle," Brailsford pointed out, "there is oil in 
Mosul." At the heart of the matter was not freedom of the seas or minority rights, 
Brailsford insisted, but power and "power in the modern world means opportunity for the 
capital behind it." The real struggle to take place at Lausanne, he concluded, was one of 
"oil against humanity and power against freedom.,,30 
Drawing from the preceding decade of Labour propaganda, on October 12, two 
days after the Iraqi Cabinet signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the Daily Herald launched a 
28 Foreign Affairs, September, 1922. LSE, Morel PaperslF6122 also see Leonard Woolf, "Proposed 
Memorandum on the Turkish Conference" October 1922, PHM, LPACIQ, No. 251 
29 The New Leader, October 06,1922. 
30 The New Leader, October 06, 1922. 
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series entitled "Secret History of the Anglo-Turk Crisis" with its first installment, "The 
Oil Behind the War Scare," retelling the story of the Great War with oil interests at the 
center?) Beginning with the Baghdad Railway agreements of 1903 and progressing to 
the 'Sykes-Picot and San Remo Oil Agreements,' Paris correspondent George Slocombe 
illustrated how the Allies had all but secured the oil fields they had used the Great War to 
conquer before the recent interference of American and French oil interests. The Ankara 
Agreement between France and Turkey, he argued, was merely a strategic move by those 
countries to wrest control from British backed Shell-Royal Dutch by America's Standard 
Oi1.32 Labour's alternative "Plan for Peace," appearing in the New Leader on November 
10, included the permanent opening of the Straits to merchant shipping in exchange for 
their permanent closure to warships, the expansion of the Russian-Armenian territory in 
exchange for "restoring to [Turkey] Mosul with its oil-bearing lands," and "a complete 
withdrawal [of British forces] from Mesopotamia." "Our seizure of Mesopotamia," the 
writer explained, "was forced against the resistance of its Arab population; our 'mandate' 
encounters their mass resistance, and violates the letter of the spirit of the Covenant.,,33 
As the Lausanne Conference dragged into 1923 and the elections swung in favor 
of the Conservatives under Bonar Law, Labour propaganda became even more adamant 
that the imperial and capitalist interests privileged by Liberal and Conservative British 
governments alike were, indeed, laying the groundwork for a second world war over the 
oil of Mosul. The Daily Herald, for its part, kept an almost daily account of the progress 
31 The Daily Herald was not the only one taking up this position. For a contemporaneous American author 
with the same view, see Louis Fischer, Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum (New 
York: International, 1926). For a more recent study of the role of oil in the First World War, see F. 
William Engdahl, "Oil and the Origins of the Great War," History Compass 5, no. 6 (2007): 2041-2060. 
32 The Daily Herald, October 12, 1922. 
33 New Leader, November 10, 1922. 
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. of the 'oil negotiations' ongoing at Lausanne and beyond, despite the attempts of the 
Lloyd George and then Bonar Law governments at secrecy, asking in mid-December, for 
example "why has ... the chairman of the Petroleum Committee, been staying here in the 
same hotel as the British Delegation? And why was the Delegation so anxious that the 
fact of his presence should not be generally known?,,34 Foreign Affairs rallied military 
experts and former commanders to illustrate how the 'freedom of the Straits' was merely 
code for British freedom to "coerce Turkey, Russia, or Bulgaria in the Sea of Marmora or 
the Black Sea whenever it may suit her.,,35 Worse still, British governments responsible 
for these preparations were no longer acting in the interests of either people or party, but. 
directed like marionettes by "the whole sinister force of International finance" that had 
transformed Constantinople into "the centre of financial intrigue and ill-feeling between 
the ... Western Powers" in the years leading up to the First World War and now into the 
postwar period. The irony that Turkey alone had formally recognized "the complete 
independence of the Arab States" while Europe still clung to 'so-called mandates' and 
'obsolete treaties' with "no validity whatever in International law" was not lost on the 
Labour press?6 In characteristically plain language, the ILP announced in its 1923 
"Manifesto on the Near East," that "THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IS AGAIN 
DRA WING US STRAIGHT INTO WORLD WAR." In opposition to the policy of 
'forced dispossession' under "our so-called Peace Treaties," the ILP "supported the 
recognition of [indigenous] rights" which it declared "as sacred as our own." The authors 
enjoined "the people to work for the political victory" of British Labour which "will 
HURL THIS GOVERNMENT FROM POWER" and provide for a "CONFERENCE OF 
34 Daily Herald, December 18, 1922, see also Daily Herald, December 01,08, 11,18, 1922. 
3S Foreign Affairs December, 1922. 
36 Foreign Affairs December, 1922. 
323 
ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD FROM WHICH THERE SHALL BE NO 
EXCLUSIONS .'037 
Nor were these merely hollow declarations. At the recommendation of the 
Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions, Labour Party 
representatives Charles Buxton and George Young circumvented the British delegates at 
Lausanne and met with the Turkish representative themselves on January 3, 1923. 
Armed with a "modus vivendi" defining Labour's terms for Anglo-Turkish relations in 
detail, Buxton and Young were granted a meeting with Turkish delegate Ismet Pasha 
"immediately on arrival" at Lausanne to arrange "a personal understanding with him 
which would justify us in recommending to our party leaders to enter into direct relations 
with the delegation on a rupture becoming inevitable." When Ismet Pasha inquired 
whether a minority party could secure Parliamentary approval of their 'understanding,' 
Buxton and Young replied that, if Ismet could "reassure humanitarian sentiment" in 
Britain by accepting their terms, Labour "would take the responsibility of stopping a war 
with Turkey" if present negotiations fell apart. Although receptive to their overtures, 
Ismet admitted, and vindicated Labour's position somewhat, that "if the Conference 
failed the quickest and cheapest road to peace might be by war." He welcomed the 
opening of dialogue with Labour leaders, however, as an alternative to war should that 
situation arise and agreed to keep those channels open which, "in any case," Buxton and 
Young pointed out, "will enable them to claim that the Party had done all it could with 
that object.,,38 
37 The Near East: Independent Labour Party Manifesto, 1923. LSE, ILPIS11923146. 
38 LPACIQ Memo 270 PHM 19230102 
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Editorials and articles in the Times and the Daily Telegraph defended and even 
celebrated Lord Curzon's "crushing demolition of Ismet's arguments" over Turkey's 
claims to Mosul at the conference as "almost cruel in its logic and in its humor,,39 and 
criticized Turkey's case as characterized by "simple ignorance and inability to understand 
the issues in question.,,40 For Labour writers, however, Curzon's arguments about 
Mosul's cultural, historical, linguistic, and economic homogeneity with the rest of Iraq 
were not only erroneous, but irrelevant. For it was not the identifications or preferences 
of rule of the inhabitants, but what lay "under the Kurdish villages ... which endear Mosul 
to Lord Curzon.,,41 The invasion of the Ruhr by France that January, and the failure of 
the British government to challenge that invasion, played directly into Labour's critique.42 
For, according to the New Leader, in the tradition of Anglo-French quid pro quo, "it is 
because Downing Street is grabbing oil, that it dare not stop the French from grabbing the 
coal [of the Ruhr]." The brazenness of the French invasion, however, only served as a 
reminder, for Brailsford, of the responsibility of the British people and Labour in 
particular to reign in the policy of its own government. The first step in influencing 
policy internationally, he argued, was for the British people to "insist on the evacuation, 
not of Cologne, but of Mosul." Only when the British people had "made our own 
Government understand that not all the oil of Mosul will reconcile us to the ruin of 
Europe will it be time to consider the best mediation or intervention" in the exploitative 
actions of other mineral hungry imperial powers, "let us prepare for the settlement by 
39 See, for example, Times of London January 23,25, and 30, 1923. 
40 Daily Telegraph,January 31,1923. 
41 New Leader,January 5, 1923. 
42 For Labour solidarity on the Ruhr crisis, see Henry R. Winkler, Paths Not Taken: British Labour and 
International Policy in the 1920's (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina, 1994), p. 
96. 
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cleaning our own record and freeing our own hands in the East.,,43 Oil was a far more 
combustible factor in global politics than coal, however. As George Young warned 
forebodingly in the New Leader, like the inflammable crude itself, "once oil gets into 
politics, any spark may set our whole world in a blaze that must be left to burn itself out." 
It was up to a "strong Labour government" to 'cement-off' the oil problem in British 
politics before that happened.44 
Certainly, Bonar Law recognized the tide of opinion on the mandate in Iraq over 
the course of the elections and campaigned on reducing British responsibility as far as 
possible if elected.4s On February 20,1923, the new Prime Minister insisted to the House 
of Commons that, in framing his administration's approach to Iraq, "the question of oil 
did not enter into the matter at all" and that he and his government were "strongly in 
favor of quitting, if that can be arranged on honourable terms.46 The Labour press bitterly 
ridiculed the subsequent and contradictory brief by Winston Churchill leading the House, 
according to the Daily Herald, to expect "the establishment of a new Nineveh and the 
resurrection of another Nebuchenezzar" in Iraq despite the fact that "that the very word 
'Mespot' stinks in the nostrils of the British public, and 'Irak' is no less offensive to our 
nerves.,,47 This contradictory and even duplicitous attitude from the Bonar Law 
administration, the New Leader reported, was an affront to the British people, whose will 
was reflected in the "demand for evacuation ... from every quarter of the House." It was 
common knowledge, the New Leader insisted, that, "Arabs never wanted our rule, that 
43 New Leader, January 19,1923. 
44 New Leader, January 20,1923. 
45 Othman Ali, "The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923," Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 
33, No.3 (July 1997), pp. 522. 
46 Daily Telegraph, February 21,1923. 
47 Daily Herald, February 21, 1923. 
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our 'coupon' King Feisal was foisted upon them by intrigue, and is maintained only by 
our subsidies and our bombing planes. Repeated revolts, both in Iraq proper and in 
Mosul, have made the pretense that we stay there to keep faith with the Arabs, too 
ridiculous even for Parliamentary use.,,48 By March, the Bonar Law administration had 
adopted the position that, although reduction in responsibilities in Iraq was of paramount 
importance, "this country ... was not going out at the point of the Turkish bayonet.,,49 
Although Labour and Liberal MP's alike, according to the Daily Herald's account of the 
March debate in the House of Bonar Law's Iraq policy, seemed to agree that, "given 
anything like a free vote of this House, it seems clear that we should decide to clear out 
of Mesopotamia," Bonar Law, like Lloyd George before him, seemed content to remain 
in Iraq, according to Labour MP's, "until the Kurds don frockcoats and become 
Presbyterian ministers.,,50 
In drafting the Bonar Law administration's policy for Iraq, the special Cabinet 
Committee assigned to the task arrived at the same conclusion as its predecessors, but 
with even more conviction in light of Turkish intransigence at Lausanne, that evacuation 
of Iraq would lead directly to internal collapse and Turkish occupation "with the results 
to British interests in those regions, and even in India, that might well in the long run be 
disastrous.,,51 The Committee was forced to recognize, however, "that there exists a 
powerful body of opinion, both in Parliament and the country, which favors ... an early 
48 New Leader, February 23, 1923. 
49 Times of London, March 2, 1923, the words are attributed to Ormsby-Gore. 
50 Daily Herald, March 2,1923. 
51 For the formation of the Committee and its preoccupation with evacuation, see Othman Ali, "The Kurds 
and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923," Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 33, No.3 (July 1997), pp. 
522-524. For the report of the Committee, see Cabinet Committee on Iraq Report, March 23,1923. NA, 
CAB/27 /206/103. 
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escape from the responsibilities ... [we] have been forced to assume in Iraq ... [if not] 
immediate evacuation," a policy Bonar Law had, in fact, campaigned on. To bridge this 
gap in policy commitments, the Committee recommended the compromise of an 
addendum to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty known as the Protocol that would reduce its length 
from twenty down to four years, dating from the pending settlement of the Iraqi frontier 
with Turkey, at which point the British government would recommend Iraq for 
membership to the League of Nations. As a further concession to opposition in Iraq, the 
Protocol also proposed that negotiations over the more contentious aspects of the current 
Treaty should be completed before its four-year expiration and form the basis of a new, 
post-mandate Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.52 This formula, policy planners believed, would 
encourage the Turkish delegates to accept the status quo with the hope that they might 
more effective make their case after the four-year term of the Treaty had passed as well 
as quell the clamor for evacuation in Britain and give Iraqi nationalists a sense of 
accommodation and progress toward complete independence. 53 The fact that the nature 
of the Protocol had been kept secret from even Fay sal , let alone the British or Iraqi 
public, for the duration of its planning over the spring of 1923 lends a degree of irony to 
the concern of its drafters that the Protocol "appear to the world" as a mutual agreement 
among peoples, "and not as a settlement imposed upon Iraq by Great Britain.,,54 
52 Cabinet Committee on Iraq Report, March 23,1923. NA, CAB12712061103 For a discussion of the 
Protocol, see Ireland, p. 378 and 406. 
53 The official documents discussing the logic of the Protocol compromise are located in NAlCOn30/39. 
54 Shuckburgh to Secretary of State April 25, 1923. NA, COl730139120768 For the "astonishment" of 
members of the House, and particularly, Commander Kenworthy, as well as their frustrations at not being 
permitted an opportunity to debate the Protocol before its announcement, see Times of London, May 4, 
1923. For discussions of potential reactions from Faysal and the Iraqi Cabinet, and thus, evidence of their 
ignorance of the Protocol, see Shuckburgh memo, April 16, 1923 on Faysal's ignorance of the Committee's 
conclusions and nature of Protocol. NA, con30/39/584. For a discussion of the largely positive 
perspective of the Sa'dun Cabinet on the Protocol, see 'Abd al-Razzaq Hasani, Tarikh Al-Wizarat Al-
'lraqiyah (Sayda: Matba'at al-'Irfan, 1953), pp. 125. 
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In his announcement of the Protocol compromise in Baghdad on May 3, 1923, Cox 
emphasized the "great strides along the path of development" Iraq had made since the 
signature of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty October last and the fact that both the British and the 
Iraqis were "equally anxious that the commitments and responsibilities of His Majesty's 
Government in respect to Iraq should be terminated as soon as possible.,,55 In praising 
the Protocol, Faysal also identified it as the clearest evidence of the "rapid strides" made 
by Iraqis and "proof of [British] confidence in the proficiency and competence of the 
people of Iraq.,,56 As if to galvanize the moment of transition, Cox announced his 
retirement just a few days later with a farewell address expressing his satisfaction that his 
tenure had seen the resolution of key tensions and set Iraq down the road to independence 
and membership in the League.57 The Residency had to admit, however, that the 
Protocol's announcement "has not excited the interest which was anticipated" in Iraq. 
Enemies of the Treaty, it was reported, viewed the Protocol as a stopgap, buying time for 
British advisors to ensconce themselves into the bedrock of Iraq's developing political 
economy before Turkish belligerence or Iraqi unrest drove them out. On the other end of 
the spectrum, pro-Treaty clients of the British among the landowning or ruling elite 
viewed the four-year term as a revocation of British promises to ensure the longevity of 
their power and prestige in the Iraqi state.58 
In the reaction of the Iraqi press to the Protocol, three related interpretations stand 
out. The first was that the Protocol compromise was the direct result of the collective 
opposition to the mandate and the Treaty of the Iraqi and the British public. The second 
was that its promulgation, with no reference to the League of Nations, meant that British 
obligations to the League were not as binding as the Residency claimed. Third, the 
SS For the full text of the announcement, see Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 10 
for May 15,1923. NA, FO/371/9009 
56 l.\:ilit. 
57 1.l:ili1. 
S81hiQ. 
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Protocol set an irrevocable precedent of acknowledging Iraqi political maturity as a state 
and, thus, Iraqi independence. Still the only paper in publication other than al Iraq, al 
Asimah preempted the announcement of the Protocol by a few days with a review of the 
progress of Iraqi development on May 3, identifying three distinct phases. The first 
phase comprised British colonialism, in which Wilson was permitted to rule "as though in 
a country like India governed directly by the British Crown." This phase, the writer 
argued, was brought to a close by the violent opposition of the Iraqi people in the 1920 
rising. The second phase one of British acquiescence, though decidedly imperfect and 
incomplete, to Iraqi demands under Cox, involving the "transfer of many important duties 
from English to Iraqi officials," the formation of a Council of State, the selection of an 
Arab monarch, and the early stages of transition from a mandate to a treaty relationship. 
The third stage, again the result of Iraqi criticisms of her quasi-colonial status, would be 
characterized by "the principle of withdrawal from Iraq gradually" that Cox, no doubt, 
was about to return to Baghdad and announce in the days to come.59 
The announcement of the Protocol was the "best source" of evidence, al Asimah 
proclaimed, that the "fitness of the Iraqi people to control their own affairs" and "the 
refusal of the English people any longer to shoulder the burden of the responsibility for 
Iraq" were the "two main causes" determining the course of the Anglo-Iraq relationship. 
"Everyone has seen," al Asimah stated, "the very general desire which has grown up in 
England for the evacuation of Iraq and the surrender of the task of government to the 
people." The transferability of this policy between British governments merely proved 
that "the differences of British politicians have been merely differences of opinion as to 
the best means of achieving this end without endangering British imperial and 
commercial interests in the East.,,60 As the 'moderate' party, it is significant that at 
59 at Asimah, May 3, 1923. 
60 at Asimah, May 7,1923. 
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Asimah identified the moment as opportune for the artificial divisions between the so-
called "optimists and the pessimists, the moderates and the extremists" be abandoned and 
Iraqis permit themselves to be "unified by their patriotism and the common cause of their 
country .'>61 
As part of the Residency's new regime under the Protocol, al Istiqlal was permitted 
to resume publication on May 17, to the consternation of Sir Henry Dobbs, Cox's 
replacement as High Commissioner.62 Ai Istiqiai also attributed the transition in British 
policy to the activism of the Iraqi people and, particularly, to itself, having fought from 
its inception for "freedom of speech, of writing and of assembly ... the abolition of 
martial law ... calling of an assembly representing the nation to frame a constitution ... the 
surrender of the reins of Government to the sons of the country only and the expulsion of 
the intruders who are sponging on it" in the face of "severe persecution and the sorrows 
of imprisonment and exile" and "repeated orders which have suspended this journal ... 
three times in succession, sometimes without trial.'063 In addition to suppressing the voice 
of the Iraqi people, as al Istiqlal styled itself, the British had also struggled to disable 
Iraqi political development, rather than progress it. The reason, ai Istiqiai explained, that 
the British had not, in the nearly four years of Iraqi political life, permitted the drafting of 
a constitution "which will define the duties and rights of all and which will secure 
democracy by laws which cannot be abrogated except by the independent representatives 
of the people," for example, was precisely because a "Government supported by the 
strong arms of the people will be able to show its strength to those who desire its 
degradation." Al Istiqiai enjoined Iraqis to build off the Protocol immediately by 
demanding open elections, "so that the people may have an opportunity to declare its will 
in connection with the treaty and its protocol." "This is the age of democracy and 
61 al Asimah, May 8,1923. 
62 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 09, May 1,1923 and Office of the High 
Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 11 ,June 1, 1923.NA, F0137119009 
63 allstiqlal, May 17, 1923. 
freedom," al Istiqlal insisted, "and we will not accept an administration not in accord 
with civilized and democratic principles." 64 
In this endeavor, al Asimah reasoned, the Protocol had turned the humiliating 
imposition of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty into a clear advantage. In a series of articles 
published toward the end of May, al Asimah illustrated for its readers that the 
combination of Treaty and Protocol constituted an acknowledgement that "the legal 
status [of Iraq] has been changed.,,65 What this meant, al Asimah explained, was that 
"whether [the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and Protocol] are ratified by the parliaments of both 
countries" or not, "now that she has been a signatory to this treaty with Iraq ... Great 
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Britain cannot claim before the League of Nations or the civilized world that she has any 
longer a right to continue the protection over Iraq.,,66 Al Istiqlal concurred, arguing that 
the British excuse in denying Iraqi independence that the mandate "is a duty which has 
been entrusted to us by the noble League ... we cannot lightly disregard" was proven false 
by the Protocol itself. Had not the British determined the duration of the mandate to be 
twenty years in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty "although the League made no resolution in this 
connection" and then, "when the English saw the determination of the Iraq people to gain 
their ends and the difficulties which they would have to face in Iraq," reduced the term 
from twenty down to four years, "again without reference to the League?" Based on 
these facts, al Istiqlal argued, it seemed quite clear that, 
the lengthening or decreasing of the duration of the mandates, even the matter of 
establishing or removing the mandates does not depend on the opinion of the 
League but on the determination of the mandated people and the difficulties which 
they can create for the mandatory power. The greater the efforts for independence 
and the greater the difficulties of the protecting powers the shorter will be the 
duration of the protectorate and vice versa.67 
64 at Istiqtat, May 21, 1923. 
65 at Asimah, May 23,1923. 
66 at Asimah, May 24,1923. 
67 al Istiqlal, May 22,1923. 
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at Asimah followed up over the next few days with a series of articles on Iraq's political 
future discussing the roles of the Iraqi people, the Iraq government, and the British 
mandatory power. The Iraqi people, at Asimah lamented, "suffered from political 
lethargy" represented by too few political parties, the few existing having been "animated 
by personal prejudice." It was their obligation to engage in the development of their 
government and state by joining political parties, voting in the elections, demanding that 
those elections be free, and giving their service, be it intellectual or physical, to the state. 
The role of the Iraqi government was quite simple, it must submit to becoming "an 
instrument of the will of the Iraqi people." The British administration, in tum, was 
expected to tum control over the Iraqi state, not to the Iraqi government per se, but to the 
Iraqi people, through ensuring that elections occur at the earliest possible moment and 
that those "elections are held in a clear atmosphere free from martial law and extra legal 
actions and the freedom of parties and assemblies.,,68 
In his instructions as High Commissioner, Dobbs was informed that the basic 
principle underlying the Bonar Law administration's approach to Anglo-Iraqi relations 
was "co-operation towards ... the progressive establishment of an independent 
Government of Iraq, friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligation to His Britannic 
Majesty's Government.,,69 An Iraqi Parliament imbued by the electoral process with 
popular legitimacy, it was believed, would not only quiet the clamor for evacuation in 
London and for complete independence in Iraq, but also strengthen the British case for 
Mosul and open the way for legislation concerning Iraq's financial and military 
development. 7o In any event, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and Protocol could not be ratified 
until a popularly elected assembly had been put in place to ratify them and, in so doing, 
68 See at Asimah, May 24,26, and 27,1923. 
69 Instructions to Dobbs, September 19, 1923. NA, CO/730/41 
70 llllil. 
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clearly articulate in legal language the precise relationship between British advisors and 
the Iraqi state they were attempting to shape in Britain's imperial interests. 71 
It was the Residency's hope in late May 1923 that the promise of membership to 
the League in four years would entice "the anti-British elements towards withdrawing 
their opposition to the elections. For it is obvious that admission to the League of 
Nations can only be gained by electing a Constituent Assembly and passing the Organic 
Law and ratifying the Treaty." With "all three of the newspapers now published ," 
meaning al Iraq, al Asimah, and al Istiqlal, "advocating the holding of elections at the 
earliest possible date," Dobbs had every reason to believe that the re-commencement of 
the elections would prove considerably smoother than the preceding fall.72 Accordingly, 
Dobbs began seeding the field of Iraqi opinion that June with the promise of 'free 
elections,' as demanded by the Iraqi press, but also with the subtle threat that, should 
such opposition be again permitted to derail the electoral process, the consequences for 
Iraq's political future would be dire. 
On June 12, for example, Dobbs announced that Iraq was not, as the press had long 
attested, under martial law , that it had not been so since the end of the 1920 rising and 
that no such limitations would hamper the complete freedom of the coming elections for 
a Constituent Assembly to approve an Iraqi constitution and electoral law and begin the 
process of electing an Iraqi Parliament. Meanwhile, however, the Iraqi Cabinet was 
passing legislation to amend the Baghdad Penal Code to permit the "dispatch to the State 
of which he is a national" any individual convicted of a crime or misdemeanor with a 
sentence of over a month and to significantly broaden the definition of "publication" to 
71 Ibid. 
72 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 11 June 1,1923. NA, F01371/9009 
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include any public expression, written or spoken in its laws against sedition.73 The 
Residency's vernacular paper, the Baghdad Times, accompanied the announcement with 
a statement of its surety that the compromises contained in the Protocol would surely 
have met the objections of the "the more extremist political associations ... suppressed 
last year." The writer also warned Iraqis, however, that "a new British Premier is now in 
power ," referring to the replacement of Bonar Law by Stanley Baldwin due to Bonar 
Law's sudden illness, "who, it is notorious, was the leading opponent of the policy of 
retaining British forces in Iraq and who would jump, even more eagerly than Mr. Bonar 
Law would have done, at any valid excuse for clearing out." If there were to be "an 
outburst of agitation against the amended Treaty," the article anticipated, "John Bull will 
utter a cry of relief to find that he is not wanted ... and there will be an irresistible 
agitation in Great Britain for an immediate withdrawal of all the British Forces from 
Iraq .,,74 Al Iraq followed up the article with its agreement that, under the new 
circumstances, unwanted and self-serving agitation against the Treaty and the Protocol 
promised only to reverse the gains they had made and ensure "the continuation of foreign 
control" and the concentration of "the affairs of state in the hands of those over whom the 
people have no control.,,75 
al Asimah and allstiqlal, however, scoffed at what the two papers perceived as an 
attempt, typical of British colonial policy, to present imperial rule as something less than 
antithetical to indigenous independence. In reply to Dobbs' inability "to understand 
73 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 13, June 6,1923. NA, F0137119009 For a 
discussion of the Sa'dun Cabinet's perspectives on preparing for and dealing with opposition to the 
elections see 'Abd al-Razzaq Hasani, Tarikh Al-Wizarat Al- 'Iraqiyah (Sayda: Matba'at al-' Irfan, 1953), pp. 
128-134. 
74 Baghdad Times, June 11, 1923. 
75 al Iraq, June 14,1923. 
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whence can have arisen the idea that Iraq is in any way subjected to martial law,',76 al 
Asimah expressed its inability to comprehend "under what kind of law ... men of this 
country were sent to Henjam and Persia [or] the nationalist press suppressed" or under 
which "the former High Commissioner [could have] assumed responsibility for these 
momentous actions.'>77 If Iraq was not under martial law ,al Asimah stated, "there was 
certainly some other kind of law resembling it in severity ."78 Al Istiqlal was even more 
deeply wounded by Dobbs' denial in that, its editor claimed, it was "we alone who have 
raised our voice in the name of the nation ... demanding the abolition of martial law" in 
the face of suppression and imprisonment. 79 Even after Dobbs' announcement, al Istiqlal 
noted a few days later, when "one of our eloquent citizens began to make a speech" at a 
farewell gathering for Sayid Muhsin Abu Tabikh, a Shi'a anti-election agitator who's 
deportation to Persia had been ordered under the new Penal code, "he was stopped by the 
Police in the name of the Director of Public Security.'.so Nevertheless, as al Asimah 
pointed out, the gesture gave leverage to Iraqi patriots concerned with free elections as 
well as acknowledged the legitimacy of the struggles, well-known to the Iraqi people, of 
"the intelligentsia of this country ... [for] the abolition of martial law , the complete 
freedom of the press, the withdrawal of the postal censorship and liberty for the 
formation of political societies, and assembly of political meetings.'>81 What was now 
needed, al Asimah argued, was the full participation of the entire nation in elections for a 
Constituent Assembly, but not only "to control the High Commissioner ... and compel 
76 al Asimah, June 11,1923. 
77 al Asimah, June 12, 1923. 
78 al Asimah, June 12, 1923. 
79 alistiqlal, June 12, 1923. 
80 alistiqlal, June 15, 1923. 
81 al Asimah, June 12, 1923. 
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[the British] to abandon their policy of banishments and exile and to ensure freedom of 
speech," but also "because a nation which cannot form such an assembly is not fit for 
independence. ,,82 
Both al Istiqlal and al Asimah undertook the responsibility of translating the 
expression of national identity they had read in the popular opposition to an illegitimate 
political system into an expression of political maturity through popular participation in 
legitimate elections. Both papers referenced the ongoing struggles all around them as 
examples to follow and inspiration to act. "All over the Arab territories," al Istiqlal 
reported in June 1923, "there is an intellectual movement and a sort of struggle to deliver 
these territories from the influence of foreigners and the wavering agents of mischief." 
Among "our brethren the sons of Palestine," however, "there is a blessed awakening 
which all but exceeds that of Egypt." The "best feature of the Palestine renaissance," al 
Istiqlal argued, was "the close union of her sons in resisting immigration of the Jews and 
the rejection of the mandate" as a foreign form of government. With but a quarter of the 
population and a tenth of the wealth of Iraq, Palestinians had organized politically on a 
national level , effectively mobilizing the "energy and fidelity" of the people behind a 
united front of nationalist leaders to challenge injurious legislation, unfair elections, and 
treaty agreements "prejudicial to the public interest." Coupled with the efforts of 
Palestinians to preserve their free press, organize political and economic conferences and 
national demonstrations, any Iraqi must admit that, whereas "Palestine has surpassed all 
Arab territories ... we have not yet done a little part of what the sons of Palestine have 
82 at Asimah, June 11,1923. 
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achieved in order to restore our glory and to achieve the longed for union under the shade 
of complete independence.,,83 
Days later, al Istiqlal offered a review of recent developments in Egypt to 
demonstrate, as the headline stated, that "the state of affairs in Egypt is similar to what is 
going on in Iraq." Al Istiqlal attributed the release of Egyptian nationalist leader Sa'ad 
Zaghloul and his colleagues from prison and the lifting of martial law to the collective 
efforts of Egyptian nationalists and "the liberals among the English" who listened to the 
"bitter complaints of the Egyptians and their cry for deliverance to the world," concluded 
that "the difficulty in Egypt would become a continuous disturbance in the Arab East," 
and "fought their battle and convinced the opposing parties to adopt a fair policy by 
which the Egyptians remain absolutely free in their country." As developments in Iraq 
had also taught, al Istiqlal argued, "international policy changes according to political 
and economic interests" and that, having occupied Iraq in the name of English interests, 
the English will be disinclined to stay "if they find that by doing so they will injure their 
own interests and create difficulties ... in the present and the future.,,84 With al Istiqlal, al 
Asimah stressed that "the Great War has changed the structure of society ... all peoples 
are now striving to find the road to success" and that Iraqis must follow the example of 
other nations, lest the moment be 10st.85 Already, al Istiqlal argued in early July, the 
efforts of the Egyptians to erect a modem government and those of the Palestinians to 
obstruct the colonization of their nation had noticeably "compelled Great Britain to 
submit to right and give attention to what is going on ... before the situation gets too 
83 allstiqlal,June 25,1923. 
84 allstiqlat,June 27,1923. 
85 at Asimah,June 25,1923. 
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dangerous ... [and] changed the old policy of Great Britain ... let us strive to emulate the 
actions of our brave and noble brothers."86 
The key theme, for the press, of Iraqi unity in the name of political power was 
shaken somewhat by the renewedfatwas emanating out of the Shi'a ulema in Kadhimain 
and the symbolic semi-voluntary exodus of nine Shi' a divines to Persia in the wake of the 
subsequent arrests for interference with the elections in July 1923.~ Although 
sympathetic with the gesture, which both al Asimah and al Istiqlal supported during the 
first round of elections, both papers took a somewhat different view in the summer of 
1923. In reporting on the exodus, al Asimah stated that the act "has for one reason given 
us great pleasure and for many reasons grief." On the one hand, the absconding ulema 
were all "learned and respected" figures in Iraq who had long spoken for "the spirit of a 
section of the Iraqi nation" whose departure threatened to "permanently mark by the 
policy of exile and banishment ... the history of our new awakening." On the other hand, 
by exiling themselves to Persia, the Shi'a ulema were merely acknowledging their noble 
Persian identity, clarifying for Iraqis that their government should be "free from all those 
who would confuse religion with politics to the corruption of the latter and the 
degradation of the former" and "to the nations of the world" that the Iraqi people are 
"firmly attached to the cause of their complete independence ... [and] hold their nation 
and their patriotism above all persons," even such revered and respected persons the 
ulema.88 
86 allstiqlal, July 5,1923. 
ffI Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 14, July 5,1923. NA, FO/37l/9009 Also see 
Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 81-82 and Hasani, 
Tarikh Al-Wizarat. 
88 al Asimah. July 2,1923. See also allstiqlal,June 29, 1923, and August 20,1923. 
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On August 3, with the Electoral Committee for the Constituent Assembly in 
place, ai /stiqiai announced Iraq's first official candidate, the renowned poet and 
literary scholar, Ma'ruf ibn Abd al Ghani al Rusafi.89 Al Rusafi's program, which the 
Residency described as "a fair representation of the views of the average politically 
awakened Iraqi," was as follows.90 The existing government had been a necessary, but 
temporary measure that "cannot legally exist permanently" and must be replaced by a 
Constituent Assembly, freely elected by the people and comprised of men of "sense, 
foresight, free thought, and honest intention." The first duty of the Assembly would be 
to draft an Iraqi Constitution defining the form of government desired by the people, al 
Rusafi's preferred form being "democratic and representative" with the "authority 
vested in the people" and the powers of the King "limited and restricted." Al Rusafi 
placed the development of Iraq's economy at the fore of his program, insisting that 
interconnectivity of national interests in the modem global economy had made 
"economic independence ... more difficult for a nation to achieve than political 
independence." Without the former, the later was impossible. Finally, al Rusafi 
addressed the future of Anglo-Iraqi relations. In exchange for England's recognition of 
Iraqi independence and reduction of British control and interference in Iraqi politics, al-
Rusafi intended to ensure that British economic interests, mutually agreed upon, were 
protected, "not by them, but by us." As for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, al Rusafi pointed 
out that it had been signed by a temporary and not formally legalized government and 
89 al Rusafi was poet and literary scholar interested in the struggles of an emerging Arab working classes 
who took to writing anti-colonialist literature and poems after the 1920 rising. 
90 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 16, August 9,1923. NA. FOl37119009 
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that, "all that it contains which is in accord with what I have said is acceptable to me, 
and all that is contrary, I reject.,,91 
To the disappointment of Dobbs and the Residency, the attitude taken up by al-
Rusafi, that the current government, the Treaty, and even the King were technically 
unconstitutional in origin quickly took root as a major campaign platform threatening to 
overwhelm the halting progress of more 'moderate' candidates especially in outlying 
regions.92 Accordingly, al Istiqlal and others clamored for any information they could 
get on the progress of the Treaty negotiations and drafting of the constitution, arguing 
that all candidates for the Constituent Assembly should make their positions on the 
Treaty as clear as possible so that the people could get behind those who represented 
their views.93 In an early warning of events to come, the Baghdad Times expressed its 
opinion in early September that campaigning on the promise to accept, amend, or reject 
the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and Protocol was somewhat moot in that, "the task of the 
Assembly will be either to accept or reject [the Treaty]. If the Assembly rejects the 
Treaty immediate evacuation of Iraq by the British Forces will take place." Should the 
Assembly accept the Treaty, however, Iraq stood a chance at becoming a member of 
the League of Nations within one year.94 
Although Treaty negotiations continued in secret, a draft of Iraq's first constitution, 
known as the Organic Law, was published in the vernacular press on November 9, 1923, 
with the Constituent Assembly elections nearly complete. Pronounced by Faysal to be 
91 allstiqlal,August 3,1923. 
92 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 18, September 20,1923. NA. FOl37119010 
93 See, for example, allstiqlal September 12, 1923. NA. FOl371190JO 
94 Baghdad Times, September 10, 1923. (172) See also Butti, Al-Sihafah. p. 96-97. 
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"one of the most advanced constitutions in the civilized world,,,95 allstiqlal nevertheless 
called upon Iraq's jurists and lawyers to give the draft "minute examination letter by 
letter" and to make their views known to the public through the press, for "there are many 
ignorant of the law" and the views of legal specialists "will be the best guide for the 
Assembly when it comes to consider the matter.,,96 One such lawyer, Salman aI-Shaikh 
Daud, published a series of articles on the Organic Law in allraq.97 The first article 
compared the constitution with those of other "progressive countries" and giving credit to 
Iraqi legislative authorities for drafting a document "consistent with the wishes of the 
majority" as well as "convenient to the political and social conditions of the country ."98 
A second article traced the history of the constitutional monarchy to eighteenth-century 
England, comparing constitutional development in France, America, Spain, and England, 
and illustrating the relationship between the English constitution and Parliament with 
those in other regions modeled after them, such as Iraq.99 A third article dissected the 
constitution article by article, alternately praising and criticizing it in relation to 
international and internationalist ideals. The Iraqi constitution exceeded some European 
models in its emphasis on the vestment of political power in the hands of all Iraqis 
equally, irrespective of caste or creed, and in placing that power above both the 
government and the King. Daud criticized the caveats permitting the subjugation of 
95 The full text of the speech was published in Baghdad Times, September 25, 1923. 
96 al Istiqlal, November 9,1923. 
97 Perhaps the most complete consideration of Shaikh Daud and his family concerns their involvement in 
what Noga Efrati has referred to as an awakening of feminist identity in interwar Iraq in "The Other 
'Awakening' in Iraq: The Women's Movement in the First Half of the Twentieth Century ," British Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies 31, no. 1 (November 2004): 153-173. Butti also discusses Shaikh Daud as a 
respected contributor to the Iraqi press, notable for the diversity of publications his articles appeared in, 
which included even the oppositional al Iraq and al Istiqlal, see Rafail Butti, Al-Sihafah Fi Al- 'Iraq, p. 93-
94. 
98 at Iraq, November 12, 1923. 
99 al Iraq, November 13, 1923. 
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Iraqis to "bonds or suffering ... exile or transportation ... [or] compulsion to change 
residence ... [and the] denial of recourse to the Courts ... in accordance with the law," all 
being "punishment favored by autocrats" and generally "prohibited in all civilized law" 
in most other constitutions. lOo In early December, allstiqlal followed up Daud's analysis 
with a consideration of the constitution against the principles of Jean Rousseau's Social 
Contract by the Baghdadi lawyer Mahami Ali Mahmud.101 Presenting Rousseau's ideas 
as 'foundational to European constitutionalism,' Mahmud explained how the constitution 
was merely a reflection of the guiding principle that "the rule in fact lies with the people 
and the Government is but an executive authority to carry out their aspirations and 
wishes," offering quotations from a French Parliamentary debates dating back to the 
1790's as evidence of its legitimacy.102 
What all of this comparative legal analysis amounted to, allstiqlal informed the 
secondary electors gathered together in February 1924 to elect the final members of the 
Constituent Assembly, was that no single nation in Europe would have considered the 
draft constitution prepared for them by the British nor the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty approved 
by their predecessors as binding in any legal sense as they were not drafted or approved 
by a representative assembly. It was the responsibility of a representative Constituent 
Assembly, therefore, and not the British, to decide for themselves the form of 
government Iraq would have and whether or not to accept the so-called Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty, which allstiqlal insisted was "not really a treaty if we consider the legal features 
and characteristics of treaties" and "would have been better to have given it the term 
100 al Iraq, November 14, 1923. 
101 For a discussion of Ali Mahmud as central figure of the anti-Treaty movement in the press, see Rafail 
Butti, Al-Sihajah, p. 93-94. 
102 al Istiqlal, December 9,1923. 
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'Charter of Independence' ."103 By April 1924, the Residency was beginning to more 
clearly identify the sources of such legalistic analysis in what British Political Officers 
described as a "small group of intelligentsia" comprised of "law students and lawyers" 
affiliated with various allegedly non-political social societies, such as the adult-education 
society Ma 'had al Ilmi .104 Alarmingly, such individuals had made a strong showing as 
Constituent Assembly candidates, who the Residency identified in March as collectively 
posing a significant threat to the approval of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.!05 Although a 
minority, this 'lawyer's group' as they were more regularly referred to by the Residency 
over the course of 1924 was also gaining ground among powerful aspirants to power like 
Yasin al Hashimi, a former Sharifian officer who, the Residency believed, desired "to 
play himself in the Iraq a part resembling that of Zaghlul Pasha in Egypt."I06 
The Residency attempted to counter such legalistic arguments about the legitimacy 
of the instruments of government produced under the Council of State or Fay sal 's 
Cabinet with its own comparative analysis in the Baghdad Times, arguing that, 
"according to international practice," as evidenced by the Treaty of Versailles as well as 
the recent Anglo-Irish Treaty, once signed by both parties, no alterations or amendments 
to a treaty may be made before .its ratification. The obvious reason for this being that, 
should one party be allowed to make alterations, then the other would feel at liberty to do 
the same, resulting in the treaty never being ultimately ratified.107 At Istiqlat countered 
with an expose on "the worn-out policy of Colonization" being substituted everywhere 
103 al Istiqlal, February 25,1924. 
104 See Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 08 for April 17, 1924. NA, FO/ 371/10097 
105 A complete list of the deputies annotated with their position on the Treaty is offered in Office of the 
High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.5 March 6,1924. 
106 See Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 08 for April 17,1924. NA, FO/371110097 
107 Baghdad Times, April 10, 1924. 
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with treaties of alliance made with the very revolutionaries it had created, such as 
"Gandhi in India, Zaghlul in Egypt, DeValera in Ireland, and Abdul Karim in Morocco" 
specifically.l08 The next day, al Istiqlal followed with two articles by deputies of the 
Assembly arguing that the 1920 uprising was crucial in 'accelerating' if not forcing the 
transition in British policy away from colonization and toward the development of 
national government and that demanding that the British modify the Treaty and 
subsidiary agreements before ratification was well within the rights of the Iraqi people 
and their elected representatives.109 
In early April, matters came to a head when the Ministry of the Interior denied the 
request of prominent member of the 'lawyer's group' and newly elected Assembly 
member for Baghdad Shaikh Ahmed Daud to hold a meeting of deputies outside the 
Assembly which the Residency believed had the "avowed purpose of delivering orations 
adverse to the Treaty ."1 \0 In an interview on the subject in at Iraq, Minister of Defense 
Nuri aI-Said defended the decision with the argument that, once popularly elected, the 
Assembly was obliged "to express its opinion on behalf of the nation ... and not [the 
opinion of] the nation itself." The intention of those "of the lawyers' class" to "acquaint 
the deputies with the opinion of the nation," as they interpreted it, on the Treaty, Nuri 
argued, was an unwelcome intrusion of one interest group into the operations of the 
government.1II For the hosts of the event, however, the obstruction was a blatant 
violation of their right to free speech, which they condemned bitterly in the press.1I2 The 
suppression saw the immediate appearance of more direct anti-Treaty propaganda in the 
lOS al Istiqlal, April 10, 1924. 
109 al Istiqlal, April 11, 1924. 
110 See Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 08 for April 17,1924. NA, FOl371IIOO97 
11 1 al Iraq, April 12, 1923. 
112 See for example, allstiqlal April 14, 1924. 
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press, including former Ministry of Education official Saiyid Muhammad Abdul 
Hussayn's recently launched at Sha'b,ll3 which called the Treaty "a fearful figure and 
looked at by the public as frightful" and directly linked through a deplorable course of 
events all the way back to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1915. It was the responsibility 
of the Assembly, he declared, to "solve its puzzles, unveil its contents, and expose it to 
the public in its real nature.,,114 Under such pressure from the press, and the 'lawyer's 
group's' newfound patron and Constituent Assembly member Yasin al Hashimi, the 
Cabinet backed down and permitted the meeting with the stipulation that the deputies 
forego any discussion of political issues. l1s As Residency agents reported, however, the 
controversy drew a large crowd to the April 17th meeting, which was characterized by 
fulminations against the Treaty and the British alike.116 
On the day of the meeting, Nuri ai-Said attempted to counter the brewing anti-
Treaty fervor with another interview in at Iraq professing his own dissatisfaction with the 
Treaty and even insisting that "there is no one in the Iraq nation who believes that this 
Treaty secures all our national aspirations ... each of us knows that it deprives us of many 
of the distinctions and rights enjoyed by free independent nations and that it is 
inconsistent with many of the aspirations of the nation and its wishes." Nevertheless, he 
pointed out, the delicate balance of Iraq's "international situation" of being caught 
between two rivaling empires for possession of its territory and resources demanded that 
Iraqis "should accept the Treaty in spite of all its defects" as the quickest way of bringing 
definition and stability to Iraq's domestic and foreign political relations. In any event, he 
\13 Butti has described al Sha 'b as a political journal with an very heavy hand in its criticisms and thorough 
in its research. Butti, Al-Sihafah,p. 92. 
114 at Sha'b, April 15,1924. 
liS Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 08 for April 17, 1924. NA, F01371110097 
116 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.9 for May 1,1924. NA, FOl371110098 
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reminded his readers, however unsatisfying the Treaty might be, the four-year term of it 
was a small price to pay for the promise of complete independence. l17 Counter 
arguments in al Istiqlal and at Sha'b drove the tension between pro-and anti-Treaty 
elements into a fervor, however and within two days of the lawyer's meeting two pro-
Treaty deputies were attacked in public, offering just the opportunity Dobbs needed to 
arrest every non-deputy known to have attended the lawyers' meeting (and even a few 
who couldn't make it) along with the two suspected assailants and to indefinitely suspend 
al Istiqlal and at Sha'b.118 
A key contributing factor to the increasingly aggressive opposition to the Treaty in 
the Iraqi press seems also to have been the advent of the first Labour government in 
British history, almost by accident, when Baldwin over-confidently called for a general 
election in the wake of Bonar Law's illness and retirement just a few months into his 
administration in the spring of 1923. Al Istiqlal for one celebrated the "triumph of 
Labour" as having "thrown the Lords and Conservatives into a great state of agitation and 
fear for the future of the Empire." For, in addition to their support of the anti-colonialist 
Bolshevik movement, Labour was also viewed as "the principal supporters" of 
Palestinian claims against the Zionists, the main critics of the Versailles settlement, 
French policy in Syria, and the mandatory system in general. British Labour, at Istiqlal 
reported was "now the strongest Labour party in Europe" and "the first benefit for which 
Arabs may look from the Labour victory is the abandonment of the policy of 
117 a/Iraq, April 17, 1924. 
118 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.9 for May 1, 1924. NA. F01371110098 
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colonization" that had characterized British policy in the Arab world.1l9 Nor was at 
Istiqlal alone in this feeling. As the correspondent for Baghdad from the Times of 
London wrote toward the end of January, "bazaar opinion" in Baghdad, particularly in 
"Nationalist circles" was "full of hope" that "Haji Ramzi," as Ramsay MacDonald was 
reported as having come, affectionately, to be known in Baghdadi coffee-shops, and his 
"Labour Party will give Eastern aspirations for independence even more sympathetic 
consideration than the Conservatives have shown since the war" while continuing to offer 
British support.120 
The Residency reported an immediate "perturbation in coffee shops and diwans" 
following Labour's election, noting that "ill wishers" of the Iraqi government had already 
seized upon it as an opportunity for propaganda. l2l The "political crisis," as the 
Residency referred to Labour's election, had, in fact "agitated Baghdad almost as much 
as London." Rumors abounded that "the Labour Party had declared for a 'bag and 
baggage' policy with regard to Iraq." Faysal in particular was "much alarmed," 
repeatedly insisting that Dobbs telegraph London to inquire whether a change in policy 
was likely and going so far as to begin organizing an Iraqi delegation to go to London "to 
get in touch with the new British Government and convince them that popular feeling in 
Iraq was entirely in favour of the Treaty policy and friendly to Great Britain and that 
withdrawal would be disastrous.,,122 Shuckburgh viewed the proposal as "impertinent" 
and "undesirable" and, in any event, "to be discouraged in every possible way" for being 
119 al Istiqlal, December 14, 1923. 
120 Times of London January 29,1924. 
121 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. I, January 24, 1924. NA, FO/37I / 10097 
122 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.3, February 7, 1924. NA, FO/ 371110098 For 
an intimate look into Faysal's perspective on British politics and perceptions of Iraq in the British press, see 
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Hodder and Stoughton, 1973). 
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an inappropriate method of communication between the two governments, for being an 
unnecessary expense on the Iraqi budget, and for the "risk that members of it might get 
into mischief."l23 
When the MacDonald administration, limited in its legislative maneuver both by the 
sudden and almost accidental manner in which it found itself in office as well as the 
anticipated brevity of its term, failed to live up to its long standing promises to 
revolutionize British policy toward Iraq, outspoken critic of British policy in Iraq 
Commander Joseph Kenworthy characteristically confronted MacDonald on the matter in 
the plainest terms, inquiring in Parliament in mid-February "whether he contemplates any 
change in or modification of the policy pursued by the last Government."l24 MacDonald 
assured Kenworthy that his government was doing everything in its power to address "the 
obligations imposed by the Mandate on the one hand and of the undesirability of 
remaining in Iraq any longer than is necessary to set the Arab Government on its own 
feet." In other words, argued Conservative MP Edward Wood with an air of satisfaction, 
"the right hon. Gentleman is pursuing exactly the policy of the late Government.,,125 
Whether 'tamed' by the responsibilities of office or limited by the brevity of a term won 
on a technicality, the Iraqi press would be forced, along with Kenworthy and the many 
critics of the first MacDonald administration, to accept the meager contribution toward 
complete independence Labour was able to make in 1924. Nevertheless, the advent of a 
Labour government did not fail entirely to impact Anglo-Iraqi relations. 
Once the Residency came to terms with the limited maneuver Labour would have 
in office, it was surmised that "the agitation into which all intelligent persons in Iraq were 
123 Minute by Shuckburgh January 25, 1924. NA, C0173015713931. 
124 The Official Report, House of Commons (5th Series) 18 February 1924 vol 169 cc1311-2 
125 Ibid. 
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thrown by the rumours of a change of policy" under a Labour government also held the 
potential to "strengthen the hands of the High Commissioner in seeing through the 
various subsidiary agreements which still await the acceptance of the Iraq Government," 
though there remained "no sign of any yielding of points which they consider vital to the 
future of Iraq."I26 As a series of articles appearing in the Baghdad Times in late May 
illustrated, the Iraqi identification of British Labour with eminent evacuation might be 
turned to advantage if the threat of evacuation could be made to seem as real and the 
fallout it would bring as clear as possible. On May 19, the Baghdad Times admitted that 
it had become clear "to the meanest intelligence" that the Treaty was uniformly disliked 
throughout Iraq. The writer asked, however, why the Assembly didn't then "pluck up 
their courage and vote quickly in accordance with the wishes of the people ... and reject 
the Treaty, and have done with it." The British government and the British people, Iraqis 
were assured, would prefer Iraqis reject the Treaty and permit them to finally evacuate a 
region of no imperial advantage and with no appreciation of British efforts to set them on 
their own feet. The article described Iraq as characterized by backwardness and an 
economically destitute region with no trade advantages other than its oil potential, "but 
there is plenty of oil elsewhere to be got with less risk of loss.,,127 On May 21, the 
Baghdad Times illustrated how the evacuation of Iraq would benefit the British in almost 
every aspect of its foreign and colonial relations, again inviting the Assembly to reject the 
Treaty and release the British from their obligations.l28 Subsequent articles gave the 
126 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.3, February 7,1924. NA. FOI371/l0097 
127 Baghdad Times, May 19,1924. 
128 Baghdad Times, May 21, 1924. 
350 
economic advantages of evacuation and suggested that the many problems and expense 
of Iraqi to the British may be turned over to Italy, who badly wanted the mandate.!29 
Even allraq, the most pro-Treaty paper in publication, referred to the Baghdad 
Times articles as intolerably offensive and "extremist in the views" it presented, rightly 
angering the Iraqi public. The attention of the Assembly to the details of the Treaty was 
not, as the Baghdad Times seemed to suggest, "a sign of backwardness." Iraq, "like all 
progressive and civilized countries is greatly interested in so vital a matter and regards it 
as a sacred right that a matter such as this should be fully and freely discussed."J3O 
Somewhat less heated in its reply, al Alam al Arabi warned the Baghdad Times, "do not 
say that the Iraq is backward lest one may reply to you why haven't you helped her on a 
little on the road of progress during the years you have been here. Do not say that the 
Iraqis are a people impossible to please lest one may reply, what is there to be pleased or 
grateful for?,,131 Either undeterred by the Baghdad Times' threats or succumbing to the 
pressure of popular will, on May 20 the Constituent Assembly advised the Cabinet that 
ratification of the Treaty be permitted only with certain amendments, including the 
abrogation of the capitulations, declaration of complete independence of Iraq, the 
elimination of Residency interference in managing the Iraqi budget, the immediate 
transfer of all public works to the Iraqi government, and the empowerment of the Iraqi 
government over its military, among a number of other amendments.132 The following 
day, the Residency upped the stakes with a prepared ultimatum that was simultaneously 
submitted to Faysal and the League of Nations that, if the Treaty was not ratified without 
129 Baghdad Times, May 23 and 24, 1924. 
130 allraq, May 23, 1924. 
131 al Alam al Arabi, May 23,1924. 
132 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 11, May 29, 1924. NA, FO/37 J / J 0098 
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amendment by the next meeting of the League of Nations on June 10, an alternative form 
of administration for Iraq would need to be found, meaning evacuation.133 
On May 29, the day the Assembly was to debate the findings of the report, around 
half of the shops in Baghdad were closed in protest and an anti-Treaty demonstration of 
around three hundred people got underway at the entrance to the Assembly House in 
response to calls from the Iraqi press. Demonstrators shouted threats at the delegates as 
they entered the House, stones were thrown and several delegates were assaulted. When 
the demonstrators attempted to force their way into the Assembly, the Iraqi police and 
British cavalry undertook to disperse the crowd, which broke in a panic after a series of 
shots were exchanged from both sides. A series of Assembly meetings followed in the 
days leading up to the June 10 deadline at which anti-Treaty speeches predominated and 
no quorum was reached. 134 Contrary to the assumption of the Iraqis and most historians, 
however, it was not Dobbs who stood unflinching in the face of the increasingly 
desperate pleas for more time from Constituent Assembly leaders,l3S but MacDonald's 
Secretary of State for the Colonies James Henry Thomas.l36 Dobbs, in fact, caved in just 
under a week before the deadline, requesting permission to authorize Paysal to dissolve 
the Assembly and ratify the Treaty by Royal Irrada in the event of the Assembly's 
refusal to do so. In reply, Thomas expressed his doubt that Paysal "could find a Cabinet 
prepared to support him" in Iraq in the wake of such a move or that the MacDonald 
government could even defend it at home. Rather, Thomas instructed Dobbs that 
"nothing further should be done ... to forestall the action that may be taken by the Iraq 
133 Ireland, p. 398. 
134 For a full account of the process of ratification, see Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence 
Report No. 12, June 12, 1924. NA, FOl3711l0098 
135 Neither Ireland, Sluglett, nor Dodge make mention of Labour's influence in the matter of the Treaty. 
136 Sluglett and Ireland, pp. 
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Assembly in regard to the Treaty. If they mean to reject the Treaty they must be left to 
do so." Any attempt to force the ratification of the Treaty, Thomas argued, would place 
the British "in a false position," contrary to "what we have said to the League and 
published to the world.,,137 Unable to end the mandate from London, the MacDonald 
administration, it would seem, tested its ability, and the will of the Iraqi people, to end it 
from Baghdad. 
After weeks of desperate negotiations and stubborn refusals that utterly polarized 
the political landscape of Baghdad, with the final appeal for more time being made at 
Wpm on June 10, a minimum quorum of 69 delegates drawn entirely from the pro-
government party was achieved and with a vote of 37 to 24, the Treaty was ratified at, 
literally, the twelfth-hour. The approval was qualified with the statement, however, that 
the delegates viewed the articles of the Treaty as "so severe that Iraq would be unable to 
discharge the responsibilities of the alliance desired by the people of Iraq" and that the 
delegates put their faith and trust in the honor of the British government to "amend with 
all possible speed" the problematic aspects of the Treaty after its ratification.138 
The failure of the Labour government to live up to its promises to take a more 
direct role in liberating Iraq, and the British people, from the mandate was not lost on the 
House and not least of all Kenworthy, who interrogated Thomas in the House on July 24 
as to the manner in which the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty had been passed. When Thomas 
confirmed that a mere 36 out of 110 delegates voted to ratify the Treaty, Kenworthy 
reminded Thomas of the importance of having a substantial minority present in such 
137 Report of an interview with Secretary of State for the Colonies James Thomas by Maj. Young, June 03, 
1924. NA, CO/730/60/26555. 
138 For a full account of the process of ratification, see Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence 
Report No. 12,June 12, 1924. NA, FO/3711l0098 
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decisions. Thomas reminded Kenworthy that "there are very important questions 
discussed in this House when few Members are present" and that, not having been there, 
it was impossible for him to give an explanation as to why so few Iraqi deputies were in 
attendance.139 Kenworthy took the opportunity of a preliminary discussion of the Treaty 
in the House on July 29 to fully vent his opposition on the matter. Like Lloyd George 
before them, the Labour government was attempting to slide Iraqi policy past the House 
without proper discussion or approval. Neither had Labour done anything to alter the 
policy of Lloyd George, he noted that estimates had not been reduced, air raids were still 
being permitted to terrorize Iraqi villages into submission, and the overall approach to 
managing Anglo-Iraqi relations remained decidedly unconstitutional. Although the 
government had offered no clear explanation as to the passage of the Treaty in Iraq, 
Kenworthy had surmised from various reports that the Constituent Assembly had been 
clearly unwilling to ratify it, and that Dobbs' ultimatum had sent Iraqi statesmen 
"scouring the streets of Baghdad in the middle of the night" to assemble a minority 
willing to vote in favor of the Treaty and, even then, only being able to get the barest of a 
majority of them to do SO.14O The degree of power vested in British officials to over-
determine economic, military, and political life in Iraq, Kenworthy declared, was 
"disgraceful" and meant that "from the first to the last there is no sort of independence at 
all." Those who would try to describe Iraq as "a separate independent political entity ," 
139 The Official Report, House o/Commons (5th Series) 14 July 1924 vol 176 ccI8-9. 
140 The Official Report, House o/Commons (5th Series) 29 July 1924 vol 176 cc 1929. 
354 
he suggested, "must have an extraordinary idea of what is independence and what is 
separation. There is no independence at all.,,141 
Reactions to the Labour government's handling of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty were 
mixed in the Iraqi press. Although the coercive manner in which the barest minimum of 
support for the Treaty had been obtained was "not hid from the eyes of anyone" in Iraq, 
according to allstiqlal, "the words of Commander Kenworthy have come to be the best 
evidence ... that God has wished to reveal its secret" to the British people as well. 142 Al 
MUfid was less celebratory of the Commander's passionate objections to the Treaty, 
noting that, "as for Kenworthy, is not it well known that there is a big party in England 
which regrets that the British Government has not got out of the Iraq and would have 
liked the rejection of the treaty?,,143 In any event, al Mufid pointed out, the promise of a 
Labour government had certainly proven less than expected, as "Mr. MacDonald has 
changed his views considerably under the responsibility of office." 144 
One area of British policy in Iraq that the MacDonald administration kept its 
promises more clearly, however, was in turning the fate of Mosul and the Iraqi mandate 
over to the League of Nations when Anglo-Turkish negotiations reached a stalemate on 
August 6 1924. Having attacked the Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Baldwin 
administrations' dangerous provocation of an Anglo-Turkish war for years over the 
settlement of the Smyrna and then the Mosul questions, as Peter Beck has shown, 
141 The Official Report, House o/Commons (5th Series) 29 July 1924 vol 176 cc 1934-35. Hasani also 
offers an account of Kenworthy's criticisms in his history of the Iraqi Cabinets, 'Abd al-Razzaq Hasani, 
Tarikh Al-Wizarat Al-'lraqiyah (Sayda: Matba'at al-'Irfan,1953), pp. 191. 
142 al Istiqlal August 4,1924. 
143 al MUfid, August 22, 1924. 
144 al Mufid, August 9, 1924. 
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MacDonald took a personal interest in reaching a negotiated settlement with Turkey, 
pushing the nine-month limit of those negotiations well past the deadline before finally 
turning the matter over the League. 145 Although MacDonald responded to Mustafa 
Kemal's belligerent saber rattling and even occupation of parts of the Mosul vilayet in the 
fall of 1926 with threats of air raids and even war, he ultimately backed down, choosing 
instead to request a special commission from the League to look into the frontier clashes 
as specified by international law. By turning the matter of Mosul' s ultimate destiny as 
well as Turkish belligerence over to the League and committing the British government 
to honoring the League's determination, MacDonald not only vindicated his Party's 
commitment to internationalism, but, according to Beck, he imbued the League with 
legitimacy as an institution of international peace keeping and arbitration. 146 
The continued ambiguity of the status of Mosul posed a complicated problem for 
the British government and the Residency in the fall of 1924. The Residency and the 
British government both believed that the election of an Iraqi Parliament and the 
completion of negotiations for oil concessions in Mosul that promised to kick-start the 
Iraqi economy would go some way to influencing the League's decision in the matter of 
Mosul in their favor. Accordingly, a few days before the Mosul question was turned over 
to the League, the Iraqi Constituent Assembly completed the task for which it had been 
appointed by approving, but not yet promulgating, an Electoral Law that would permit 
Parliamentary elections to commence. As managing director of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company (TPC) H. E. Nichols pointed out to the Foreign Office that July, however, the 
145 Peter J. Beck. "'A Tedious and Perilous Controversy': Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute. 
1918-1926 .... Middle Eastern Studies YoU7. No.2 (1981). pp. 261. 
146 Beck. pp. 271. 
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speedy advent of an Iraqi Parliament was not necessarily a good thing all around. It was 
imperative, in fact, Nichols argued, that the TPC oil concession be passed before the 
advent of an Iraqi Parliament or, in any event, before the promulgation of the long 
awaited Iraqi Organic Law specifically because the articles of that document forbade the 
signing of any mineral concessions over three years without approval from the Iraqi 
Legislative Assembly. In other words, if the oil concession desired by the TPC and its 
primary share holder, the British government, was not obtained before the Organic Law 
was promulgated, the TPC would face indeterminate delays as the process of electing a 
Parliament commenced which would then have the freedom to either reject the 
concessions or, worse still, grant them to another entity. 147 Moreover, with Labour in 
office, the Mosul question at the League of Nations, and an election about to commence 
in Iraq/48 one Foreign Office official minuted, it would be "very undesirable that the oil 
question should receive pUblicity or should form the subject of intrigues ... at the present 
time. His Majesty's Government have succeeded so far in keeping the oil issue out of the 
Turkey-Irak frontier settlement, and ... it would be most undesirable to depart from this 
precedent.,,149 In other words, the matter of passing the TPC concession was one of the 
utmost delicacy and one requiring the speediest and least publicized of solutions. 
The Iraqi politician Faysal and the Residency selected for the delicate work of 
ferrying through the TPC concession before the election of the Parliament in the 
immediate wake of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty passage was Yasin al Hashimi, whom Faysal 
147 Nicholes to Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 16, 1924. NA, FOl3711 100841E6167. 
148 For the Foreign Offices consideration of this trifecta of influences, see Major Young memo p. 4 of NA, 
FA 371110162 and p. 34NA, CO 730163 
149 Memorandum signed by Todd July 2,1924. NA, FOI3711l0084. For a discussion of the sensitivity of 
British statesmen and officials to oil as a political factor, see Peter J. Beck, '''A Tedious and Perilous 
Controversy': Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926.," Middle Eastern Studies 
VoU7, No.2 (1981): 256-276. 
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asked to form a cabinet on August 2,1924, the day the Constituent Assembly was 
dissolved.l50 Although Yasin Pasha had been an officer under Faysal during the Arab 
Revolt and a member of his government in Damascus, Faysal had been reluctant to call 
him back to Iraq precisely for his tendency toward aggressive self-empowerment. When 
Yasin did return in 1923, he characteristically cultivated his relationships both with the 
Palace and with the 'extremist' opposition alike. By the summer of 1924, Yasin had so 
ensconced himself in both the Sherifian court and the 'extreme nationalist' circles that, at 
the height of the Treaty debate in April, he was able to force the Iraqi Cabinet's 
permission for the cancelled 'lawyer's group' meeting on April 17th that he himself had 
been involved in organizing and even spoke at. Knowing that Y asin' s true loyalties were 
to his own interests, Faysal invited him to form a government that could approve the 
Treaty in May, which Yasin refused to do because, he claimed, the suspicion that he had 
been bribed to accept the Treaty would ruin his popular credibility .151 Nevertheless, 
Yasin reportedly made an offer to Dobbs in the following weeks guaranteeing the 
passage of the Treaty in exchange for the ousting of both Faysal as King and his Prime 
Minister, the Sherifian loyalist Ja'far al Askari, which Dobbs refused. 152 The value of 
Yasin's mastery at playing both sides ofthe political spectrum, however, overrode 
Faysal's fear of his ambition in the weeks following the approval of the Treaty, however, 
and on August 2, he was offered the Premiership once again as the most promising choice 
to push the TPC concession through without drawing the opprobrium of the Iraqi 
public. l53 
150 For a thematic account of the Yasin al Hashimi Cabinet, see Hasani, Tarikh Al-Wizarat, pp. 197-234 
151 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 10, May 15, 1924. NA. FOl3711l0098 
152 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. IS,July 24,1924. NA. F0137J1JO098 
153 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 15, July 24,1924. NA. FOl3711l0098 
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As anticipated, when Yasin's Cabinet submitted its program, it received near 
universal approval.l54 The Residency described the program, which included "putting the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty into precise application," despite the fact that Yasin had been among 
the most vehement opponents of the Treaty, as being "generally considered to be the best 
programme that has as yet been issued by any Iraqi Cabinet.,,155 Al Iraq characteristically 
expressed its agreement with the Residency's sentiment.l56 Ibrahim Hilmi's al Mufid, 
which the Residency had chosen to subsidize in exchange for articles friendlier to its 
agenda rather than continue to suppress it, also praised the program, drawing particular 
attention to its emphasis on cooperation between the Iraqi and British governments and 
the upholding the Treaty.l57 
alIstiqlal, described by the Residency as "the organ of Yasin Pasha, or at least to 
be entirely submissive to his wishes" on the day ofYasin's appointment as Prime 
Ministerl58 acknowledged that, like Yasin himself, it had been among "the first to reject 
[the Treaty]."I59 Now that the Treaty had become "an accomplished fact," however, al 
Istiqlal directed the attention of Iraqis to the shortcomings of previous administrations 
that had made the Treaty a/ait accompli, in addition to the brutal suppression of Iraqi 
154 Hasani, Tarikh Al-Wizarat, pp. 198. 
155 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 17, August 21,1924. NA, F01371110098 
156 al Iraq, August 9,1924. NA, COn30/611635 
157 Plant to ASI, July 30, 1926. NA, A/R1231264. Butti also notes al Mufid's support for the Treaty at this 
point, but views this as merely the editors personal perspective. Butti, Al-SihaJah,p. 95. 
158 The Residency also identified allstiqlal as the potential organ of Ja'far abu Timman's reorganization of 
the "two extremist parties" Hisb al Watani and Hisb al Nadhdhah in November of 1923 into a single 
grouping under the auspices of al Ahd, with which al Istiqlal had also been identified as a primary 
mouthpiece, Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 22, November 15, 1923. allstiqlal 
is also noted to have pushed for the Premiership of Yasin with the fall of the Abdul Mushin Beg cabinet in 
late 1923, Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 23. December 1, 1923. So the notion 
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nationalist sentiment/60 as well as to the future in which Yasin's administration was 
expected to bring an end to the dangerous course the development of Iraqi political life 
had been set upon.161 
In seeming conformity with such expectations, Yasin opened his administration 
with a call for the formation of political parties in preparation for the election of an Iraqi 
Parliament, with the first applicants being his own favored group of Baghdadi lawyer 
activists.162 Although concerned to keep interference with Iraq's political formation to an 
absolute minimum, when the lawyers' party, Hisb al Ummah, applied for a formal 
license, the Residency's Criminal Investigations Department stepped in to block them, 
owing to the association of its members with anti-Treaty and anti-election agitation in the 
past. In their place, the Minister of the Interior granted, with the Residency's approval, 
the application of the Hisb al Sha'b as Iraq's second political party, a group that shared 
the Hisb al Ummah's program of "complete independence" for Iraq, free elections, and 
amending the Treaty, but maintained a closer alliance with the Palace through the 
leadership of Saiyid Muhammad Abdul Husain, the Chamberlain of the Palace and 
loyalist to Faysal.163 
al Istiqlal complained bitterly at the Residency's obstruction of the Hisb al 
Ummah, arguing that the "crime" for which they had "lost their civil rights" amounted to 
nothing more than "disagreeing with the views of the Cabinet." Concerning the 
legitimacy of their complaint that the stipulations of the Treaty for Iraq were "too heavy 
160 allstiqlal, August 4, 1924. 
161 allstiqlal, August 14, 1924. 
162 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 17, August 21,1924. NA, FOl371110098 
163 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 19, September 18, 1924. NA, F013711l0098 
Butti refers to the Hisb al Sha'b as the first internal government party, along with and akin to the official 
government party Hisb al Taqaddam to come, but with more of a popular nationalist slant that would soon 
be exploited by Yasin al Hashimi who would make the party his own political vehicle and the foremost 
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to be borne," al Istiqlal directed its readers to go back to its earlier publications and "read 
the statements of Englishmen themselves in Parliament-do they deny what we said?"I64 
Even without approval, however, the Residency observed with foreboding the advances 
of the Hisb al Ummah as the elections approached in November. Attracting many of the 
most articulate and vocal nationalist agitators and contributing writers to the Iraqi press, 
such as Shaikh Ahmad al Daud, Daud al Sa'di, and Qasim al Alawi, the Hisb canvased 
widely for support across the nation, seeking to publically out and intimidate pro-British 
candidates and succeeding in stacking the Election Inspectors Committee of 12 with 10 
party members, including known nationalist agitators such as at Istiqlal owner Abdul 
Ghafur al Badri, Yasin collaborator Naji Beg al Suwaidi and even to place Shaikh Ahmad 
al Daud as the Committee's president.165 Celebrating the victory, regular contributor to al 
Istiqlal Mahami Ali Mahmud compared Iraq to the occupied provinces of ancient Rome, 
in which political life was always dichotomized into the party representing the occupiers 
and the party, played in Iraq by the Hisb al Ummah, representing the popular indigenous 
opposition to those interests .166 
Other parties soon followed, comprised of special interests relating to property, 
ethnicity, or sectarian identity. Al Istiqlal criticized most alternatives to the Hisb al 
Ummah for attempting to factionalize the unified movement for complete independence 
they would need to achieve it. When Shi'a nationalists launched the Hisb al Nahdhah 
under the presidency of Abdul Razzaq al Sharif in December, purportedly out of fear that 
the predominantly Sunni led Hisb al Ummah would trample their rights if empowered in 
164 alIstiqlal,August lOand 12, 1924. 
165 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 24, November 27,1924. NA, FOl3711lO098 
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office,167 al Istiqlal warned that its leadership was, unlike the lawyerly Hisb al Ummah, 
nearly bereft of formal education or administrative experience and were driven to 
candidacy by a desire for position and wealth.l68 Al Mufid, in its turn, gave its support to 
the diversification of political groupings as reflecting the progress of Iraqi democracy and 
regenerating Shi' a identification with the Iraqi state.169 More accustomed to appointment 
than election, the Sherifian court mobilized its own "moderate party" by January, the 
unpopular and short-lived Hisb al Islah under the presidency of the previous Prime 
Minister, Ja'far al AskariPo 
By the new year, the acceleration of political mobilization and proliferation of 
political groups had led to a political landscape the Residency described as "chaotic," 
with parties tending to "coalesce and disintegrate for personal reasons rather than 
political reasons."l7l By the early spring of 1925, the Residency reported, the actual 
political struggle had devolved down to where it had began, with supporters of Yasin al 
Hashimi holding a loosely knit opposition to the subservience of the Arab government to 
the British and those of Ja'far al Askari tending to give their support to the King and 
strong Anglo-Iraqi ties.172 Although the convictions behind popular political mobilization 
remained very much the same, by the spring of 1925 they had become identified, for the 
first time in Iraqi history, with two opposed Iraqi politicians. 
167 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 25, December 11,1924. NA, FO/3711 10098 
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During the entire period of Iraq's political mobilization over the fall of 1924 and 
spring of 1925, the Yasin Cabinet was quietly conducting negotiations with the Turkish 
Petroleum Company toward reaching a compromise before the completion of the 
elections threatened to force the matter in March. Near the end of February 1925, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies Leo Amery identified the heart of the delay as being 
the issue of control, with the Iraqi government refusing to sign any concession that did 
not give them a significant say in the management of the company and the TCP's 
"objection to any Iraq control of the policy of the Company." Indeed, as Nichols had 
informed him, the delicate and hard-won balance of influence between Dutch, French, 
American, and British companies sharing interest in the TCP simply had no place 
whatsoever for an additional controlling interest, be it Iraqi or otherwise. "If the 
admission of the Iraq Government to a share participation was accepted," Nichols told 
Amery, "the whole fabric of the Turkish Petroleum Company would be destroyed.,,173 
Yasin's willingness to accept a concession in which the Iraqi government would have 
absolutely no control or voice in the TCP, which he would do on March 15, 1925, and his 
ability to sell this concession to the Iraqi people would have been significantly more 
difficult if not for the arrival in Iraq of a League of Nations Frontier Commission to 
determine the status of Mosul that January .174 
From the moment Anglo-Turkish relations over the Mosul question collapsed in 
late July 1924, the Iraqi press had stressed to its readers that the matter had very little to 
173 Committee on Petroleum Policy in Iraq, February 27,1925. NA, CABI271268/l-7. For a discussion of 
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do with their just claims to an Iraqi Mosul and everything to do with oil. Al Alam al 
Arabi and al Istiqlal had both offered exposes on European press coverage of the 
MacDonald administration's turning the matter over to the League illustrating the 
predominance of oil in its columns. It was "clear from all European papers," al Istiqlal 
wrote, "that the only interest felt abroad in the Iraq is on account of the oil.,,175 In 
October, coinciding with the arrival of a British delegation to inspect the Mosul oil fields, 
al Alam al Arabi announced that "the hour has approached and the nation must awake," 
arguing that as "the English Syndicates have put up all that they possess of power, 
influence, money and men to enter into the Petrol Struggle on the fields of Iraq" the Iraqi 
people must endeavor to ensure that "Government and people should reap the ripe fruits 
of the struggle.,,176 Similarly al Istiqlal declared that it had become obvious that that 
"Britain controls the Iraq merely for the sake of oil," that many "European nations have 
become rich on oil ," and that "Iraq independence can not be gained unless her mineral 
resources are well handled" through competitive concessions, rather than 'most-
privileged-nation' agreements.177 
The press reflected a kind of bewildered disbelief when the League announced at 
the end of September 1924 that a Frontier Commission would be sent to Iraq. Al Mufid 
declared, however, that "no one is afraid of [the Frontier Commission] because all are 
sure of the feelings of the population" of Mosul.178 Al Iraq took the opportunity to chide 
opponents of the Treaty, noting that the British had come to their defense and "carried out 
the full principle of that treaty which was much criticized here by people of obscured 
175 al Istiqlal, September 5,1924. NA, C0I730/62/324. Also see al Alam al Arabi, July 30, 1924. NA, 
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understanding.,,179 As a result of British efforts, al Iraq assured its readers, "there can be 
no doubt as to [the Committee's] decision ... the matter is practically settled."lso Al 
Istiqlal was also confident, but more from the "specious arguments" of Turkey's claim 
than British good faith. For, although both Britain and Turkey were out to "take 
possession of the oil of Mosul," the British had the added advantage of the principle of 
nationality on their side, without which the Turkish case would "have no influence with 
the League of Nations," which would base its decision on the will of the Mosuli people. 
In light of the obviousness of Mosul's Iraqi identity, al Istiqlal speculated, "it is probable 
that the Commission may carry out its work by means of aeroplanes without mixing with 
the people at all."181 Nevertheless, as the Commission's arrival approached, both al 
Mufid and al Iraq advocated peaceful public demonstrations, speeches, and newspaper 
articles to express "the national feeling about Mosul," and even the organization of an 
Iraqi delegation to bring those views to the doorsteps of Europeans.182 
When the Commission began its investigations in January 1925, a series of open 
letters appeared in the Iraqi press identifying the decision as one of significant 
international magnitude that would have far reaching implications for the global 
awakening in which the League of Nations and Iraq has both played such a crucial role. 
In a letter to the Commission published on January 12, al Mufid described Iraq as an 
ancient epicenter of global wisdom and learning shut off from global progress by the 
forces of tyranny. Iraqis, the writer pleaded, now looked to the coming of the League of 
Nations to Iraq to end the age of oppression and open the way to reviving Iraq's 
179 ai Iraq, October 4, 1924. 
ISO at Iraq, October 6, 1924. 
lSI at Istiqiai, December 16, 1924. 
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contribution to the progress of the world. The raison d'etat of the League, al Mufid 
reasoned, was precisely to lift such peoples as the Iraqis from beneath the heavy hand of 
foreign tyranny, under which they stilllived.l83 Al Mufid assured Iraqis that the members 
of the Commission "belonged also to small countries which strove for their rights and 
they know the evils left by foreign rule."l84 The internationalist rhetoric that had 
characterized the Iraqi press in the wake of the 1920 rising also returned to its pages, with 
al Mufid noting that "when the war ended, the voice of humanity was heard and the 
lovers of humanity proclaimed the liberation of the weak. The civilized nations have 
declared that they will defend the equality and rights of all nations. Those who were 
oppressed rejoiced and the Arab nation welcomed this new age." No longer was national 
identity a question of size or power, al Mufid insisted, but of "independence and life" 
awakened in so many subjugated peoples after the war.185 
al Istiqlal directed its letter to the Turkish delegates of the Commission. Greeting 
the delegates "as Easterners to Easterners" and Iraq's former imperial governors "until 
the national awakening separated us," al Istiqlal extended a hand of welcome. The 
welcome was qualified with the rebuke, however, that, in her good fortune, Turkey had 
proven unsatisfied with the extent of her lands, disrespectful of "the rights of neighbours" 
and covetous of Iraqi oil. Al Istiqlal recognized that "this is the age of oil and wrong is 
clothed in the dress of right," but pledged that the indisputable fact of Mosul' s historic 
identification as one of the triad of Ottoman vilayets that had comprised the land known 
as Iraq for centuries would be recognized and Turkish deception exposed.l86 
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at Iraq also published a letter, its being directed to the Iraqi people. It was 
imperative that Iraqis present to the Commission "a picture of complete solidarity and 
unity of Iraq" as well as a driving desire toward "progress and organization" among a 
people "worthy of the complete independence toward which [Iraq] is moving." The key 
was to emphasize how far Iraq had come from the desolation under the Turks in so short 
a time. l87 Enumerating the progress of Iraqs, at Iraq described "the endeavour of its 
people" to live "under a Constitutional regime," the obvious fact that "[Iraqis] had been 
awakened by their connection with civilized countries and by reading the papers," the 
effort of the Iraqi people "to liberate themselves from Turkish rule." As a result of these 
efforts, "the Iraqi... now rules himself, ... can follow the path he judges ... express his 
opinions freely on the principles of social live ... feels himself to be a member of a nation 
known as one of the independent states," and looks forward to the day when "the voice of 
Iraq will be heard by civilized states ... these are the gifts of the Constitutional regime 
which the people have attained."I88 
On January 27, the newly emerging political party in Mosul, Hisb al Istiqlal, 
published its second edition of at Ahd with a letter to the Iraqi people and to the 
Commission. Building off the Hisb al Istiqlal 's founding statement in the previous issue, 
at Ahd emphasized the transition underway in which subjugated peoples around the world 
were awakening as nations and standing against the continuation of tyranny as the Iraqis 
experienced under the Ottomans. Whereas Iraqis had lent their voice to those of the 
Egyptians, Syrians and others in 'making their national claims known to the world,' 
Iraqis now had the distinct opportunity of "receiving in our own country the Commission 
187 alIraq,January 13,1925. 
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to which our rights should be exposed." The moment had arrived in which Iraqis could 
declare to the League, and through the League the world, their desire and preparedness 
for a 'completely independent' national existence and intention to "reject all foreign 
Government whatever it may be." To the Commission, al Ahd declared that "we do not 
know of the existence of the Mosul question" in Mosul, for "Mosul has always been 
Arab" and Turkish rule always representative of the tyrannical and anti-democratic rule 
the League is organized to oppose. l89 Leaders then followed "exposing the designs of the 
Turks," their object being "not to regain Mosul but to obtain possession of the Oil."l90 
Perhaps to gain advantage in the negotiations over the Concession for the Y asin 
administration, al Istiqlal raised the stakes in mid-February by directly exposing the 
relationship between the delays in the oil concession and those in promulgating the 
Organic Law and completing the elections.191 Al Istiqlal warned the negotiators that 
Iraqis would not tolerate the "sale of their birthright for a mess of pottage." AIIstiqlal 
noted that the assumption that the TPC would get a concession for the whole of Iraq 
regardless of competition was dispelled somewhat when negotiations went quiet 
"following the coming into power of the Labour Government." Now that Baldwin was in 
power, however, "the negotiations have found fresh vigoUr."l92 In the interests of the 
people, democracy, and constitutionalism, al Istiqlal supported Shaikh Ahmad Daud and 
Naji Beg Suwaidi's move to suspend the negotiations until after the Parliament had been 
189 al Ahd, January 27,1925. 
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elected and could express its opinion on the matter.l93 In all developed nations, al Istiqlal 
argued, the constitution is the foundational document of the state. Already, Iraqis had 
been made to accept a series of treaties, laws, and elections with profound implications 
for Iraq's future as a state without the benefit and protection of a constitution, which the 
government refused to publish, let alone promulgate. Now Iraqis were being made to 
accept their foremost natural resource being "put secretly to tender, not to open auction" 
as a prerequisite for the promulgation of the constitution. The Iraqi nation, al Istiqlal 
insisted "fears the execution of laws embracing vast schemes designed to strip Iraq of 
what riches remain to her ," 
All Constitutions provide that all laws involving financial obligations must pass 
through and come from the Chamber of Deputies. Moreover the Iraq Government 
has only been created on condition that it shall be constitutional and 
representative ... any law which embraces financial provisions cannot be held to 
be legal unless it comes from the Chamber ... the Government cannot therefore 
grant ... oil concessions without the consent of the Chamber of Deputies. the 
future Chamber will have strong grounds for cancelling all such concessions if 
granted. Any Ministry which attempts to pass into law concessions ... before the 
summoning of the Parliament ... will not be able to escape from the responsibility 
when the Parliament meets.l94 
al Mufid presented the example of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company as a warning, noting 
that "the Persian Government gets so little benefit from it that it does not cover the 
expense of maintaining local order while the Company is getting 4 millions a year. We 
want reciprocal benefits." Delaying the concession until the Parliament could be elected 
and meet to express its opinion would be "sound policy," 195 while the postponement of 
the constitution until after the concession had been made was "a matter of common 
193 allstiqlal, February 13, 1925. 
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indignation."I96 Citing articles from the British press, al Alam al Arabi argued in late 
February that Mosul was being "ransomed at a double price." Already, Iraqis had been 
made to compromise their rights in the name of national integrity by ratifying an 
otherwise unacceptable Treaty. Now, on the verge of electing their first Parliament, 
Iraqis were being subjected to the greedy haggling of "many powerful States who are not 
friendly but merely want to get the wealth of the country at their own terms and by 
threats ."197 
On March 9, however, the tone shifted with an interview with Yasin published in 
al Istiqlal in which the Prime Minister explained the details of the concession he had 
negotiated, its benefits to Iraq, and the reasons for the rush. The issue, he argued, was not 
merely economic, but political. His administration did not wait for the completion of the 
elections and assembly of Parliament because they "were afraid to lose a valuable 
political opportunity ... to assert our right to [Mosul]." Nevertheless, he illustrated, by 
signing the concession, his government had secured a minimum of £850,000 per year, a 
guarantee that the price of oil in Iraq would be one third of the market price in Europe, 
and the right to negate the concession should the TPC fail to "work the oil fully."I98 Al 
MUfid similarly noted on March 8 that "the Hashimi Cabinet was confronted with 
difficulties rather political than economic. The fate of Mosul depended on the Treaty and 
the oil concession. Therefore the Cabinet like the previous Cabinet was obliged to 
sacrifice some benefits to obtain the principle interest in the north where danger 
threatened the country ."199 On March 3, a new paper covering political issues, al Siyasah, 
196 al Mufid, February 15, 1925. 
197 al Alam al Arabi, February 28,1925. 
198 al /stiqlal, March 9,1925. 
199 al Mufid, March 8,1925. 
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published its first issue, proclaiming its service to "the Arabs and the whole Orient" along 
with the recognition that "the regeneration of the East cannot be achieved by the 
awakening of one country only; all must arise and awake together." The paper promised 
to work toward that end. Al Siyasah also acknowledged the international parameters of 
the oil concession, explaining that, if the Iraqi government had refused the concession, 
the Turkish government might well have promised the TPC the concession in exchange 
for its influence with the League in getting a settlement of the Mosul question in 
Turkey's favor. As it stood, the British, French, American, and Dutch owners of the TPC 
"had friends in the League who will take up their view." The Hashimi Cabinet, in the 
view of al Siyasah, was wise to make such an alignment, and "besides ... it appears that 
the share of Iraq will be more than the share of Persia in the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company." Just as the Askari Cabinet had "passed the Treaty to save Mosul," so had the 
Hashimi Cabinet "sacrificed some economic advantages to avoid the dismemberment of 
the country .,,200 
On March 15, the halting negotiations that had characterized the spring of 1925 
came to an end in a concession agreement between the Yasin administration and the TPC 
in which the Iraqi government would receive no control over the TPC what so ever?01 In 
less than a week of that signing, the Organic Law was promulgated and preparations for 
the Parliamentary elections begun in earnest?02 On the very day the oil concessions were 
approved by Yasin, allstiqlal reflected a clear shift away from its support for the Anglo-
Iraqi Treaty with a series of articles reiterating the argument that every legislative act 
200 al Siyasah, March 3 and 7,1925. 
201 Committee on Petroleum Policy in Iraq, February 27,1925. NA, CAB/27/268/22. 
202 Ireland, p. 371. . 
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dating back to the coronation of Faysal, according to Ali Muhamud, the Iraqi government 
had been referred to as "a constitutional representative democratic government 
established in accordance with the Organic Law." The British government had 
undertaken to conclude a treaty with Iraq and to persuade the League of Nations to admit 
Iraq to membership, neither of which would have been appropriate for a "dependent 
state." For all intents and purposes, the Ali Muhamud concluded, the British government 
had long recognized the independence of Iraq, a fact that would be difficult to dispute 
should Iraqis choose not to ratify the Treaty in the end?03 Accordingly, Ali Mahmud 
followed up, Iraqis should challenge the legitimacy of the Treaty and ask themselves, for 
example, 
why is the signature of the Plenipotentiary of Britain over that of the 
Plenipotentiary oflraq ... why the foreign representation in Article V is restricted 
by the approval of HBM to the representatives of foreign powers ... why is His 
Britannic Majesty represented by a High Commissioner whereas he should be 
represented by an Ambassador as in the case of independent states ... why is the 
appointment of non-Iraqi officials restricted by the consent of His Britannic 
Majesty? All of these threaten our independence. 204 
Shortly thereafter, al /stiqlal published an annotated list of its nominations for the 
Parliament, citing such qualifications as high standing as a lawyer, a history of opposition 
to either the Treaty or the oil concessions, having been involved in other historic forms of 
opposition to the British or the mandate or, in the case of Abul Ghafur al Badri, because 
he was the publisher of al /stiqlal?05 The Residency, for its part, had been keeping close 
tabs such sentiment, with Special Security Officers reporting that the Hisb al Ummah had 
been secretly gathering and conspiring to use the elections as a throughway for the 
overthrow of Faysal and his "Hedjazi Government" and its self-interested ministers for 
203 al /stiqlal,AprilI5, 1925. 
204 al /stiqlal,AprilI6, 1925. 
205 al /stiqlal,April28, 1925. 
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"selling the country to the English" and to replace it with a 'government of the people.,206 
On July 15, however, Iraqis celebrated the completion of the elections and the 
impending formation of Iraq's first Parliament. With his role for the Palace and the 
Residency completed, however, Yasin found his political maneuver being increasingly 
constrained by Faysa1.207 When a new Cabinet was called for upon the completion of the 
elections, Yasin was replaced by Sherifian loyalist Abdul Mushin Beg Sa'dun now also 
the president of a new 'moderate party,' the Hisb al Taqaddam largely representing the 
views and policies of the Palace in which around half of the newly elected Deputies 
joined?08 
readers 
On the day the Parliament was elected, the now unsubsidized al Mufid warned its 
not to be deceived nor deceive ourselves into thinking that we are free and that 
our representatives and our parliament are like the parliaments of England and 
France or Belgium even though it may have an external resemblance. Let us not 
be deceived by such an illusion ... the power of our parliament is limited and 
restricted by foreign influences?09 
Even at Iraq, though identifying itself as having been "one of the strongest supporters of 
the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty" seemed to sense a shift in political thinking about the 
amendments that it and supporters and detractors of the Treaty alike had been clamoring 
for in expressing its "astonishment at the dilatory way in which the question of amending 
these agreements, the harshness of which is admitted by the British government itself' 
was being address by the new government and Parliament.2lO 
206 SSO Driver to Air Staff Intelligence March 30, 1925. NA. AlRI231334 
207 SSO Plant to Air Staff Intelligence July 15,1925. NA, AlRI231263125 
208 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 15, July 16, 1925. Also see Amy Ayalon, The 
Press in the Arab Middle East: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 94-95 
209 al Mufid, July 15,1925. 
210 a/Iraq, July 21,1925. 
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Recognizing the turn in Yasin's fate, al Alam al Arabi followed its criticism of the 
Parliament as an 'aristocracy' of Iraqi wealth,211 with its call for Iraqi support for the 
speedy formation of a legitimate opposition party to Sa'dun's Hisb al Taqaddam, noting 
the importance of such an opposition to parliamentary democracies the world over.212 
According to Special Security Officers, Yasin was already busily working towards this 
end by expanding his party base into Kurdish and Shi' a areas, promising, "in accordance 
with the 'Yasin Method' of promising all to everyone, according to SSO Foster Plant, 
that he would "do all in his power to obtain their much desired autonomy for them.,,213 
Nevertheless, the Residency reported on August 6 that the Parliament was characterized 
by a "spirit of businesslike and affectionate cooperation with British policy ... Extremist 
parties have been submerged and everything points to the existence of a genuine desire 
among the bulk of the population for the support of Great Britain" though their remains 
and "will always remain the critical, vocal and discontented minority which would be 
against any government in power. The outlook for the future of Anglo-Iraqi relations is 
perhaps more promising than ever before.,,214 
The path to the final ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was made yet more 
complicated in December 1925, however, when the League of Nations finally released its 
decision to award Mosul to Iraq under the condition that the British government extend 
the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty from four to twenty-five years barring the admission of Iraq to the 
League of Nations before its expiration. The recognition of Mosul as part of Iraq was, for 
211 at Atam at Arabi, July 9, 1925. 
212 at Atam at Arabi, July 16 and 18, 1925. 
213 SSO Plant to Air Staff Intelligence August 1,1925. NA, AIRl23/263/35 
214 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 16. August 6,1925. (89) 
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the press, a vindication of Iraq's legitimacy as a state at the international level. 
Accordingly, the Residency reported a sense of general relief at the decision. The shock 
of the twenty-five year extension of the Treaty was tempered by its presentation to Iraqis 
as something of a formality or fail-safe demanded by the League of Nations made 
irrelevant by fact that Iraqi membership in the League would come, as many believed, 
within the span of a few years.215 Al Alam al Arabi, for example, was "overjoyed" at the 
decision ,216 but inquired of the League of Nations decision to extend the Treaty, "have 
they discovered that we are really so backward as all that?,,217 
al MUfid declared that "the nation is entitled to rejoice at the diplomatic triumph 
which it has achieved at Geneva," but that it had come at a "heavy cost," involving "the 
sacrifice of the greater part of the wealth of the country" through the recent TCP 
concessions, and "the binding of the freedom of the country and the placing of the Iraqi 
people in the position of a nation which continues still to bear the chains of slavery and 
degradation" through the oppressive Treaty.218 In the "whole long course of history," al 
Mufid claimed, "we know of no case where a court has carried off a poor slave which it 
has ordered to be emancipated." The people of Iraq were advised to learn carefully this 
lesson and "not to be cowardly," but to "exert themselves to protect the rights of Iraq 
with the utmost bravery and the greatest daring.,,219 The first consideration, for al Mufid 
was the new Treaty, "which the League has ordered should be made without consulting 
the wishes of the people of Iraq." Although al MUfid did not deny "the need for the help 
of a powerful nation ... or refuse to recognize the backward condition of the country," it 
215 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 26 December 18, 1925. NA, C0/730/105 
216 al Alam al Arabi, December 18, 1925. 
217 al Alam al Arabi, December 19, 1925. 
218 al Mufid, December 20,1925. 
219 al Mufid, December 20,1925. 
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also did not condone these as justifying "enslaving the nation." For "an alliance based on 
mutual benefits is one thing and submission to foreign rule and entrance into the ranks of 
colonies is another thing." Al Mufid criticized the Cabinet's policy of "hiding all 
information from the Deputies, from the press, and from the enlightened elements of 
society" as destructive of public confidence. This feeling was compounded by the Iraqi 
Prime Minister's admission that he had not seen the Treaty and the British Prime 
Minister's promise to have a Treaty ratified by the Iraqi government by February 2. "The 
nation," al Mufid declared, "will not forgive those who sacrifice the liberty of the nation 
for the sake of their rank and position.',zzo 
al Istiqlal commented that "no Arab can consider the decision of the League of 
Nations without feeling both grief and joy at the same time." The decision was just 
because it was based on evidence of popular sentiment and reflected the fact of Mosul's 
Iraqi identity. It was lamentable, however, in that "the great efforts of Great Britain" had 
been made not for principles but for the retention of Iraqi oil and that the "conditions" 
attached to the Treaty by the League were "contrary to [Iraqi] aspirations and an obstacle 
to the complete freedom which they love." al Istiqlal was particularly perturbed by the 
League's reference to the mandate, "it appears that in the eyes of other nations the 
mandate still exists while we regard it as non-existent."221 For regardless of the 
undergirding principles, "mandates have in practice been used to carry on an 
administration in no way different from that usually set up in a colony or protected 
territory.',222 
220 al Mufid, December 30,1925. 
221 allstiqlal, December 22,1925. 
222 allstiqlal, December 20,1925. 
The Daily Herald announced the League's decision with the statement, 
summarizing Labour opinion on it generally, that 
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the British Nation is now condemned against its will to govern a far-away 
territory in Asia for twenty-five years at a cost of several millions annually ... War 
is a possibility. Continual friction with the Turks is almost certain ... The inclusion 
in Irak of a large part of the Turkish province of Mosul. .. gives the whole 
business a buccaneering air, an Imperialist flavour, which the mass of the British 
People strongly dislike. Mr. Baldwin gave a pledge that our responsibility should 
end in 1927. Now it is to be prolonged until 1952,z23 
In its weekly notes for speakers, the ILP condemned the 'Mosul Mouse Trap' as opening 
the door to "another Egypt." To Amery's comment that the work in Iraq had been, "as 
fine a piece of work as that done by Lord Cromer in the early days of Egypt," ILP 
speakers were encouraged to remind their audiences that the occupation of Egypt was 
followed by fifteen years of war and the maintenance of British influence by brute force. 
At nearly £4 million per year, twenty-five years would prove a long and expensive 
occupation.224 For his part, MacDonald published an article on the decision in the Daily 
Herald stating that, in light of the financial obligations entailed and the threat of War 
with Turkey should the decision be rejected, "the agreement to continue our 
responsibilities for Irak for another 25 years is a blunder of the most serious kind.,,225 
The National Council of the ILP, in its "alarm and indignation" at the decision, 
expressed its confidence at "the united and determined opposition of the whole Labour 
movement to this costly and dangerous policy of imperialism" and, reflecting back on its 
disappointment with the MacDonald's failure to act more aggressively against its 
predecessors Iraq policy and demanded that the "Labour Party declare in advance that it 
will not be bound in its dealing with Iraq by the undertakings which the present 
223 Daily Herald, December 17, 1925. 
224 Independent Labour Party, Independent Labour Party Information Committee Weekly Notes for 
Speakers, vol. 239 (Independent Labour Party Information Committee, 1925). 
225 Daily Herald, December 19, 1925. 
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Government may assume," in its next tum in office. Most importantly, however, the ILP 
demanded a "free vote in Parliament" over the ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty once 
a draft had been produced?26 
Both the demand for a free vote and opposition to the ratification of the Treaty 
among Labour propagandists built up over the month of December, as the end of the 
sessions for the winter approached.227 On December 21 in what were, quite literally, the 
final hours of Parliamentary sessions for 1925, Baldwin finally opened the floor of the 
House for debate over the approval of a fully drafted Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. MacDonald 
stood in protest, pointing out that "two or three hours debate on an issue which might 
conceivably involve grave developments was inadequate" and requesting "the 
withdrawal of the motion ... permitting a general debate on the adjournment for the 
purpose of eliciting information from the Ministers." When Baldwin summarily refused, 
the Labour Party walked out of Parliament en mass in protest.228 In the absence of 
Labour representatives, the resolution to ratify the Treaty was passed 239 to 4. 
In the days following the approval of the Treaty in the British Parliament, Amery 
instructed Dobbs in Iraq to "impress on [Faysal] the paramount importance of concluding 
the treaty with the least possible delay." Toward that end, Faysal, the Prime Minister, 
and through him the Iraqi Parliament were informed that the "various outstanding 
amendments" would not be included in the new Treaty, though they would be subject to 
later negotiation, and that "the League will be satisfied with nothing less than the terms of 
226 Independent Labour Party, I.L.P. Report a/the Annual Conference held at Carlisle March-April, 1929 
(London: Independent Labour Party, 1929). 
227 See Daily Herald December 21,1925. 
228 Daily Herald, December 22,1925. Also see Berriedale A. Keith, "The League of Nations and Mosul," 
Journal o/Comparative Legislation and International Law, 3rd Ser. Vo1.8, No.1 (1926), p. 47-49. 
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the proposed treaty." Any attempt even to criticize it from the Iraqi government, they 
were assured, "will have the worst possible effect both on the League and on His 
Majesty's Government.,,229 The Residency was confident, however, that Faysal was 
"genuinely determined to exert every effort to put [the Treaty] through without further 
argument once His Britannic Majesty's Government have definitely decided upon its 
final form.,,23o The trouble, the Residency anticipated, would come from the opposition. 
For though the opposition had accepted the twenty-five year extension of the Treaty, 
believing that League membership would come much sooner, it had insisted that the 
Treaty "be a new treaty," that the Parliament be permitted "to examine its provisions with 
great care and to secure all possible concessions to both the dignity and the pocket of the 
State," and that the Iraqi Cabinet ultimately take full responsibility for failing to secure 
such an agreement.231 
On January 13, 1926, Dobbs and Faysal signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty draft 
without revision. The next day, al Mufid declared "the future [as] shrouded in fearful 
darkness and doubts" and that it appeared that "Iraq is headed for destruction." The Iraqi 
government, al Mufid inferred, was being intimidated by the British "so that the new 
treaty may be signed blindly.,,232 With al Mufid, allstiqlal interpreted the silence of the 
Iraqi government on the impending Treaty debate against the backdrop of the cacophony 
in the European press over the impending Anglo-Turkey agreement to mean that "the 
new treaty contains clauses which will not be welcomed by the people." No doubt, al 
lstiqlal suggested, "for obvious reasons which need no mention here it is impossible for 
229 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 26 December 24, 1925. 
230 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.1, January 7, 1926. 
231 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.1, January 7,1926. 
232 at Mufid, January 14,1926. 
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the Government of Iraq to oppose the making of this treaty, so that our Ministers are 
faced with a fait accompli. Will you, 0 Ministers, not receive from London a treaty to be 
accepted without amendment?,,233 Challenging the logic and principles of the League over 
the matter, al /stiqlal inquired how anyone could reconcile the recognition of Mosul as 
being part of Iraq with the enforced imposition of a treaty "that destroys the 
independence and sovereignty of the country" the Mosul decision seemed to 
acknowledge. It was in the power of the British to make a treaty that did not demand 
Iraqis "forget our nationality nor relinquish our national rights," al /stiqlal insisted "we 
need an ally not a master.,,234 
When the Treaty was laid before the Iraqi Parliament a few days later, Yasin, now 
the leader of the Hisb al Sha'b, echoed these arguments as well as the opposition of 
British Labour in their own Parliament in insisting that it should be referred to a special 
Parliamentary committee for review before it was debated by the Parliament as a whole. 
Yasin was informed by the Prime Minister, however, that he and 42 members of the Hisb 
al Taqaddam, the pro-government, and in important respects, pro-British party, had 
already tabled a petition demanding the Treaty be debated immediately, that the public be 
excluded from the House during the debate, and that the debate be closed and secret.235 
As MacDonald and the British Labour Party had weeks before them over the same issue, 
Yasin and all 19 members of the opposition party walked out in protest. The 58 
remaining Deputies, then excluded the public, debated for a little over an hour, and 
produced a unanimous vote for the acceptance of the Treaty.236 
233 alistiqlal,January 13,1926. 
234 allstiqlal, January 17, 1926. 
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By the end of 1925, a nationalist opposition movement in Iraq, largely inspired by 
the Iraqi popular press, had organized into political parties with the Hisb al Sha'b at the 
forefront and begun to act as a collective force in the name of 'complete independence' 
upon the Residency, the Palace, and a political grouping of Iraqi 'moderates' identifying 
with the Hisb al Taqaddam's advocacy of a healthy cooperative relationship with the 
British in the name of long-term Iraqi stability. Over the course of the process of 
ratifying the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, Iraqi nationalist leaders had learned important lessons 
about the political power of mobilized popular opinion but also about the limits of that 
power. Although walking out of Parliament over the issue of the Treaty all but ensured 
that it would be ratified, denying the government even their oppositional vote against the 
Treaty also ensured that the stigma of coercion and compromise would be forever 
attached to it in the Iraqi imagination, along with the enduring patriotism of those who 
had rejected it and the undemocratic manner in which it had been passed. 
al Istiqlal immediately cast the Hisb al Sha'b as the champions of democracy and 
constitutionalism and the Hisb al Taqaddam as both anti-democratic and recklessly self-
serving in having ratified "a treaty which binds the future of Iraq for a quarter of a 
century ... in half an hour.,,237 Hisb al Sha'b's new paper, Nada al Sha'b, appearing a few 
days after the debate, gave a detailed exposition of the many points about the treaty that 
should have been raised in debate, illustrating that there "was no fact, no reason why it 
should not have been discussed for at least a fortnight," but also that the House was not 
the only place in which such a debate could take place.238 With detailed discussions of 
237 allstiqlal,January 19,1926. 
238 Nada al Sha 'b, January 20, 1926. 
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the Treaty in relation to past agreements, examples of other treaties, and constitutional 
analysis from Iraqi experts, Nada al Sha'b demonstrated that the Treaty itself as well as 
the manner in which it had been passed represented a retrogression of Iraqi progress that 
would never be overcome until British power was no longer a component in Iraqi 
politicallife.239 
It was al Alam al Arabi that first gave voice to the attitude the press would 
ultimately take concerning the Treaty in lamenting the "outpouring of abuse and blame 
which have followed the ratification of the new treaty" and calling for unity of purpose 
among the papers and the parties whose interests they both influenced and reflected. 
"The treaty," the writer argued, "has been ratified ... let all efforts now be turned to 
improving those things which so sadly need improvement and reform.,,24Q A few days 
later, al Alam al Arabi expanded on its reasoning, stating that "those who have 
prescribed for us are watching the effects of this medicine. We must therefore make 
every day an effort to improve so that each year may mark a definite advancement in our 
administration, our education and in our national wealth so that we may be ready to stand 
alone at the earliest possible moment.,,241 
That is not to say, however, that the Iraqi nationalist press or political parties had 
resigned themselves to the fate of becoming a quasi-protectorate of the British Empire. 
As the concluding chapter of this dissertation discusses, the final contest over control of 
Iraq's political destiny before the advent of her independence began the moment the 1926 
Treaty was ratified and Iraqi nationalism, largely because of the empowerment I have 
described above, would playa crucial role in shaping it. The independent freedom of 
239 Nada al Sha'b,January 21,1926. 
240 al Alam al Arabi,January 22,1926. 
241 al Alam al Arabi, January 30, 1926. 
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action of the press and the leaders of the political opposition in Iraq expressed in the 
years leading up to the 1926 Treaty, however, would not be experienced again in Iraq for 
the duration of the twentieth-century. For as emancipation from the mandate became 
increasingly inevitable over the second half of the 1920' s, Faysal would demand every 
means of leverage the Iraqi state could bring to bare on the British government to ensure 
that the final settlement of Anglo-Iraqi relations would be something more than merely 
the next tier of indirect imperial rule. Although they would remain at the fore of the most 
aggressive and unified mobilization of the Iraqi public against British control that the 
Residency had seen since the 1920 rising, Iraqi nationalist leaders would also directly 
contribute to the undermining of Iraqi democracy and the empowerment of the Sherifian 
court that would characterize Iraqi political life for the next quarter century. 
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Chapter 7: Complete Independence? 
In his classic work on the Iraqi mandate period, Peter Sluglett has referred the 
nearly three years between the January 1926 ratification of the second Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 
and the declaration by the second Labour government of its pending unconditional 
support for Iraqi membership to the League of Nations in the fall of 1929 as the "Years of 
Frustration," and with good reason. I With the ratification of the 1926 Treaty, the 
emancipation of Iraq from the British mandate became a matter of time and both the 
Baldwin administration and Faysal began laying the groundwork for maintaining their 
power and influence in a post-mandate Iraq. For the Baldwin administration, it was 
imperative that the British government lay down in a legal agreement precisely what its 
responsibilities and privileges would be in a free Iraq, to British advantage, while they 
were still in a position to determine precisely when Iraqi membership in the League of 
Nations would take place. For his part, Faysal held no illusions about the dependence of 
his monarchy and his nation's bid for independence alike upon British military and 
political support. Although the Residency's perception of his cooperation in the 
negotiations was essential for the maintenance of British support for his monarchy, it was 
equally essential that he be perceived by the Iraqi people as a champion of 'complete 
independence' from the British and sympathetic to the efforts oflraq's growing anti-
colonial nationalist movement. 
This concluding chapter seeks to offer a more detailed discussion than has yet 
been undertaken by historians of precisely how Faysal orchestrated a stalemate over a 
new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty between 1926 and 1929, the role played by Iraqi nationalist 
political parties and the press in Faysal's bid to obtain the maximum degree of Iraqi 
1 Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq 1914-1932 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), pp. 141-170. 
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control over its national destiny and the consequences of that role for Iraqi nationalism, 
and, finally, the role the second MacDonald administration played in overcoming that 
stalemate and emancipating Iraq from the mandate in 1932.2 I argue that while Faysal 
used the network of political patronage that he, Cox, and Dobbs had constructed through 
the Sherifian court to keep order and keep treaty negotiations on track, he also depended 
heavily on the formidable opposition movement generated through the Iraqi press to 
frustrate those negotiations to his personal advantage? As a result, he was able to incur a 
stalemate with the Baldwin administration as a means of holding out for a more 
advantageous treaty arrangement ultimately delivered by MacDonald's Labour 
government in 1929, but only through the appropriation and ultimate delegitimation of 
the popular nationalist movement in Iraq. Although Faysal's manipulation of the Iraqi 
political system to his advantage during this period is a theme in most scholarly work on 
the subject,4 this study shifts the crucial role of anti-colonial nationalism in Iraq to center 
2 Philip Ireland's 1937 work on the mandate period briefly notes the key points of tension between Faysal 
and the British over the details of the Treaty negotiations and points up the unpopularity of the final draft in 
Iraq. He does not consider the opposition to the Treaty, beyond Faysal' s limited objections, as being of 
significant influence, however, and merely notes that the advent of a Labour government in 1929 
"facilitated a change in British policy" that, though still unpopular generally, faced little opposition in its 
passage through the Iraqi Parliament. Philip Willard Ireland, 'Iraq: A Study in Political Development 
(London: Kegan Paul, 2004), pp. 409-418; Sluglett's 1976 work on the mandate gives a bit more 
consideration to the basic tensions between Faysal and the British government as well as a discussion of the 
views of nationalist political parties, he does not, however, view the opposition as having been unified in 
any way or very influential on the process apart from offering an occasional scare of popular unrest for the 
Residency. Sluglett, like Ireland, merely identifies the advent of a Labour government as a transition point 
for British policy without an analysis of Labour's view of the mandate. See Sluglett, pp. 141-170; Toby 
Dodge's more recent study of the mandate period does point out that Faysal deliberately "paralyzed" Iraqi 
politics as a means of pressuring the British into acquiescing to his demands, but offers no consideration of 
Iraqi politics per se or attempts to make an argument for the actual influence of Faysal's efforts on the 
negotiations. Dodge goes a bit beyond Ireland and Sluglett in recognizing that the "Labour minority 
government ... was not constrained by the imperial ideology of its predecessor," but that comment is the 
extent of his analysis. See Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History 
Denied (New York: Colombia University Press, 2003), pp. 34-37. 
3 For a brief iteration of the pervasive argument that the Iraqi press under the mandate and, especially after 
1926, was primarily a tool of Iraqi politicians, see Amy Ayalon, The Press in the Arab Middle East: A 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 91-95. 
4 See footnote 2 above. 
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stage as a political force for change in and of itself that Faysal merely tried to influence 
and direct. 
This chapter also illustrate how the treaty stalemate gave the second MacDonald 
administration in 1929 the opportunity to vindicate its legacy as the party for a more 
democratic approach to imperial and foreign policy by replacing the Baldwin draft of the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty with one less offensive to Iraqi nationalist sensibilities and offering to 
support Iraqi admission to the League in 1932 unconditionally. The fact that it was a 
Labour government that broke the stalemate and emancipated Iraq has also been 
acknowledged by most historians interested in the mandate period,5 though it has tended 
to interest historians of Labour history very little.6 Here, I argue that the emancipation of 
Iraq in 1929 was a culminating and vindicating moment for Labour's legacy, beginning 
with the advent of the ILP in the late 19th century and galvanized through UDC and ILP 
propaganda during the First World War, as the party for the democratization of the inter-
5 Elizabeth Monroe's view of the role of British Labour in Iraq offers a snapshot of a somewhat pervasive 
tendency among historians who consider Labour's role in Iraq policy at all by viewing the first MacDonald 
administration's failure to shift the policy of its predecessors, despite MacDonald's personal standing as a 
"long-standing critic of imperialism," as example of idealist politicians being 'tamed' by the realities of 
office and of the stability the imperial framework gave to Britain's inter-national relations generally. 
Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1963), pp. 74-142. Also, see footnote 2 above 
6 David Howell's study of the Labour movement specifically over the course of both MacDonald 
administrations, for example, makes no mention at all of Labour attitudes toward policy in Iraq, see David 
Howell, MacDonald's Party: Labour Identities and Crisis, 1922-1931 (Oxford [England] ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). Henry Winkler's extensive work on the Labour Party has paid significant 
attention to foreign policy and and Labour's involvement in the League of Nations movement. 
Nevertheless, even Winkler has tended to leave Iraq out of his narratives. See Henry R. Henry Ralph 
Winkler, British Labour Seeks a Foreign Policy, 1900-1940 (New Brunswick, N.J. Transaction Publishers, 
2005) and Henry R. Winkler, Paths Not Taken: British Labour and International Policy in the 1920's 
(Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina, 1994). For works on Labour's related interest 
in India and Egypt, see the classic work by Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour 
Movement, 1914-1964 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975) and the more recent by Nicholas 
Nicholas J Owen, The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism, 1885-1947 (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007). John Callaghan's recent study offers an example of a history of 
Labour's foreign relations that touches on the mandates briefly only to leave off the story until the Attlee 
government takes office in 1945, John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History 
(London: Routledge, 2007). 
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imperial system as a whole and beginning with the British Empire. Just as the UDC and 
ILP's call for the interdiction ofterritorial transfer at the end of the Great War gave rise 
to a popular support for British membership and conformity with the principles of a 
League of Nations, so too would Labour's emancipation ofIraq from British rule and 
support for its membership to the League become the first steps toward the 'age of 
decolonization' that would follow the Second World War in which a third and fourth 
Labour government in the 1940's and 1960' s would also playa crucial role. 
It was no coincidence that Faysal had selected Abd al Mushin al Sa'dun to be the 
Prime Minister to midwife the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1926 through the Parliament. 
Though loyal to the Sherifian court, Sa'dun was also a firm believer in the necessity of a 
strong relationship between the Palace and the British government for Iraqi stability and 
progress toward independence, and even after, and had organized and led his 'pro-
government' Hisb al Taqaddam, which dominated the Parliament by 1926, accordingly.7 
With the Treaty ratified and Sa'dun as Prime Minister, Faysal seemed well positioned to 
shore up the strength of the monarchy as the political center of the soon-to-be 
independent state oflraq. His tactic of empowering 'extreme nationalist' elements to 
bring pressure to bear on the Residency as well as bring the Iraqi public into line with the 
Palace agenda over the fall of 1925, however, had, perhaps, overly empowered opponents 
to Sa'dun's program and even rivals for Faysal's position at the center of the Iraqi 
political landscape. 8 For although Yasin al Hashimi and his Hisb al Sha'b had not gotten 
7 Sluglett, p. 85 and Ireland, p. 422 and 'Abd al-Razzaq Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah Al- 'Iraqiyah, vol. 2 
(Sayda: Matba'at al-' Irfan, 1971), pp. 5-11 and 31-39. 
8 This is a view shared by a number of historians of Iraq, including Phebe Marr, The Modern History of 
Iraq (Oxford: Westview Press, 2004), pp. 31-34; C.Ernest Dawn, "The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in 
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the nationwide support they expected in walking out of Parliament over the passage of 
the Treaty, they had generated enough popular legitimacy as the main opposition party to 
significantly challenge the Hisb al Taqaddam's legislative agenda in Parliament and the 
press.9 
As early as February 1926, the Sa'dun Cabinet determined to silence its foremost 
critics by shutting down both al Istiqlal and Nada al Sha'b for their criticisms of his 
governments subservience to British interests, but on the grounds that "their publications 
disturbed the security of the country." On Faysal's advice, tellingly protective of Yasin's 
freedom of political maneuver, that it might be "inadvisable to suspend at one blow all 
organs hostile to his government," however, it was decided to make an example of the 
more independent al Istiqlal alone, along with the public notification that any personal 
attacks on members of government were forbidden by pain of legal action. JO Nada al 
Sha'b, the organ ofYasin's Hisb al Sha'b, was permitted to continue publication and took 
full advantage of the suppression of al Istiqlal as an example of the Hisb al Taqaddam's 
tendency to suppress, rather than engage, opposition to its agenda. Nada al Sha 'b 
characteristically followed the suppression with articles on the importance of a free press 
as a bridge between the public and the government in democratic nations.1I Experts on 
constitutionalism wrote in to express their "astonishment" at the suppression, the reasons 
for which were legally determined to be "entirely inadequate and unjustifiable.,,12 Nada 
the Interwar Years," International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 20, No.1. (February 1988): pp. 67-
91; and Sluglett, pp. 141-147; 
9 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.4, February 18,1926. (220) and Hasani, Tarikh 
Al-Sihafah, vol. 2, pp. 31-42 and 48-52. 
10 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.5, March 4, 1926. NA. COl370J0511 allstiqlal 
got wind of the suppression plan and was actually able to condemn its own suppression on the day it was to 
commence, see al Istiqlal, February 22,1926. 
II Nada al Sha'b March 9,1926. 
12 Nada at Sha'b March 7,1926. 
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al Sha'b compared the pro-British slant of al Iraq13 and "the English newspaper" the 
Baghdad Times l4 with the patriotic condemnation of the unequal Anglo-Iraqi relationship 
appearing in the papers Sa'dun chose to shut down to illustrate where his true loyalties 
lay. 15 As one might expect, Nida al Sha 'b pointed out, the Sa' dun administration had 
also failed to push for the reduction of British presence and influence in the 
administration of Iraq, the promise of which had served as the basis for forming a quorum 
for the ratification of the Treaty in the first place. 16 As Faysal, Sa'dun, and the Hisb al 
Taqaddam well knew, Nida al Sha 'b declared, all that was needed "to bring about the 
execution of these promises ... was a little pressure and a little determination" from the 
Iraqi people. 17 The question at the heart of the matter, as far as the Iraqi people were 
concerned, was what the government and the Palace had to gain by choosing to suppress 
that effort, rather than support it. IS Considering the vehemence of Nada al Sha 'b 's 
response to al Istiqlal 's suppression, an equally important question this chapter seeks to 
answer is why Nada al Sha 'b was permitted to pursue the same lines of argument. 
In Parliament, regular contributor to the nationalist press Shaikh Ahmad Daud led 
opposition members' efforts to obstruct practically every act of legislation put forward by 
the Sa'dun administration. 19 Having gained a majority in a financial oversight 
committee, Yasin used his position to attack the government for its failure to reduce the 
number of foreign advisors who, despite the expense of their employment, had failed to 
13 Nada al Sha'b February 25,1926. 
14 Nada al Sha'b April 26, 1926. 
15 Nada al Sha'b April,6, 1926. 
16 Nada al Sha'b, March 16. 
17 Nada al Sha'b April 1 ,1926. 
18 Nada al Sha' b April 1 and 26, 1926. 
19 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.7, April 1, 1926. NA, COl7301 1051 1 and 
Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, vol. 2, pp. 21-23. 
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prepare Iraqis, let alone the Iraqi state, for self-government.2o By May, Faysal informed 
Dobbs that the only way the Sa'dun Cabinet would be able to move forward would be to 
dissolve the Parliament, pass whatever legislation he could by Royal decree, and then 
arrange "new elections for the purpose of securing a more subservient Assembly." 21 
Although Dobbs stood in the way of Faysal's dissolution of the Parliament, the King's 
appointment of a coalition government to replace Sa'dun that fall which would include 
key nationalist opposition leaders suggests that a "more subservient Assembly" may not 
have been his primary goal for the unrealized move. In any event, however, Dobbs' 
prevention of Sa' dun's replacement in May was out of concern that such a tactic would 
delay the ratification of a tripartite treaty between the British, Iraq, and Turkey that would 
finally and formally settle Anglo-Turkish relations over the Mosul question.22 
Having been in negotiations for months in which Turkish demands for shares, 
rather than profits, in Iraqi oil development had prevented any agreement from being 
reached over the Mosul question, circumstances suddenly changed dramatically in early 
May to the advantage of British delegates. In an urgent telegram to the Foreign Office on 
May 7, 1926, the British representative in Angora reported that, to his utter shock, the 
Turkish delegates had caved in of a sudden and agreed to settle for a lump sum payment 
of £500,000, which the Iraqi government would be expected to pay, and a minimal 
percentage of oil profits. The opportunity for putting the Anglo-Turkish dispute over Iraq 
right with the League, as well as vindicating the British government's position that, 
unlike the unquestionably self-serving motivations of Turkey, Britain's primary concern 
20 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 10. May 13,1926. NA, CO/730/105/l. 
21 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 11 May 27, 1926. NA, CO/730/1 05/1. 
22 Ibid. 
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had been the principle of nationality in Iraq all along, was far more than British delegates 
could ever have hoped for. 23 Accordingly, once the new treaty had been drafted, Dobbs 
worked tirelessly to bring the Sa'dun government and the opposition together for its 
ratification.24 
In a telling repetition of the passage of the 1926 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the Hisb al 
Shab, led by Yasin in Parliament, made every effort to obstruct the Hisb al Taqaddam 
majority's approval ofthe Iraqi-Anglo-Turkish settlement and, when those efforts failed, 
he and his party walked out ofParliament.25 Having fought the opposition's obstructions, 
Sa'dun and the Hisb al Taqaddam then used the opportunity of their absence from 
Parliament to pass and ratify the historic agreement on June 14, 1926, with a reasonable 
majority?6 Special Security Officer for Baghdad Philip Plant, for one, viewed the walk-
out with suspicion. As Plant pointed out, although Yasin's dramatic exit from the 
Parliament bolstered his popularity with 'the anti-British section of the population' and 
disassociated himself from the passage of the treaty, it, in effect, opened the door for the 
ratification of the treaty that might not have made it through in a vote with the 
opposition's moral and physical presence in Parliament.27 The response to the 
ratification of both the government and the opposition offers some clarity both to the 
walk-out and to Plant's half-formed suspicions. 
Nada at Sha 'b came out immediately with the condemnation that the ratification 
was but "further evidence of the continued policy of [the government's] readiness to 
23 For the full collection of dispatches pertaining to the negotiations and settlement, see NA, FOl371 111458, 
11461,11462, and 11463. 
24 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 11 May 27,1926. NA, C01730/l05/l. 
25 For a detailed chronological account of the treaty debates in the Iraqi Cabinet, see Hasani, Tarikh Al-
Sihafah, vol. 2, pp. 58-71. 
26 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 13, June 24,1926. NA, COl7301 1051 1. 
27 Plant to ASI June 9,1926. NA, AJRI231264132 
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concede [to the British] when the interests of the country are at stake." The critique was 
placed in an historical context, however, of sacrifices already made and deemed by the 
nationalist press as having been unavoidable 'ransoms' paid by the Iraqis for their 
independence, noting that "we have made sacrifices to the English, the Americans, the 
French, and the Dutch all in order that our young state might have a good start in life and 
now we have made our sacrifice to the Turks toO.,,28 Although the Sa'dun administration 
was guilty of falling short of the opposition's commitment to resisting the imposition of 
the treaty, like other administrations, it had also been faced with the all too familiar fait 
accompli imposed on Iraq as the price of its independence by the British, who were the 
real enemies of 'complete independence' in Iraq. 
As for the Sa'dun administration, an interview in at Iraq with the chief negotiator 
for the treaty in Angora, Nuri al Said, pointed out that the government had succeeded in 
obtaining a treaty in which "Great Britain had not signed ... as a mandatory power," and, 
therefore, codified in an international agreement that "the mandate was non-existent." 
Moreover, the completion ofthe settlement with Turkey also meant that Iraq was on track 
for League Membership in 1928, as promised by the Bonar Law administration with the 
passage of the Protocol, at which time "not one British soldier would remain in the 
Iraq.,,29 In a move designed to preemptively diffuse the argument that foreigners were 
'drinking the blood of Iraq' that had accompanied the Turkish Petroleum Company 
concessions in years prior, the Residency accompanied the announcement of the 
settlement with a congratulatory gift of forgiving Iraq's debt to the British of some 
£790,000, an amount that would more than make up for the £500,000 Iraq was meant to 
28 Nada at Sha'b, June 15, 1926. 
29 at Iraq, June 14, 1926. 
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pay the Turkish state for Mosu1.30 Although the government may have failed to entirely 
deflect the latest ransom for Iraqi emancipation, it had not entirely sacrificed Iraqi 
interests in keeping the state on the path toward independence and the expulsion of the 
British from the country. In the end, the manner in which the Iraqi-Anglo-Turkish Treaty 
was ratified succeeded in painting the British as the foremost enemies of Iraqi self-
determination while permitting both the government and the opposition to retain their 
popular legitimacy as divergent, and yet parallel movements for an independent Iraq. 
A key point of divergence between the Hisb al Taqaddam and the Hisb al Sha'b that 
would emerge from the public debate over the Turkish settlement, however, was the 
importance of membership to the League of Nations for Iraqi independence. For the 
government party, the defining end of British control in Iraq had always been League 
membership. Although the end of British rule was also at the forefront of the 
opposition's agenda, a new line taken up by the opposition press in the fall of 1926 
disparaging not only the relevance of Iraqi membership in the League, but of the League 
itself, suggests a clear awareness that negotiations for a new treaty to define Anglo-Iraqi 
relations in the wake of independence was in the offing. 
The settlement with Turkey was accompanied by a report from the Residency to 
the League of Nations, published in London and Iraq that August, which emphasized 
Iraqi progress in its domestic and foreign relations, as evidenced by the ratification of the 
two recent treaties, toward League membership. The report's publication inspired, 
however, the unanticipated eruption of anti-League of Nations sentiment in the 
opposition press, according to the Residency, in which 'extreme nationalist' writers 
"sneered" at references to Iraqi progress and "decried" the advantages of League 
30 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report no. 14, June 25,1926. NA, CO/730/105/1. 
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membership all together. Although the Residency anticipated that there would still be "a 
very strong movement in this country to bring pressure to bear on the British Government 
to secure [Iraqi] admission" to the League in 1928, it acknowledged that even Iraqi 
moderates tended to view the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty as "the sweetest fruits 
of League membership," which, otherwise, seemed to be losing its appea1.31 
alIstiqlal, for one, declared that there were no advantages whatsoever to League 
membership apart from the end of the mandate, an argument that al Iraq immediately 
countered with the example of Germany and Egypt "doing their utmost to gain admission 
to the League because they know that the League is a body which has a decisive voice in 
the affairs of the world." In any event, al Iraq declared, "Iraq is fit now to enter the 
League of Nations" and the only criticism that could be made of the report was the 
appearance of the word "hope" its projection of Iraqi acceptance to the League in 1928, 
which the Baldwin administration would soon reject out of hand. 32 Al Alam al Arabi 
made the opposite argument, challenged the report's claims that Iraq was "enjoying a 
considerable measure of prosperity," arguing that "the author of the report felt the fear of 
the truth ... and strove to minimize the shock" of the reality of "present deplorable 
financial situation" Iraqis were actually facing. Considering the number of well-paid 
British advisors and their failure to set Iraqis or their state on the road to prosperity and 
31 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 18, August 20, 1926. NA. RI20lAI1238 The 
opinions of Iraqis concerning the League of Nations, beyond their desire to signify independence through 
League Membership, are almost never considered by historians of Iraq. For a discussion of the lack of 
attention to non-imperial perspectives on the League, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-
Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
32 al Iraq August 20,1926. 
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progress, af Afam af Arabi concluded, it was the British themselves who were responsible 
for the economic straits Iraq was in.33 
Nada af Sha 'b similarly argued that Iraqi progress should be measured in the 
ability ofIraqi 'public men' to wring any sort ofliberty at all out of their foreign 
occupiers. "How much justice it would have been," the writer stated, if the report had 
more accurately illustrated "that Iraqis had been able by their patience to obtain ~ 
fruits from a constitution which does not ensure their principle hopes nor the fundamental 
principles embodied in the constitutions of other countries." "Where are the fruits of this 
constitution," the writer wryly asked, "in the freedom of the press, perhaps it lies in the 
constant neglect of the resolutions of Parliament, or the ill temper with which the 
expressed wishes of the people are so constantly received.,,34 As for membership in the 
League, Nada af Sha 'b stated, "everyone knows what the free Iraqis think about the 
League of Nations." 35 They did "not set much store by entering the League of Nations ... 
[for] entry into the League does not mean freedom or independence." The League was 
stocked with "many countries subject to the protection or colonization of others ... India 
and Australia and Canada and Ireland and South Africa" while other countries "quite 
independent and free like America and Germany and Russia and Turkey lose nothing by 
not being members of the League." As the experiences of Arab peoples under League 
protection had shown, "the League is still subject to the influences of the Colonizing 
Powers who created it and its mandates to satisfy their lusts and greed." The notion that 
membership would bring an end to the illegitimate Anglo-Iraqi treaty relations was little 
more than a dream, as the recent Treaty had demonstrated. The only attraction for 
33 at Atam at Arabi August 17, 1926. 
34 Nada at Sha'b, August 15, 1926. 
35 Nada at Sha'b, August 15, 1926. 
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League membership, in the view of Nada al Sha 'b was the modicum of leverage Iraqis 
could gain from it to force some kind of revision in its relations with Britain and "recover 
some of our lost rights" as a mandate.36 
Such sentiments were confirmed and even enflamed that September, when British 
delegate to the League of Nations Sir Austen Chamberlain protested against the 
'inquisitorial nature' of the Permanent Mandates Commission's assumption of the right 
to make inquiries into the management of the mandates.37 How, asked al Istiqlal, could 
Chamberlain reconcile Britain's famous "love of democracy and constitutionalism" with 
his opposition to the "examination of Mandatory Powers in regard to their 
administrations ... and for hearing of the complaints of the mandated peoples?" 
Chamberlain would do well to remember, al Istiqlal advised, that although there were 
those Iraqis content seeing their nation "bound with the golden chain of the mandate," 
there were also "the true sons of Iraq who watch closely every movement which they 
think may be detrimental to its national existence," offering French occupied Syria as 
example of what a free hand would bring.38 Nada al Sha 'b responded to Chamberlain's 
interferences with a tirade against the League of Nations. For the League had 
"undermined the foundations of high principles on which it was established and done 
much to impair its reputation" by way of its "attitude ... in regard to the Arab countries." 
All "oriental peoples," as a result, were "disposed therefore to see in it a tool in the hands 
of the greater nations used at their will to gain their own political ends." Thus, the paper 
36 Nada al Sha'b, August 16, 1926. 
37 For a discussion of the Permanent Mandates Committee, see H. R. G. Greaves, The League Committees 
and World Order; a Study of the Permanent Expert Committees of the League of Nations as an Instrument 
of International Government (London, Oxford University Press: H. Milford, 1931), pp. 169-199, 
38 allstiqlal, September 8,1926. 
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did not see "any great benefit for Iraq to be gained from joining the League, except the 
termination of the ... Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and escape from its unsatisfactory conditions.,,39 
Over the fall of 1926, the Residency observed with foreboding as Y as in 's Hisb al 
Sha'b seemed to gain more and more ground over Sa'dun's Hisb al Taqaddam. As Nada 
al Sha 'b accurately pointed out in November, a number of Hisb al Taqaddam supporters 
in the Chamber had "changed sides disgusted with [its] conduct" and begun to threaten its 
grip on the government.40 In what seemed to have been a plan to force a declaration of 
confidence in the Hisb al Taqaddam in the face of the opposition, Sa'dun called for the 
election of a new Parliamentary President in November in which his candidate was 
turned out by the lawyer and outspoken enemy of British influence in Iraqi government, 
but, tellingly, a loyal supporter of F aysal' s throne, Rashid Ali al Gay lani. 41 The new 
president announced in his acceptance speech that his election "must be regarded as a 
defeat for the government" that had failed to enforce the transition from British advisors 
to Iraqi statesmen at the helm of the Iraqi government under Sa'dun.42 Nada al Sha 'b 
concurred, openly rejoicing the victory as showing "the true extent of the Chambers' 
confidence in the Saduniyah Government" and even the somewhat more moderate, in the 
view of the Residency, al Alam al Arabi called the election of Rashid Ali "tantamount to 
a vote of no confidence in the government. ,,43 When Rashid Ali's election led directly to 
the Sa'dun Cabinet's resignation and Faysal's appointment of former Prime Minister 
Ja'far al Askari,44 Nada al Sha 'b enjoined the Hisb al Taqaddam to "emulate the 
39 Nada at Sha'b, October 21,1926. 
40 Nada at Sha'b, September 22,1926. 
41 Hasani, Tarikh At-Sihafah, vol. 2, p. 79. 
42 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 23, November 9,1926. NA, COI7301/07168 
43 al Alam al Arabi November 5,1926. 
44 Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah h, vol. 2, p. 79-81. 
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opposition by allowing the new Cabinet an opportunity to prove its worth or otherwise in 
a calm atmosphere." Taking the opportunity to point up the outgoing Cabinet's 
shortcomings and the role of the opposition in ousting it, the writer stated that, 
If after such an opportunity the new Cabinet proves to have violated constitutional 
rights, failed to give effect to the resolutions of the Chamber of Deputies, made 
light of public interests, sprung [legislation] upon the Chamber ... and exposed the 
Capital to inundations ... the Opposition will not fail to find some means to turn the 
new Government down.45 
The selection by F aysal of al Askari, a Sherifian loyalist and close friend of the 
King also well liked and respected among members of the Hisb al Taqaddam and the 
opposition parties alike, made sense to the Residency. Suspicions were raised, however, 
by Faysal's decision to ask al Askari to form a coalition government that would include 
Nuri al Said, perhaps the most politically powerful member of the Sherifian court, Yasin 
al Hashimi, the clear forerunner for leadership of the popular opposition movement, and 
Parliamentary President Rashid Ali.46 With five months of the al Askari coalition behind 
them and the negotiations for the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty underway by the summer of 
1927, Dobbs and his Councellor and Acting High Commissioner during periods of 
absence B. H. Bourdillon would reflect back on the formation of the al Askari coalition 
as the opening move in a grand plan devised by Faysal to pressure the British government 
into giving him the kind of treaty he desired by generating as much anti-British 
opposition in Iraq as his monarchy could withstand.47 
4S Nada al Sha'b, November 10, 1926. 
46 For a discussion of the formation of the al Askari coalition, see Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, vol. 2, p. 80-
81. 
47 B. H. Bourdillon's candid discussion of Faysal's attempts to manipulate the political landscape of Iraq as 
a negotiating tool against British designs for the Treaty can be found in his dispatches to the Foreign Office 
in NA, FO/371112259. The accusation that Faysal had deliberately fueled the fire of anti-British sentiment 
in Iraq and even politically empowered known 'extremist nationalists' to the point of endangering his own 
monarchy was presented to Faysal during the negotiations in the fall of 1927, the minutes of which are in 
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The advantages for Faysal of a national movement opposed to the successful 
completion of treaty negotiations he himself was undertaking was several-fold, according 
to Dobbs and Bourdillon. Faysal held no illusions about the dependence of his authority 
in Iraq on British power, a fact illustrated by his fruitless pleading with Dobbs for British 
military support for imposing national conscription in Iraq which, for reasons of politics, 
principle, and security, Dobbs refused to provide.48 By replacing some of the "best and 
most efficient civil officials in Iraq" with known "extremists and anti-British adherents of 
the Royal House" in key locations around Iraq during the treaty negotiations in 1925, 
according to Dobbs, Faysal hoped to give Iraqis the impression that the opposition was 
on the rise and that the end of British occupation in 1928 they demanded would require 
the Iraqi people to protect themselves in their absence, connecting nationalist sentiment 
with the idea of conscription.49 Although remaining ostensibly in support of Sa'dun's 
efforts to reach a settlement, according to Bourdillon, Faysal had at his disposal a coterie 
of "well trained orchestra of ministers and newspapers which ... at a sign from the baton 
of the royal conductor, change their tune with a dexterity reminiscent of a band switching 
suddenly from 'Three Blind Mice' into 'The Sewanee River'." Having failed to achieve 
his ends completely in 1925, Faysal was upping the stakes for the pending negotiations of 
a new treaty from the fall of 1926 and into the summer of 1927, Bourdillon believed, by 
empowering the opposition and fomenting a popular hatred of the British and a sense of 
patriotic Iraqi identity grounded in pushing them out of the country.50 
NA, CO/7301l20/40299. For an historical discussion of conscription in Anglo-Iraqi relations, see Sluglett, 
pp. 142-147 and Ireland, pp. 392-393. 
48 For a discussion of conscription as a political issue, see Sluglett, pp. 142-147 and Yitzhak Nakash, The 
Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 115-117. 
49 Dobbs, "Note on the Internal Situation in Iraq," June 27, 1927. NA, FO/3711l22591l50. 
50 BourdiIlon to Shuckburgh, July 28,1927. NA, FO/3711l2259/212. 
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The political framework reflected in the al Askari coalition represented what 
Phebe Marr has called a "tripartite balance of power" in Iraqi politics that "persisted right 
up to the revolution of 1958" comprising the throne, with its ambivalent relationship with 
both the British and Iraqi nationalism, the Prime Minister representing a bridge between 
the throne and the people while sharing its identification with British patronage, and a 
"shifting group" of politicians of an oppositionist and anti-colonialist bent, but 
nevertheless willing to take office to achieve their ends.51 The al Askari coalition also 
perfectly reflected the falj:ade of an empowered Iraqi nationalist movement desired by 
Faysal, a fact not lost on Bourdillon. Ja'far al Askari and Nuri al Said were both key 
figures in the Hisb al Taqaddam and Sherifian loyalists who shared Faysal' s "wildest 
dreams of Arab Imperialism, the former ready to produce the most fantastic schemes of 
military domination" but also his recognition of the importance of the Anglo-Sherifian 
relationship after independence. Rashid Ali could wield considerable "influence with the 
young lawyer class" but also evinced a clear "subservience to the King." Y asin Pasha 
was, perhaps the riskiest of the alliances, for, although he held the broadest influence 
among the anti-British element in Iraq, he was also known to be "loyal to himself alone ... 
[and] content to work slowly for his own ends." Yasin was considered to be "the ablest 
and most forceful politician in the country," which made him especially dangerous to 
Faysal in "conceiving himself as the future Zaghlul of Iraq." Bourdillon had little doubt 
that Yasin, for one, was merely using the opportunity to gain a footing for his own 
political advancement "and is using the King as a stepping stone. ,,52 
51 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Oxford: Westview Press, 2004), p. 33. Also see Phebe Marr, 
"The Development of a Nationalist Ideology in Iraq, 1920-1941," Muslim World 75, no. 2 (1985): 85-101 
52 Bourdillon to Shuckburgh, July 28,1927. NA, F01371112259/211 
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With opposition leaders in the government and nationalist agitation heating up all 
over the country, Faysal, Dobbs and Bourdillon presumed, believed he could bring 
pressure to bear on the Baldwin administration to concede on key issues in the treaty 
negotiations, including supporting Iraq's membership to the League in 1928 and possibly 
the support of the RAF for conscription, to ensure the Treaty's acceptance by the 
Chamber and to prevent a general rising. IfFaysal could return to Iraq with such a treaty 
in hand and have the al Askari coalition approve it, in one fell swoop he would have 
succeeded in securing Iraq's 'complete independence', raised a fervor of patriotic support 
for himself and his government sufficient to implement a policy of national conscription, 
and, thus, procured for himself a government free from foreign control and an army 
strong enough to maintain his increasingly authoritarian tendencies as monarch. 53 
In early June, in the wake of a spate of newspaper articles speculating on the new 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, al Askari requested that Acting High Commissioner Bourdillon make 
a statement in the press addressing which aspects of the existing the British government 
were prepared to negotiate and which they were not. When Bourdillon, believing he was 
being manipulated, refused even to acknowledge that negotiations were immanent, a 
telegram from the Iraqi representative in London, Muzahim al Pachachi, was 'leaked' to 
at Iraq suggesting that negotiations were about to begin and that Faysal would soon be en 
route to Europe to undertake them. The publication of the 'Pachachi telegram' sparked a 
"tide of journalistic speculation" about the negotiations, but also opinions as to what the 
desiderata of the Iraqi government should be, especially in relation to the "necessity for 
reducing the powers of the High Commissioner and of British Advisers" that, Bourdillon 
noted, was but the first salvo of "a violent press campaign, on considerably anti-British 
53 Dobbs, "Note on the Internal Situation in Iraq," June 27,1927. NA, FOl3711l22591l58 and 162. 
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lines." Bourdillon had no doubt that the inspiration for the campaign, in which al/stiqlal 
and Nada al Sha 'b took the lead, and the wild speculations about the negotiations it 
sought to popularize emanated directly from the Palace and, accordingly, he refused even 
to acknowledge their demands for a clarifying statement. 54 
Faysal's hold over the nationalist opposition was not as complete as Bourdillon let 
. on, however, and almost immediately after the assembly of the al Askari coalition, some 
of the most outspoken members of the Hisb al Sha'b, the most notable being Shaikh 
Ahmad Daud, opted to defect from the party.55 With the lawyer nationalist and fellow 
independent Muzahim al Pachachi, Shaikh Daud had been an important voice in the early 
'lawyers' group' with its focus on constitutional principles in relation to the instruments 
of government British advisors were attempting to pass through the government. It was 
in that spirit that Daud and Pachachi challenged nearly every piece of legislation the 
incoming al Askari Cabinet attempted to pass. As Pachachi, having returned from 
London and resumed his place in Parliament, pointed out to the Parliament, it was not the 
legislation to which they objected, but the manner in which it was being handled. Like 
the Sa'dun administration, the al Askari administration tended to "abuse its constitutional 
54 Bourdillon to Amery July 29,1927. NA, C017301l2014051S14. For examples of such publications, see 
alJstiqlal, July 27 and 28 and alJraq July 28,1927. NA, COl7301l2014051S14 
55 It was during this period that the most significant Iraqi nationalist movements of the 1930' s to the 1950' s 
began to take more organized form, presumably in the face of the appropriation of the movement by the 
likes of Yasin al Hashimi. For a succinct discussion of the emergence of the Iraqi nationalist club al Ahali, 
see Mudhafar Amin and Edmund Ghareeb, "The Intellectual Origins and Ideas of the Ahali Group," in 
Mudhafar Amin and Edmund Ghareeb, Law Personalities, and, Politics of the Middle East: Essays in 
Honor of Majid Khadduri, ed. James Piscatori and George S. Harris (Washington: Westview Press, 1987). 
For a more extensive discussion of the history of underground 'revolutionary movements' in Iraq focusing 
on the origins of the Iraqi Communist Party, see the classic work by Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes 
and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of 
Its Communists, Ba Thists, and Free Officers, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton, N J. Princeton 
University Press, 1978), especially pp. 367-434. For a discussion of the administrative tensions among the 
opposition elements in relation to Faysal during this period, see Ahmad Khalif 'Afif, Al-Tatawwur Al-Idari 
Lil-Dawlah Al- 'Iraqiyah Fi 'ahd Al-Intidab Al-Baritani, 1922-1932, (,Amman: Dar Jarir, 2008), pp. 93-
110. 
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powers." It was not the increase in the Public Works Department that was at issue, for 
example, but the designation of the increase as an urgent expenditure to streamline the 
legislative process over the recess. Similarly, it was not the granting of a loan to the 
Railway Department, but the fact that the railway itself had not technically become the 
property of the Iraqi state, and therefore remained a troubling matter of foreign, and not 
merely domestic, relations that demanded the attention, and not the political maneuver, of 
the government. 56 
By May 1927, SSO Plant reported, Shaikh Daud had drawn a sufficient number of 
supporters from the primarily urban 'lawyers group,' the Shi'a uiema, and some 
influential tribal leaders away from Yasin's Hisb al Sha'b and even begun holding secret 
meetings with the aim of unifying their efforts to disrupt the government across lines of 
sect and class.57 Using the traditional hostility to conscription of both the Shi'a and the 
tribes under the Ottomans as a rallying point, demonstrations were organized in Baghdad 
early May in which speeches, attended by thousands, called for the unification of all 
Arabs irrespective of their religion or nation and, indeed all subjugated peoples,58 "to free 
themselves from the yoke of colonizers and mandatory powers.,,59 By mid-May, Daud 
and his Shi' a supporters had begun holding formal meetings promoting a trans-sectarian 
opposition under the name Hisb al Ittihad60 that immediately began to draw members of 
the predominantly Shi'a Hisb al Nahdhah accelerated by party leader Rashid Ali's 
56 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. I, January 6,1927. NA, COl730112264 
57 Plant to ASI, May 2,1927. NA, AIRl231266. 
58 According to Plant, speakers drew attention to the struggles in China as an example of the global struggle 
"for freedom of thought" and there was "a great deal of Long live China, long live Iraq and long live 
independence in the speeches." Plant to ASI, May 7,1927. NA, AIRI23/266. 
59 Plant to ASI, May 7,1927. NA, AlRl231266. 
60 Plant to ASI, May 10,1927. NA, AlR1231266. 
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reluctance to come out against conscription.61 Faysal and Yasin's attempts to draw 
Shaikh Daud back into the Hisb al Sha'b62 and his Shi'a collaborators into the 
government with promises of position and permission to publish a Shi' a political interest 
newspaper, al Nahdhah, had little impact.63 When the annual Shi'a pilgrimage to 
Karbala got underway that August, SSO for the region Robert Foster reported an 
uncharacteristic "unity of ideas expressed by both tribal and religious heads" in which 
"strong anti-government feeling" and a "universal disapproval of the monarchy" seemed 
to prevail everywhere in the ubiquitous call for an immediate "change in government." 64 
For Dobbs and Bourdillon alike, the success in using conscription to bring tribal 
leaders and the Shi' a ulema together by "Sunni extremists" like Shaikh Daud and urban 
nationalists of Shi' a decent like President of the Hisb al N ahdhah Amin al Charchafchi 
was extremely dangerous and the clearest example that Faysal's political manipulation of 
the 'extreme nationalist' movement was backfiring.65 Although "His Majesty's personal 
influence in the government ... has increased considerably since the [Askari Coalition 
Government] came into being," Bourdillon reported, "his personal popularity has 
decreased pro rata" as his seizure of "extra-constitutional powers" to appoint ideologues 
led to the overall deterioration of his regimes efficiency along with its legitimacy. 66 
Although the al Askari coalition attempted to silence their critics, their efforts 
only galvanized the new opposition. The arrest of Shaikh Daud's son, the lawyer and 
61 Plant to ASI, May 16,1927. NA. AlRl23/266. 
62 Foster to AIS, July 22,1927. NA. CO/AlR/23/266. 
63 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 17, August 16, 1927. For a brief history of al 
Nahdhah. see Butti, Al-Sihafah, 107-109 
64 Foster to ASI, August 22 and 29,1927. NA. AlRl23/266. 
65 Dobbs, "Note on the Internal Situation in Iraq," June 27,1927. NA. FO/371112259IJ58. It is interesting 
to note that, despite Faysal's ambivalent relationship with both British power and Iraqi nationalism, his 
popularity or lack thereof in Iraq is almost never considered by historians of Iraq. 
66 BourdiIJon to Shuchburg, August 5,1927. NA. FO/371IJ2259/223. 
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nationalist writer Salman Shaikh Daud, for seditious articles in al Nahadah only drew the 
increased interest of the public, "affording the opposition an excellent opportunity for 
anti-government propaganda.,,67 When Salman al Daud was sentenced to a month's 
imprisonment and a fine, Charchafchi and the Hisb al Nahdhah defied the demand of 
both the Palace and the Cabinet to desist in its attacks on the government and even 
arranged for the Hisb to pay Salman al Daud's fines and legal expenses.68 The Residency 
would later report that, although Salman al Daud lost his initial trial, ''the prestige of the 
Government was considerably damaged.,,69 When Yasin Pasha himself informed the 
court that the government did not wish to pursue its case upon Salman al Daud's appeal, 
the Residency reported in October, the Iraqi public drew "the obvious conclusion" that 
Yasin Pasha, the main target of Daud's articles, feared being himself put into the dock.7o 
On September 9, Yasin Pasha sent for "the heads of all newspapers" and publicly 
admonished the editors of al Nahdhah, and warned them that he would close any paper 
which continued to publish anti-government articles.71 In spite ofYasin Pasha's warning, 
however, al Nahdhah immediately published a slew of anti-government articles and 
Salman al Daud publicly expressed his intention to continue his virulent criticisms of the 
Cabinet in the paper. 72 
At this precise moment, a dispute arose between Abdul Wahid, a wealthy tribal 
landowner of the Fatlah region, and the Mutasserrif of Diwaniyah over tax issues.73 
67 Foster to ASI, September 05,1927. NA. AlRl231266. 
68 Foster to ASI, September 6,1927. NA. AlRl231266. 
69 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 20, September 29,1927. NA. F01371112265 
70 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 21, October 11,1927. NA. FOl371112265 
71 Foster to ASI, September 7,1927. NA, AlRl231266. 
72 Foster to ASI, September 9,1927. NA. AIRl231266. 
73 Dodge has provided a land and tax issues as a socio-political category in which the relationship between 
the Palace and the Residency played a clear role, see Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation 
Building and a History Denied (New York: Colombia University Press, 2003), pp. 101-131. 
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When Yasin Pasha failed to support Abdul Wahid's position, Abdul Wahid filed for an 
appeal, but also threatened to "have the whole case published, accompanied by strong 
criticism, in al Nahdhah." He also asserted that, from then on, he would give his full 
support to Hisb al Nahdhah's anti-government campaign.74 Foster reported shortly 
thereafter that powerful supporters of Abdul Wahid had begun to tum up in Baghdad and 
similarly threatened to align themselves as well with the increasingly popular Shi'a anti-
government movement.75 Within days, Abdul Wahid had formally joined Hisb al 
Nahdhah, published the threatened article in al Nahadah, and gone so far as to suggest 
that the tribes of southern Iraq had reached their breaking point suffering under the 
oppression of the Government.76 When Abdul Wahid initiated his appeal that October, 
Foster reported, he did so having been offered the representation by Daud al Sadi, a 
prominent Baghdadi lawyer, opposition activist, and former editor of the suppressed al 
Dijlah.77 Within a few days of the appeal, Yasin Pasha relented and gave his full written 
support to Abdul Wahid in asking for the original ruling to be overturned by the court.78 
Yasin's willingness to back down in the face of the opposition Faysal and the al 
Askari coalition had, in fact, generated was pushed to the limit in mid-October when 
word reached him that British negotiators for the new treaty had come to believe that 
most Iraqis were not only "indifferent" to the Treaty revisions Faysal was so 
determinedly fighting for, but "thoroughly disgusted with the present Government." 79 In 
the role of Acting Prime Minister in al Askari's absence, Yasin Pasha immediately 
74 Foster to ASI, September 13, 1927. NA, AlR/23/266. 
75 Foster to ASI, September 15, 1927. NA, AIR/23/266. 
76 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 20, September 29, 1927. NA, FO/371112265 
77 Foster to ASI, October 19, 1927. NA, AlR/23/266. 
78 Foster to ASI, October 19, 1927. NA, AlR/23/266. 
79 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 22, October 27,1927. NA, FO/371112265 
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suspended al Nahdhah with no reference to the King or High Commissioner on the 
grounds that "it had ascribed to the Government acts that have no foundation of truth and 
has carried out harmful propaganda tending to cause dissension detrimental to endanger 
the public safety.,,8o The Hisb al Nahdhah responded with petitions and letters protesting 
the unconstitutionality of the decision to the Residency, the Cabinet, the local press and 
tribal and religious leaders throughout southern Iraq.81 The volatility of the situation 
motivated Dobbs to demand that Yasin, once again, back down and permit al Nahdhah to 
resume publication on the condition that no more seditious articles would be published, 
which he did but resigned his position as Acting Prime Minister in disgust as a result. 82 
In spite of Y asin' s acquiescence, however, Shaikh Daud merely transferred the staff of al 
Nahdhah to the revived al Dijlah83 when Charchafchi refused to sign the agreement to 
desist in activities he viewed as not only legal, but a patriotic duty. 84 
When Faysal finally returned to Iraq, after over four months abroad in 
negotiations, in December 1927 with a Treaty sanctioning another twenty-five years of 
British influence in Iraqi government, particularly in financial and military matters,85 
most Iraqis, according to Foster's report, expressed an "apathetic dissatisfaction", having 
already come to believe that, no matter what concessions had been made on paper, no 
real change would have taken place in actual fact. Supporters of Faysal and the Treaty 
expressed their disappointment at the failure to get the 'new Treaty' they wanted, but 
80 Ibid. 
8) Ibid. 
82 Foster to ASI, October 29,1927. NA. AlRl23/266. 
83 Foster to ASI, October 25,1927. NA. AlRl23/266. 
84 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 24, November 23, 1927,NA. FO/371/12265 
85 For a discussion of the negotiations, see Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, vol. 2, pp. 124-133. 
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their confidence that negotiations in the immediate future would see adjustments in their 
favor. Kurds and tribal shaikhs tended to see the Treaty as marking no change in Anglo-
Iraqi relations, but that any lessoning of British control would mean either the unwanted 
empowerment of the Sherifian officers or the collapse of law and order generally. Older 
educated Sunnis of a moderate bent tended to realize the dependence of Iraq on the 
British for a decade at least and to view the concessions the British did make as much as 
they could have hoped to gain. More nationalist minded lawyers, schoolteachers, 
educated youth, and educated Shi' as tended to view the negotiations as mishandled by the 
Iraqi government and Faysal, who they blamed for the failure to make any significant 
gains.86 
When Faysal asked the al Askari Cabinet to sign the Treaty he had negotiated, 
Yasin and Rashid Ali tended to their nationalist credibility by making a show of 
threatening to resign from the Cabinet rather than put their names to the document. 
Within a few days, however, all four members of the al Askari coalition had given their 
signatures and turned to the next phase of 'negotiations' in which Yasin, Rashid Ali, and 
Nuri would begin mobilizing the Iraqi people in opposition to ratifying the Treaty they 
had just signed as a means of forcing the British to make further concessions in the face 
of national opprobrium.87 The unfortunate role of supporting the ratification of the Treaty 
in the Parliament fell, once again, to Sa'dun and the Hisb al Taqaddam.88 Using al 
Istiqlal as their organ and, with elections for a new Parliament underway, Yasin, Rashid 
Ali, and, to a lessor extent, Nuri immediately set out to brutalize the Sa'dun government 
86 Foster to ASI, December 24 and 27,1927. NA. AlRl23/267. 
'in Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 26, December {Y7, 1927. NA. 
COl7301l051l2265 and Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, vol. 2, pp. 130-142. 
88 Ibid. pp. 144-151. 
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in the press, arguing that Ja'far al Askari had been prevented from carrying out his 
"patriotic programme" by the British, that Sa'dun had had replaced him because of his 
willingness to "compromise with the Residency and to sacrifice Iraq's national interests," 
and that a blow to Sa'dun was a blow to the British occupation.89 According to Foster, 
Yasin also turned his attention to uniting the opposition that his personal role in the al 
Askari coalition had done so much to fracture behind a new party under his leadership, 
the Hisb al Ikha al Watani.90 Within weeks, Yasin had succeeded in drawing in key 
figures from the 'lawyer's group' in the Hisb al Sha'b, the remains of the collapsing Hisb 
al Nahadha including Amin Charchafchi, and the Shi'a nationalist Ja'far abu Timmen.91 
Publicly maintaining his support of the Sa'dun Cabinet's candidates for the 
Parliament and a free election, Faysal secretly, according to the Residency, "strained 
every nerve ... to influence the elections in favour of the opposition candidates ... to prove 
that His Britannic Majesty's Government and the High Commissioner were wrong [in 
assuming] that the mass of the people were believed not to be in favour of a radical 
change in the relations of Great Britain and Iraq" and that the drive for complete and 
immediate independence was "artificial and inspired merely by an extremist clique.,,92 
Across the spectrum of the Iraqi press, accusations were made that the government and 
the opposition alike were unduly influencing the election for a new Parliament underway 
with the new Cabinet. 93 By the end of April, the Residency was reporting brawls at most 
polling centers in Baghdad, some of which ended in deaths, though the many complaints 
of intimidation, in the end, went largely unexamined.94 
89 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.3, February 1,1928. NA. FO/371113027 
90 Foster to ASI, February 27,1928. NA,AIRl23/267/60a. Butti,Al-Sihafah, pp. 112-119. 
91 Foster to ASI, February 27,1928. NA, AIRl23/267/61a Butti,Al-Sihafah, pp. 108-109. 
92 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.8 April 11,1928. NA. FO/371113027 
93 Foster to ASI March 6 and 28,1928. NA. AlR/23/267. 
94 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 9, April 25, 1928. NA. FO/371/13027 
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When the Hisb al Taqaddam and Sa'dun Cabinet achieved a majority in the 
Parliament at the end of the elections in May,95 Rashid Ali and Yasin Pasha used the 
troubles at the polls and widespread suspicion of interference with the elections to their 
advantage by challenging the constitutionality of the elections, and Sa'dun's victory, in 
the Parliament. Rashid Ali openly accused the Sa'dun administration of ordering 
officials to interfere in the elections "contrary to the spirit of the Electoral Law" and 
making a "mockery of the so-called reference to the people.,,96 As Treaty negotiations 
went on between the Residency and the Sa'dun administration over the fall of 1928, 
Yasin and his collaborators toured the country in their attempt to unify the opposition and 
expand its reach into new areas.97 Ja'far Abu Timmun's revival of the 1920's party Hisb 
al Watani was especially threatening to the Residency in it's appeal to the Iraqi working 
classes to form trade unions98 and to the urban elite to form intellectual societies and 
professional guilds, such as a Lawyers Society, alike.99 Moreover, the Residency 
observed that October, it was known that Timmun intended to run the Hisb's political 
campaign around the total rejection of the Treaty complete with regular public 
demonstrations to bring pressure on the Cabinet to refuse to ratify it. JOO 
The Treaty negotiations were, at this point, taking place primarily between Sa'dun 
and Dobbs personally, though both were strictly limited in the compromises they could 
95 See Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 10 May 9,1928 and No. 11 May 23, 
1928. NA, FOl3711 13027 and Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, vol. 2, pp. 164--169. 
96 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 12, June 6,1928. NA, FOl371 113027 In the 
confusion of these accusations, one unfortunate and bewildered member of the opposition, the 
representative for Kut Ata Effendi al Khatib, implicated himself as an example of government interference 
to put opposition members in office, for which he was summarily expelled from the Parliament by the 
Sa'dun government only to be returned when Faysal deemed the expulsion unconstitutional and reversed it. 
Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 12, June 6,1928. NA, FOl37111 3027 
97 Dobs to Amery, May 5,1928. NA, C017301l341584001238. 
98 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report no. 21, October 10, 1928. NA, FOl3711 13027 and 
Butti,AI-Sihafah, pp. lO9-112. 
99 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report no. 22, October 24, 1928. NA, FOl371 I 13027 
100 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 23, November 7, 1928 and Office of the High 
Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 26, December 19, 1928. NA, FOl3711l3027 
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make by Faysal and the Baldwin administration respectively. Sa'dun's demands, as he 
put them to Dobbs in the final stages of negotiations on the verge of collapsing in 
December 1918, pertained primarily to matters of the military and finance. Rather than 
be made to wait for membership to the League, Sa'dun demanded that the Iraqi 
government take full responsibility for such military matters immediately in order to 
prepare themselves for independence. As part of that responsibility, Sa'dun insisted that, 
regardless of the nationality of its operatives, all military forces operating under the 
auspices of the Iraqi government should be under the command of Iraqi, and not British, 
officers. Concerning matters of finance, Sa'dun insisted that the British take 
responsibility for the entire cost of the Residency and its entire staff and that various 
disagreements over customs and railway costs be settled in Iraq's favor. In any event, all 
agreements made in such matters would be terminated or at least subject to 
reconsideration by the Iraqi government no later than 1932, at which point the terms 
would be set by the Iraqi, and not the British government.101 
In his reply to Sa'dun, Dobbs reminded him that it must have been as apparent to all 
Iraqis as it was to himself and the British government that "without the support of the 
British Forces ... the Iraqi Army ... would be powerless to protect Iraq from external 
aggression or to resist the forces of internal disintegration." The "final responsibility" for 
Iraqi security, therefore, ultimately fell upon British forces and, therefore, the "ultimate 
control" of defense forces in Iraq, "whether Iraqi or British must remain in British 
hands." Moreover, because of British responsibilities within Iraq and on her behalf at the 
international level, it was for the British, and not the Iraqi government, "to decide when 
the time has come to relax this control, and the degree of relaxation which may then be 
practicable." In the meantime, Dobbs argued, he and his officers were more than willing 
to work in the background to help Iraq get on her feet, but not to formally tie their own 
hands. In the case of the stagnation of negotiations, Dobbs informed Sa'dun that the 
101 Abdul Mushin al Sa'dun to Dobbs December 27,1928. NA, FOl3711l375715451161 
British would simply revert to the previous treaty of 1926 for the duration of their 
obligation as mandatory power.102 
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On January 19, 1929 Sa'dun held a meeting with opposition leaders Yasin Pasha, 
Ja'far abu Timmun, and Rashid Ali to inform them that the Cabinet had failed to reach an 
acceptable agreement with the Baldwin administration over military and financial matters 
and that they intended to resign, a decision which the opposition applauded.loo Faysal's 
expectation that the collapse of the Cabinet would induce the Baldwin administration to 
rethink their intransigence was mistaken, however, and he found Dobbs "unperturbed" by 
the situation and confident that no further concessions would be forth coming from 
London. Dobbs telegrammed the Colonial Secretary that day to inform him of the 
decision and warn him that, "in their present mood," neither supporters of Sa'dun and the 
Hisb al Taqaddam, nor the opposition, nor any member of Parliament would be willing to 
take office, noting that Yasin and the opposition informed Sa'dun upon being told of his 
resignation, that "if [Great Britain] wished to impose her will she must take over the 
whole administration."I04 On the anniversary of Sherif Husayn's declaration of war on 
the Turkish the next day, Timmun declared the holiday a day of mourning for Iraqis, 
owing to "Great Britain having broken her promises, the blood of the Arabs who had 
fought for freedom had been shed in vain.,,105 The Iraqi government would remain 
without a Prime Minister or any legislative activity for nearly four months. I06 
By the end of April 1929, Faysal seemed to be giving in. He informed Dobbs' 
replacement as High Commissioner Gilbert Clayton of his intention to ask former dean of 
the Baghdad Law College, delegate for Iraq at the Arab Conference in 1913 and at 
Lausanne in 1922, and legal advisor to Faysal on foreign relations Tawfiq al Suwaidi to 
form a government on the basis of the 1926 Treaty for the purpose of reviving day to day 
102 Dobbs to Sa'dun, December 29,1928. NA, FOl371 11 3757154511 73 
103 Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, vol. 2, pp. 198-212. 
104 Dobbs to SofSforC January 20, 1929. NA, F01371113757E3681124. 
\05 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.3, January 30, 1929. NA, F01371 / 13760 
106 Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, vol. 2, pp. 212-214. 
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government in Iraq.107 In al Suwaidi's inaugural speech to the Cabinet on April 28, he 
seemed to vindicate the patriotism of both the Sa'dun government and the opposition, 
suggesting that the British had been forced to face the complete collapse of Iraqi 
administration short of their acquiescence. Iraq as well, however, had also been made to 
face the consequences of this state of affairs and found them unacceptable. The King and 
the Hisb al Taqaddam, he declared, had come to see that the resumption of government 
legislation was detrimental to Iraq and had decided on a program "of practical and 
productive policies" oriented toward building Iraq's political, economic, and intellectual 
strength for the coming end of the mandate.108 Yasin Pasha, Rashid Ali, and Timmun 
condemned the decision in the press, arguing that it constituted a retrogression back to 
1922 and, significantly, that it made all the Sa'dun administration had struggled for in 
vain. Nevertheless, the opposition took only 16 out of 56 votes in a vote of no confidence 
for the Suwaidi administration and the progress of Iraqi government commenced.109 
By mid-July, however, the Residency reported a clear shift in Faysal's attitude 
toward the Suwaidi Cabinet reflecting "his desire for a more strongly nationalist Cabinet" 
once again. In explaining this transition, the Residency reported that the former Iraqi 
Diplomatic Representative in London, Muzahim Pachachi, had been contributing regular 
articles on the coming general elections in England, complete with "well informed 
articles on Labour policy." As a result, Faysal had been "undoubtedly encouraged" to 
resume his pressure tactics on the British "by the idea, which is generally held in 
Baghdad, that the changes of Government in England should being about modifications 
in British policy in Iraq favourable to nationalist aspirations" if Labour was victorioUS. 110 
A consideration of the kind of Labour propaganda and political activity Pachachi would 
107 Clayton to Secretary of State for the Colonies, April 29, 1929. NA, FOl371 1137581E2218145. 
108 Baghdad Times, May 8, 1929. NA, F017301l37581E2753174. 
109 Residency note on the Chamber of Deputies Meeting of May 7,1929. NA, F017301l37581E2753187. 
lJO Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 13, July 21,1929. NA, RI20lAl1238 
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have been exposed to during his periodic visits to Britain after 1926, suggests that Faysal 
had good reason to be hopeful. III 
Immediately following the Parliament's approval of the 1926 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 
in the wake of Labour's walk-out in protest, MacDonald and the Labour Party formally 
"declined to extend the period for which the country accepted any responsibility for Iraq" 
and "urged the Government to use every effort to expedite the admission of Iraq to the 
League of Nations.,,1\2 Supporters of the Bonar Law and then Baldwin administrations' 
policy toward Iraq had prepared for Labour's opposition to the Treaty in the fall of 1925 
by reminding Labour and the British public generally of the first MacDonald 
administrations failure to deviate from it. "Every responsible government, including the 
Labour government," Colonial Secretary Leo Amery declared that October, had "upheld 
the principle" that "the policy of scuttle was impossible ... because it was dishonourable" 
and because it would mean "dangers and difficulties far greater than those involved in the 
fulfillment of our obligations." Any pretense to the contrary, he insisted, was not only a 
"reckless disregard" for the facts, but for British honor and even national security.113 A 
few days later, Baldwin spoke in the House condemning the "lurid language" with which 
some in the government and press had attempted "to prove that the Government is 
pursuing a provocative policy calculated to bring about war with Turkey, that it is 
claiming on behalf of Iraq territory to which it has no right, and that it is undertaking 
111 Although most important work on the mandate notes that it was a Labour government that broke the 
stalemate and emancipated Iraq, very little attention is usually given to the reasons for that transition and 
almost no mention is made about Iraqi perceptions of British Labour and its meaning for Iraq. See Sluglett, 
pp 167-170; Marr, pp. 34-36. Dodge, pp. 34-37. Also see footnote 2 above. 
112 Times of London, January 17, 1926. 
113 Times of London, October 2, 1925. 
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costly and dangerous commitments for which there is no necessity and no authority," all 
key components of Labour's propaganda. The Anglo-Iraqi relationship, Baldwin 
insisted, was "governed, not by an ordinary mandate, but by a Treaty of Alliance which ... 
constitutes the recognition of the independent national life which we have aimed at 
establishing in Iraq in accordance with our general principle of self-government" from 
the beginning of the occupation. The treaty in negotiations with the Iraqis was merely a 
confirmation of that principle and relationship.1I4 
When Amery confronted MacDonald with such arguments in the wake of 
Labour's walk-out and condemnation of the Treaty in early 1926, MacDonald claimed an 
"injured innocence" at being accused of either having "furthered rank imperialism" by 
failing to overturn his predecessors' policy in Iraq or of turning a matter of British honor 
to uphold their responsibilities in Iraq into a cheap political tactic. What Labour had 
done in office, had been forced to do for MacDonald, was to clean up the "Lausanne 
muddle" they inherited from the preceding decade of British policy while endeavoring to 
champion Iraq's right to determine its own destiny in conformity with the principles of 
the party.lIS 
In the wake of the Treaty's ratification, the ILP assembled an Imperial Policy 
Commission to advise the Labour Party. At the annual conference in March, the 
Commission's report suggested that the League of Nations be imbued with the power to 
more directly influence the manner in which less developed regions, such as the 
mandated territories, were being guided toward self-government with an eye to realizing 
114 Times of London, October 9, 1925. 
115 Times of London, February 19, 1926. For examples of the Bonar Law and Baldwin administrations' 
admonition of Labour's criticisms of British policy in Iraq concerning the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, see Times of 
London, October 2, 3, 9,14; December 17,22 and 24,1925 and the Daily Telegraph October 3 and 9 and 
December 18, 21 , and 22, 1925 and February 19, 1926. 
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a "Socialist Empire Policy" designed to accelerate the advancement of such regions to 
self-governing status. Iraq, however, was entitled to the immediate advent of self-
government and membership to the League of Nations. When the next Labour 
government takes power, the ILP demanded, Iraq should be emancipated in a general 
shift away from determining the destiny of all British possessions, including the 
commonwealth itself.116 
The announcement of the League of Nation's decision to award Mosul to the 
British in December 1925 inspired Foreign Affairs, the UDC's monthly magazine on 
international relations, to review the history of Anglo-Iraqi relations to illustrate how 
Britain's "right of conquest" had prevailed, but, from the perspective of the League, in 
the name of maintaining a "durable peace." The lesson to be learned, the writer 
proposed, was that, although imperial power remained, perhaps unavoidably, a significant 
factor in international relations, the British people remained responsible to ensure that 
Iraq "should not be treated as a colony."117 It was the responsibility of Labour, the writer 
argued, to provide the will of the British people to use the League to curtail imperial 
power with a political framework of action.ll8 Foreign Affairs expressed its relief that an 
agreement between the Turkish and British government's had been reached in July of 
1926, but lamented the "bullying style" of the Baldwin administration in reaching it as 
well as its "intransigence" in recognizing the legitimacy of Turkey's claims or in 
accommodating Turkish interests even in the face of possible conflict."9 
116 The text of these 1926 reports appear in full in ILP Report of the Annual Conference held at Carlisle 
March-April, 1929 (London: Independent Labour Party, 1929). PHM. Also see I.L.P. Empire Policy 
Committee, Socialism and the Empire (London: I.L.P. Publication Department, 1926). LSE, ILP151I926139. 
117 Foreign Affairs, January, 1926. 
118 Foreign Affairs, February, 1926. 
119 Foreign Affairs, July, 1926. 
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Foreign Affairs was also extremely critical of the 1928 draft of the new Anglo-
Iraqi Treaty which, the writer argued, had only been signed by the al Askari coalition 
under "severe pressure" and that "much more would be needed" to get it ratified by the 
Iraqi Parliament, for 
the present treaty in no way changes the position as it has existed up till now. The 
British High Commissioner retains his right of constant supervision and of 
interference in Iraqian affairs. The style of the treaty has been slightly altered in 
deference to the fictitious independence of His Majesty the King of Iraq ... and 
there is a promise of Iraq's admission to the League in 1932, but this promise is 
made conditional upon Iraqss progress and demeanour during those four years; 
and as there is no unbiased judge of Iraq's conduct, Mesopotamian politicians may 
be forgiven for seeing in those conditions a possibility of evading the obligation at 
Great Britain's pleasure. 120 
As Iraqi popular opposition to the Treaty was being mobilized and deployed by Yasin 
and his collaborators over the summer of 1928, Foreign Affairs commented that 
it is a grave mistake, often made in England, to think that there are any sections of 
the Mesopotamian population which are not nationalistic or are not striving for 
the complete independence ... in accordance with the promises given by the Allies 
during the Great War. This general desire on the part of all Mesopotamians, 
without exception, to free themselves from mandatory tutelage may appear 
unwise, and there may be many outside observers who believe it to be in the true 
interests of the social and cultural progress of the Iraqian population to be guided 
by Great Britain's expert advice ... but it is a fact that the MesoV0tamians will not 
accept voluntarily anything short of complete independence. 12 
The Anglo-Iraqi alliance the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was meant to convey was little more, the 
writer declared, than a "thinly veiled protectorate." 122 
In April 1929, with the general elections in Britain still underway, ILP member of 
Parliament James Maxton set out the ILP's view of the incoming government's 
responsibilities toward the Empire in his opening speech as Conference chair. 
The Government that assumed the direction of their affairs after the election had 
120 Foreign Affairs, February, 1928. 
121 Foreign Affairs, April, 1928. 
122 Foreign Affairs, April, 1928. 
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not merely the duty of solving the problems of this nation. The votes of the 
20,000,000 electors in this country gave it the right to control the destinies of 
hundreds of millions of people in India, Africa, and other parts of the world ... 
Labour had the right, not only to awaken hope in the hearts of the British 
working-class, but to revive hope in the hearts of all the people in the British 
Empire. They had to right and duty to say to these people, they had been 
compelled to live under awful conditions, they desired to make them free men. 
Free to define for themselves the political and economic conditions under which 
they should choose to live, absolutely free to settle their own destinies. 123 
When, in the fall of 1929, it had become clear that Labour would take the elections, 
Foreign Affairs identified the failure of the first MacDonald administration to alter his 
predecessors' imperial policy as a key criticism that the second MacDonald government 
would have to answer to in taking office once again. Dedicating an entire issue to the 
subject entitled "East and West" that August, Foreign Affairs began with UDC co-
founder Norman Angell's discussion of the question, "what is our substitute for 
imperialism." Angell's key point was that Labour's substitute for imperialism was not 
"absolute Nationalism, the 'right' of each to be 'free and independent'" which too many 
"Socialist critics of imperialism" tended to offer as the "the only alternative to 
imperialism." What the leaders of the Labour movement recognized and their critics, 
even in their own camp, failed to see, he continued, was that "'absolute' self-
determination, or sovereignty, or independence, is incompatible with civilization." 
To talk, as anti-imperialist critics sometimes do, as though a few thousand desert 
tribesman or Hispano-Indian peasants, if only they will call themselves a 'nation', 
should have complete control of raw materials indispensable to the world as a 
whole, or the right to forbid their use; or the right to block some world highway; 
is to set up standards which in fact will not be observed, and which perhaps in 
ethics do not deserve observance. 124 
The "remedy for Imperialism," Angell argued, was not nationalism, "which threatens to 
123 ILP Report of the Annual Conference held at Carlisle March-April. 1929 (London: Independent Labour 
Party, 1929). PHM 
124 Foreign Affairs, August, 1929. 
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Balkanize the world, "but Internationalism" dedicated to protecting, but also limiting the 
rights of nations, "in the same way that in any civilized society the right of the individual 
must be made subject to the general interest in order that the individual can live at aB.,,125 
Among the first acts of the Labour government pertaining to British-Arab 
relations was the final settlement after years of negotiations of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
a little over a month after taking office in August 1929 in which the British occupation of 
Egypt would be terminated, British troops reduced to key stations along the Suez Canal 
and the British government would unconditionaBy approve of Egypt's membership into 
the League of Nations. Unsurprisingly, the Residency would report in August that the 
Iraqi Parliament and press were keenly interested in these developments, with relevant 
debates in the British House published in fuB in the press. The potential promise of the 
advent of a second Labour government for a nationalist agenda in Iraq was, according to 
the Residency, all but proven by Labour's ending of the Anglo-Egyptian stalemate. 126 
On September 14, such hopes seemed to be vindicated by the Labour 
government's announcement of unconditional support for Iraq's membership in the 
League of Nations within three years. In less than a week, Faysal had asked Sa'dun to 
return to office as Prime Minister, which he promptly did with his original 1926 agenda 
of reducing to a minimum aB administrative positions held by non-Iraqis and to reduce 
the contracts with those that remained to the shortest possible period and to reorient Iraqi 
trade regulations around Iraqi revenue production, rather than British profits. 127 Within 
two months of taking office, however, Sa'dun took his own life, leaving a note addressed 
125 Foreign Affairs, August, 1929. 
126 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 17, August 16, 1929. NA, RI20lAl1238 
127 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 20. September 27, 1929. NA, RI20lAl1238 
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to his oldest son implicating both the English and Iraqi nationalists as the sources of his 
torment. l28 "The nation," Sa'dun wrote, "expects service, but the English do not agree. I 
have no supporters, the Iraqis who demand independence are weak, powerless, and very 
far from independence ... they consider me a traitor to my country and a servant to the 
English ... I who am the most loyal and fervid servant of my country ."129 
The Residency expressed its shock and befuddlement at Sa'dun's actions and his 
reasoning especially in light of the Labour government's clear resolve to settle the Anglo-
Iraqi stalemate on terms far better than Sa'dun could ever have hoped for. They could 
only conclude that Sa' dun continued to have deep reservations about how the final 
settlement would reflect upon himself and the Hisb al Taqaddam, having been the 
government and party most pliant beneath the weight of British pressure and 
ultimatums. 130 The marked and immediate transition to a policy of obstinate obstruction 
to any cooperation with British advisors and the fomenting of an even more violently 
anti-colonialist political climate at a national level under Sa'dun's successor, Tawfiq's 
brother, Naji Beg Suwaidi after November 18, I argue, sheds considerable light on 
Sa'dun's reasoning in taking his own life. 131 
In addition to abruptly ending discussions that had been ongoing between the 
Residency and the Sa'dun Cabinet over the renewal of expiring contracts for British 
officials and advisors, Iraqi Ministers under the Suwaidi administration, already noted as 
being "less helpful and friendly" over the preceding year, became openly obstinate and 
128 Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, vol. 2, p. 269-271. 
129 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 24. November 25,1929. NA, FOl3711l3760 
130 Ibid. 
\31 Ibid. 
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dismissive of their British counterparts, giving the impression to Iraqi administrators 
throughout the country that "British officials no longer counted," even in the contentions 
areas of finance and the military. 132 Within a fortnight of Suwaidi's appointment, the 
Residency reported 
The popular contention is that if admission into the League is to mean anything ... 
it must mean the reduction almost to the point of abolition of British interference 
in the administration of the country, consequently, Iraq must begin to prepare at 
once for that eventuality by taking over herself, as far as possible, full 
responsibility in every branch of government. 
The Residence left no doubt of its view that "the inspiration and justification for this 
policy is found in the recent declaration of the British Government concerning their 
support in 1932 oflraq's candidature for admission into the League ofNations."m 
Troublingly, the promise of independence did not seem to quell the anti-British sentiment 
in the press, but rather to set it aflame with most papers remaining in publication 
violently disparaging the legacy of misrule and suppression of Iraqi progress under the 
British.134 Especially with the current state of nationalist agitation having been raised to 
such a fervor by Faysal himself, the Colonial Office feared, the emasculation of British 
authority by Labour's announcement now threatened to "let loose the forces of disorder" 
on an Iraqi nation that had been fooled into believing it was, in any way, "able to stand 
alone" or able "effectively to govern itself." 135 
Under the direction of Yasin, Timmun, and Rashid Ali, the opposition to the Hisb 
al Taqaddam in Parliament continued to hammer the Suwaidi government as it had 
132 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 25. December 9,1929. NA, F01371113760 
and Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihafah, pp. 254-264. 
133 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 25. December 9, 1929. NA, FOl3711 13760 
134 Office of the High Commissioner. Intelligence Report No.2. January 20,1930. NA, R1201A/1238 
135 Air Staff Report, January 2, 1930. NA, COl7301 151 178025 
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Sa'dun's for failing to transfer authority from British to Iraqi officials fast enough. 136 
Accordingly, days before negotiations for a new Treaty between the Iraqi government 
and the MacDonald administration were meant to begin on April 1, 1930, Naji Suwaidi 
handed his resignation to Faysal on the grounds that his Cabinet had "encountered 
obstacles which have prevented them from carrying out" the transfer from British to Iraqi 
authority, implicating the obstruction of the Residency.137 The nationalist agitation 
against the Suwaidi administration had grown so voluminous by then, according to 
Clayton' replacement as High Commissioner upon his sudden and untimely death Sir 
Frances Humphrys, that his resignation was accompanied by a demonstration of over 
eight thousand Iraqis at which speeches were given condemning British policy in the 
Middle East generally. 138 F aysal' s choice to replace Suwaidi as Prime Minister and 
negotiate the new Treaty was Nuri al Said, Faysal's most dependable and most politically 
influential collaborator from the early days in Damascus. Indicative of the government's 
treatment of the press by this point, Nuri opened his administration by shutting down 
most of the nationalist papers in publication within weeks of taking office and reviving 
several that had been suppressed over the months before Labour's announcement of 
support for League membership for the same violation of "publishing articles prejudicial 
to the internal and external peace ofIraq.,,139 
Although Faysal and Nuri agreed with Humphrys' request that the negotiations 
opening on April 1, 1930 be undertaken with the utmost secrecy in order to prevent 
136 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.3, February 3, 1930 and Office of the High 
Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.4, February 17, 1930 NA, Rl20lAl 1238 
137 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.6, March 17, 1930. NA, RI20lAl 1238 
138 Humphrys to Secretary of State for the Colonies, March 5, 1930. NA, FOI371114503IE1701l216-7. 
139 al Istiqlal, al Nahdhah, and al Zaman were all allowed to resume publication while al Rafidan, Fata al 
Iraq, al Ritad, and Sadiq allraq were suppressed, see Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence 
Report No.7, March 31, 1930 and Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.9. April 28, 
1930. NA. Rl20lAl1238 
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"tendentious articles in the press" from fomenting public agitation in Iraq and unsettling 
the "friendly spirit" and "high hopes of success" that characterized the first meeting, they 
clearly intended to use the press to bring pressure to bear on the British delegates. By the 
second meeting Humphrys was already complaining to the Iraqi delegates that the 
Baghdad papers reflected an inside knowledge of the negotiations they could only have 
obtained from the delegates themselves and that the articles in question reiterated the 
very objections to the treaty that Faysal and Nuri had made the day before, along with its 
lament that British obstinacy had "doomed [the negotiations] to failure.,,14o Nevertheless, 
negotiations proceeded quickly and within a matter of months, both Nuri and Faysal had 
put their signatures to a Treaty that, according to Peter Sluglett, "represented a limited 
progress towards national sovereignty.,,141 With League membership immanent, both 
parties to the negotiations were far more amenable to small changes in the language of 
the Treaty as well as larger changes, including the British declaration that full 
responsibility for the maintenance of internal order rested with Faysal, while formally 
promising to come to Iraq's aid in the case of external invasion. Iraq was to receive its 
own air force and the right to maintain RAF bases, though those bases would technically 
remain British property. The difficult matter of the financial agreement was largely left 
out of the Treaty and personally negotiated by Nuri in the subsequent weeks, to similar 
effect. 142 
The day after Nuri and Faysal signed the new Treaty, on July 1, 1930 the Iraqi 
Parliament was dissolved and new elections called over the issue of ratifying it. The 
140 "Iraq: Record of Proceedings of Meetings of the British and Iraqi Delegations in Baghdad, April-June, 
1930, concerning the proposed new Anglo-Iraq Treaty," p. 5. NA, COl73011 5111 5. 
141 Sluglett, p. 181 and Hasani, Tarikh Al-Sihajah, vol. 2, pp. 264-265. 
142 Sluglett, p. 180-182. 
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British agent responsible for collating and interpreting all of the infonnation about the 
Baghdadi political landscape during this period was Special Security Officer for Baghdad 
and RAF Captain Gerald De Gaury. Although admittedly bewildered by the seemingly 
chaotic manner in which Iraqi opposition was developing around the sole idea of ousting 
the British despite the promise of admission to the League by Labour, De Gaury also 
began to piece together what might also have been a far more organized political tactic 
than it appeared at first glance. When Ja'far Abu Timmun's opposition coalition Hisb al 
Watani boycotted both the elections and Yasin al Hashimi for his refusal to follow suit, 
De Gaury interpreted the rejection of Yasin as "owing to his agreement with the present 
Cabinet," meaning that Yasin "is secretly in favour of the Treaty" and that the Cabinet 
and Faysal were dependent upon his ultimate approval. The Hisb al Taqaddam, De 
Gaury reported "would never have dared to ratify [the Treaty] alone" in the face of such 
widespread hostility to it and "the King is less worried about the attitude of the serving 
ministers than he is about the man outside the government, i.e. Yasin Pasha.,,143 
De Gaury kept a close eye on Yasin, convinced that he was playing the opposition 
against the Palace and the Cabinet by building his influence in both, but also in the 
expanding Iraqi anny. By the end of July, De Gaury could report that the "Iraqi Anny is 
irretrievably infected with the virus of political intrigue." The "influence ofYassin Pasha 
al Hashimi is great" De Gaury lamented, because of the fact that, on the one hand, 
"promotion and desirable appointments are more and more often obtained by those who 
have influence outside [the anny] in political circles," a patronage system Yasin was 
busily organizing around his person, as well as the fact that "more Officers are politically 
143 De Gaury to ASI July 26, 1930. NA. AIRl23/267. 
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inclined than are not," meaning that Yasin's centrality to the opposition movement made 
him popular among the officers in general. 144 
By August, De Gaury reported, Yasin had used the boycott of the elections, and 
indeed, of himself, to his political advantage both within the opposition and in relation to 
the government. Yasin was already inducing key members of the Hisb al Watani away 
from their boycott of the elections with promises of position in the new Parliament and 
even came out publicly in praise of Ja'far abu Timmun, who he enjoined to end the 
hopeless boycott of the elections, for "it was just men like Ja'far who are wanted in the 
Parliament and they should not cut themselves off from active work." De Gaury had no 
doubt that Yasin's efforts would put him in a strong position in relation to Nuri al Said. 
Specifically, De Gaury noted, because of the strength ofYasin's popularity and influence 
among the most influential nationalist MP's, "when Nuri Pasha returns ... it will be 
difficult for Nuri to pick M.P.s who will follow him and not Yassin, but also be 
sufficiently 'National' ... he will find himself inevitably selecting those who will also and 
more closely follow Yassin.,,145 Perceived as an advantage, rather than a difficulty, 
however, the narrowing of the pool of candidates to those acceptable to both Nuri and 
Yasin would also seem to legitimate the later alignment of government and opposition 
parties. 
For the time being, however, it was advantageous to the opposition to establish 
the illegitimacy not only of the Treaty, but of the administration that would ratify it for 
the sake of future negotiations. Accordingly, on November 1, 1930, Ja'far abu Timmun 
acting as the Secretary General of the Hisb al Watani wrote to the Secretary General of 
the League of Nations a letter denouncing the Nuri al Said government. The al Said 
144 De Gaury to ASI, July 22,1930. NA. AIR/23/267. 
145 De Gaury to ASI, August 2,1930. NA, AIRl23/267. 
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administration, Timmun declared, was formed in an unconstitutional manner as a means 
of solving the tension between the Palace and the British government over issues relating 
to the Treaty. Once in office, Nuri dissolved the Parliament "so as to get rid of a 
controlling body and establish an unconstitutional regime with the approval of the British 
High Commissioner in contradiction to the specific provisions of the Constitution 
deposited in the League of Nations." Timmun described the suppression of the press, 
prosecution of journalists, prohibition of public demonstrations,and general disregard for 
the voices of the Iraqi people. The Treaty concluded in this manner has, not 
unexpectedly, "caused general indignation all over the country" for their tolerance of 
"British imperialism and domination and imposed British tutelage and protection" for the 
next 25 years. In order to legitimate these actions, Timmun went on, a "false election" 
was forced on the country through the collusion of corrupt Iraqi politicians and their 
British advisory staff which the opposition, led by Timmun, had boycotted and rejected 
as unconstitutional and illegitimate. Timmun enjoined the League Secretary to convey to 
the members of the League that the Iraqi nation "considers null and void every treaty, 
agreement, concession, and any international instrument which the present 
unconstitutional government and any illicit Parliament of Assembly which it may cause 
to Assemble, have executed or may agree to on behalf of Iraq."l46 
When Nuri al Said returned to Iraq in September, he did so with the stipulation that 
the Treaty he had negotiated had to be accepted or rejected by the Iraqi Parliament 
without debate or amendment, establishing both the character of the Treaty as but the 
latest British/ail accompli as well as Nuri's status as the political strong-man oflraq that 
would maintain him in power for the next twenty years of Iraqi history. 147 Yasin 
146 Ja'far Abu Timmun to Secretary General of the League of Nations November 1, 1930. NA. 
COI730/15J/16. 
147 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 19, September 15, 1930. NA. RI20lAl1238 
Marr has identified this moment as marking a shift in Iraqi politics in which Faysal and his supporters 
tightened their grip on the political landscape and "spawned a new opposition" unhappy with the persistent 
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immediately responded with a coordinated assault in the press, not on Nuri, tellingly, but 
on the entire legacy of British policy in Iraq.148 A series of demonstrations denouncing 
British policy in Iraq, either organized or encouraged by Yasin, were announced in the 
press, only to be thwarted by the police and resulting in the arrest of their promoters. 149 
By mid-November, however, Yasin's newly founded opposition coalition party, the Hisb 
al Hilla al Watani, had succeeded in drawing in Ja'far Abu Timmun, Rashid Ali al Gilani, 
and even Naji al Suwaidi, effectively absorbing nearly all opposition parties and even key 
members of the Hisb al Taqaddam into one group under Yasin's leadership. The most 
pressing concern for De Gaury was not the coalition of nationalist opposition itself, 
however, but the Hisb's unification of nationalist sentiment throughout the country from 
widely diverse communities in an attempt to become a truly national party inclusive of all 
sects and classes. Tribal landowners like Abdul Wahid,150 the "workmen of the towns 
and the fellaheen," 151 and key figures of the Shi'a ulema l52 all seemed to be drawn into 
the new coalition Hisb, the declared program of which was to reject the Treaty, obstruct 
is passage through Parliament, disempower British officials and advisors toward 
weakening the hold of the British down to nothing and, ultimately, to unite Arab 
opposition to imperial rule through out the region. By the end of November 1930, De 
Gaury reported that the Hisb al Ikha al Watan was advancing so rapidly that, "if things 
role of the British in backing his regime. See Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 2004), p. 35. 
148 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No. 19, September 15, 1930. NA, R1201A/ 1238 
149 DeGaury to ASI September 23,1930. NA, AIRI231268 and Office of the High Commissioner, 
Intelligence Report No. 19 and 20, September 15 and October 1, 1930. NA, RI201A/1238 
ISO De Gaury to ASI, November 18, 1920. NA, AIRI231268130A 
151 De Gaury to ASI November 12, 1930. NA, AIRI231268129A 
152 De Gaury to ASI, December 23,1930. NA, AIRI231268134A 
continue at the present rate about two thirds of the inhabitants of importance will have 
joined in about another six weeks."I53 
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De Gaury was taken, however, by the seeming imperviousness of the Nuri al Said 
administration to the attacks of the opposition and the near absence of any attempt by the 
government to defend the Treaty it intended to ratify. Admittedly, he reasoned in mid-
December, "the Parliament is sufficiently 'rigged'" by Nuri and the Palace to insulate 
themselves from an opposition majority and, "there is no other way of making themselves 
felt except by forwarding petitions ... which is not very effective, or by direct action 
which they will not attempt unless galled beyond reason." The most likely explanation, 
De Gaury concluded, for the dilatory attitude of the government toward the Treaty and, 
presumably, their own political fate at the hands of the opposition, was Nuri's intention to 
cast himself and his government as "the pathetic victims of British coercion" after the 
Treaty's ratification and Iraq's membership to the League of Nations. With Yasin and 
the new opposition coalition presumably prepared to accept their beleaguered compatriots 
with open arms in the wake of independence, the Sherifian court at the helm of the Iraqi 
government stood a good chance of coming out of the transition as "national heroes."I54 
Over the course of 1931 and 1932, the Hisb al Ikha al Watani maintained a steady 
stream of anti-British public sentiment/55 occasionally breaking into demonstrations and 
even a general strike in the summer of 1931.156 Nuri and Faysal, who, despite the 
continued ability of the opposition to attract thousands to rallies denouncing Nuri's 
government ,I 57 remained, according to Sluglett, supremely confident "that until another 
and stronger threat developed, their own position was virtually unassailable," passed the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty through the al Said Cabinet with little difficulty or fan-fare, 
153 De Gaury to AIS, November 24,1930. NA, A/Rl23/382/7H. 
154 De Gaury to AIS, December 17, 1930. NA, A/Rl23/382/J3A. 
155 De Gaury to ASI,January 19, 1931. NA, A/R/23/268/56A and De Gaury to ASI, March 3,1931. NA, 
AIRl23/268/44A 
156 For an account of the strike, see De Gaury to ASI July 16, 1931 and Sluglett, pp. 206-212. 
157 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report No.9, April 29, 1931. NA, R/20/AlJ238 
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presenting its ratification as both the only path to League Membership and, in any event, 
a British/ait accompli.l58 Even as key figures in the opposition remained active 
propagandists and organizers against the government, Faysal and Nuri gradually made 
positions for them available in the government one by one/59 to the disgust of De Gaury, 
who described the opposition leaders in early 1931 as "actuated by their own desires for 
lucrative appointments" and "a band of unsympathetic schemers ... who only use [the 
people] when it suits them for what their own ends dictate.,,16o In any event, the Sherifian 
court's manipulation of the election system to their advantage over the preceding years 
had left many supporters of the opposition and government alike with the impression that 
elections of any kind were rigged at best and, at worst, "little more than a 'nomination' ," 
with the result that many influential tribal leaders and Shi' a ulema exchanged their party 
loyalties for a hostility "against all Baghdad political parties" equally by the eve of Iraqi 
independence, according to De Gaury.161 
When Faysal invited Rashid Ali, clearly one of the most vocal members of the 
opposition, into his court as his most trusted advisor in June 1932, the Residency 
remarked on Faysal's obvious transition toward characterizing his court as having always 
been friendly to the nationalist opposition at heart. The political malaise of the Iraqi 
people for whom such gestures were meant to appeal, however, was palpable by the 
announcement ofIraq's membership to the League in October of 1932. As the Residency 
stated in one of its final reports, "it cannot be said that public opinion has been much 
moved by the emancipation of Iraq from mandatory control. Nor is this surprising since, 
158 Sluglett, p. 182. 
159 De Gaury to ASI, November 10, 1931. NA, AlRl231382187a. 
160 De Gaury to ASI, January 8,1931. NA, AlRl231268145A. 
161 De Gaury to ASI, May 19, 1931. NA, AlRl231382132A and 33A. 
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outside official circles, the event has not been marked by any notable change.,,162 Almost 
immediately, Faysal asked Nuri to step into the background, where he had always proven 
far more influential tool of the Palace, and made it known that he desired Yasin al 
Hashimi to form a government as Prime Minister and, therefore, complete the pretense 
that the Palace had always been aligned with the nationalist opposition. 163 Yasin, for his 
part, did not take the bait just yet, perhaps, as De Gaury had accused him a year prior, for 
his ambition to become the "Dictator of a Britain-rid Iraq,,,164 or perhaps, as it was 
"freely said in the Bazaars," according to the Residency, that "he would not sacrifice his 
honour for a 'place' .,,165 Nevertheless, although Faysal was made to settle for the 
undistinguished, but innocuous, civil servant Naji Shaukat for the first Prime Minister of 
his independent monarchy,166 Rashid Ali and Yasin al Hashimi would both serve terms as 
Prime Minister within a few years of Iraqi independence and would continue to do so 
whenever Nuri al Said, the undisputed master of the Iraqi political landscape for the 
duration of the monarchy and the prime inheritor of Faysal's political power on the 
King's death, felt he needed to, temporarily, present a less authoritarian image to the Iraqi 
people. 
In Inventing Iraq, Toby Dodge has argued that the conflict of interest inherent in the 
British Empire's self-appointment as a mandatory power responsible for the state-making 
project in Iraq inevitably resulted in the production of a 'quasi-state' in Iraq, 
162 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report no. 21, October 17, 1932. BL, UP&SIlOI1313 
163 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report no. 22, October 22,1932. BL, UP&SIl01l313 
164 De Gaury to ASI, March 18,1931. NA, AIRI.231382126a. 
165 Office of the High Commissioner, Intelligence Report no. 21, October 17, 1932. BL, UP &SI 1011313 
166 Sluglett, pp. 217. 
characterized for the duration of its history by authoritarian rule through a system of 
political patronage under the protection of foreign powers installed by the British in 
1920.167 Certainly, Nuri al Said's twenty-year tenure as the embodiment of political 
power in Iraq and primary British client in the region lends credence to Dodge's 
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argument. Similarly, the tendency of Iraqi nationalism to reject liberal democratic forms 
in favor of communist and, later, fascist forms developing in the political margins only to 
explode onto the scene in the form of coup d'etats also speaks to the experience of being 
manipulated and betrayed by their own leaders in the very moment of independence. As 
the course of Iraqi history would bare out, the pattern of incorporation of Iraqi nationalist 
movements by the authoritarian center or its rivals to bolster or shift power was as regular 
as the subsequent suppression and even destruction of those movements once the desired 
adjustments to the Iraqi political landscape had been achieved. Even at the time of the 
writing of this study, an administration backed by foreign powers continues to struggle 
with both a wide spectrum of ethnic and sectarian nationalist groupings as well as the 
organized efforts of a diverse set ofIraqi leaders to break even the national borders set for 
them by colonial powers during the First World War and redraw the post-Ottoman states 
as, they feel, they should have been drawn in those early days. 
In commemorating Iraqi independence in October of 1932, WN Ewer wrote a piece 
in the Daily Herald entitled "A Land of Empire Day-Dreams" that placed the momentous 
167 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure oj Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: 
Colombia University Press, 2003), pp. xi-xix, 31 and 169-171. Dodge's argument about this particular 
aspect of Iraqi history is pub more succinctly in Toby Dodge, "Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous 
State-Building in Historical Perspective," in From Nation-Building to State-Building, ed. Mark T. Berger 
(London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 143-164. Toby Dodge takes the term 'quasi-state' from Robert Jackson 
who identifies the mandate system as the turning point in an international political system now responsible 
for protecting the national integrity of states not only incapable of protecting themselves from internal 
collapse or external invasion, but often comprised of regimes completely out of conformity with 
international human rights regulations. See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International 
Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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occasion in the context of Labour political identity. Independence for "Iraq, alias 
Mesopotamia, alias 'Mes-pot' ," Ewer wryly noted, was but the most recent transition of 
status for a state that "surely must have had more than any other spot on the earth" by 
1932. Reflecting back to the early days of the Great War, Ewer pointed out that, in 
Britain, "nobody knew much about it or cared much about it. The man in the street in 
England could hardly have told you where Baghdad was or why ... anyone should be 
concerned about it." Nevertheless, he argued, echoing nearly twenty years of dissenting 
propaganda, "for all that, the war, so far as Britain and Germany were concerned, was 
very largely a war over Baghdad and Iraq." Ewer reviewed the history of the Great War 
and the mandate in Iraq that followed, placing oil politics and the "megalomaniac dream" 
of the Eastern Empire at the center of the story of fraught inter-imperial and international 
relations leading up to Iraq's final emancipation. But "the end," he warned, "was not 
yet." Petroliferous and strategically positioned Iraq was "still the center of the world" 
and British statesmen, however "harassed by a hundred legacies of that folly" that was 
the mandate were "still thinking in the same terms as those in which Disraeli thought." 
The mandate is ending; but there is a treaty in its place ... Iraq comes into the 
League of Nations. But Great Britain does not come out ofIraq. The chapter is not 
yet closed. And there may be a pack of trouble still ahead for us in these blood-
stained lands. 168 
Ewer could not have been more prescient in his thoughts. For indeed, the British 
government would continue to maintain a powerful influence in Iraq through the very 
leaders various administrations had put into power under the mandate, with Nuri al Said 
at the center, until 1958 and even re-occupy Iraq a second time for nearly a decade in 
168 Daily Herald, October 14, 1932. 
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1947 specifically to reverse the overthrow ofNuri by his long-time political opponent-
cum-collaborator-cum-rival Rashid Ali al Gaylani. 
Just as the First World War had seen the rise of Labour as a legitimate party of 
opposition and the transition toward a revision of imperial policy in the inter-war period, 
so too did the Second World War see the advent in 1945 of the first Labour government 
since the second MacDonald administration and a revision of the preceding twenty years 
of Conservative imperial policy. 169 After yet another twenty years of Conservative 
imperial management, fraught by Cold-War politics and nationalist revolutions, a fourth 
Labour government in 1964 implemented policies that would, finally, result in the near 
wholesale dismantlement of the British Empire. 17o 
This study has sought to bring the two trajectories of anti-colonial nationalism in 
Britain and Iraq into a single narrative as a means of illustrating that the paths of the 
metropolitan centers and peripheral possessions of European empires toward the status of 
nations both independent and free of possessions was not over-determined by the 
interests of imperial powers nor by the inevitability of indigenous nationalism's victory 
over foreign influence as many histories seem to assert. Nor were they the inevitable 
product of the irrepressible march of liberal democracy from the Enlightenment to 
'modernity.' Rather, I have attempted to show, this process was the result, perhaps 
169 John Callaghan has shown, however, that, upon the advent Attlee government in 1945, all Labour 
ministers were in accord with their Conservative and Liberal counterparts in the conviction that "Britain 
was and must remain a world power based upon its Empire-Commonwealth" and that it was domestic 
financial difficulties, nationalist agitation in the possessions, and international politics that pushed Attlee 
toward a decolonization agenda in India, Africa, and the Middle East. John Callaghan, The Labour Party 
and Foreign Policy: A History (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 162-190. 
170 Paul. Kelemen, "The British Labor Party and the Economics of Decolonization: the debate over Kenya," 
Journal o/Colonialism and Colonial History 8, no. 3 (2007). 
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ironically, of compromises made by individuals seeking to harness the desire shared by 
most peoples to determine their own destinies in a complex web of contests for political 
power on a global level. As the fate of nationalist movements in both Britain and Iraq 
have shown, the path to independence from imperial power and the anti-democratic 
weight of imperial responsibilities was neither direct nor inevitable. As the recent 
British-American led coalition occupation of Iraq suggests, this path is also incomplete. 
Just as commentators on the recent war and current international nation-making project in 
Iraq have largely failed to examine the transnational history of international relations 
responsible for the emergence and endurance of Sad dam Husayn's regime in Iraq and the 
resurgence of a quasi-imperial global political agenda in the United States after 
September 2001 that overthrew him, so too has the history of decolonization tended to 
focus on the immediate political contexts of regime change and to emphasize the role of 
contemporaneous power relationships in which the imperial center always plays the 
dominant role, even in choosing to withdraw its control. As the recent questioning of 
international power relations and the complicity of powerful democratic nations in 
maintaining post-emancipation authoritarian regimes raised by the near simultaneous 
rejection of those regimes in Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan and Libya has 
pointed up, a transnational approach to colonialism, decolonization, and the persistence 
of colonial frameworks of rule remains both necessary and, yet, sorely lacking. 
Hold the accolades on China's 'green leap forward' 
By Bjorn Lomborg, Wednesday, April 20, 7:50 PM 
As the world's factory floor, China is not an obvious environmental leader. It is beleaguered by 
severe pollution and generates more carbon emissions than any other nation. Yet many have 
trumpeted it as an emerging "green giant" for its non-carbon-based energy production and its 
aggressive promises to cut carbon emissions. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman 
described China's "green leap forward" as "the most important thing to happen" at the end of the 
first decade of the 21st century. 
But the facts do not support this "green" success story. 
China indeed invests more than any other nation in environmentally friendly energy production: 
$34 billion in 2009, or twice as much as the United States. Almost all of its investment, however, 
is spent producing green energy for Western nations that pay heavy subsidies for consumers to 
use solar panels and wind turbines. 
China was responsible for half of the world's production of solar panels in 2010, but only 1 
percent was installed there. Just as China produces everything from trinkets to supertankers, it is 
exporting green technology - which makes it a giant of manufacturing, not of environmental 
friendliness. 
In wind power, China both produces and consumes. In 2009, it put up about a third of the world's 
new wind turbines. But much of this has been for show. A 2008 Citigroup analysis found that 
about one-third of China's wind power assets were not in use. Many turbines are not connected 
to the transmission grid. Chinese power companies built wind turbines that they didn't use as the 
cheapest way of satisfying - on paper - government requirements to boost renewable energy 
capacity. 
Consider the bigger picture: 87 percent of the energy produced in China comes from fossil fuels, 
the vast majority of it from coal, the International Energy Agency found in 2010. 
The explosive recent growth in Chinese solar and wind generation equates to going from zilch to 
a small fraction: Wind today generates just 0.05 percent of China's energy, and solar is 
responsible for one-half of one-thousandth of 1 percent. 
The avoided carbon emissions from all of China's solar and wind generation - even maintained 
over the entire century - would lower temperatures in 2100 by 0.00002 degrees Fahrenheit. 
That is the equivalent, based on mainstream climate models, of delaying temperature rises at the 
end of the century by around five hours. 
Of course, proponents argue that China has promised to do much more: It vowed to cut carbon 
intensity (the amount of emissions produced per dollar of gross domestic product) 40 to 45 
percent by 2020. But this is essentially promising to do nothing new: lEA projections, using 
expected growth and development and absent any new policies, show carbon intensity already 
on track to fall 40 percent. Even with this reduction, by 2020 China will have quadrupled its 
emissions from 1990. 
China also aims for non-fossil-fuel energy sources to account for 11.4 percent of primary energy 
consumption by 2015. At best, this is a promise to slide backward merely slowly. Today, China 
gets 13 percent of its energy from non-fossil fuels, particularly biomass and hydropower, with a 
little nuclear energy and a minuscule amount of solar and wind power. 
The reason China does not use more wind and solar power is simple: Even when mass-produced 
with cheap labor, solar panels and wind turbines are not cost-effective replacements for fossil 
fuels. They appear so in the West only where politicians create generous subsidies for their 
implementation. 
There is, however, a mostly untold story from China that shows an area where the promise of a 
"green future" is not without foundation. China leads the world in the production of solar heaters. 
This industry doesn't receive subsidies because it doesn't need them: Solar heating is cost-
effective. 
Heat constitutes almost half of global energy demand, much of it from households wanting to 
cook, heat water or warm their environments. Solar heaters can heat water cheaply - at about 
one-quarter the price of an electric water heater. In China, solar heaters provide four times more 
energy than wind turbines. Exports of this product bring in more than $6 billion a year. 
Because solar heaters are cheaper than fossil fuel heating, consumers don't need to be paid 
large subsidies to use them. 
This is the green lesson China holds: A green future will result not from subsidizing immature 
technology today but from developing competitive green technology that is effective and cheap. 
Wind and solar power are not yet competitive. Research would be a much better investment for 
Western countries than subsidizing imports of today's green technology from China. Until we can 
make alternative energy technology effective and affordable for everybody, there will be no happy 
ending to the "green" success story. 
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